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Introduction: On Studying the Effects of 
Policy and State 
 
 
This dissertation explores the ways in which state neutrality and political 
power interrelate in the process of policy making. It describes how civil 
servants working in a ministry collectively produce policies that are aimed at 
the “integration” of migrants, and citizens “with a migration background”, in 
the Netherlands. By studying the procedures, practices, and people that make 
up this bureaucratic organization and the policy outcomes it develops, I 
examine how state authority is socially produced. I do so through an analysis 
of the mechanisms that objectify policy making, clarifying how political 
decisions are translated into seemingly rational, legal, impersonal, technical, 
and definite policy measures that represent legitimate state power. In this 
way, this thesis elucidates how the state is constructed as an apolitical entity, 
as if above politics and the society it governs and deriving its legitimacy from 
this neutral nature, while at the same time it is inherently political. 
 Various anthropologists have analyzed the state as a cultural artefact that 
is constantly produced in everyday practices and representations (Abrams 
1988, Gupta 1995, 2012; Mitchell 1999; Trouillot 2001; Hansen and Stepputat 
2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; G. Feldman 2005). Rather than a coherent, 
singular entity, it is a “multi-layered, contradictory, translocal ensemble of 
institutions, practices, and people” (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 6). The state, 
however, is typically represented as a monolithic and autonomous actor that 
naturally “possesses the supreme authority to regulate populations within its 
territory” (ibid.: 8). The state is made to appear as standing apart from and 
above the society it intends to govern, as it is an effect of “mundane 
processes” that “create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into 
state and society” (Mitchell 1999: 95).  
 The state is generally also conceived of as being above group interests and 
party politics, as “state interests” are thought to coincide with the general 
interest of a country in terms of order, stability, and the welfare of its 
population (Baumann 1999: 32-33). As such, the state is mostly conceptualized 
in neutral institutional and administrative terms of proper government, taking 
care of the security, health, and prosperity of all its citizens. It is considered 
a mere bureaucratic instrument of proper government (also see Sharma and 
Gupta 2006: 7-8). Moreover, the rule of law in many countries is grounded in 
principles of equality, liberty, and non-discrimination, implying that state rule 
2Introduction
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stands above party politics and is focused on legitimate, impartial, and 
righteous government. 
 The state is, however, also political, as it is typically ruled by actors who 
represent particular interests. Democratic countries are ruled by elected 
political parties that represent a specific part of the population and have an 
ideological program. In more autocratic countries the state may also overlap 
with personal interests of rulers. The state is also political on another level. 
Usually perceived as a nation state, the state, itself “devoid of culture” (ibid.), 
is thought to naturally serve the interests of its citizens, represented as a single 
national community. Most modern states do not consist of a single national 
group, however, but have citizens with various backgrounds. While ostensibly 
a neutral entity, a state may in fact render legitimate the favouring of one 
social group over others (Baumann 1999; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; 
Trouillot 2001). 
 Indeed “statecraft, which is invariably concerned with consolidating social 
order, inherently privileges some people over others without revealing the fact 
that it is producing an order of inequality; policies must be ‘bad’ to achieve 
the ‘good’ of a stable state” (Wedel et al. 2005: 36). A “key feature of modern 
power" is the "masking of the political under the cloak of neutrality" (Shore and 
Wright 1997: 8). This tension is particularly salient in the Dutch policies aimed 
at the “integration” of particular groups of migrants and Dutch citizens with a 
“migration background.” This Integration Policy, as it is called, is closely 
related to a heated political debate about belonging in the Dutch nation. The 
Integratienota [Integration policy paper] of the Rutte I coalition government 
(Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations 20111: 1) is a good illustration: 
 
European countries are confronted with the unruly consequences of 
decades of migration towards and within Europe by large groups of 
people, often from non-Western countries. Time and again it shows 
that many Dutch do not experience the cultural and ethnic diversity 
that characterizes the Netherlands as an enrichment, but as a 
threat. Integration and social cohesion are still under pressure and 
further steps are needed to safeguard the continuity and stability of 
society.  
[…] 
The stake of this government’s policy is to protect and promote 
security, prosperity and welfare in a changing world. 
 
                                                          
1  Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2010–2011, 32 824, nr. 1. White Paper Integration, binding, 
citizenship [Nota Integratie, binding, burgerschap]. 
All translations in this dissertation are mine, unless otherwise noted. See Appendix 1 for an 
overview of government coalitions. 
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 Migration is perceived to threaten the cultural, economic, political, and 
social order in many European nation states (Stolcke 1995; Wimmer and Glick 
Schiller 2002; Silverstein 2005; Vertovec 2011). The Integration Policy has been 
created as a means to deal with the position of migrants and their descendants 
in Dutch society, ostensibly focusing on their socioeconomic, cultural, and 
institutional inclusion, in order to prevent marginalization and strengthen 
social cohesion. However, its symbolic political function of demarcating the 
Dutch nation by defining its Others has been equally important (Yanow and Van 
der Haar 2013; Slootman and Duyvendak 2015; Ghorashi 2017; Schinkel 2017). 
It is this meaning that is neutralized as it is rendered rational, self-evident, 
and legitimate. 
 Therefore, it is an interesting case to examine the tension between 
neutrality and politics out of which the authority of the state is constructed. 
Policy goals and their underlying assumptions are regarded as common sense, 
necessary, and beyond question, rather than particular political choices (Shore 
2011: 171). Moreover, claiming to safeguard the “continuity and stability of 
society” and to promote “security, wealth, and welfare,” effectively 
legitimates policies. They are fixed “within the framework of a wider and more 
universal set of goals and principles” lending “further ‘authority’ to the 
decisions taken” (Shore and Wright 1997: 11). Political decisions are 
represented as neutral, necessary, and rational instruments to deal with 
migration and to protect the welfare of the “Dutch” population. 
 The Integration Policy is an example of what Cris Shore (2011: 171-2) has 
described as the “policy effect,” which describes how “declaring policy to be 
‘official’ endows it with a certain [institutional] authority,” in the same way 
as “the act of exhibiting transforms objects into ‘art.’” Policy “implies a 
calculated and coherent course of action,” not only giving “legal-rational 
coherence and direction” to particular, political interests, plans, and actions, 
but also endowing these with a “dignity and morality [they] might not 
otherwise possess” (ibid.). The goal of the present study is to disentangle the 
mechanisms through which this effect is realized and to describe how exactly 
state authority is produced. 
 There are several reasons why it is interesting to study the Integration 
Policy as a case of the policy effect. First, “policies are major instruments 
through which governments […] classify and regulate the spaces and subjects 
they seek to govern” (Shore and Wright 2011: 2). Populations are rendered 
governable, not through explicit power but more subtly by instilling norms of 
conduct that make subjects behave as desired. Modern state power works 
through arrangements of knowledge and techniques that define subjects and 
4Introduction
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naturalize specific models of social life (Foucault 1991; Ferguson 1994; Rose 
1996; Scott 1998; Mitchell 2002; Dean 1999; Li 2007). Studying the policy effect 
thus contributes to an understanding of how state government functions, being 
both political and apolitical in nature. 
 Second, in addition to these generalist accounts of governance that 
explain how modern power works, I analyze the bureaucratic practices in which 
policies are actually created, as they reveal the complexities of modern 
government (Heyman 2004; Hoag and Hull 2017). Studying the creation of 
policy as it takes place in bureaucracies sheds light on how “the state” is 
constructed as an authoritative, legitimate, and neutral entity that governs 
“society.” Although there is an increasing body of literature focusing on 
bureaucratic discourses and practices, the focus is on policy implementing 
rather than policy making bureaucracies. This dissertation studies the work 
being done in a ministry, a higher level of state bureaucracy where policy and 
politics are closely linked and where policies are created that effect both 
political decision making and conceptualizations of social reality. 
 Third, examining the policy effect in depth is important, because 
“[r]endering the political technical has profound implications for democratic 
political ideals (Yanow 2011: 309). This social relevance is salient in case of 
the Integration Policy, as it deals with questions of who may belong in the 
Netherlands and on what terms. Various scholars have highlighted how the 
expertise and political assumptions on which the Integration Policy is based 
reinforce and legitimize existing power relations (see for example Rath 1991; 
Essed and Nimako 2006; Schinkel 2013; Ghorashi 2017), making it an interesting 
case to study the policy effect. A fundamentally political moment is translated 
into policy measures that apparently are apolitical. Analyzing the mechanisms 
through which this is realized may help to contextualize particular tropes in 
the public and political debate about the changing Dutch society, and to better 
understand the ways policies relate to how the Dutch nation is imagined. 
 In sum, examining the policy effect is important for understanding 
contemporary social developments and offers a promising angle to study the 
construction of the state as legitimate authority. More specifically, it can shed 
light on the tension within the state between neutrality, taking care of all 
citizens, being inclusive and acting in the general interest, and political goals 
of favouring particular groups while excluding others. This needs constant 
enactment in order to be realized. I study how this is done through examining 
the construction of policies as it takes place in a ministry, focusing on how 
policy making has been organized, how political decisions have been translated 
into legislation, how in the bureaucratic context of a ministry policy is 
5On Studying the Effects of Policy and State
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collectively produced, and how civil servants deal with tensions in their work 
of making policy. 
 This dissertation investigates the following question: How is policy making 
in state bureaucracies shaped by tensions between neutrality and politics, and 
how does it constitute state authority? 
 In order to answer this question, four chapters each address one sub 
question:  
1. How has “immigrant integration” been conceptualized and 
institutionalized in a policy domain? 
2. How are policy measures created as a legal and technical answer to 
political questions? 
3. How are policy texts produced as objective, expressive of a collective 
body, and having both political and state authority? 
4. How do civil servants navigate tensions between political decisions and 
features of proper government? 
 
 The focus in this dissertation thus is on policy creation, rather than 
implementation, analyzing this process as it takes place in a ministry. It 
approaches policy making from various angles, from the Integration Policy in 
general, via the creation of specific measures and the bureaucratic context in 
which they are produced, to the people doing the actual work. In the last 
section of this Introduction I explain the Integration Policy in more detail, 
including why the specific policy of inburgering legislation will serve as a main 
case.2 There, I also elaborate on my research methods. First, I discuss the 
theoretical foundations of this dissertation. 
 
 
The policy effect 
 
In this section I further explain the policy effect by elaborating on the theories 
underpinning the three ways in which policy is made to appear as being above 
politics. As Shore and Wright have argued, policy is often represented as a 
rational and efficient instrument, decision making is objectified, and particular 
plans are legitimated and endowed with authority (1997: 10-11). By studying 
the social production of policy within state bureaucracies as if it is apolitical, 
this thesis contributes to the emerging field of the anthropology of policy, but 
also relates to anthropological approaches of bureaucracy and the state. I start 
                                                          
2 And why throughout this dissertation I use the Dutch term rather than an English translation. 
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with explaining my theoretical approach to policy. I then discuss 
anthropological studies of bureaucracy and, finally, of the state. 
 
Policy: a rational, efficient instrument? 
An important part of my analysis is informed by governmentality studies that 
have described how policy is inherently political, but is represented as a 
rational, efficient instrument for solving clearly defined problems (Shore and 
Wright 1997: 5). This is reflected both in popular ideas about policy and in how 
mainstream policy studies conceptualize policy. As I will make clear in this 
section, a more critical approach views policy as a specific discourse that is 
represented as pragmatic or even natural. In order to understand these 
dominant conceptualizations of policy, I start with providing formal definitions 
of policy, even though I am not ultimately interested in “assigning abstract and 
immutable definitions of the term ‘policy’” (Wedel et al. 2005: 35). 
 The Cambridge dictionary defines policy as “a set of ideas or a plan of 
what to do in particular situations that has been agreed to officially by a group 
of people, a business organization, a government, or a political party.”3 The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines policy as “the conduct of public affairs,” 
which may refer to “a device, a contrivance, an expedient,” or “a principle or 
course of action adopted or proposed as desirable, advantageous, or 
expedient; esp. one formally advocated by a government, political party, 
etc.”4 Within these two dictionaries, in fact, a wide range of meanings can be 
found;  likewise in academic studies, as with many social phenomena, there is 
no one authoritative definition. I think three aspects are important: 1) plans, 
activities, or measures; 2) of an (official) organization; 3) in order to achieve 
a desirable goal. 
 Put simply, in a political context5, policy can be defined as an instrument 
of government rule, grounded in a set of ideas about why and how to intervene 
in society. This conceptualization highlights the formal properties of policy, 
which is commonly represented as a rational solution to a clearly defined 
problem, so as a pragmatic, functional, and efficient instrument. This 
“practitioner’s  perspective” (Shore and Wright 2011: 6) is also dominant in 
mainstream policy studies. These often serve policy making, adopting an 
instrumental approach and analyzing the rationality or effectivity of a specific 
                                                          
3 https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/policy, accessed 10 November 2017 
4 http://www.oed.com.ru.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry/146842?rskey=rtKIhd&result=1#eid, accessed 
10 November 2017  
5 Of course, companies, non-governmental organizations, public association, and international 
bodies may also adopt policies. In this thesis, however, I focus on state policies in order to 
understand how political decisions are neutralized. 
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policy measure, thus naturalizing policy and its underlying assumptions as self-
evident (cf. Fischer 2007; Yanow 2011). Positivistic theories, which assume 
policy making is a rational, linear process of clearly designated steps during 
which problems are objectively observed and the best and most efficient policy 
solutions are adopted, continue to dominate mainstream policy studies.  
 More critical neo-institutionalist and interpretative policy studies have 
paid attention to the normativity, variability, and complexity of policy making 
(see for example Rein and Schön 1977; March and Olson 1984; Stone 1988; 
Schön and Rein 1994; Hall and Taylor 1996; Yanow 1996; Fischer 2003). These 
point to the importance of discourse, framing, and meaning in policy making, 
analyzing policy as an unstable concept, the creation of which is contested and 
messy, rather than straightforward and linear. Policy, as a powerful instrument 
of rule, is not approached as a rational tool for solving objectively observed 
problems. Rather, interpretative analyses of policy examine how it produces 
meaning and serves particular interests. These approaches thus provide a 
better starting point for understanding how policy is political of nature but 
represented as neutral. They relate to anthropological approaches of policy. 
 Indeed, “an anthropology of the policy process […] looks at it as ritual and 
as production of meaning rather than production of effective policies per se” 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 17). As policy outlines a particular course of 
action it categorizes the world and gives meaning to it; policies “belong to 
particular social and cultural worlds, or ‘domains of meaning.’ But they create 
as well as reflect those worlds” (Shore and Wright 2011: 1). Policies codify 
social norms and values, acting as a “fundamental ‘organizing principle’ of 
society” (ibid.: 2). As such, they are similar to myth, acting as a charter for 
action. “The ‘work of policy’ is to classify and organize people and ideas” 
(ibid.: 3). Policies contain models of society (Shore and Wright 1997: 6), 
imposing “an ideal type of what a ‘normal’ citizen should be” (Wedel et. al. 
2005: 37). 
 The Integration Policy developed in the Netherlands, for example, targets 
those deemed “in need of integration.” Various scholars have argued that 
notwithstanding intentions to improve the social position of policy objects, an 
important meaning these policies convey is that supposed cultural differences 
cause problems such as unemployment, criminality, and low education 
achievements (Rath 1991; Essed and Nimako 2006; Schinkel 2007; Ghorashi 
2014). As such, policies reinforce and naturalize national imaginaries by 
categorizing some people as being outside the national community, which is 
itself represented as problem free and belonging to a dominant cultural group 
(Schinkel 2007; Van Reekum 2016). Since the 1990s, citizenship in particular 
has become a strategy of culturally constituting the Dutch nation and 
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demarcating those who are not thought to belong to it (Schinkel and Van Houdt 
2010; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016).  
 As in other European countries, some groups of migrants are seen as a 
threat, and policies are created as a means to protect the national order 
(Stolcke 1995; Vertovec 2011). Rather than following a “methodological 
nationalist” analysis that takes the existence of discrete nation states for 
granted, as is typically the case in scholarly and popular accounts of migration, 
this order should be critically investigated so as to understand how it is 
constructed and preserved (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, cf. Malkki 1995). 
Nation states are premised upon static and essentialist conceptualizations of a 
homogenous people that naturally share an identity and culture, that belong 
in a specific territory and that form a political and economic community. They 
are protected by means of migration and border regimes (see for example De 
Genova 2002; Fassin 2011; G. Feldman 2012), but also by defining who belongs 
in a certain territorial space, drawing boundaries between people residing in a 
country (Silverstein 2005; Vertovec 2011). 
 The Dutch Integration Policy thus is part of a wider trend of how European 
countries aim “to ‘contain’ the foreign element through administrative 
measures” (Fuglerud 2004: 33, cf. Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010), defining and 
defending the “dominant national culture,” as they constitute the norm and 
its deviations. Policies thus are clearly political, creating meaning, organizing 
society, and protecting the political status quo. At the same time, they are 
created as technical measures within bureaucratic administration; policy is 
often removed from the political sphere as it is represented as necessary, 
rational, and objective (Shore 2011b: 126; cf. Schwelger 2011; Ferguson 1994; 
Mitchell 2002; Li 2007). Foucault’s (1991: 198) account of how centuries ago 
the leper and the plague were differently dealt with is insightful in this 
respect. Whereas the exile of the leper was meant to keep the community 
pure, the arrest of the plague was realized through meticulous technologies of 
governance that related with the disciplined society. 
 Combining the two approaches, today many European countries attempt 
to keep the nation “pure” through rational, meticulous policy interventions. It 
is a form of statecraft that Foucault (1991) has described as governmentality. 
By this term he meant to describe, among other things, the “ensemble formed 
by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and 
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of 
power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge 
political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of 
security” (ibid.: 102). According to Foucault, governmentality aims to secure 
the welfare of a population through the right manner of disposing things, or 
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creating order. Techniques such as policies are used to conduct people’s 
behaviour in such a way that they out of themselves act as desired by those in 
power. 
 Policies are based on “models for social life that compete with, erode, 
and exclude other models for human activity” (Heyman 2004: 490). In order to 
be able to govern, the social world needs to be rendered manageable by 
making aspects of existence legible and amenable to calculation and technique 
(cf. Miller and Rose 1990; Rose 1996; Scott 1998). This process relies on 
calculability and expert knowledge that often seems to imply an objective 
interpretation of the world (see for example Mitchell 2002; Yanow et al. 2016). 
But making society legible is a political act, because it means rendering social 
reality comprehensible in a particular way. Defining desired outcomes is 
premised upon specific interpretations of the social world rather than 
reflecting it as it naturally occurs, especially since the welfare of the 
population is often secured at the cost of others (Foucault 2003). 
 Various “technologies of normalization” that were developed in the 
nineteenth century illustrate the importance of expert knowledge. These 
aimed to discipline and cure, for example, the delinquent, the mentally ill, or 
the sexual deviant. “An essential component of technologies of normalization 
is that they are themselves an integral part of the systematic creation, 
classification, and control of anomalies in the social body. Their raison d'être 
comes from their claim to have isolated such anomalies and their promises to 
normalize them” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 195). Fulfilling this promise is 
not necessarily the desired goal. As I will make clear in Chapter One, the 
categorization of certain people as objects of the Integration Policy is not only 
instrumental for realizing their normalization or improving their social 
conditions, but also is a way of isolating particular groups as Others as such, so 
enabling the imagination of Dutch society (cf. Schinkel 2007). 
 “Sexual deviants,” “migrants,” and “ethnic minorities” are not natural 
categories; they have no ontological status other than being defined against a 
norm and disciplined by an authority, which is itself also constituted in this 
act. “Power operates in the constitution of subjects and not only after those 
subjects come into contact” (G. Feldman 2005: 219). The identification of 
anomalies is done by experts in a seemingly neutral and rational way, obscuring 
the act of constitution. Such scientific knowledge, on the one hand, implies 
portraying the world as if it is objectively found, and on the other hand 
produces expert authority (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; Rose 1996; Mitchell 
2002). 
 Political questions are transformed into technical ones as the debate over 
policies primarily involves experts and is focused on implementation, 
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foreclosing a fundamental discussion about policies and the interpretations on 
which they are based once they are in place (Foucault 1991: 172; Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1983: 196). Rather, if science and technical interventions do not bring 
the promised improvement, this is “construed as further proof of the need to 
reinforce and extend the power of experts” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 196). 
Indeed, the liberal mode of government dominant in many “Western” nation 
states today is constructed as inevitable through representing the experts who 
create policies as neutral (Rose 1996). Modern government relies on 
“objective” knowledge and expertise that in fact serve particular political 
interests (ibid.; Miller and Rose 1990; Dean 1999). 
 Moreover, various scholars of development aid have shown how expert 
interventions in this field often do not bring the development they promise, 
but instead consolidate and depoliticize the marginalized position of people 
that is aimed to be improved (Ferguson 1994, Mitchell 2002; Li 2007). Not only 
does the complexity of “relations and processes with which government is 
concerned present intrinsic limits to the capacity of experts to improve things” 
(Li 2007: 17). Policy solutions are also based on expertise that tends to exclude 
“the structure of political-economic relations” and instead is attuned to the 
capacities of the objects of policy (ibid.: 7). Because the explanations and 
solutions for poverty are primarily presented as issues related to the people 
themselves, rather than, say, to global economic relations, access to land, or 
state policies, people living in poverty’s marginalization becomes naturalized. 
 In this way, essentially political questions about inequality, power 
relations, and distribution of wealth, and thus about the existing economic and 
political order, are depoliticized. A similar mechanism shapes the Integration 
Policy, as I will explain in detail primarily in the first two chapters of this 
dissertation. In this context, the term “politics” needs some further 
explanation. On the one hand it may refer to institutionalized, official domains 
in which democratically elected politicians act, such as Parliament, 
government, and city councils. But “politics” may also be defined in the much 
broader sense of contestation between conflicting interests within a 
community (Müller 2011). Rancière (2004) defines politics as opposition to the 
established social order by those that are excluded, effectuating a reshaping 
of the status quo and aiming to make it more egalitarian. So even when a topic 
such as “integration” is debated by elected politicians, the debate can still be 
depoliticized because it does not involve a fundamental debate about the 
Dutch nation state and who can belong in it. In fact, it often means any 
challenge to the status quo is silenced. 
 In this thesis I use the term “politics” interchangeably between the 
broader meaning and the institutional definition, for example, describing 
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elected Members of Parliament and government coalitions. Using both 
conceptualizations also makes it possible to refer to the distinction that is 
often made by informants between bureaucracy and politics. In their view, 
politics is about moral choices, values and interests, as is opposed to 
bureaucratic work that is supposedly grounded in rationality and expertise. As 
an emic term, it is therefore useful to analyze how policy is constructed as 
being non-political, while it is obviously very political according to the terms 
of its broader definition. 
 The governmentality approach to study policy as discussed in this section 
brings important insights about how power works subtly through the 
identification of the abnormal based on expert knowledge, so representing 
policy measures as necessary, rational and good. However, it is a rather “broad 
brush approach” that studies how power works in general, as if bureaucracy 
and policy by definition have depoliticizing effects, while ignoring possible 
other analyzes (Heyman 2004: 491). Equally important for understanding the 
policy effect is studying how policy measures are actually constructed in the 
daily practices of bureaucrats, revealing the complexities of policy making and 
the tensed relation with politics. 
 Three examples of in depth scholarly inquiries into the construction of 
policy within state bureaucracies are Bonjour’s (2009) study of the 
construction of family migration policies in the Netherlands, Nyqvist’s (2008, 
2013) study of the Swedish pension system reforms, and Greenhalgh’s (2008) 
study of how within the Chinese national administration the one child policy 
was conceived. Central to their analyses is the seminal role that bureaucratic 
actors have in policy making, not only in terms of substantiating political 
decisions, but also in terms of counteracting them. Both scientific knowledge 
(Greenhalgh 2008; Nyqvist 2011) and moral values (Bonjour 2009) are 
important in this respect. In the next section I turn to theoretical discussions 
of bureaucracy. 
 
Bureaucracy: objectifying and universalizing decision making 
My focus on state bureaucracy does not mean I assume the creation of policy 
as simply a linear process in which decision-making elites in government and 
bureaucracy craft rational solutions to objectively defined social problems. 
Indeed, policy making is cyclical, involves contestation, includes many actors 
and localities, and is not limited to state actors (Shore and Wright 2011; Yanow 
2011). Rather, this focus makes it possible to study “the transformation of 
political decisions into bureaucratic administration, and, through this, the 
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disappearance of the moral issues pertaining to” migration, inequality, and 
belonging (Fuglerud 2004: 34). 
 I am particularly interested in how political decision making is objectified, 
as bureaucracy and policy can “serve to cloak subjective, ideological, and 
arguably highly ‘irrational’ goals in the guise of rational, collective, and 
universalized objectives” (Shore and Wright 1997: 12). The creation of state 
policy takes place in the practices of various individuals who work in ministries 
and have to negotiate conflicting interests, ambiguity and complexity. Policy 
making in a ministry is a complex process, out of which seemingly smooth, 
definite, and unambiguous policy outcomes are produced. 
 Many studies of bureaucracy, literally meaning “rule by desk,” depart 
from Weber’s seminal account, in which he analyzed bureaucracy as “the 
means of transforming social action into rationally organizing action” (1978: 
987). He described various ideals of bureaucratic organization that relate to 
its rationality, efficiency, and neutrality, such as fixed rules and structures, 
clearly defined areas of jurisdiction and tasks, recruitment based on 
specialization and expertise, a strict hierarchy, both authority and duty 
attached to positions instead of persons, a fixed income and career, and also 
the importance of written files in regulating the organization. This 
formalization implies impersonal, obedient servants that neutrally do their job 
in an organization that has clearly defined goals and in which decision making 
is rationalized. 
 Since Weber, scholars have challenged the ideal type of bureaucratic 
organization by emphasizing the complexity, contestation, irrationality, and 
informality of official organization (see for instance Selznick 1949; Blau 1955; 
Merton 1957; March and Simon 1958; Downs 1967; March and Olson 1976; 
Perrow 1986). Weick (1995), for example, analyzed (bureaucratic) organization 
as sense making and the production of rationality. Likewise, a growing number 
of anthropologists studies bureaucracy as a social practice that objectifies 
decision making while being both internally defined by cultural values and 
themselves part of larger systems of meaning (see Hoag and Hull 2017 for an 
overview). Before I describe studies of bureaucratic practices, I first explain 
the ideological foundations of bureaucracies, which should primarily be 
understood as a symbolic system of meaning. 
 Handelman (1981) and Herzfeld (1992) have described how bureaucratic 
thinking is not rational but symbolic, as it is grounded in taxonomies of purity 
and pollution that see disorder as disruptive and dangerous (cf. Douglas 1966). 
Bureaucracies intend to create “order” from “chaos.” Shore paraphrases 
Herzfeld by claiming that “[t]he self-image of Western bureaucracy rests 
precisely on a classificatory system that pits its own inherent ‘rationality’ 
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against the disorderly and irrational ‘Other’” (2007: 186). Building upon family 
metaphors and ideas about cultural proximity and authenticity, Herzfeld 
(1992) argues, Greek bureaucracy is culturally grounded in nationalism and 
indifferently excludes those defined as outsiders. Categorizations are most 
fundamentally concerned with national boundaries, as "all other bureaucratic 
classifications are ultimately calibrated to the state's ability to distinguish 
between insiders and outsiders" (ibid.: 109).  
 Bureaucratic categories, serving state control, create order by designating 
people their place (Scott 1998; Mitchell 2002). Bureaucracy “generates 
taxonomies in order to act upon them” (Fuglerud 2004: 31). So rather than 
rationally surveying the world as it exists, objectively gathering information 
about it, bureaucracies “actively shape the world as well […] bureaucratic data 
gathering and action have rigid, linear [and simplifying] qualities that are 
imposed on complex, fluid people and nature” (Heyman 2004: 490). Policies 
concerned with migration and “integration” are a case in point, being based 
on nationalist ideas, categorizing people as belonging to seemingly fixed and 
homogeneous groups, assigning them a place in the national order of things 
and defining some as anomalies, making their exclusion possible (Malkki 1995; 
Brubaker 2002; Grillo 2003; Silverstein 2005; Vertovec 2011). 
 An important aspect of the Weberian features of bureaucratic 
organization is “that they are means to an end, ways of carrying out the work 
of shaping and controlling other human beings” (Heyman 1995: 488). 
Bureaucracy reinforces the political order, because of which it can be seen as 
an “affirmation of Weber’s ‘iron cage’” (Hoag and Hull 2017: 7). Weber used 
this term to describe how civil servants are “confined” in a system that serves 
those in power and is based on efficiency, rational calculation and control. 
Civil servants thus are themselves controlled within a bureaucratic hierarchy. 
According to Weber (1978: 975), “[b]ureaucracy develops more perfectly, the 
more it is ‘dehumanized,’ the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from 
official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotion 
elements.” 
 Indeed, looking from outside of bureaucracies, decisions and policy 
outcomes appear to be rational, impersonal and definitive, “since it is the final 
result, not the midpoint, of struggles and routines” that is visible (Fuglerud 
2004: 31). It is an organizational form that “projects an aura of finality, 
completeness, and inhuman objectivity (what Philip Abrams [I988] terms the 
"state idea") over empirically complex and often highly biased results” 
(Heyman 1995: 264). Bureaucratic organizations provide absolution from 
personal accountability and disguise authorship and self-interest (Shore and 
Wright 1997: 11; Shore 2011: 171-2; Hull 2003). Responsibility for decision 
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making is collectivized, obscuring human agency and distancing the authors of 
policy from its objectives. In this dissertation, taking my cue from these 
insights, I study bureaucracy as a context in which state neutrality, objectivity 
and legitimacy are socially produced (cf. Herzfeld 1992; Brenneis 1994; I. 
Feldman 2008).  
 In order to understand how this is made possible, I focus on the practices 
of civil servants and the ways in which they respond to the organization that 
controls them. Civil servants are not self-evidently disciplined to act and think 
as they are asked to. There is a tension since “bureaucratic workers must think 
for themselves because of the nature of their tasks, yet they must be 
controlled as thinkers in order to ensure the regular production of control 
duties” (Heyman 1995: 263). Bureaucrats do not simply execute political 
orders. Civil servants are individual human beings who do not inescapably do 
their work objectively and neutral, but of course have emotions and ideas 
about what is right and wrong (Hoag and Hull 2017: 13). Rather than strictly 
applying formal rules, they respond to their surroundings.  
 Heyman (1995), for example, has described how border control agents 
rationalize the conflict between the reality of Mexico-U.S. border crossings, 
which is largely driven by an economic need for cheap labour, and the official 
goal of limiting migration. By doing so, he showed how a bureaucratic 
worldview that serves state power is formed in the education and socialization 
of civil servants. In similar fashion, Fuglerud (2004) showed how immigration 
officers in Norway come to act in what they see as the interest of the state, 
even if this contradicts political decision making. These and other studies of 
bureaucratic work (see for example Lipsky 1980; Brenneis 1994; Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; I. Feldman 2008; Colebatch, Hoppe 
and Noordegraaf 2010; Hoag 2010, 2014; Gupta 2012; Hull 2012b) have shown 
how it is internally conflictive. 
 Bureaucracy is very complex, ambiguous, and conflictive because of the 
diversity of ideas, values, interests, and actors involved (Hoag and Hull 2017). 
Official goals may, for example, conflict with personal ideals, political plans 
may run against the rule of law, or a proposed policy measure may conflict 
with other policy areas. Bureaucratic organizations are social worlds that 
consist of human struggles. Civil servants have to be able to handle conflicting 
pressures. They develop systems of meaning to navigate the indeterminacy of 
their work context, in which people are socialized through pattern-following 
(Brenneis 1994; Heyman 1995; Hoag 2010). Most of these insights are drawn 
from fieldwork with street-level, service-oriented bureaucracies, where 
decisions are made about individual cases that appear on their desks. 
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 Much less is known about bureaucratic work in higher ranks of the national 
administration in which policy measures such as legislation and official 
regulations are created (Hoag and Hull 2017: 9). There are a number of studies 
that focus on how civil servants higher up in state bureaucracies go about their 
work of crafting policies and that mostly focus on bureaucratic practices as 
such, rather than on the nature and content of policy measures (Noordegraaf 
2000, 2007; Page and Jenkins 2005; Hoppe and Jeliazkova 2006; Rhodes et al. 
2007b). These also emphasize how this work is about navigating indeterminacy, 
playing roles, and making sense of an ambiguous work context. These studies 
make clear that the fuzziness of bureaucratic work is largely hidden to the 
outside world. 
 The dominant public perception of bureaucracy is that of a monolithic, 
homogeneous, rational and impersonal organization at distance from the 
society it governs. This dissertation sets out to humanize bureaucracy, aiming 
to understand how it objectifies and collectivizes human behaviour. By doing 
so, it examines how the ambiguous, heterogeneous and complex bureaucratic 
organization is represented as definite and how state authority is produced (I. 
Feldman 2008). This dissertation also links these observations of practices 
taking place within the complex and ambiguous bureaucratic organization to 
broader political and social contexts (Heyman 1995; 2004). Not many studies 
of high-level state bureaucracies make this connection. By focusing both on 
the content of policies and the process in which they are created, the present 
study aims to investigate how state authority is produced. I do so by addressing 
various aspects of policy making in state bureaucracies. 
 In Chapter Three I focus on the writing of policy texts as a collective 
process, structured by bureaucratic rules and hierarchy, in which authorship is 
detached from the individual act of writing and transferred to the institution 
(Harper 1998; Hull 2003, 2012a; Gupta 2012). In this collective effort, political 
choices are aligned with bureaucratic values and standards of proper state 
government. It is a contentious and ambiguous process, while policy outcomes 
appear to be definitive and rational. By focusing on the bureaucratic practice 
of writing I not only aim to contribute to a better understanding of the 
complexities of bureaucratic work and how individual bureaucrats relate to the 
organization (cf. Hull 2003), but I am particularly interested in analyzing state 
authority is socially produced in daily practices (cf. I. Feldman 2008). 
 In Chapter Four, I focus on how individual civil servants deal with political 
volatility by performing as “professional” experts. I examine how they have to 
navigate conflicting values and interests and how, by balancing political 
decisions and their own conceptualizations of appropriate state interventions, 
they endow decision making with expert authority. It is through being able to 
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deal with the ambiguities in their work that civil servants demarcate a specific 
position that they define as neutral. The two chapters focus on the 
complexities of bureaucratic organization and how individual civil servants 
relate to it, analyzing bureaucracy as a context in which individual agency and 
morality are both controlled and needed. Indeed, bureaucracy reflects 
different senses in which the state is both neutral and political, and it is out 
of this ambiguity that state authority is constructed. It is to this last aspect I 
turn next. 
 
The state: legitimacy and authority 
A third function of policy is that it legitimizes political decisions and endows 
them with authority (Shore and Wright 1997: 12). Policy often is represented 
as serving higher goals such as “social cohesion,” “social stability,” “Western 
values,” “rule of law,” “liberal democracy,” or “public order,” in the case of 
the Dutch Integration Policy. These can be considered what Shore has called 
“sacrosanct principles” that universalize particular functions of political 
choices, because a challenge to policies can be construed by those in power as 
a challenge to these principles (Shore 2011: 171-2). The principles I mention 
here all relate to what may be referred to as “state interest,” implying “the 
state” is the actor that legitimately keeps order against alleged chaos (Shore 
and Wright 1997: 6; Wedel et al. 2005: 36). 
 In this sense, the state is assumed to be a neutral actor that protects the 
general interest of society and rightfully intervenes in it. It is made to seem as 
standing above politics and morality. There is an aura of objectivity over the 
"state idea” (Abrams I988). But as I described above, in practice state policies 
often serve the interest of particular groups over others. The state thus 
constantly needs to be performed in such a way that it appears as a legitimate, 
neutral authority. The formal, Weberian notion of the state theorizes it as “a 
unitary actor who regulates the territory of the nation state and the people 
who inhabit that territory” (Sharma and Gupta 2006:22). Central features 
include “exercising monopoly over violence in a given territory, securing the 
territorial border and sovereignty, governing a particular population” and 
levying taxes (ibid.). 
 Such a conceptualization, however, is very narrow and does not enable a 
thorough study of the nature of state rule. In fact, the state is not an objective, 
unitary, and discrete actor but is constructed, an effect of discourses and 
practices (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 8; cf. Mitchell 1999; Trouillot 2001). In 
interactions, for example, between street-level bureaucrats, as state 
representatives, and citizens the idea of a vertical, encompassing state is 
constructed that controls a population from above (Hansen and Stepputat 
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2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Gupta 1995, 2012). The state of course is no 
monolith, but consists of many agencies, organizations, and institutions, from 
courts, ministries, and a prime minister, to the police, welfare organizations, 
and vaccination campaigns. These all have their own interests and employ a 
variety of people on many different locations (Hoag and Hull 2017: 9). 
 What unites these agencies, people, and practices is that they produce 
and reproduce the “specific authority of the state, based on its hegemonic 
location at the centre of society, through symbols and rituals” (Fuglerud 2004: 
26). As Sharma and Gupta (2006: 13) have argued, the  
 
structure of bureaucratic authority depends on repetitive re-
enactment of everyday practices … that are performative … rather 
than being an outward reflection of a coherent and bounded state 
“core” they actually constitute that very core. It is through these 
re-enactments that the coherence and continuity of state 
institutions is constituted [emphasis in original]. 
 
Mundane procedures, activities, symbols, practices, and materialities 
reproduce the primacy of the state (ibid.: 13-15). A passport, policing, filling 
in a form or paying taxes all constitute the effect of a state that is an 
authoritative entity that is separated from society. However, this boundary is 
no objective given, but is actually produced through such mundane procedures 
(Mitchell 1999). Bureaucratic practices, especially, “are a crucial mechanism 
through which the shifting effect of the state is produced and reproduced” 
(Sharma and Gupta 2006: 17). 
 To the public, civil servants working in the national administration are not 
directly visible, but they represent what the state does, meaning crafting rules 
and regulations in order to govern from behind a desk. The idea of “the state” 
is represented to citizens through official communication, such as policy 
measures, law texts, and other official communications (Mitchell 1999: 81). 
Bureaucrats are themselves presented the idea of “the state” through banal 
techniques of representations such as stamps, letterheads, logo’s, passes, 
uniforms and so on (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 18). The “acceptance of 
institutions’ self-presentation is not only a legacy of Weber’s […] work, but 
also of the success of that self-presentation: the formalities, the rules, the 
forms, the signage, the uniforms—all of these communicate the coherence of 
institutional purpose and legitimacy” (Hoag and Hull 2017: 8). 
 Analyzing policy making thus not only sheds light on “the nature of state 
rule and ways of governance” (Nyqvist 2008: 16), but also on how policies and 
the bureaucracies that produce them constitute the state as the legitimate 
authority. In case of the Dutch Integration Policy this works in two ways. First, 
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policy making as such is a way of performing state authority. In this thesis, I 
analyze authority as a quality that is not a given but has to be constantly 
enacted. The state needs to be recognized as a legitimate, righteous, worthy, 
and capable ruling apparatus. Authority is something that is socially produced 
and that has to be accepted and respected by those who obey state power. In 
Chapters Three and Four I describe how the work of civil servants in a ministry 
is in itself the enactment of state authority, besides that the policies they 
create are representations of it. 
 Second, policy measures are aimed at keeping order against alleged chaos, 
which is represented as a seemingly neutral state intervention. In the case 
studied here, the expertise on which the Integration Policy has been based 
consists of ideas about a national community and various minorities. This is 
represented as a natural given. At the same time, by delineating the Dutch 
national order the state is also able to reassert itself as a legitimate power 
that safeguards the nation. As Gregory Feldman (2005: 214) argues, rather than 
merely being a burden, migrants and minorities are essential to the state’s 
performative constitution, establishing its legitimacy as the self-evident 
protector of the national society (also see Fuglerud 2004: 32). 
 Protecting the national order is considered a self-evident focus for state 
involvement, because most European states are naturally conceived as a 
national community (cf. Baumann 1999). Benedict Anderson (1983) has 
described how the nation is imagined as a static, homogeneous community that 
is defined along territorial, cultural, and linguistic lines. People are thought to 
belong to this political, ethnoracial, sociocultural, and territorially bounded 
community by birth; the term nation itself stems from the Latin natus, or birth. 
This implies they naturally belong to a place, and automatically share a 
common identity. However, this national order of supposedly discrete national 
groups that are each protected by their own state is a political project (Malkki 
1995; Baumann 1999; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). It needs to be 
constantly reified and one way of doing so is through representing policies that 
are essentially political as reflecting the natural status quo and being in the 
general interest of society. 
 These policies, moreover, are produced by an actor that occupies an 
ostensibly neutral, non-partisan position. It is precisely because the state has 
an above party position, which policies themselves help constructing, that 
policies are endowed with authority. In this way, the Integration Policy helps 
to naturalize the national model of society. In the next section, I further 
describe the content of the Dutch Integration Policy and the context of their 
production. In the final section of this Introduction, I further explain how I 
have studied the creation of these policies 
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Studying Integration Policy 
 
Having explained why it is important to study the policy effect in the previous 
section, I now further explain how I have done so and why the Dutch Integration 
Policy provides a good case to study this effect. In this section, I first describe 
the context, content, and development of this policy domain. Because I also 
address these issues in the next chapter, I limit my account here to a broad 
contextualization of the case studied. After this, I explain the research 
methods I used to analyze policy as an anthropological object of study. 
 
A short explanation of the Dutch case 
The Dutch Integration Policy is an interesting case to study. It deals with 
fundamentally political issues such as belonging, identity, nationalism, and 
exclusion. At the same time, many policy interventions are represented as 
apolitical, aiming to improve the marginalized position of some people in Dutch 
society, to foster social cohesion and a “stable society.” Policies at the local 
level that cities create and implement often have a more direct effect on 
people’s daily lives (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Uitermark 2012). I focus on 
the national level, however, because this is the primary level that sets the 
discursive framework on issues related to the place of migrants and their 
children in Dutch society. It is also the place where legislation is crafted that 
has far-reaching effects on its objects and society at large. 
 Policy may entail “a field of activity, specific proposal, government 
legislation, general program, desired state of affairs, label for outcomes or 
achievements” (Wedel et. al. 2005: 35). My focus is on what is being done 
within the state administration that is labelled “Integration Policy.” It is in the 
national administration where politics is translated into policy measures. This 
is specifically salient for the Integration Policy, that has been translating and 
channelling an increasingly politicized moment in the Netherlands in expert 
policy measures. This makes it an interesting case to study the policy effect. 
Growing political involvement has not only affected the outlook of policy 
measures, but also the process of policy making itself (Scholten 2011b: 76). 
The Integration Policy has seen a volatile development, principally instigated 
by changing terms of the political debate (Entzinger 2006).  
 In reaction to postcolonial, labour, and family migration that took off after 
the Second World War, policy makers increasingly felt policy interventions 
were needed in order to prevent disorder and crisis (Rath 1991). Supposedly 
fundamental cultural differences and socioeconomic marginalization of 
“foreigners,” who were at the same time increasingly becoming permanent 
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inhabitants and Dutch citizens, at least in the formal sense, were thought to 
pose a threat to the Dutch nation state. From the 1980s onwards, successive 
governments have aimed at facilitating the “integration” of various people 
categorized alternately as “minorities,” “allochthones,” and “Dutch with a 
migration background.”6 Appendix 1 provides an overview of all government 
coalitions in the Netherlands since the late 1970s, including ministers 
responsible for these Integration Policy. 
 The institutionalization of the Integration Policy materialized with the 
creation of a directorate in 1980, within the Ministry of Interior, called 
Coordination of Minorities Policy. Originally, the policy field was described as 
a “collection of measures and points of attention of various authorities, 
departments, services, institutions and organizations” (Minister of Interior 
1983: 162). It included creating legislation and measures, but also initiating 
projects, setting up and coordinating institutional collaboration and 
consultancy structures, ordering and using research, and advocating the 
dominant discourse on minorities and integration through government 
statements, speeches, or information campaigns. Although the assumption has 
always been that the goal of “integration” should also be realized through 
general policies, for example in the areas of healthcare, employment, or 
education, I focus on the task, practices, and products of this directorate as it 
has been developing over time. It is into these specific policy measures that a 
very politicized debate has been translated. 
 In 2002, after having first been renamed Principles Minorities Policy in the 
late 1980s and Coordination Integration Policy Minorities in the mid-1990s, the 
directorate was moved to the Ministry of Justice. In 2007 it was renamed 
Integration and Inburgering and relocated to the Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning, and Environment, only to be moved back again to the Ministry of 
Interior in 2009 for a short period of time. The directorate is currently named 
Society and Integration and is since 2012 housed at the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment. Because of these developments I will generally refer to the 
directorate as “the Directorate” throughout this thesis, rather than using 
specific names for each period. Appendix 2 contains an overview of the 
institutional development of this directorate, describing organization, name 
changes, and relocations. 
                                                          
6 In 2016, the official terminology was changed, because it was considered less stigmatizing. The 
Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy published a report (WRR 2016), in which it argued 
to stop using of the term “allochthon” in all official state communications, because this allegedly 
neutral policy term had become associated with subjective qualifications. This advice was followed 
by the Dutch government. As I will explain in Chapter One, “allochthon” was never as neutral as 
it was intended to be, and the new category does not fundamentally differ from previous ones. 
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 These relocations and name changes reflect the difficulties state 
authorities have been having in getting a grip on migration and how it has been 
affecting Dutch society. It also relates to how thinking about “integration” has 
been developing over time (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011, Scholten 2011a, 
Entzinger 2006, 2014; Duyvendak and Scholten 2012). Political attention 
towards the topic has been gradually rising since the early 1950s, but until the 
late 1970s there was no coherent Integration Policy on the national level, as 
politicians held on to the “myth of return.” In policy terms, migrants from 
former colonies were either seen as Dutch or as Others who could never really 
“integrate” in the Netherlands. Labour migrants from Mediterranean countries 
were considered temporary guests. The Netherlands has always been a 
“reluctant country of immigration” (Rath 2009). This changed when 
descendants of Moluccan migrants from former colony Indonesia committed a 
series of violent attacks during the 1970s to attract attention to what they saw 
as their unfair treatment by the Dutch state. 
 This raised awareness among politicians and policy officials about the 
potential threat “badly integrated minorities” posed to the public order. The 
Minorities Policy that began in reaction to this in the early 1980s, was aimed, 
besides preventing more immigration, at stimulating the “participation” and 
“emancipation” of various migrant groups that were categorized as ethnic 
minorities (Minister of Interior 19837). These predominantly redistributive 
policies entailed preventing and improving marginalization in the domains of 
housing, healthcare, education, and employment, facilitating an equal legal 
and political position and fighting discrimination (De Zwart 2012). An important 
technique of making these minorities feel included was promoting group 
organization and stimulating cultural emancipation. A perceived lack of 
results, attributed mostly to the soft outlook of policies, raised calls for a 
change in policy, especially in times of mass unemployment and growing 
political debate about the Dutch nation (Van Reekum 2016). 
  In the early 1990s, the Integration Policy was introduced in which 
“minorities” were re-categorized as “allochthones” and the focus changed 
from emancipation to citizenship (Minister of Interior 19948; Scholten 2011b; 
Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Entzinger 2014). This “universalist” phase is 
often portrayed as a reasonable approach (ibid.), focusing more on 
socioeconomic participation than on cultural matters and treating objects of 
policies as responsible citizens rather than cultural or ethnic groups in need of 
government assistance (see, for example, Duyvendak and Scholten 2012: 273; 
                                                          
7 Tweede Kamer, zitting 1982-1983, 16 102, nrs. 20-21. Minorities White Paper [Minderhedennota]. 
8 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1993-1994, 23 684, nr. 2. Contours White Paper [Contourennota]. 
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Entzinger 2014: 697). Indeed for one part this change in policy meant more 
incorporation of these groups compared to the previous Minorities Policy, but 
at the same time they continued to be categorized as others, based on similar 
ideas about cultural differences (Yanow and Van der Haar 2013; Ghorashi 
2014). 
 This continued after the turn of the millennium, when the Integration 
Policy New Style was introduced as a necessary reform of previous policies 
(Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 20039). Around the 2002 elections 
the topics of migration and integration rose high on the political agenda, in the 
wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the murder of 
popular anti-immigration politician Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands (Scholten 
2011b: 86; Entzinger 2014). Later this was reinforced by several incidents, of 
which the murder of Theo van Gogh was the most prominent. Political reactions 
have evolved into intense debates, a tougher, hyper-realistic political 
discourse of frankly speaking “the truth” in the name of ordinary people, and 
problematizing cultural differences and leftist politics (Prins and Saharso 2010; 
Uitermark 2012). Much focus is now put on alleged problems of social-cultural 
adaptation, which relates to a turn to more restrictive, obligatory policies that 
demand from those who are obliged to integrate to prove they are “fit” to live 
in the Netherlands (Schinkel 2010). Cultural differences are explicitly seen as 
a threat to national unity and the curbing of immigration and the assimilation 
of migrants, especially Muslims, that already live in the Netherlands, have 
become important goals.  
 Following this typology, the Netherlands is often considered an exemplary 
case of the EU-wide “multiculturalism backlash” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 
2010). The development of policy is presented as a trend from inclusion based 
on a positive valuation of cultural difference, through a more “pragmatic” 
socioeconomic focus on incorporation and, finally, a negative appraisal of 
cultural difference (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011; Duyvendak and Scholten 
2012; Entzinger 2014). There are, however, different interpretations of this 
development, as I will further explain in Chapter One. Some scholars argue 
that policies have been, and to a certain extent still are, “multicultural” in the 
sense that they institutionalize minorities rights, and that this has had adverse 
effects (Joppke 2007; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Koopmans 2007, 2009, 
2012). Others point out policies have never been intentionally “multicultural,” 
but that culture was used instrumentally instead (Duyvendak and Scholten 
2011; De Zwart 2012; Ghorashi 2014; Van Reekum 2016). 
                                                          
9  Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 29 203, nr. 1. Integration Policy New Style 
[Integratiebeleid Nieuwe Stijl]. 
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 Either way, culture has been an important means of how the Dutch state 
aims to consolidate the national order by defining Others who do not naturally 
belong in the Netherlands and need help with their “integration” (Rath 1991; 
Essed and Nimako 2006; Schinkel 2017; Ghorashi 2017). Policies have been 
premised upon a distinction between those who are “from here,” until 2016 
called “autochthons,” and various groups of mostly “non-Western” migrants 
and citizens, who are considered not to be rooted here (Yanow and Van der 
Haar 2013; Ghorashi 2017). For this latter group, “allochthon” had been 
introduced in the 1990s as a supposedly neutral policy term. At the same time, 
this policy category relates to political convictions about belonging and 
apparent cultural, ethnic, racial, and religious differences posing a threat to 
the nation (ibid.; Essed and Nimako 2006; Geschiere 2011; Schinkel 2017). 
 The development of the Integration Policy has been related to an anxious 
politics about the fate of the nation state that projects social problems onto 
often racialized Others (Modest and De Koning 2016: 98). Although race is not 
commonly used in the Netherlands, neither in the political domain nor in 
academia, ideas about fixed groups that belong in certain places have been 
central in the Integration Policy (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010). Indeed, the 
distinction made between “Western” and “non-Western,” indirectly defines 
the dominant majority as European, white, and liberal (Essed and Hoving 2014; 
Van Reekum 2016). According to Silverstein (2005: 364), racialization 
 
refers to the processes through which any diacritic of social personhood – 
including class, ethnicity, generation, kinship/affinity, and positions 
within fields of power - comes to be essentialized, naturalized, and/or 
biologized. […] Racialization thus indexes the historical transformation 
of fluid categories of difference into fixed species of otherness. 
 
There is a debate about whether cultural essentialism is racism in another guise 
(Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Lentin 2014; Goldberg 2012), or rather a 
different discourse of alterity (Schinkel 2013: 1145; cf. Stolcke 1995; Grillo 
2003). My focus is not on judging whether policies and underlying assumptions 
are a form of racism or not, but rather on how the mechanism of racialization 
functions as a means to protect the nation. 
 The many reforms in the policy domain are a reaction to perceptions of 
policy failure, which has more to do with nationalist expectations and 
imaginaries of those in power than with actual social processes that are often 
associated with “integration” (Van Reekum and Duyvendak 2012; cf. Entzinger 
2014). As recent studies have pointed out, discourse, politics, and thinking 
related to “integration” have increasingly focused on nationalist sentiments, 
either in terms of a culturalization of Dutch citizenship (Tonkens and 
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Duyvendak 2016), an exclusionary “neoliberal communitarian citizenship” 
(Schinkel 2010; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010), a general “culturism” (Schinkel 
2007; Uitermark 2012 cf. Essed and Nimako 2006; Ghorashi 2014), or 
reassertions of Dutchness (Van Reekum 2016) and autochthony (Mepschen 
2016). 
 In sum, the Integration Policy has been characterized by a constant 
balancing between inclusion and exclusion of those defined as “in need of 
integration.” It is this tension that makes it an interesting case to study the 
policy effect. Throughout this dissertation, I use the name Integration Policy 
to describe this policy field in general, when not referring to a specific period, 
because it is the most widely used term. I also use the official name, rather 
than the more descriptive “integration policies,” in order to emphasize that it 
is an emic term rather than my own description. Whereas in Chapter One I 
provide an overview of the work and policies of the Directorate, the following 
chapters focus primarily on inburgering legislation. Inburgering legislation is 
an important policy in terms of budget and political attention. It is one of the 
few “real” policy instruments and has been in place for a longer period, making 
it a good case for an in depth study of policy making. Moreover, it consists of 
concrete legal measures about which there have been numerous debates in 
Parliament, so there is ample of documentation available in order to analyze 
the policy making processes in detail. 
 Inburgering loosely translates as “becoming a citizen,” and is officially 
defined as “the first step towards integration,” meaning having elementary 
knowledge of the Dutch language and Dutch society, i.e. “norms and values” 
(Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations 201210: 2) It is often translated as 
“civic integration,” implying that having the basic skills to be a “good” Dutch 
citizen is an important part of the “integration process.” Passing an 
inburgering exam is considered by policy makers as both a precondition for and 
“proof” of being a self-reliant citizen that can fully participate in the 
socioeconomic, political, and cultural domains of the Dutch nation state 
(Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 2016a11). In Dutch colloquial speech, 
inburgeren is also a verb that refers to once foreign customs, cultural 
expressions, practices, words or materialities that have been normalized and 
are commonly used within a community.12 
                                                          
10 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2011–2012, 33 086, nr. 3. Explanatory Memorandum Amendment 
of the Inburgering Bill [Memorie van toelichting Wijziging van de Wet inburgering].  
11 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2016–2017, 34 584, nr. 3. Explanatory Memorandum Amendment 
of the Inburgering Bill [Memorie van toelichting Wijziging van de Wet inburgering].  
12 For example the celebration of Halloween, eating spaghetti or English management terms have 
become ingeburgerd in Dutch society. 
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 This meaning of incorporating what is foreign reflects the idea of a pre-
existing “receiving society” in which someone or something is incorporated. 
What is interesting is that this implies an act of this society, while 
contemporary inburgering policies primarily demand action from a migrant. I 
prefer using the Dutch emic term throughout this dissertation, because it 
emphasizes the political meaning of these policies. It is not just about learning 
skills in order to be able to participate and become a citizen in the formal 
sense, but about becoming part of a national community, which is a two-way 
process that is effectively rendered a one-way obligation that seems virtually 
impossible to fulfil (cf. Schinkel 2010). The term inburgering13 thus reflects 
these meanings better than the official and more technical term civic 
integration. In the next section I explain the methods I used to study the 
Integration Policy. 
 
The methods to study policy 
 
I’m starting to feel familiar here. But at the same time I’m very 
much an outsider. I know the procedure: report at the reception of 
the ministry, have my ID checked, a call is made to the person I 
have an appointment with, I wait until my informant comes, we 
shake hands, I receive a pass to enter the security gates, we walk 
the stairs and corridors, have an informal chat meanwhile (how was 
your trip, who did you already speak to, what did you already find 
out, etc.), I get a bad tasting coffee from the dispenser, we find a 
place to sit and start the interview. I know the building of the 
ministry, know what questions to ask, know more and more people, 
know more and more about the Directorate. But at the same time it 
bothers me that it is difficult to grasp what is being done on a daily 
basis, what routine tasks are and how exactly policy is created in 
concrete practices. I am not participating in the process I am 
studying.  
 
(Field notes, 30 April 2014) 
 
My main locus of data collection and analysis has been the Directorate 
responsible for the Integration Policy. This was mostly because it has been the 
central actor in this policy area, making it a good vantage point for studying 
the creation of policy, but also because this site “opens up windows onto larger 
processes of political transformation” (Shore and Wright 2011: 12). Analyzing 
the work of civil servants that work here not only covers most activity that is 
                                                          
13 For sake of readability, I will not italicise it anymore from now on. 
26
Introduction
38 
done in terms of policy making, but also offers an opportunity to study the 
complexities of bureaucratic organization and of shaping policy. Especially the 
many relocations and name changes the Directorate underwent, in 
combination with the indeterminacy of the exact scope of the policies it has 
been creating, make it an interesting focus in this respect. 
 The national administration, by which I mean the ministries that support 
the elected government in executing its policy agenda, is located in The Hague. 
This administrative capital of the Netherlands, moreover, houses the 
Parliament, the Council of State, the Supreme Court, the King’s working 
residence, and various other state institutions. Most ministries have in recent 
years been centred around the Binnenhof, the historic location in the city 
centre where Parliament and government are housed. At the time of my 
research, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment was housed in a 
building a bit further outside of the city centre. It was a typical 1980s concrete 
building with a no-nonsense interior and a maze-like floor plan. This was the 
place where most interviews with civil servants who were at that time working 
for the Directorate took place. 
 In order to provide the necessary context, I now briefly describe the Dutch 
Parliamentary system and “the Hague bureaucracy.” The Netherlands is a 
liberal democracy; elections for the House of Representatives14 are held every 
four years, after which the largest party forms a government coalition that 
determines the policy agenda (Van der Meer and Dijksma 2011). Besides 
appointing ministers that make up the ruling coalition, these parties may 
decide to restructure or create new ministries or appoint special ministers, but 
core departments are mostly left untouched. Another cornerstone of the 
liberal Dutch state is the rule of law. This entails the principle of legality (all 
state action should be based on legislation), the trias politica (separation of 
powers), constitutional freedoms and rights citizens have (for example, of 
speech, of religion, or of equal treatment), and an independent judiciary 
system (WRR 2003: 154-160). Put simply, the rule of law is set to ensure that 
state power is restricted so as to protect citizens. 
 Whereas a democratically elected government has legitimacy to develop 
new legislation, the rule of law determines this has to be done within the 
confines of the Constitution. State bureaucracy is one place that safeguards 
the rule of law against political volatility. The civil service remains relatively 
stable and civil servants stay in office for a long period of time, many 
                                                          
14 In Dutch called “Tweede Kamer,” meaning Second Chamber. Together with the First Chamber, 
or Senate, it constitutes the Dutch Parliament. The Senate is considered a “chamber of reflection” 
and is indirectly elected through the Provincial parliaments. Real political power and decision 
making lies at the House of Representatives. 
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throughout their entire careers, as they are appointed on the basis of expertise 
instead of political affiliation. However, higher ranking officials, from the level 
of director up, are mostly (dormant) members of a political party and 
appointment may be based on the political power relations at a given time. In 
general, the idea of neutrally and objectively serving politics is given substance 
through a traineeship as selection criterion of personnel with the right mindset 
and through the circulation of personnel between policy fields and 
departments. 
 Especially in Chapters Three and Four, I further analyze these aspects of 
the bureaucracy and civil servants. Bureaucratic work is often done by highly 
skilled and trained people, and consists mostly of administrative functions, 
rather than implementation on the local level. “Generally, policy staff is 
expected to do policy work at an academic level, on the basis of rational 
expertise, and (bureau-political) skills in consensus-building or policy 
harmonization” (Van Braam 1986: 202, in Hoppe and Jeliazkova 2006: 37). 
During my fieldwork I encountered various types of civil servants that take part 
in the policy making process.15  They all have clearly described tasks and 
responsibilities in the process of shaping policies.16  
 A policy official or advisor is often responsible for one or a few subtopics, 
which is called one’s “dossier,” and is often a specific field of expertise such 
as one part of the inburgering system, labour market discrimination, or 
religious radicalization. These experts are tasked with developing specific 
policy measures based on political priorities and advising the minister on this 
specific topic. The Dutch state defines this function as “taking care of the 
preparation, development, implementation, execution, and evaluation of 
policy” attuned to a demarcated policy (sub)terrain.17 In terms of practices 
this entails writing policy advice, having contact with other actors in the field, 
organizing meetings, reading studies, monitoring the implementation of 
policies and writing official documents such as answers to Parliamentarian 
questions. These actors thus are expected to have knowledge on a specific 
subtopic and of current developments.  
 A coordinating policy official also is an expert, typically responsible for 
one or a few topics and coordinating the officials working on various subtopics, 
                                                          
15 Without denying their importance for running a ministry and thus facilitating policy making, I 
have not focused on supportive staff. 
16 Therefore, when describing in general the people working in a ministry, I use the term civil 
servant and use a more precise term when relevant. 
17  https://www.functiegebouwrijksoverheid.nl/functiegebouw-html/functiegroep/510, accessed 
on 5 December 2017. 
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thus being responsible for “integral policy products and solutions” such as more 
comprehensive advice given to a minister, policy papers, and other official 
documents.18 In the empirical chapters, I will further elaborate on these tasks. 
Besides these advisors on specific topics, there are several civil servants with 
slightly different tasks. A legal expert translates policy plans in sound 
legislation, advises about legal possibilities, and plays an important role in 
drafting bills in terms of writing legal texts. This is often done in cooperation 
with legal experts from other directorates and departments. A scientific 
analyst is responsible for tendering specific research questions among 
consultants and research institutes, translating policy desires into knowledge 
questions, and reloading scientific insights into the policy process.19 
 A strategic policy official is closer to politics in the sense that this actor 
is responsible for the overall rationale and vision of the policy field, thinking 
about how the various topics are connected in an overarching story, which is 
closely related to the political strategy of a minister.20 These officials are 
higher ranked, but not part of a management team. Within the Directorate 
there have been between two and five managers over time, most of them a 
Head of Unit and responsible for a policy subfield and the twenty to twenty-
five policy officials working on it. The director is responsible for the policy 
field in general.21 In the empirical chapters, I will further discuss the tasks of 
these managers and of the higher management of a ministry, which are the 
director general and secretary general. 
 
Anthropological research in a policy world 
The various types of civil servants have been the subjects of my investigation 
into the policy effect. Although this dissertation is an anthropological study of 
policy making and I did make use of qualitative methods associated with an 
anthropological approach, it is not an ethnography per se. Access was a major 
challenge and I was not allowed to conduct fieldwork in terms of participating 
in and observing the daily practices of the Directorate. Bureaucracies are a 
closed world and most policy makers have little interest in being studied by 
                                                          
18  https://www.functiegebouwrijksoverheid.nl/functiegebouw-html/functiegroep/554, accessed 
on 5 December 2017. 
19  https://www.functiegebouwrijksoverheid.nl/functiegebouw-html/functiegroep/538, accessed 
on 5 December 2017. 
20  https://www.functiegebouwrijksoverheid.nl/functiegebouw-html/functiegroep/555, accessed 
on 5 December 2017. 
21  https://www.functiegebouwrijksoverheid.nl/functiegebouw-html/functiegroep/518, accessed 
on 5 December 2017. 
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outside scholars (cf. Schwelger and Powell 2008; G. Feldman 2011; Wright and 
Reinhold 2011).22 They might be afraid they will disclose information that may 
be harmful to the policy making process, the minister, the functioning of the 
democratic system in general, or to their own careers. 
 In short, they might feel they have nothing to win but a lot to lose by 
being scrutinized up close. I thus had to resort to other options, which may not 
always provide the thorough insider’s understanding of policy making 
associated with ethnography. In what follows, however, I will make clear how 
my approach is characterized by an “ethnographic sensibility” (Shore and 
Wright 2011: 15) and triangulation of methods. Although not observed directly, 
attention to ordinary, everyday practices in which policy is created illuminates 
the construction of both policy and state. I have studied the people that take 
part in this process by interviewing them and studied the policy they produce 
by analyzing documents. Taken together, both methods have allowed me to 
reconstruct how exactly political debate is translated into policy measures and 
what effects this has. 
 Interviewing has been an important means of data collection. In total I 
conducted 40 in depth, semi-structured interviews, with a duration between 
45 minutes and three hours, with civil servants, former ministers, social 
scientists, and people working as experts for NGO’s or commercial companies. 
I have mostly interviewed civil servants who are working at the Directorate, or 
who have worked there and either have moved jobs or are retired, but also 
civil servants working in adjacent administrative functions. The main means of 
contacting informants has been snowball sampling, as I would typically receive 
contact information at the end of interviews to make contact with new 
informants. Interviews with people still working at the Directorate normally 
were conducted during working hours at office or in a bar. For retired civil 
servants this was different, as I would visit them more easily at home and they 
had more time for an interview. I recorded all interviews, transcribed them 
verbatim, coded these transcripts, and analyzed them inductively, which I will 
further explain below. 
 Often it was rather easy to make an appointment for an interview, but 
some informants proved difficult to contact. Not everyone had an equal 
interest in talking to me. As Schwelger and Powell (2008: 6) put it, “frustrated 
attempts generate data because they reveal the implicit topography of power 
and influence in a specific political field.” People who were reluctant to 
participate in my research might either have occupied important positions they 
                                                          
22 Access is also difficult in a very tangible sense because entrance to the ministry is guarded and 
it is not possible to walk inside offices without appointment. 
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did not want to jeopardize, had no interests in being questioned by as 
academic, or felt they might disclose confidential information on policy 
making. They might also have had personal reservations with their policy work 
they did not want to share. 
 This may have been the case for civil servants “with a migration 
background” who are currently working at the Directorate. I was advised by 
other informants to interview them, because of their “in-between position and 
corresponding views on policy.” Their inhibition to cooperate in my research 
could be related to the reflections they have about working as a civil servant 
on a policy that affects them personally because of their background. Their 
disinclination to share their thoughts may be an indication of how civil servants 
are not supposed to have a personal opinion or share reflections with outsiders, 
because ambiguities threaten the representation of policy as objective and 
smooth. Difficulties in getting access thus point at sensitivities and tensions. 
At the same time, people who had retired or moved on to another job were 
more likely to cooperate and speak out more freely. Likewise, more senior 
officials tended to be more relaxed and aware of what they could and could 
not say, whereas younger ones were more uncertain.   
 Although most people were willing to participate and even more open than 
I had imagined, it was difficult to really get to know informants and find out 
what they think. Traditionally, the anthropological methodology of 
ethnographic research is based on building rapport (Sluka 2012). However, an 
anthropology of policy involves less immediate relationships between 
anthropologist and interlocutors; while they may certainly be cordial, they 
consist of neither rapport nor complicity (Schwelger and Powell 2008: 6). It 
was difficult to get beyond the official interview setting. Casual conversation, 
what Driessen and Jansen (2013) call “small talk,” before and after interviews 
and during several public events that I describe below, did reveal interesting 
information about the workings of state bureaucracies and the reflections of 
civil servants. 
 I remember having drinks after a conference, when I talked to civil 
servants who were very open about the bureaucratic “snake pit” they struggled 
with. Or about difficulties they had with some political decisions they 
disagreed with but had to accept. These were different conversations in terms 
of complicity than a more formal interview I would have with them at a later 
moment. Another example was walking to the train station together with an 
informant after an interview. During these ten minutes she told me more about 
the development of the Directorate and about the norms and values of civil 
servants then during the interview we had just had. Such instances, in 
combination with the narratives of informants, pointed to some important 
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tropes that reveal how they attribute meaning to their work, such as 
“professionalism” or “playing a game.” These have been important cues for 
later interviews and for analyzing my data.  
 Of course there exist differences between what people say they are doing, 
for example during an interview, and what they actually do (Sluka 2012). 
People often have the tendency to sketch a nicer picture of their work, daily 
tasks, and activities than they are in reality. They may overestimate their 
influence, give socially desirable answers, obfuscate struggles and discussions, 
et cetera. Especially when talking about politically sensitive topics, people 
may not always express their true opinion. Civil servants know what they can 
and cannot say about their work and their personal affinities, and how these 
relate to the political context they work in.  
 In order to address these limitations, it proved valuable to have spoken to 
retired civil servants and non-state actors, which allowed me to triangulate 
the stories of civil servants currently working at the Directorate. By talking to 
many different actors and studying what they say about each other, it is 
possible to compare what people say about themselves and their work with 
another source. For example, when I asked civil servants how they felt when 
they had to work for a government that was pretty harsh on integration issues, 
they reacted by stating they have to accept this as part of their job and they 
do not let their personal convictions dictate their professional lives. When I 
talked about this subject with informants outside the state bureaucracy, they 
told me about civil servants thinking about quitting their job. “Only their 
mortgage makes them stick to their job.” 
 Although my findings are always interpretations of interpretations, they 
do provide insight in how civil servants think and perceive their role in terms 
of how they represent themselves to the outside world (see Heyman 1995). 
Interviews with various types of actors can be used to become aware of “active 
concerns, everyday concepts and political understanding of at least some of 
the sets of people involved in the issue under study” (Wright 2011: 28). An 
example of this in my research is the self-evident importance of “the line” in 
bureaucracy, which I discuss in Chapter Three, or the trope of 
“professionalism,” which is central in my analysis in Chapter Four. In addition, 
what Ortner has named “interface ethnography” (2010), allowed me to move 
beyond the formal interview setting and further become aware of key issues in 
the policy making process. 
 This entailed attending events in which the closed institution of the 
Directorate presented itself to the public and linking these observations with 
other data I collected. I participated in conferences and symposia organized 
and attended by civil servants. Moreover, I attended and observed several 
32
Introduction
44 
public events, such as parliamentary committee meetings on integration and 
inburgering in March 2013, June 2014, and January 2015, during which a 
minister debates with Members of Parliament about specific policy measures 
and related social developments. I also attended an information meeting 
organized by the Directorate to inform and instruct professionals having to 
implement reforms in inburgering legislation in November 2014. And I 
participated in Empowering People network meetings in 2013 connecting social 
initiatives with national and local civil servants. 
 What I learned from these observations was, firstly, how civil servants 
perform a role and sometimes reflect on their work as a game. When attending, 
for example, a meeting in the House of Representatives, civil servants would 
reflect on what was taking place as a “ritual dance,” meaning to say they knew 
beforehand more or less what questions would be posed to the minister and 
how to respond to them. Although they consider such meetings as the essence 
of their work, supporting and advising their minister, and they took their task 
very seriously, civil servants could also be rather cynical on how political 
parties would use this opportunity for their own political interest, while not 
really debating the topic at hand. Moreover, I observed how policy makers, as 
a community of people, have informal contacts and relations that crosscut 
their formal status related to the state-society division (Mitchell 1999).  
 For my own fieldwork, besides providing opportunities to have informal 
chats with civil servants and other relevant actors, these moments worked well 
to get into contact with new informants and make appointments for interviews. 
Although allowing me to see a mere glimpse of the policy making process, 
making additional observations and having small talk besides interviewing 
informants, made it possible to triangulate my data. Together, the data can 
“equip the anthropologists with the fieldwork eyes to scrutinize a wide range 
of material emanating from other locations in the field” (ibid.: 29). This 
“ethnographic sensibility” (Shore and Wright 2011: 15), for example, opens up 
possibilities for analyzing many different documents through the lens of how 
the contested and political nature of policies is neutralized. It also means 
having eye for contingency, problematizing or situating policy assumptions 
instead of taking them for granted, and relating it to wider social processes. 
 Studying documents has been my other main method of data collection, 
which was also an important way of triangulating the interview material. 
Documents should not just be seen as background material, as Wright argues, 
but analyzed for “key concepts, embedded assumptions and nuances of 
meaning, as well as for social, economic and political relationships, 
organizational dynamics and the operation of power” (2011: 29). For example, 
I used key concepts that emanated from interviews and informal talks, such as 
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“professionalism,” “the line,” and “the Minister,” but also embedded 
assumptions about inburgering, to structure my document analysis. I divide the 
documents that I have analyzed into two main categories: public documents 
and archives.   
 I have included the following documents in my research: policy papers, 
letters written to Parliament, reports of Parliamentary meetings, legal texts, 
evaluation reports, newspaper articles, published interviews with involved 
actors, and government websites with official information. All these 
documents could be accessed digitally through the Internet, through websites 
such as www.officielebekendmakingen.nl, www.gahetna.nl, 
www.rijksoverheid.nl and websites of newspapers like www.volkskrant.nl or 
www.nrc.nl. Policy papers, in particular, reveal core assumptions of policies, 
but the other documents also provide a rich source of how actors perceive of 
and engage with policy. 
 The same holds for the other type of documents I studied, the policy 
archives that are kept by the Directorate on the creation of successive 
inburgering legislation. Upon request I was given permission to study the 
folders that have been archived, and which are now stored by a central 
documentation agency of the national administration, called Doc-Direkt, that 
falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. This meant I had to go 
to an office where relevant folders that were selected by this organization had 
been sent to and where I could study them. Of course I do not know which 
documents were kept from me, but the total number of files I could study was 
very large. I had to make selections of selections myself of all the documents 
I was allowed to see. 
 These have not been made public, as would have been the case under the 
Public Governance Act (Wob), as I could only “inspect” them. The excerpts I 
used in this thesis had to be approved before publication. The archives span 
the period from the first governmental decision to start developing 
“inburgering contracts” in 1994, to the passing of the Inburgering Act in 2007. 
As the construction of inburgering legislation involved a lot of policy work by 
civil servants, it also provides rich data for reconstructing policy making 
processes in terms of actors, ideas, interests, and decision making. Moreover, 
the unique possibility of studying documents that are otherwise closed off from 
the public, allowed me to analyze the material qualities of bureaucratic 
documents as well, which I explore in Chapter Three. Such qualities may 
provide insight into the constitution and workings of bureaucratic organization 
(Hull 2012a) I refer to these documents in a separate list of references, stating 
their case number, date, and title where possible. 
34
Introduction
46 
 These files contain many relevant communications between involved 
actors during the creation of successive inburgering laws, such as advisory 
memos written for a minister, agendas and reports of departmental and 
interdepartmental meetings on various hierarchical levels, drafts of official 
documents such as law texts and Parliamentarian letters, decision making 
memos, internal commentaries on evaluations and plans, letters and e-mails 
sent to other civil servants and non-state actors, and so on. This vast body of 
documentation allowed me to reconstruct the decision making process more 
precisely than I could have done otherwise. And to analyze more in depth the 
actors, assumptions, power relations, motivations for decisions, contention, 
and conflicting interests involved. 
 It thus has proven to be a very valuable source of data to reconstruct how 
and why policy decisions were made, who have been central actors, to 
understand how certain ideas and conceptions end up in policy texts, and how 
political ideas are rendered technical (cf. Bonjour 2009). It showed me a 
process made up of “multiplicities of interpretations and clashes of meaning-
making” in which the complexities of policy making reside (Yanow 2011: 310). 
Moreover, as Hull (2012a) has argued, studying bureaucratic documents helps 
to understand how the bureaucratic organization as such is constituted. For 
this, the material qualities of documents, besides the content they convey, is 
important, just as the circulation of documents between various groups of 
bureaucrats that hold specific positions. This will be the focus of my analysis 
in chapter Three. 
 I have analyzed both these internal documents and public ones, together 
with the transcripts of the interviews, with the help of Atlas.ti software. I have 
coded texts in an iterative process for assumptions about belonging, 
categorizations and problematizations of the objects of policy, proposed policy 
solutions, and reflections on specific policy measures. But also highlighting 
various stages of policy development, practices of policy making, 
organizational developments of the Directorate, background of civil servants, 
their reflections on their work, aspects of bureaucratic work, networks, and 
worldview. It means I have been developing an analysis and getting back to the 
data for revising the codes and domains23, shaping my argument, though based 
on the theoretical framework I explained above, in interaction with the data 
found. In this way, both public and archival policy documents made it possible 
                                                          
23 After a domain analysis, I further specified codes by focusing, for example, on characteristics of 
civil servants and how the cope with tensions, professionalization of the Directorate, structural 
features of assumptions and worldview underpinning policies, and interdepartmental position and 
contention. 
35
On Studying the Effects of Policy and State
47 
to obtain a rather comprehensive view of the policy making process that 
complemented and reinforced my analysis of interviews. 
 It helped to further triangulate my data, which I also did by comparing 
the multiple accounts and perspectives of the wide network of policy actors, 
making additional observations and having small talk, comparing interviews 
with documents and reconstructing decision making through archival research. 
In sum, an ethnographic sensibility in the methods I used helped to secure the 
validity of my work. My present work in a Dutch ministry, which I started after 
finishing my research but when still writing this thesis, made it possible to 
further validate several insights, especially those described in Chapters Three 
and Four. It has confirmed my earlier observations about the tension between 
political decision making and creating policy.  
 I conclude this part about my methodology with some ethical 
considerations and limitations of my approach. As mentioned above, 
interviewing policy makers is a sensitive enterprise and bureaucrats tend to 
cloak their work in secrecy because they are afraid to disclose information that 
might be harmful to themselves, others, or the policy making process. I respect 
the position of my informants. I have recorded all interviews and agreed with 
informants to ask them for permission if quoting them in a publication. Many 
insisted on anonymity, so I have tried to make it difficult to trace quotes to 
individuals and did not include a list of informants. All translations of quotes 
from both interviews and documents, are mine. 
 Although anthropologists have always been subject to the appraisals of 
their informants when it comes to publishing, the institutional weight and high 
profile of many of my interlocutors could add a new dimension to the 
relationship (Schwelger and Powell 2008: 3). Mosse (2006) points out that the 
anthropologist’s findings may be actively contested and critiqued by 
informants, challenging the anthropologist’s authority. In this case it may be 
less likely, because as one civil servant indicated, “you as a researcher are in 
an easy position to write up things the way you want it, because you do not 
have to take into account the many factors and interests I have to deal with. 
For you there are no consequences attached. I do not even have the possibility 
to publicly react to critical academics.” 
Academics and civil servants have shared epistemologies (Schwelger and 
Powell 2008; Mosse 2011), basing their expertise on knowledge and science, 
being preoccupied with reading and writing complicated texts, performing a 
nuanced position. What makes my interpretation more plausible than theirs? 
Throughout my research, I constantly moved between a critical analysis of 
policy making and an appreciation of the difficult position of the people who 
actually do this work. This dissertation does not, therefore, have the goal of 
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criticizing civil servants, and neither celebrates nor condemns particular 
policies. It is easy to criticize them as an academic and describe what is wrong 
with the policies they create. But my interest was ethnographic, not to make 
ethical judgements per se. I think I know why and how these people are doing 
this job: that is what I sought to understand. They do their work, which can be 
rather difficult, with sincere intentions. At the same time, policies do have an 
impact on the lives of people, and I think it is important to critically analyze 
the creation of policy and the effects it has on political decisions and society. 
 The focus of my research has primarily been on civil servants, not so much 
on the objects of policy or on the role of non-state experts, politicians, and 
street-level bureaucrats in policy making. An important reason for this, besides 
the considerable amount of data I did gather by only focusing on this group, is 
that my focus is on how the policy effect is realized in state bureaucracies. 
From the point of view of civil servants working in state bureaucracies it was 
possible to study how politics is translated into policy. Especially because there 
are various studies of the implementation of policies and their effects on 
people that I could use in my analysis (see for example Van Huis and De Regt 
2005; Bjornson 2007; Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008; Omlo 2011; Uitermark 
2012; Slootman 2014; Eijberts and Ghorashi 2017). Still, further research would 
benefit from defining the “policy field” more broadly or by “studying through” 
the policy from its creation to how it affects the life of its subjects and society 
at large (Wright and Reinhold 2011; Nyqvist 2011). 
 On another level, policy measures are only one aspect of how the state is 
performed or how a government may aim to intervene in society. Political 
discourse used in speeches, political debate and official communications, for 
example, is also important in shaping the social world. However, the goal of 
this dissertation is not to measure the influence that policies have on society 
compared to other factors. Rather, it sets out to understand policy making as 
the production of meaning, which is at the same time neutralized, authorized, 
and legitimized, and as constituting the state as a neutral actor. To this end, 
four empirical chapters each address a specific part of the policy effect. 
 
Set-up  
In Chapter One I examine how the “integration problem” has been 
conceptualized and institutionalized in the Netherlands since the 1950s, 
focusing specifically on the work and organizational position of the 
Directorate. By analyzing the specific policy measures it has been creating over 
time, I examine the expertise underpinning the Dutch Integration Policy and 
how this has been consolidating the political status quo. This chapter not only 
37
On Studying the Effects of Policy and State
49 
sets the context for further investigation in following chapters, but also 
illustrates how policy measures reassert the national order and how they 
depoliticize the political debate about the nation state. 
 In Chapter Two I analyze this mechanism in more depth, focusing on the 
creation of inburgering policies. I illustrate how the political debate about 
“immigrant integration” has been translated into inburgering legislation, 
paying specific attention to the tensions between political decisions and the 
rule of law. Political decisions are neutralized in this process, as they are 
endowed with authority and legitimacy. In this way the political debate is 
channelled, moreover, and a political question about belonging is translated 
into a technical problem of inburgering.  
 In Chapter Three I focus on the bureaucratic context in which policy is 
produced, in order to further disentangle how the policy effect is realized. I 
analyze how the hierarchic line in a ministry facilitates the collective writing 
of policy texts as seemingly rational and objective. In this way, I examine how 
civil servants are controlled in the bureaucratic organization, how authorship 
is depersonalized, and how in this context political ideas and decisions are 
aligned with state neutrality, endowing policy texts with authority.  
 In Chapter Four I focus on the people that do the actual work of policy 
making, examining how they deal with political volatility. I analyze how civil 
servants perform as professional experts and so enact state authority. The 
trope of professionalism both gives meaning to their work and disciplines them 
in a code of conduct.  
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1. The Integration Policy: Creating Order 
 
 
This is the anxiety: will the Netherlands remain the Netherlands? [...] 
We have to deal with thirty years of failed integration policy. […] 
You don’t repair in just four years’ time what you’ve let slip over the past 
decades. But it starts with demarcating the norm. 
 
(Prime Minister Mark Rutte in De Volkskrant, 20 September 2016). 
 
 
Ever since the first creation of the Integration Policy, the criticism has been 
the same: it fails. For one thing, claiming policy failure should be understood 
as political rhetoric, enabling politicians to make a fierce stance (Duyvendak 
and Scholten 2012). Notwithstanding the political rhetoric, there seems to be 
a consensus, expressed in public debates and various evaluation studies that 
the Integration Policy is ineffective and not able to realize its stated goals 
(WRR 1989, 2001; Blok Commission 2004; WODC 2007; Algemene Rekenkamer 
2017). More and stricter “integration policy” is consistently presented by policy 
makers as a remedy for its own ills (Scholten 2011a; Entzinger 2014). But the 
policy domain has never been fundamentally revised or discarded altogether 
because of a lack of success (Schinkel 2008; Ghorashi 2014). 
  Apparently, there are reasons to keep the Integration Policy in place. 
Rutte’s claim that it starts with demarcating the norm points at Foucault’s 
(1991: 272) analysis of the prison system. This fails to achieve its stated goal 
of rehabilitation, but it does function as a “technology of normalization,” 
systematically creating, classifying, and controlling “anomalies in the social 
body.” In this way, it constitutes ideas about normality and because it needs 
to be able to continuously define the norm, the prison has to fail as an 
institution that brings social improvement. In this chapter, I use a similar 
approach to analyze how the failing Integration Policy also functions as a form 
of normalizing power. Indeed, various scholars have analyzed how it has 
consistently been defining who cannot really belong in the Dutch nation state 
(see for example Rath 1991; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Yanow and Van der 
Haar 2013; Ghorashi 2014; Essed and Nimako 2006; Schinkel 2017). 
 Paradoxically, the Integration Policy produces the conditions for its own 
failure. This resonates with studies of development aid that explain why 
seemingly rational policy solutions do not bring the improvement they claim to 
bring (Ferguson 1994; Mitchell 2002; Li 2007). The social world needs to be 
made manageable by rendering political questions amenable to calculation and 
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technique, based on scientific, seemingly objective knowledge (ibid.; Miller 
and Rose 1990; Rose 1996). However, the complexity of “relations and 
processes with which government is concerned present[s] intrinsic limits to the 
capacity of experts to improve things” (Li 2007: 17). As a result, policy 
interventions are often based on expertise that excludes the political-
economic context of power relations, and lays responsibility on the objects of 
policy. As such, policy measures help to consolidate the existing social order, 
keeping the conditions in place that make them fail. 
 Both socioeconomic marginalization and the political position of power 
from which policy is created, are depoliticized in this way. A similar mechanism 
seems at work in the Integration Policy, being aimed at social improvement 
but also demarcating the nation and thus consolidating the status quo. It is 
essentially political, especially because the political debate has had great 
impact on policies (Regioplan 2016: II). Yet it is also apolitical, being premised 
on the apparent self-evident need to “integrate” some people, through policy 
measures that seem technical instruments of state government and that focus 
on fixing perceived shortcomings of individuals rather than on the structural 
context. It thus is an interesting case of how policy making reflects the state 
as both a political and a neutral entity. This leads me to the following question 
that I will answer in this chapter: How has “immigrant integration” been 
conceptualized and institutionalized in a policy domain? 
 Drawing on interviews with involved actors, archival research, analysis of 
public documents, and secondary literature, I analyze how in reactions to 
social developments and subsequent popular anxieties and political debate, 
policy responses have been developed. I examine the assumptions, specific 
measures, institutional organization and effect of the Dutch Integration Policy. 
But rather than analyzing whether the “intractable policy controversies over 
immigrant integration” (Scholten 2011b: 90) have been effectively resolved or 
not, I am more interested in what happens if a political debate about 
migration, the nation, and belonging is translated into a policy problem that 
presumably can be solved with the right technical measures. So instead of 
assuming the obvious need for such policies, I analyze how this need has been 
institutionalized as self-evident by examining the specific policy measures that 
have been developed over time. 
 Politicians generally interpret earlier policies as “multicultural” and “too 
soft,” which have allegedly caused an “ethnic underclass” to grow that 
threatens “Dutch culture” (Prins and Saharso 2010). Denouncements of an 
alleged multicultural past serve electoral interests, Van Reekum and 
Duyvendak (2012) argue, as they are a way of performing a specific imagination 
of Dutch national identity in which there is no room for cultural diversity. It 
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also enables a fierce stance, creating the need for hard policy measures that 
are necessary to “repair faults of the past.” In academia there is more debate 
about how to interpret previous policies, their failure, and development. Some 
argue that religious freedom, subsidies for cultural organizations and the 
targeting of ethnic groups, which are said to follow from the Dutch tradition 
of pillarization, point out how previous policies have been multicultural, which 
is also seen as an explanation for policy failure, because it has allegedly 
created a distance between “minorities” and “Dutch society” (Joppke 2007; 
Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Koopmans 2007, 2009, 2012). 
 Moreover, because of a strong path dependency the Integration Policy is 
still considered to be oriented towards multiculturalism and thus have adverse 
effects (ibid.). On the other hand, there are scholars who define policies of 
the 1980s as having “multicultural” elements, but point out there have been 
various changes since then (Entzinger 2014; Duyvendak and Scholten 2012). 
Some also contend there has never been an intentional “multicultural” policy 
model in the Netherlands, but rather that policies used culture instrumentally, 
instead of building on a tradition of pillarization (Vink 2007) or valuing cultural 
diversity as a positive goal in itself (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011; De Zwart 
2012; Ghorashi 2014; Van Reekum 2016). In that sense, it has not been an ideal 
typical case of multiculturalism in Northwest Europe that has seen a backlash 
during the early 2000s (Vertovec and Wessendrof 2010). 
 Culture has been important in the policy domain, but there has been a 
continuous tension between being instrumental to improve social conditions 
and institutionalizing exclusive notions of nation belonging (Essed and Nimako 
2006; Schinkel 2017). At their core, policies have not changed much (Ghorashi 
2014). The Integration Policy has created objects of governance, rather than 
political subjects, based on ideas about cultural, ethnic, religious, and national 
otherness. As Dikeç (2007; 2008) has argued, once objects of policies are 
created, their problematization essentially remains unchanged and the 
positions of governors and governed remains the same, although specific 
approaches may vary over time. As I describe in this chapter, since the 1990s 
there has been an increasingly negative appraisal of cultural differences in 
policy measures, which actually builds on the problematizations and objects of 
earlier policies. 
 The chapter is chronologically structured and divided in four periods: early 
initiatives that were concerned with migrants in the Netherlands; the 
institutionalization in state bureaucracy of the Minorities Policy; reforms of the 
Integration Policy; and further restrictions following an increasing 
politicization. For each period I analyze the political moment, what policies 
promised to do, how this was translated into specific measures and 
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implementation, how the bureaucratic context in which this took place was 
organized, and, finally, what the effects have been. I will make clear that for 
each period, results in terms of improvement have not been clear-cut, while 
effects in terms of reinforcing the national order have been growing larger. 
 
 
1.1 Foreigners in the Dutch nation state: 1950-1980 
 
The reason why the foreign worker has come to the Netherlands is 
primarily economic, but at the same time he is socially more 
vulnerable than his Dutch colleagues, both as an employee, as well 
as in broader sense as a (temporary) member of the community. 
The various interests regarding this require continuous care of the 
government that stretch across multiple ministries. 
 
(Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health et al. 197024: 3) 
 
1.1.1 The temporary reception of migrants 
The Dutch Integration Policy has developed in reaction to several post-Second 
World War migration flows. First, during and after the decolonization of 
Indonesia, various groups moved from there to the Dutch “fatherland” during 
the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s (Schuster 1999; Koolen and Tempelman 2003; 
Jones 2007; Laarman 2013). Those who were seen as “real” Dutch, understood 
as white, Christian, and European, faced some difficulties building a new life 
in the Netherlands, but they were hardly problematized as “foreigners” and 
considered to be “repatriated.” The migration of those of mixed decent, the 
“Indo-Dutch,” was seen as a problem and therefore discouraged. This was 
partly legitimized by a post-war housing shortage, but also because they were 
“not seen as a part of the Dutch nation racially, culturally, or socio-
economically” (Laarman 2013: 1237).25 
 They were deemed in need of assistance with adapting to the “Dutch way 
of life.” Social work organizations started to educate them about, for example, 
                                                          
24Kamerstukken II 1969-1970, 10 504, nr 1. White Paper Foreign Employees [Nota Buitenlandse 
werknemers]. 
The first official government statement on how it aimed to address the presence of migrant groups. 
25 Although the ties of the Indo-Dutch to the Netherlands were recognized, as they belonged to the 
middle-class, held administrative jobs and were educated in the Dutch educational system, they 
were at the same time represented in public and political debates using colonial stereotypes 
(Laarman 2013: 1238) 
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the proper way of running a household or finding a job (Rath 1991: 164-172). 
Sometimes these people were first placed outside of Dutch society, both 
symbolically and literally, and assessed how well they were adapted to the 
“Dutch way of life” before they were allowed to live independently. Moluccans 
who had been serving in the Dutch colonial army and were brought over to the 
Netherlands26 formed another group of migrants from Indonesia. They were 
seen as racial others, much more than the Indo-Dutch, but also as temporary 
guests, as a result of which it was neither thought possible nor necessary to 
“integrate” them into Dutch society (Laarman 2013: 1243). In the Netherlands, 
they were discharged from the army, denied Dutch citizenship, and housed in 
camps with virtually no government assistance. They were thus literally placed 
“outside society” and not given the opportunity to become part of it.  
 A similar approach was adopted by the Dutch government concerning 
“guest labourers” or “foreign workers,” terms used to describe low-skilled 
labour migrants who were recruited from Mediterranean countries from the 
mid-1950s onwards to support Dutch industries during the post-war economic 
boom (Penninx 1996). Initially labourers were brought over from Italy, Greece, 
Yugoslavia, Portugal, and Spain, countries that were thought to have a culture 
very different from the Dutch culture. This was even more so for “guest 
labourers” that started to be recruited, or coming at their own initiative, from 
Turkey and Morocco from the 1960s onwards to fulfil the ever increasing 
demand for cheap labour.  
 Expecting to stay in the Netherlands temporarily, most labourers were 
housed on work sites or in cheap pensions. Initially their stay was no political 
issue and the national administration did not feel responsible for their well-
being (Koolen and Tempelman 2003: 6). Instead, local and private initiatives 
were initiated with the goal to assist specific migrant groups, defined on basis 
of their country of origin27 (Van Amersfoort 1974; Rath 1991; Penninx 1996; 
Uitermark 2012). Primarily organized by welfare organizations with a 
conservative Christian base or related to unions, and to a lesser extent by 
municipalities and employers, these facilities were mostly short-term-oriented 
and were created to meet the particular needs of migrants. For example, they 
                                                          
26 Not accepting citizenship of the newly constituted Indonesian state and instead aiming for their 
own independence, the Moluccans were brought over to the Netherlands shortly after 
independence in 1949, in order not to affront the Indonesian government. Although the Dutch 
government stated to support claims of Moluccan independence, this was never substantiated and 
instead it did not take any responsibility for these people. They were supposed to return after a 
short period in the Netherlands, but this did not happen. 
27  Catholic priests were, for example, assisting labour migrants from Spain and Italy. “Turk 
mothers,” or Dutch women, took care of workers from Turkey (Bovenkerk et al. 1985). 
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provided social and mental assistance, or helped with legal and practical 
difficulties migrant workers were facing related to employment and housing. 
 Many of these initiatives understood the problems they wanted to solve as 
having their roots in the specific background of migrants, primarily an ascribed 
cultural otherness, that made it difficult for them to find their way around in 
the Netherlands (Rath 1991: 169). Differences such as being born and raised in 
“impoverished,” “rural,” and “traditional regions,” were thought to be 
incompatible with the Dutch “orderly,” “highly industrialized,” society, 
characterized by a “different work ethos, landsaard (national character), 
habits, and traits” than they were used to (ibid.). Lack of social skills, little 
knowledge of appropriate social behaviour, low education levels and little 
knowledge of Dutch language were thought to be hampering a smooth stay in 
the Netherlands and potentially causing trouble in terms of disorderly 
behaviour of foreigners. 
 So as early as the 1950s and 1960s policy interventions targeting migrants 
are based on the assumption that there are fundamental cultural differences 
between groups of people that cause problems. Though certainly having 
benevolent intentions of assisting migrants, these policies are also premised 
upon a culturalist, nationalist logic that demarcates migrants as non-Dutch and 
sees their otherness as an important reason to help them. This tension between 
social improvement and culturalist expertise would characterize the policy 
domain over the decades to come. It was closely related with the goal of 
keeping public order that was also perceived to be threatened by too much 
diversity. 
 During the 1960s and 1970s various violent incidents took place that were 
interpreted as eruptions of social tensions between “foreigners,” who felt 
unwelcome and worried about their housing and working conditions, and 
“natives,” who felt threatened by migrants because these were allegedly 
occupying scarce social housing, competing for low skilled labour, taking “our 
women and girls,” and “invading our neighbourhoods,” changing their outlook 
and causing nuisance (Rath 1991: 174; Koolen and Tempelman 2003: 11; 
Penninx 1996). There were “ethnic riots,” for example between Italian and 
Spanish labour migrants and local youths in several cities in Twente in the early 
1960s. In 1972, there were clashes in the Afrikaanderwijk in Rotterdam lasted 
a week, because the established population was angry because they had the 
feeling “their” houses were used to shelter labour migrants while they 
themselves had to wait for housing. 
 While these incidents may partly be interpreted as competition among 
socioeconomically marginalized populations over scarce resources, they also 
related to anxieties among the majority population about cultural otherness 
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challenging the Dutch nation (Van Reekum 2016: 29). Political contestation 
about belonging and identity thus has long since been an important motivation 
for policy interventions. Such incidents triggered political debate and gave 
national authorities the idea that something needed to be done, although the 
official government standpoint was that most migrants would return home to 
their countries of origin. Various of my informants recalled how civil servants 
at the Ministry of Culture, Recreation, and Social Work, often seen as the 
epitome of the welfare state, more actively started to attempt improving the 
welfare of migrants from the second half of the 1960s onwards, in order to 
prevent social disorder and conflict (cf. Rath 1991; Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 
2011; Uitermark 2012). 
 They did so by professionalizing and subsidizing the private welfare 
organizations I have just described. Gradually, this ministry would become the 
central actor in this policy field (Uitermark 2012: 48), an institutionalization 
that was related to a growing awareness of the permanent character of the 
settlement of most “migrants” in the Netherlands. Family reunification and 
formation programs for labour migrants that started off in the 1960s and 
continued during the 1970s and 1980s28 were an indication that most “foreign 
workers” were going to stay and that their numbers were increasing. As they 
were less and less considered as “guests,” an increasing need was felt to govern 
their presence in the Dutch nation state (Rath 1991). The reception structures 
that had been developing in response to previous migration waves were 
created for family migrants as well. But also for Dutch moving to the 
Netherlands from former colonies in the West Indies. 
 The migration of “overseas citizens” from the Dutch Antilles, starting from 
the 1960s, and Suriname, especially during the 1970s, to the Netherlands 
further strengthened the idea that migration could pose an enduring threat to 
the Dutch nation.29 This last group, despite being legal citizens of the Dutch 
Kingdom, was not considered to be ethnically Dutch and migration from these 
parts of the kingdom to the Netherlands was discouraged (Schuster 1999; Jones 
2007, 2014). Being defined as racial and cultural others problematized the 
belonging of these citizens in the Netherlands. Their presence was conceived 
                                                          
28 Official recruitment schemes were ended after the 1973 oil crisis when the demand for labour 
dropped and more and more low skilled jobs were relocated from the Netherlands to low-wage 
countries (Rath 1991). But mass unemployment would reach its highpoint during the 1980s 
recession. 
29 People from the Dutch Antilles started to migrate to the Netherlands from then onwards and 
continue to do until today because they are still part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, although 
not defined as ethnic Dutch. Many people from Surinam decided to move to the Netherlands before 
and right after its independence from colonial power the Netherlands in 1975. See Schuster (1999) 
and Jones (2007) for more information. 
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as a threat to “national unity” and economic prosperity. Existing policy 
arrangements were expanded for these groups in order to guide their 
incorporation in Dutch society. In sum, policy measures developed from the 
1950s onwards with the goal of facilitating the “integration” of various migrant 
groups have always been closely related with the ways the Dutch nation state 
has been imagined. 
 
1.1.2 Administering diversification 
Several violent incidents in combination with continuing migration made 
national authorities to increasingly turn to policies addressing the presence of 
“foreigners” in Dutch society as important techniques to prevent tensions and 
conflicts (Prime Minister 197430; Rath 1991: 179). The then government of the 
Labour Party (PvdA), Liberal Democrats (D66) and three conservative Christian 
parties (PPR, KVP and ARP) started to pay more attention to the topic, although 
it was no major political issue yet. During the first half of the 1970s, the 
Ministry of Culture, Recreation, and Social Work aimed to further 
institutionalize the welfare foundations for specific “problem groups” and 
bring more coordination between them by creating a unit at the ministry called 
Migrerende Groepen, or Migrating Groups  (ibid.: 178). Funding was made 
available for “self-organization” and “community development,”31 so people 
could be taught to take care of and emancipate themselves.  
 Several policy interventions aimed to bring relief to deplorable housing 
conditions, difficulties with employers or legal issues (Minister of Social Affairs 
and Public Health et al. 1970). These partly followed the paternalistic logic of 
adapting ill-equipped “foreigners” to the Dutch way of life, but were at the 
same time attuned to let them culturally and socially strengthen their own 
communities. “The goal of these early policies was to keep public order by 
pacifying minorities,” an official working for the Ministry of Interior 
remembered. An objective that had grown in importance in light of the 
deindustrialization of the Dutch economy and consequent unemployment that 
was growing during the second half of the 1970s. This affected the whole 
country, also “natives,” but “foreign workers,” and other “migrating groups” 
                                                          
30 Kamerstukken II 1973-1974, 10 504, nr 9. Memorandum of Reply to the Temporary Report 
[Memorie van antwoord op het tijdelijk rapport].  
A “badly integrated group” was thought to be a source of tensions that may cause conflicts 
31 The Dutch word opbouwwerk is difficult to translate, but refers to interventions to strengthen 
a community in such a way that people who are part of it learn to take care of themselves. This 
was a popular policy approach for the marginalized Dutch underclass in general during those days, 
which was often seen as the heyday of the welfare state. Now it was also thought to be effective 
to alleviate the needs of migrant communities. 
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were very vulnerable, which was seen as a potential cause for social unrest 
and threat to public order.  
 As another closely involved official explained that “if they wanted a club 
house, church or mosque they would get one from CRM [Ministry of Welfare]”. 
Cultural diversity was not positively valued or seen as a policy goal as such, 
but rather used instrumentally to keep order. Originally, the idea was that 
“preservation of their own identity and cultural practices” would facilitate 
their eventual return home (Prime Minister 1974: 10). So the government could 
safeguard the national order by controlling foreigners as temporary guests. 
Around the mid-1970s this changed to an explanation that put more emphasis 
on integration, claiming that a sense of belonging and being part of a (minority) 
community would give them security and support in a strange new country 
(ibid.). 
 Cultivating the otherness of migrants was now also used as a means to 
keep public order and foster stability. Although the recognition among civil 
servants that most migrants would settle permanently in the Netherlands 
meant they were more included, they were eventually supposed to adapt to 
“Dutch society,” which itself was not thought to be changing because of 
migration. In fact, the Dutch government, especially the Ministry of Justice, 
did not want the Netherlands to become or to be recognized as a country of  
immigration, because it was thought to pose a threat to stability and the nation 
(Schuster 1999; Jones 2007; Bonjour 2009).  
 These early initiatives should be interpreted as the demarcation and 
rendering intelligible of a field of governance that aims to administer the 
diversifying Dutch nation state (Li 2007: 7; cf. Rose 1996; Mitchell 2002). Some 
socioeconomically and politically marginalized people living in the Netherlands 
were rendered visible as cultural Others, “foreign workers,” “Moluccans,” 
“Surinamese,” or “Arubans and Antilleans,” 32 by experts such as scholars, 
professionals, and policy makers. Rath (1991: 171) has characterized policy 
interventions aimed at these “minorities” as being based on the same 
paternalistic logic of assimilating, re-educating, re-socializing, and integrating 
the “non-adapted, anti-social” underclass of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century that was primarily socioeconomically marginalized, but was 
problematized by authorities because of their supposed sociocultural non-
conformity. 
 The “bourgeois ideal” of proper citizens in both sociocultural and 
socioeconomic senses (Bonjour and Duyvendak 2017), was also projected onto 
those defined as “minorities,” as they were not only seen as culturally 
                                                          
32 “Repatriates” from Indonesia were thought to be already integrated. 
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different, but they were also occupying low socioeconomic positions. Their 
supposed sociocultural non-conformity was thought to be an indication for, or 
even causing their marginalization (Rath 1991: 125, 169-171). This problem, 
defined as a “cultural deficit” (Essed and Nimako 2006: 289; Mullard et al. 
1991; cf. Schinkel 2007; Ghorashi 2014), could allegedly be amended with help 
of the right policies. Since it is their cultural difference, policies focused 
primarily on amending the capacities of these people. Structural factors such 
as the socioeconomic and political context, the reluctant acceptance of 
migrants by the Dutch people and government, or racialized power relations 
were much less taken into account as cause or solution (Rath 1991: 181-2; Essed 
and Nimako 2006: 290; cf. Ferguson 1994; Li 2007; Lentin 2014). 
 This “minorisation,” or categorizing populations as minorities (Rath 1991: 
171), aimed to make heterogeneous populations and social processes legible 
and amenable to technical policy interventions by ethnically defining the 
boundaries of the domain to be governed and facilitating control (Miller and 
Rose 1990; Rose 1996; Mitchell 2002; Li 2007).33 Arguably, most policy makers 
had benevolent intentions of creating solutions to do something about 
marginalization and help people deemed in need. But at the same time these 
early policy initiatives were grounded in a culturalist expertise that 
constructed social reality rather than objectively reflecting it. The dominant 
lens of interpreting and addressing the presence of particular groups of 
migrants in the Netherlands has been cultural Otherness. 
 Rather than the result of intentional exclusion, I think this outlook of 
policy is the result of a self-evident way of how policy makers looked at society. 
Such sentiments are also present among parts of the population, irrespective 
of these government interventions, but policy does give them legitimacy and 
reinforces categorizations (Shore and Wright 2011). As the Integration Policy 
was gradually developing, institutionalizing and normalizing national 
demarcations and conceptualizations, towards the end of the 1970s problems 
such as unemployment, drug abuse, criminality, or a supposed threat to the 
“unity and harmony of society” (Rath 1991: 181) were increasingly associated 
by politicians and the larger public alike with the foreign culture of migrants. 
As Rath put it, there were growing tensions and anxieties about an “enemy 
within” (ibid.). 
 In this light, it is no surprise that existing policies were not considered to 
be effective enough. An official involved in policy making explained that “these 
                                                          
33  See Rath (1991), Vink (2007) and Duyvendak and Scholten (2012) for arguments why this 
minorisation is not so much the result of pillarization, but rather a continuation of the paternalistic 
logic aiming to control paupers in the early twentieth century. 
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policies brought no structural improvement because they were only reactive 
and because social work is not the right instrument.” Informants recalled that 
there was a growing awareness among policy officials and academics that 
existing policies were not effective enough for improving employment, housing 
conditions, education participation, and legal position (also see Rath 1991: 
180). The Ministry of Culture, Recreation, and Social Work was not only 
criticized for being too much concerned with wellbeing, but was also thought 
to occupy a weak interdepartmental position. Civil servants therefore thought 
it was better to develop it coherently in the context of public governance.34  
 But according to informants who were involved in policy making during 
the 1970s, politicians were not eager to formally acknowledge the presence of 
migrant groups as a permanent phenomenon Therefore, the reorientation of 
the policy system as proposed by civil servants and experts did not materialize 
immediately (also see Bruquetas-Callejo 2011 et al.: 141). It was given 
urgency, however, by a series of violent acts during the 1970s through which 
children of Moluccan migrants wanted to draw attention to what they saw as 
their unfair treatment by the Dutch state. 35  These involved two train 
hijackings, several kidnappings of Indonesian diplomats, and the taking hostage 
of an elementary school class (De Zwart 2012: 304). These acts, some resulting 
in lethal victims, received broad attention and caused much public and 
political debate on the question how people who have been living here for such 
a long time are still not integrated (Rath 1991: 181). 
 In response to these events, government decided to review its policy 
regarding Moluccans and put more emphasis on their inclusion into Dutch 
society by not only focusing on wellbeing, but also on their socioeconomic and 
political position in Dutch society in general (ibid.; Koolen and Tempelman 
2003: 14; De Zwart 2012: 304). As such, it should be understood as a means of 
both keeping public order and addressing the presence of groups that 
challenged the national order. The policy paper about the “Moluccan Minority” 
(Minister of Interior 197836) presented more redistributive policies as technical 
solutions to address the “social problems of the Moluccan Minority in the 
                                                          
34 The policy field at that time was thought to be too scattered (Scholten 2011a: 95-7). The Ministry 
of Justice was responsible for asylum and general admission (residence); the Ministry of Social 
Affairs was responsible for “foreign workers;” and the Ministry Culture, Recreation, and Welfare 
for the reception of admitted refugees, Moluccans and overseas citizens. The Ministry of Social 
Affairs, for example, explicitly held on to the assumption of temporality. 
35  After being housed in camps for several years, Moluccans had been relocated to specific 
neighbourhoods in cities across the country (Laarman 2013). They felt they were left to themselves 
and the government did neither facilitate their integration in Dutch society, nor assist them with 
their political struggle for an independent state. This marginalization had fostered resentment. 
36 Tweede Kamer, zitting 1977-1978, 14 915, nr. 23. The problematic of the Moluccan minority in 
the Netherlands [De problematiek van de Molukse minderheid in Nederland]. 
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Netherlands.” These included improving education and labour market 
participation, providing airtime for radio and television, “combatting drug 
problems among youths,” and making more social housing available. Moreover, 
the Moluccan community would be consulted and asked for advice about 
policies. 
 Subsequently, the approach of other “minorities” was now portrayed as 
pappen en nathouden (soft, reactive, non-effective) and was therefore 
questioned as well. As such, policy officials remembered the Moluccan attacks 
provided a window of opportunity to push for the coordination of a general 
Minorities Policy from the department most concerned with governance, the 
Ministry of Interior (Molleman 2003). During Parliamentary debates on the 
latest instances of Moluccan terrorism, Henk Molleman, a Member of 
Parliament for the Social Democrats, had also called for a more comprehensive 
and substantive approach to “cultural minorities” in order to prevent the “race 
riots” and  the creation of a “racialized underclass” as in the United Kingdom37. 
The newly created Scientific Council for Government Policy had come with a 
similar advice in its Ethnic Minorities report (WRR 1979).  
 The role of scientific knowledge in producing increasingly institutionalized 
expertise (Scholten 2011a), which was also reflected in the Advisory 
Commission Minorities, further testified to the growing importance of the 
policy system and the need to design effective policy interventions. In order 
to contain perceived challenges to the public, social, cultural, and national 
order, society had gradually been made manageable by rendering visible 
“cultural deficits” of those categorized as ethnic Others by creating policy 
interventions that aimed to amend these. The expert knowledge on which 
policies and categories were based represents “minorities” as social facts 
rather than the effect of policy categories. As such, minorization relates to the 
“scientific isolation of abnormalities” as described by Foucault (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1983: 195-6), not only creating a seemingly objective base for 
policies, but also turning the “minorities issue” into a technical problem.  
 Rath (1991: 182-3) has pointed out that there is an ambiguity in the 
expertise underpinning the policy reactions. These were on the one hand 
premised on the recognition to include some groups of migrants as residents, 
while on the other hand problematizing their presence because they are seen 
as non-Dutch. The presence of “minorities” thus was not considered a reason 
for a fundamental political debate about the nature of the Dutch nation state. 
Policies supposed a pre-existing bounded society that did not exist (ibid.: 183). 
                                                          
37 Tweede Kamer, zitting 1977-1978, 14 915, nr. 13. Motion of the member Molleman c.s. [Motie 
van het lid Molleman c.s.]. 
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As a closely involved civil servant recalled: “They had to ‘integrate,’ but into 
what?” Rather, the Dutch nation state can be seen as actually being constituted 
in opposition to “minorities,” who were essentialized as cultural others (cf. G. 
Feldman 2005). As the residence of various “foreigners” was gradually 
acknowledged to be permanent, it not only became a question of public order, 
but also raised the political question what their place was in the Dutch nation 
state. 
 Assigning “minorities” a place outside the Dutch national order effectively 
defined a “majority” of “true Dutch,” who were absolved from reflecting on 
their own position (Schinkel 2007; Ghorashi 2014; cf. Grillo 2003; Vertovec 
2011). Various violent incidents were not interpreted as an indication of how 
the Dutch nation state was changing, but as a valid reason to create policies 
that address and thereby legitimize anxieties about a supposedly naturally 
existing social order being threatened by the presence of migrants. This is a 
performance of legitimate state control in terms of protecting public order by 
preventing social unrest. Founding policies upon such universal principles 
makes it difficult to challenge them (Shore 2011: 171). However, policies were 
thought to fail to bring stated goals of improvement during the 1960s and 1970s 
(Ferguson 1994; Mitchell 2002; Li 2007). The calls for a more comprehensive 
approach are a reaction to this perception of failure, which, as Foucault has 
argued, was seen as proof to reinforce and extend the power of policy (Dreyfus 
and Rabinow 1983: 196). 
 
 
1.2 Integrating ethnic minorities: 1980-1990 
 
We have not been able to operationalize the core principle of the 
policy field, which is coming to a mutual understanding and 
mutual coexistence […] a new conceptualization of society in 
which the majority does not automatically has the primacy to 
demand others to adapt. I still don’t know whether this is because 
of a lack of vision or whether it is just impossible to develop a 
good strategy. 
 
(Retired senior policy official and manager of Directorate) 
 
1.2.1 The Minorities Policy: political assumptions and policy 
measures 
The consensus about the necessity of a more comprehensive and substantive 
approach to what had come to be known as “the minorities issue” pressured 
the government coalition of Christian Democrats (CDA) and Liberals (VVD) to 
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decide in 1979 to create a directorate to coordinate policy solutions (Minister 
of Interior 198038; Prime Minister 198039). Thereby it officially acknowledged 
the permanent presence of “minorities” and the necessity to give coherence 
to the policy system. The Directorate was called Minorities Coordination 
Policy40 and located at the Ministry of Interior, because this department was 
concerned with issues of public governance and order and because it was 
considered to be a neutral place in relation to the particular interests of other 
ministries.41 
 Though the issue of migrant presence and “integration” had become 
politically important, officials remembered there was a “gentlemen’s 
agreement” among mainstream political parties not to politicize the topic (cf. 
Scholten 2011a: 114). It was feared that the politicization of ethnic diversity 
would aggravate social unrest and polarization in society, which would be very 
difficult to control and thus conflict with the goal of protecting the public and 
social order. While not explicitly debating the diversifying Dutch society, the 
developments described in the previous section illustrate it actually was a 
pressing political issue that was deemed in need of government attention. The 
policy paper about the “Moluccan Minority” (Minister of Interior 1978) had 
proposed promoting equal position, more recognition and fighting 
marginalization as solutions to such possible threats. 
 The Directorate was to give shape to such redistributive and emancipatory 
interventions, with the aim of “integrating” and thereby pacifying “minorities” 
(De Zwart 2012; Van Reekum 2016). Thus, it was never the intention to create 
a multicultural society in the moral-legal sense of institutionalizing cultural 
pluralism as a goal in itself (Kymlicka 2010; Duyvendak and Scholten 2012). The 
                                                          
38  Tweede Kamer, zitting 1979–1980, 16 102, nr. 2. Principles of the organisation of the 
coordinated minorities policy [Hoofdlijnen van de organisatie van het gecoördineerde 
minderhedenbeleid]. 
39 Tweede Kamer, zitting 1979–1980, 16 102, nr. 6.  Reaction of the government to the report 
“Ethnic minorities” of the WRR [Regeringsreactie op het rapport “Etnische minderheden” van de 
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid]. 
40 As I have explained in the Introduction of this dissertation, because of the changes in name and 
location of the Directorate initiated by successive governments, which I will discuss during the 
course of this chapter, I refer to it throughout this thesis as “the Directorate.” 
41 For example, there was competition with the Ministry of Culture, Recreation, and Welfare, which 
had been actively involved in the decades before and therefore considered itself to be the rightful 
owners of the policy field. As explained, too much focus on welfare was seen as undesirable. 
Similarly, the ministries of Justice, Employment, and Education were also thought to represent 
too vested interests. Involved officials recalled how the Secretary General of the Prime Minister’s 
Cabinet eventually decided to locate it at the Ministry of Interior. Politically the policy domain 
also had to be “neutral,” which may be one of the reasons the Minister of Interior Hans Wiegel, 
who was member of the Liberal Party, appointed Social Democrat Molleman as director. As I 
explain in chapters 3 and 4, the concept of neutrality more fundamentally. 
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Minorities White Paper (Minister of Interior 1983: 11), for example, stressed 
that members of minorities “have to make an effort to master social skills – 
including the Dutch language – necessary” for participation in Dutch society and 
that “it goes without saying that people from minority groups have to respect 
the fundamental values and norms of the Dutch rule of law.” Indeed, from a 
government perspective of control it was found important to make 
“minorities” feel at home by allowing them their own identiteitsbeleving, or 
experiencing their own identity.42 
 But it was at the same time made clear that if values and norms should 
conflict with “fundamental norms of Dutch society,” the position of women 
and individual freedom are explicitly mentioned, there was no doubt that the 
“culture of the majority is anchored in Dutch society” and therefore a 
confrontation with minority cultures was considered “a priori unequal” (ibid.: 
107-8).43 “Dutch society” was thus explicitly defined from the perspective of a 
“native majority,” which was seen as the neutral status quo. The targeting of 
“ethnic groups” or “other cultures” was thus primarily instrumental to the 
goals of appeasement, control and defining the norm instead of a way of 
valuing different cultures as equal. But policies were also premised on ideals 
of emancipation and improvement. 
 Because at the same time, the Minorities White Paper seemed to highlight 
a more inclusive and structural approach compared to the interventions in 
place during the decades before, because the main goal underpinning policies 
was that minorities should “have an equal place and full possibilities for 
development” in the Netherlands (ibid.: 10). Moreover, “minorities are not 
merely residing in ‘our society,’ but this ‘society’ is also their society and ‘our’ 
means including members of minority groups” (ibid.: 14). This somewhat 
cryptic sentence actually meant it was recognized that migrants should be 
considered as full citizens of the Netherlands, which also would imply 
reconceptualizing the Dutch nation and society. Indeed, to a certain extent 
policies were aimed at equal rights and recognition of cultural and religious 
diversity. But this turned out to be difficult to realize, especially because 
categorizing some as being outside the national community conflicted with this 
goal. 
                                                          
42 Also because other “identity groups” in the Netherlands, such as Catholics and various Protestant 
denominations, had the same rights. 
43 As Bonjour and Duyvendak explain: “As a matter of fact, the state and private institutions have 
done their utmost to get these Others to adjust to the dominant life style, in other words, to 
change them. Thus, in the 1980s, the Dutch state was attributed both the capacity to improve 
migrants’ position in Dutch society (by making them adapt to Dutch culture), and the responsibility 
to do so” (2017: 5). 
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 This was partly because the policy rationale of improving social conditions 
was primarily premised on fixing alleged cultural deficits. The Minorities White 
Paper, the official document in which policy plans were presented, built on 
the knowledge and interventions that had been shaping the policy domain 
during the decade before. It also drew heavily on the Ethnic Minorities Report 
(WRR 1979), which, as one official recalled, provided the expertise that 
determined policy goals and the tools needed to realize them. Many officials 
involved also had a personal engagement with improving the position of 
“minorities”, rather than the more political goals of protecting the public and 
national order. A common assumption was the idea that people were facing 
difficulties because of their background and therefore needed assistance with 
their integration. 
 As explained in the previous section some migrant groups had “been 
ideologically and politically made into ‘minorities’” (Rath 1991: 189). Now, the 
existing interventions were used as a confirmation to determine their status as 
problem group (also see De Zwart 2012; Essed and Nimako 2006).44 Defined 
target groups were “caravan dwellers”45 and “legally residing members of 
ethnic minority groups,” specified as “Moluccans, Surinamers, Antilleans, 
foreign workers and their families from countries of selection, gypsies, and 
refugees” (Minister of Interior 1983: 11). There is a certain arbitrariness in this 
choice, as has been argued by several policy officials (also see Molleman 2003: 
64), which was the result of political weighing of interests related to costs and 
effects. They also explained it was an artificial construction, because of the 
diversity within “groups” and the difficulties of unifying the variety of migrants 
coming from a specific country.  
 So policy makers categorized heterogeneous collections of people in 
neatly defined groups, in order to make society legible and governable (Rose 
1996; Scott 1998; Mitchell 2002; Yanow 2003). According to informants, those 
groups were categorized that were large enough and were seen as outsiders, 
both because of their socioeconomically marginalization and because they 
                                                          
44 Another reason why this categorization was chosen was because the term “migrants” was not 
considered to be an option, as it would imply an official recognition the Netherlands had become 
and would remain a country of immigration. “Minority” indicated the arrival of these migrants was 
a unique event. “Foreigners” was not seen as inclusive enough. It is, furthermore, both interesting 
and striking to read how former director Molleman (2003: 64) argues how they did not succeed in 
defining what constitutes an “ethnic minority.” 
45 Like the paupers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these marginalized people 
were considered to be non-adapted to mainstream society, especially because they had history of 
nomadism, making them illegible and difficult for the government to control. They were made 
subject of the minorities policy because there was a felt need to incorporate these people into 
Dutch society, just like the other defined minorities. Because the political and public debate and 
the vast majority of the policies focuses on migrant minorities, I do not focus on this group of 
caravan dwellers and also do not pay much attention to gypsies. 
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were perceived to be culturally and ethnically very different from “native 
Dutch” (cf. Rath 1999; Bonjour and Duyvendak 2017). In other words, those 
who were considered to be residing somewhere outside Dutch society, that was 
so constructed as problem free (cf. Schinkel 2013: 1146), which explains why 
gypsies and caravan dwellers were also included. As such, policy 
categorizations were linked to anxieties related to national belonging and 
economic welfare, conflating ethnicity and class, and promoting bourgeois 
ideals. 
 Policy categories effectively demarcated those residents that were 
considered to not automatically belong to the Dutch nation, based on assumed 
ethnic and cultural backgrounds, thus consolidating a national order that is 
based on essentialist notions of ethnically bounded groups as strangers, 
intruding on a neutral and culturally homogeneous national space (Wimmer and 
Glick Schiller 2002; Grillo 2003; G. Feldman 2005; Silverstein 2007). Policies 
thus were related to imaginations of the Dutch nation state as belonging to a 
dominant group, rather than being grounded in multicultural ideals. Otherness 
was primarily defined in cultural and ethnic terms, determined by one’s place 
of birth and “non-Western” backgrounds (Essed and Nimako 2006: 300-1). In 
this way, policy categories naturalized nativist conceptualization of Dutch 
society and “the fatal strangeness of the ‘other’” (Maeso 2015: 66; cf. Stolcke 
1995). 
 This political outlook was translated in a set of policy measures that have 
a less political outlook and focused more on specific techniques to realize 
“integration.” The Minorities White Paper presented the main objective of the 
policy field as providing (members of) minorities “an equal position and full 
possibilities for development” (Minister of Interior 1983: 10). It stated to 
realize this through the following sub goals: 1) to create conditions necessary 
to let minorities culturally emancipate and fully participate in society, and also 
to stimulate mutual adaptation and acceptation; 2) decrease socioeconomic 
marginalization; 3) prevent and fight discrimination” (Minister of Interior 1983: 
11). Various policy interventions aimed at improving social conditions were 
created and implemented to realize these goals. In Text box 1.1 I give an 
overview of the most important ones. Here I address the results these measures 
did and did not have.  
 As the first sub goal is concerned, this was, on the one hand, given 
substance by interventions aiming to provide a sense of belonging, such as 
stimulating “self-organizations” and facilitating cultural and religious 
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practices.46 Policy makers primarily considered minority organization as a way 
of controlling communities, as I shall explain below, and consultation was more 
about appeasement than substantial influence. Like during previous decades, 
cultural emancipation was instrumental to the envisioned smooth 
incorporation of “minorities” into Dutch society, which itself was not 
understood to be changing because of migration (Schinkel 2007; Slootman and 
Duyvendak 2015; Van Reekum 2016). This has been characterized as 
“indifferent multiculturalism” in the sense that “migrants were tolerated as 
absolute others” (Ghorashi 2014: 113). 
 Indeed, the institutionalization of otherness was an important aspect of 
the Integration Policy that was developed during the 1980s. However, my 
analysis of policies during this decade also reveals their ambiguity. Although 
assumptions about national belonging shaped the outlook of policy, it has not 
necessarily been created as being “indifferent.” Informants working at the 
Directorate at that time recalled they were concerned with the fate of 
“minorities” and they had the intention to improve the position of marginalized 
groups, aiming for equality and inclusion and by doing so improve society at 
large. At the same time they diagnosed culture as explanation for the backlog 
of “minorities” in many socioeconomic areas and thus as an important problem 
to fix. 
 So on the one hand migrants were more included, for example through 
political participation by giving them voting rights, or by successfully 
facilitating access to healthcare and other public institutions. But on the other 
hand this did not mean a real equal position and valuation of minorities. It 
turned out to be difficult to realize the goal of “mutual adaptation and 
acceptation.” According to a retired official, it was hard to operationalize the 
goal of coming to new understandings of Dutch society into “concrete methods 
and techniques to take along that majority” (cf. Li 2007: 17). In fact, some 
policies reified the existence of ethnic or religious Others, for example 
measures that addressed the participation of “Muslim girls” in education, work, 
and healthcare (Minister of Interior 1983: 125-130).  
 These are premised on specific conceptualizations of the position of 
women in Islam and the need to improve it. Policies targeted women because 
they were thought to be “predominantly living according to traditional norms 
and values” and need help with their emancipation (ibid.: 123). Furthermore, 
policies targeting “deprived youth” (“randgroepjongeren”) (ibid.: 142) can be 
                                                          
46 Like other religious communities in the Netherlands, people should be accommodated in terms 
of holding religious services, following burial rites and food prescriptions (Minister of Interior 
1983:111). Other rights, such as education in their “own language,” were seen as instrumental to 
a smooth integration. 
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seen as a predecessor of policies aimed at preventing radicalization and 
criminality, which I describe further on in this chapter, that use “ethnicity” as 
an important indicator. Such policies may have helped to foreclose rather than 
stimulate a political debate about the changing character of the Dutch nation 
state. In later policy papers, thinking about the Dutch nation state beyond the 
perspective of those defined as the “native majority” is not even mentioned 
anymore, as this perspective was institutionalized as the neutral, self-evident 
status quo. 
 How did the second sub-goal of decreasing socioeconomic marginalization 
materialize? As I describe in Text box 1.1, various interventions were created 
that aimed at alleviating marginalization in education, housing, employment 
and well-being. In other words, unequal access “minorities” were thought to 
have to specific social domains was attempted to be improved. Ameliorating 
Text box 1.1 Policy interventions 
 
Within the following subdomains various goals were set that were to be 
translated in concrete programs and interventions, some of some which more 
successful than others  (Minister of Interior 1983). 
 
− Education: money to invest in extra education facilities based on number of 
pupils form “minorities” [gewichtenregeling], improving accessibility, 
stimulating contact between school and parents, providing education in “own 
language,” providing Dutch language classes and adult education; 
− Housing: improve quality of houses, accessibility, subsidizing social housing, 
improve position on waiting lists, ameliorate “deteriorated neighbourhoods,” 
for both “minorities” and “Dutch;” 
− Employment: make state institutions and other employers hire “minorities,” 
stimulate entrepreneurship, provide courses; 
− Wellbeing and emancipation: community building, youth and social work, 
facilitate minorities organizations, facilitate practicing of religion, finance 
cultural projects in such fields as sports, arts, and libraries, make healthcare 
accessible, facilitate broadcasting, create consultative bodies that would 
institutionalize in the National Advisory and Consultancy Structure in 1985; 
− Legal position and accessibility of public institutions: stimulate political 
participation, provide voting rights, anti-discrimination measures, legal 
assistance and accessibility; facilitate naturalization (which turned from a 
favour into a right under new 1984 Act on Dutch citizenship (Groenendijk 
2011a: 339));  
− Coordination of research: monitoring the “progress of minorities” in various 
domains such as employment and education, primarily through statistical data; 
− Restricting immigration, stimulating remigration: regulations to (financially) 
facilitate remigration; preventing illegal migration and restricting labour 
migration.  
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(interviews, Minister of Interior 1990 47 ). Fighting marginalization in 
employment and education, however, was a few years later deemed 
unsuccessful (ibid.; WRR 1989; Minister of Interior 1994). This was partly 
attributed to characteristics of “minorities” such as cultural background, low 
education levels, unfamiliarity with customs and little participation in 
networks, which seem to be related to alleged cultural deficiencies (Mullard 
et al. 1991; Essed and Nimako 2006; Lentin 2014).  
 At the same time, the “conscious and unconscious practices of side-lining 
[achterstelling]” by employers was also seen as an important explanation for 
unemployment (Minister of Interior 1983: 90). This brings me to the third sub-
goal of preventing discrimination. This was to be effectuated through 
techniques that aimed at improving the legal position of “members of 
minorities” and through anti-discrimination measures targeting employers and 
state institutions. Whereas stimulating the employment of “minorities” in state 
institutions was considered a reasonable success, it turned out to be more 
difficult to realize this with other employers. Discrimination was not addressed 
as a structural phenomenon caused by the dominant position of a white 
majority in the Netherlands, but instead defined as objectionable behaviour of 
individuals (Essed and Nimako 2006: 302). This not only led to limited results, 
but also may have naturalized marginalization because it denied the influence 
of power relations (cf. Lentin 2014; Maeso 2015). 
 This analysis of the assumptions and workings of policy measures making 
up the Minorities Policy shows that most interventions were grounded in ideals 
of emancipating the marginalized, but did not value multiculturalism as a goal. 
As during previous decades, intentions to assist those having difficulties 
because of a background that indeed differs from many born and raised in the 
Netherlands may be genuine. However, at the same time policy interventions 
have also been concerned with questions about national identity. Thus being 
part of a political debate, the Minorities Policy has been primarily represented 
as a mere instrument of improvement, apolitical and focusing on 
emancipation. Its assumptions and limited results point at the political function 
of protecting the nation, which may also be related to perceptions of its 
failure. 
 Informants recalled that within a couple of years many policy 
interventions were increasingly criticized by various actors in the policy field 
for being unsuccessful. Policy failure was not necessarily attributed to the 
                                                          
47 Minister of Interior (1990), Kamerstukken II 1989-1990, 21 472, nr. 3. Standpoint of the Cabinet 
regarding the WRR report “Immigration Policy” [Kabinetsstandpunt inzake het WRR-rapport 
“Allochtonenbeleid”]. 
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expertise underpinning policies that mainly problematized alleged cultural 
differences, but rather to their “soft” nature and exclusive focus on 
“minorities.” Policies did not speak to those defined as “natives.” Moreover, 
as one involved civil servant explained, “many of these measures were 
intentional in the sense that they are directed at the attitudes of people, but 
you cannot control the free will of people in a liberal democracy.” Another 
factor complicating the effectivity of policies was the bureaucratic 
organization and means of implementation. For a complete understanding of 
the functioning of the policy domain, I now turn to the ways in which the 
Directorate set out to create and implement the policies described above. 
 
1.2.2 A bureaucratic outsider and political symbol 
Officials who took part in setting up the Directorate explained that the original 
idea was it would only be a small coordinating directorate that would actively 
incite other official organizations to start paying attention to and create 
policies for “minorities,” but would itself be dissolved as soon as other 
administrative bodies had established durable policies. Some saw themselves 
as a small group of activists, “a Gideon’s lot,” or engaged front runners that 
were to shake things up and make sure the “minorities issue” would be resolved 
rapidly 48 . Henk Molleman, the former Member of Parliament who was 
appointed as first director, was seen as an activist and a good deal of the policy 
officials, who were attracted from other ministries, cities, and social work, 
defined themselves as equally engaged. The Directorate was to coordinate 
policies both at the national and the local level.49 To this end, the organization 
was structured in a division “Horizontal coordination” and a division “Vertical 
and Groups Coordination.” 
 The latter was responsible for giving substance to the goals of the 
minorities policy at the local level, “where the actual process of integration 
takes place.” The former manager of this division explained that the Group 
Coordination was not really about coordination, but about “digging canals so 
we would get entrance to key figures and key organizations within the 
minorities.” Minority organizations are primarily a result of state policy and 
officials recognized the ambiguity because “there were all kinds of conflicts 
                                                          
48 Informants remembered this construction phase as an energetic, open, informal, and therefore 
very interesting time. But, as they remembered, because Molleman was more of an activist, not 
educated in bureaucracy, he also had troubles getting things done. 
49  This reflects the assumption that the “integration of minorities” was a problem of 
administration. 
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piled up within such a group and it was difficult to keep them around one 
table.” Nonetheless, consultation with minority organizations became 
institutionalized.50 They were deemed important not only to give minorities 
the feeling they were taken seriously by the government, a form of 
pacification, but primarily to keep an eye on what they were doing. Knowledge 
of what was going on was thought to be important for being able to govern, 
while regular contact was seen as a technique of preventing crisis such as the 
Moluccan attacks during the 1970s.51 
 The former manager continued to explain that “Vertical coordination” 
meant administering municipalities, “preaching Molleman’s gospel to city 
councils.” As another former official put it, this primarily entailed “taking 
them by the hand and letting them discover they had a responsibility and that 
it was in their own interest to create policies regarding ‘their’ minorities” (cf. 
Minister of Interior 1983:  164-5). He continued to explain: “we literally 
travelled through the country to talk to local civil servants and aldermen who 
were working on community development, youth affairs, or neighbourhood 
problems, it could be anything.” Funding was made available so cities could 
start developing “their own initiatives, develop instruments, appoint 
coordinators.” The success of these efforts differed from case to case, but in 
general civil servants working in the policy domain reflected on them as 
primarily having had short-term effects. 
 An equally important part of the work of the Directorate was the 
coordination of policies at the national level, with other ministries, which was 
called the division Horizontal Coordination. “Most policies were the 
responsibility of other ministers, who suddenly had to take into account this 
typical domain of minorities, which was rather difficult to realize,” as one 
official explained. Other departments would not automatically share the goals 
of the Minorities Policy and collaborate with the Directorate.52 One official 
explained that “we were an outsider, to every part of that state bureaucracy, 
because we were coordinating and they were asking, what are you 
coordinating, what is your influence and where is your power?” Other 
departments were not always automatically convinced of the use of specific 
minorities policies, nor were they willing to “sacrifice” budget and man power 
to it. 
                                                          
50 This became codified in the National Advisory and Consultation Structure Minorities in 1985. See 
Text box 1.1 
51 The peaceful reactions to the Rushdie affair in 1989 were mentioned by informants as an 
example of this. 
52 This was also the case within their own department as I will make clear in Chapter 3. 
61
The Integration Policy: Creating Order
73 
  To have some leverage, the Interdepartmental Coordination Commission 
Minorities policy was created, in which high ranking officials from various 
departments came together monthly to prepare decision making for the Sub 
Council of Ministers responsible for the Minorities Policy (Minister of Interior 
1983: 163). Yet despite some degree of success of the Commission in putting 
the issue of ethnic minorities on the political and policy agendas, officials 
recalled it was difficult to achieve concrete structural results. Most 
departments remained unwilling to commit themselves fully to the Minorities 
Policy. In Text box 1.2, I describe some of the examples officials gave to 
illustrate the frustration they experienced in terms of the disinterest of other 
ministries. 
 Although over the years the Directorate was encapsulated in the 
bureaucratic field, as it expanded and became more formalized, this did not 
really change the weak interdepartmental position it had. Politically the policy 
field was not important enough, as some officials argued, to enforce 
cooperation of other departments. The relatively small budget 53 that was 
available for the policy field is also an indication of this. Similarly, it was 
difficult to fight prejudice and discrimination among employers and the larger 
public, because these actors were not really held accountable by politicians 
and other departments. The complications of coordinating and implementing 
policy measures thus made it difficult to be really effective in the “hard” sub 
domains of employment and education  (WRR 1989: 9-10; Minister of Interior 
1990; Minister of Interior 1994: 14-5). 
 
  
                                                          
53 See Appendix II for an overview.  
Text box 1.2 Interdepartmental struggles 
 
Several policy domains had been designated as being important areas for the 
Minorities Policy, itself defined as “an assembly of measures and points of 
attention of various authorities, departments, services, institutions and 
organizations” (Minister of Interior 1983: 162). But it was not clear who had 
chief responsibility for specific policies in the various domains of intervention, 
as informants explained: the Directorate could officially only “coordinate” and 
was heavily dependent on other policy fields. Even the writing of the Minorities 
White Paper had been difficult, because of negotiations with other 
departments, especially since they were not willing to write about their own 
policy fields in the context of the minorities policy.  
 
(text continues on next page) 
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 In general it is typical of state bureaucracies that long standing 
administrative bodies are not eager to change and distrust newcomers. 
Moreover, it takes time before you build a network and become a familiar face 
and the Directorate not taken seriously by established bureaucratic 
organizations; they were sometimes also seen as a threat to established policy 
structures, who “saw our integration policy as unwanted interference with 
their kingdoms.”. Although the Directorate had attracted officials from other 
departments in order to have a foothold in the national bureaucracy, it 
remained an outsider.  
 Collaboration between ministries was institutionalized in the 
Interdepartmental Commission Minorities Policy (ICM): The departments 
involved covered the areas of employment, education, housing, healthcare and 
welfare (Minister of Interior 1983: 163). Moreover, the ministries of Justice, 
General Affairs (the Prime Minister’s department) and Financial Affairs watched 
over the general policy lines of the government and the budget.” The task of 
this Interdepartmental Commission was to prepare decision making for the 
Council of Ministers, so it involved high ranking civil servants.  
 In practice, collaboration did not run very smoothly. There was a 
particularly tense relation with the Ministry of Welfare, because this 
department had also wanted to coordinate Minorities Policy and felt they had 
the first right to give shape to the new directorate. Some involved officials 
talked of a “competition urge” which would last for a considerable time. They 
also remembered there was an “endemic tension” with the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and the Ministry of Justice and, to lesser extent with the Ministry of 
Public Housing and the Ministry of Education. 
 The following quotes from policy officials not only illustrate the difficulties 
of defining the boundaries of the integration policy domain and getting other 
actors to cooperate, it is also an example of policy ambiguity. 
 
SZW [the Ministry of Social Affairs] has never acknowledged that you 
should pay specific attention to ethnic minorities. For them it was just 
labour market. There were only people on the labour market and 
people outside of it. 
 
Another official: 
 
there was an endemic tension with SZW [..] because then minister 
Bert de Vries and his civil servants, although being in favour of 
getting more minorities to work, did not want a coordinating 
minister up their back. There was also a tension with the Ministry of 
Justice, who were not keen on language requirements for those who 
could naturalize, because then a “lake” would form. 
 
These quotes reveal the difficulty of taking other actors along, as the policy 
field was not very important to other parts of the national bureaucracy. After 
some years the name of the Directorate was even changed in Principles 
Minorities Policy, dropping the Coordination so as not to offend other 
departments. Another aspect, which I further tease out in the coming chapters, 
is how civil servants tend to think from their own expertise. Relatedly, it 
indicates how difficult it is to determine what the policy domain is about, 
besides “treating minorities differently.” 
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 So although politically it was found important to have a policy system for 
the “integration of minorities” in order to prevent alleged disorder, it was not 
important enough to really make an effort for it. Informants explained that 
successive responsible Ministers of Interior did not really engage themselves 
with the Integration Policy or have a clear idea about what policies to create. 
It seems as though the symbolic performance of governing processes of 
migration and diversification is more important to politicians than actually 
thinking about how to politically engage the changing fabric of society. There 
was a tension between protecting dominant Dutch norms and values on the one 
hand, and constitutional rights that protect the religion, identity,  and culture 
of “minorities” on the other, which was also seen as instrumental to the goal 
of “integration.” But clear conceptualizations of what exactly this should 
entail in terms of a shared national order have never been developed. 
 As I have mentioned earlier, there was consensus among political parties 
in the House of Representatives not to politicize the policy field (Fermin 1997: 
223). In political debates, “minorities” were not explicitly mentioned as a 
threat to the national community. The only one explicitly voicing anti-
immigrant sentiments, Hans Janmaat of the Center Party, was placed outside 
the political order. As one official remembered “it was not so sour yet at that 
time, we made fun of him.” But as Ghorashi (2014) and Van Reekum (2016) 
have pointed out, Janmaat voiced a radical version of commonly held views 
about cultural otherness being the root of many social problems and of their 
incompatibility with the Dutch nation. 
 The creation of technical measures did not take away anxieties among 
“native Dutch” related to belonging and identity. In fact, these may have been 
reinforced by policies because they deepened the demarcation between “real 
Dutch” and migrant Others. During the 1980s, for example, the Netherlands 
was going through an economic recession, causing an increase in 
unemployment in general but especially affecting former “guest workers,” 
because of the decline of labour intensive sectors in which they had been 
employed (Scholten 2011a: 136). This was primarily considered a failure of 
their integration. Furthermore, an increase in the number of refugees arriving 
during this period caused perceptions of an uncontainable stream of foreigners 
threatening the Dutch nation state. Family reunification and formation 
continued, especially from Turkey and Morocco, expanding these “ethnic 
minorities.” 
 This directed the political debate increasingly to these groups, for 
example reflected in worries about “high criminality rates of Moroccan youths” 
(Minister of Interior 1994; Schinkel 2007). Such “anxious politics” (cf. Modest 
and De Koning 2016) was also related to Islam, which was deemed to become 
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too visible in the public domain, a trend reinforced by the Rushdie controversy 
(Uitermark 2012: 82). As one official explained, “the resentment against 
foreigners among the electorate was becoming more visible.” Increasingly, 
people who were born in the Netherlands or who had become Dutch citizens 
were primarily seen as members of minorities, as non-Dutch in terms of where 
they belong. Policies normalized the idea of the Netherlands as a problem free, 
homogenous nation and consolidated the dominant position of the majority 
population (Essed and Nimako 2006; Schinkel 2007; Ghorashi 2009).  
 The Minorities Policy that was adopted during the 1980s as strategy of 
government had promised more effective policy measures aiming to improve 
the position of migrant Others in Dutch society. Specifically aimed at the 
socioeconomic emancipation of minorities, the hope was that this would  
enable their smooth incorporation into Dutch society. Because most policies 
did not yield promised results, while being premised on expertise that defined 
some parts of the population as non-Dutch, an important effect of policies has 
been institutionalizing the Dutch national order. As the Minorities Policy self-
evidently problematized the presence, and alleged cultural differences, of 
“minorities,” it defined a “native majority” and depoliticized its dominant 
position. 
  “Minorities” were rendered objects of policy, in need of “integration,” 
rather than subjects in the political process of redefining conceptualization of 
Dutch society (cf. Arendt 2006). Policies aimed to pacify them so as to forestall 
their political claims and instead naturalized particular conceptualizations of 
the Dutch nation state as the only possible order (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; 
Shore 2011; Müller 2011; cf. Ferguson 1994; Li 2007). Policies further 
depoliticized the presence of migrants because of their aims of technical 
improvement, based on seemingly objective expertise. The majority position 
from which they were created was considered the neutral status quo. State 
involvement was, moreover, legitimized by claiming to serve the general 
interest of public order, as if policies had no part in a politics of belonging.  
 When, within a few years, there was an increasing sense of policy failure, 
this was therefore primarily attributed to the objects of policy. Informants 
reflected “all attention paid to the position of minorities” as having resulted 
in giving the impression to the majority that these groups were “pampered” 
and had been “cuddled too much” (also see Bonjour 2009; Uitermark 2012; Van 
Reekum 2016). Accordingly, there was criticism that minorities had been made 
into subjects of care (zorgcategorieën), being too dependent on government 
policies (WRR 1989; Minister of Interior 1994). This shows how quickly after its 
inception, the Integration Policy was criticized for and represented as being 
“too soft” and “too multicultural.” Five years after publication of the 
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Minorities White Paper (Minister of Interior 1983), “minorities” were thought 
to be at “too great a distance from society,” primarily meaning their 
marginalization in the domains of education, employment. These perceptions 
of failure raised calls for policy change. 
  
 
1.3 “We really had to get serious”: 1990-2000 
 
Dutch society has seen substantial changes over the past decade. 
[…] after such a period it is desirable to systematically analyze the 
existing policy framework in light of an effective integration and, 
if necessary, adapt it to new insights. A decisive benchmark for a 
new policy framework is the effectivity in solving the dilemmas in 
a multicultural Netherlands.  
 
(Minister of Interior 1994: 10) 
 
1.3.1 The Integration Policy: politics translated in policy 
During the early 1990s, the place of migrants and their descendants in Dutch 
society more prominently entered public and political debate, focusing on 
Islam in particular (Prins and Saharso 2010; Uitermark 2012; Duyvendak and 
Scholten 2012; Van Reekum 2016). In 1991, a few years after the Rushdie 
controversy, Frits Bolkestein, then leader of the VVD, was the first mainstream 
politician to question the position of foreign, i.e. “non-Western” or “Islamic,” 
cultures in Dutch society. He argued for the need to protect Dutch culture by 
means of a “more daring and creative solution” for the “difficult problem of 
the integration of minorities,” without “leniency and taboos” (Bolkestein 
1991). Politicians increasingly felt pressure to address “dilemmas in a 
multicultural society” and come up with “solutions,” according to some 
officials partly to prevent others to capitalize on the electoral discontent.  
 In response, then Minister of Interior Ien Dales (PvdA) initiated a so-called 
National Minorities Debate (Minister of Interior 199254) about the position of 
minorities in Dutch society (Van Reekum 2016). After decades of deliberate 
depoliticization, the policy domain now became subject to more open political 
debate and planning (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). More emphasis was put 
on how cultural and religious diversity in Dutch society, Islam was explicitly 
                                                          
54  Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1991-1992, 22 314, nr. 9. Societal Debate Minorities 
[Maatschappelijk debat over de integratie]. 
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mentioned, may impede the goal of “integration,” although it was stressed 
that constitutional rights such as freedom of religion hold equally for everyone 
living in the Netherlands. To channel concerns and address these issues, 
politicians looked at the integration policy field, despite the fact that it was 
being criticized for being ineffective. As such, it was a good example of how 
once in place, policies are not fundamentally questioned, but reformed instead 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 196). 
 Several informants who took part in reframing the Integration Policy 
explained that a small group of politicians, high ranking policy officials and 
social scientists organized closed “work conferences” in 1992, in order to come 
up with harder interventions that could address perceived problems and 
popular concerns. At the same time, high ranking officials at the Ministry of 
Interior and the Directorate aimed to strengthen the position of the Directorate 
in the Dutch national administration. New legislative measures were thought 
to improve its bureaucratic power position. The Scientific Council for 
Government Policy had been asked, already back in 1987, to come with new 
advice in order to revise the expertise, on the basis of which the policy domain 
could be renewed (Scholten 2011a; Entzinger 2014). 
 The report, entitled Allochtonenbeleid (tellingly translated as Immigrant 
Policy), had been published in 1989 and it provided a clear rationale for policy 
change. It advocated for an individual approach instead of the minorities’ logic 
that focused on groups, putting more emphasis on the self-reliance of migrants 
and members of minorities through employment. Too many of them were 
thought to be too dependent on social benefits, “remaining in a marginal 
position and failing to participate effectively in society” (WRR 1989: 10). It 
defined the necessity for policy change explicitly in terms of previous policies 
having adverse effects, primarily because they treated minorities too much as 
subjects in need of government care (ibid.: 16-7). 
 Burgerschap, meaning citizenship, was put forward as a central policy 
concept. In line with the general political trend of neoliberal reforms and 
“activating citizenship,” all Dutch citizens were considered responsible for 
success in their own lives and for society as a whole (cf. Schinkel and Van Houdt 
2010; Rose 1996).55 On the one hand, the policy domain was made more 
inclusive by explicitly defining members of “minorities” as Dutch citizens who 
                                                          
55 Like the Minorities Policy was a specific branch of general welfare and emancipation ideals in 
the 1970s and 1980s, this reform was a specific effect of general political developments as well. 
See for example Van Gunsteren 2009. Later reports (Pre-study Citizenship 1992; Policy Follow-up 
Minorities Debate 1994) further developed the idea of citizenship, as a central policy concept. 
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have the right to be offered opportunities to “participate in society.” On the 
other hand, they were held responsible for making an effort themselves to 
“integrate,” primarily defined as having employment, but also strongly 
implying overcoming their supposed cultural deficit. To underline the 
individual approach, the report reintroduced56 the category “allochthones” 
(WRR 1989: 19-21).  
 Literally it means “not from native soil,” as in rock or mineral formations, 
but which here was initially defined as “all aliens in legal sense, former aliens 
who have been naturalized, Dutch from overseas areas, and their descendants 
of the third generation” (ibid.: 15).57 It was meant to create a neutral category 
for people in need of governance assistance because of their migration 
background, and the term lent a sort of impartial, scientific credibility to the 
notion. As I will explain extensively in the next chapter, de facto the same 
groups were problematized on the same grounds as during the Minorities 
Policy, and it seemed as if the core of the problem defined had more to do 
with “foreignness” as such than with migration and marginalization (Korteweg 
and Triadafliopoulos 2015; Yanow and Van der Haar 2013). It also indicated 
how more formal inclusion in terms of granting citizenship fostered the need 
to have clear categorizations of who really belongs (cf. Geschiere 2009; 
Ghorashi 2014). Instead of categorizing various “minorities,” the term 
“allochthon” lumps together all Others in one category and demarcates “real” 
from “virtual” Dutch citizens (Schinkel 2010). 
 Citizenship was explicitly conceived as grounded in “fundamental norms 
of our rule of law,” defined as “freedom of speech, self-determination of the 
individual, equality of man and women, separation of state and church” 
(Minister of Interior 1994: 25).58 These aspects all relate to ideas about “Islam” 
as being fundamentally opposed to “Western culture.” A high ranking official 
explained “allochthon” was a “well-chosen term, because it pinpoints the 
remaining problem – we could fix language and employment – of culture and 
own identity, which is the core of being allochthon.” He related this to the 
“growing visibility of resentment against foreigners among the electorate.” A 
                                                          
56 Although introduced before and used in policy documents (for example Minorities White Paper 
1983), it did not really resonate. But it would become a defining term since its use in this report. 
57 This would later be made measurable by designating all persons who are themselves, or have at 
least one parent who is, not born in the Netherlands; later still it would be refined into “Western 
allochthones” and “non-Western allochthones (Netherlands Statistics 1999). People from for 
example Germany, the United States or Sweden are technically allochthones, but not 
problematized as such, therefore the distinction Western - non-western was made. I discuss how 
this terminology relates to the imagination of the Dutch society towards the end of this section 
and in the following chapters. See Yanow and Van der Haar (2013) for an extensive discussion on 
the meaning and effect of the categorization. 
58Freedom of religion and equal treatment for all are not mentioned. 
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few years later, in 1994 the Centre Democrats would become rather sizeable 
in council elections, making the growing discontent with “foreigners” among 
part of the electorate politically relevant (Van Thijn 1994; Fermin 1997). 
Successive governments led by the CDA from 1982 to 1994 were replaced by a 
“purple” coalition of PvdA and VVD, after elections in which “minorities” for 
the first time really became an issue. The new government was eager to take 
up the Integration Policy. 
 In the Contours White Paper (Minister of Interior 1994)  the reorientation 
of the policy domain, and a change in name from Ethnic Minorities Policy into 
Integration Policy59, was announced. Despite the introduction of “allochthon” 
as a new and more general policy category, “four largest minorities groups” 
were defined: “Surinamers,” “Antilleans and Arubans,” “Turks” and 
“Moroccans.” Together with refugees they were categorized as “priority 
groups” because of their growing numbers and continuing marginalized position 
(ibid.: 22, 30)60, which for a large part was explained by their lack of necessary 
knowledge and skills or proper upbringing (ibid.: 24-5; WRR 1989: 18-22). 
“Causes are, amongst others, to be found in the socio-cultural background of 
minority groups and the integration and acculturation problems that follow 
from it” (Minister of Interior 1991: 10). My analysis on the following pages will 
make clear that the Integration Policy became more attuned to the 
responsibility the “receiving society” had as well (Minister of Interior 1994: 5-
6). 
 But in practice, policies continued to be focused “more on the capacities” 
of defined problem groups than on structural conditions (Li 2007: 7). In terms 
of objects of policies and their problematization, the Integration Policy can 
thus be seen as a continuation of the Minorities Policy of the 1980s, aiming to 
solve integration as a problem of cultural Others. What can be considered to 
have changed was that responsibility for emancipating the objects of policies 
shifted from the Dutch state to the objects themselves. The most important 
policy goal was realizing “active citizenship” of “allochthones,” which was 
based on the central, neoliberal principle that they were given equal 
opportunities and rights, but also had the duty to make themselves an extra 
                                                          
59 The name of the Directorate, however, would continue to have the word ‘minorities’ in it until 
2007. After being shortly called Principles Minorities Policy, from 1994 onwards it was named 
Directorate Coordination Integration Policy for Minorities (DCIM). See Appendix II. 
60 Thus discarding “Southern Europeans” and Moluccans, who were considered less as a problem 
group either because they had left, or because they were considered to have become part of 
mainstream society. Instead, refugees started to become problematized as a serious threat to 
Dutch society. 
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effort to acquire the social, economic and cultural capital that was deemed 
necessary to make it possible to participate in the “competitive Dutch society” 
(Minister of Interior 1994: 24-5).  
  The new approach of being both more inclusive and more demanding 
reflected the strongly felt need to take “integration” more seriously at hand 
by means of a “more concrete” approach. As the then newly appointed (1990) 
director put it, the adagio among civil servants was “now we’re really going to 
integrate.” 61  During an interview he explained this reorientation entailed 
moving “away from the social work and subsidies set up, to make policies more 
binding and become more effective in the interdepartmental power field. … 
Our purpose was to create a new Netherlands, a new integration policy.” This 
was based on the Canadian model (also put forward in the 1989 WRR report) in 
the sense of strict immigration policies, connected to offering migrants with 
permission to settle genuine opportunities to “integrate.” 
 Just as the expertise in the policy domain is a variation on existing 
interpretations of society, the renewal of policies that was to give the proposed 
reorientation shape can also be considered a continuation of, or variation on 
existing interventions, implying similar limitations and adverse effects. In Text 
box 1.3 I provide an overview of various existing policies that were continued 
and further institutionalized. The original idea that the Directorate would only 
coordinate a fragmented policy field had gradually been discarded. It had 
started developing its own policies during the 1980s, which were now codified 
as new legislation was created and implemented. Here I describe several new 
measures, which partly also built on existing practices, in more detail.  
 An example of a variation on existing measures, is legislation that 
facilitated legal equality and political participation. Some officials have called 
this the “rights’ side” of the new, harder approach. Whereas during the 
previous decade measures had already been developed to ensure voting rights, 
work was now made of further removing legal barriers for immigrants to 
become citizens of the Netherlands, for example by making it more easy to 
naturalize and by facilitating double nationality (Minister of Interior 199162). 
                                                          
61 Being himself “member of a minority group” his appointment has some interesting features that 
relate to the expertise and effects of the policy domain in general, which I further explore in 
Chapter 4. 
62 Kamerstukken II 1990-1991, 22 138 nr 2, White Paper Legal Position and Social Integration [Nota 
Rechtspositie en sociale integratie]. 
As the director at that time explained: “if you know the interdepartmental power field you know 
it is very interesting we, the ministry of Interior, wrote this and not the ministry of Justice.” In 
similar vein the Directorate had appropriated responsibility for “status holders” (asylum seekers 
that have been granted the status of refugee and can therefor legally reside in the Netherlands 
for at least three years), with the goal of spreading these people evenly across the country. 
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Although these changes were deemed rather successful at that time, they 
would later instead considered to be hampering integration. 
   
Text box 1.3 Continuation of policy 
 
Several policy instruments of the Directorate have been used since the 1980s and 
have been further professionalized and institutionalized during the 1990s 
(Ministry of Interior 1994). Various regulations aimed at stimulating remigration 
that had been created during the 1980s were codified in the Remigration Act 
(1999), which was (and still is) especially aimed at people from specific ethnic 
minorities who return to their country of origin and could receive financial 
compensation for this. 
 Furthermore, despite officially abandoning the ethnic minorities rationale and 
welfare and emancipation goals, the consultative structure with minority 
organizations that had been institutionalized in the National Advisory and 
Consultancy Structure (Landelijk Advies en Overlegstructuur, LAO) in 1985 were 
codified in the Minorities Consultancy Act (Wet Overleg Minderheden, WOM) in 
1997 (Staatsblad 1997 335). 
 Another example is the focus on “deprived neighbourhoods.” While a 
coherent “social renewal” policy, meant to attune various social policies that 
were to alleviate the “marginalized socioeconomic conditions” of both 
“allochthone minorities and autochthone majority,” had not been very 
successful, a new Large City Policy was instigated to address problems specific to 
deprived areas in the four largest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague and 
Utrecht). 
 In the field of education, there was still money to invest in extra education 
facilities based on number of pupils from “minorities” [gewichtenregeling], which 
was eventually discarded in 2006 (RMO 2012: 14). The education in own language 
would also continue, until it was discarded in 1998. In general, the welfare 
policies of the 1980s were gradually cut down. 
 Labour market discrimination was also continuously addressed through policy 
measures. These had not been very successful during the 1980s and successive 
new measures were created. So called “consent compliance” obliged companies 
tendering for government assignments to have a certain percentage of employees 
from minorities. Hiring more people from “minorities” was also stimulated by the 
“60.000 jobs plan.” 
 This eventually developed into the 1994 Encouragement of the Equal Labour 
Market Participation of Allochthones Act [Wet Bevordering Evenredige 
Arbeidsdeelname Allochtonen] (Staatsblad 1994 423). In 1998, this legislation was 
replaced by the Stimulating Labour Market Participation Minorities Act (Wet 
Stimulering Arbeidsdeelname Minderheden, SAMEN, meaning ‘together’ in Dutch; 
Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 1997, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 
1996-1997, 25 369, nr. 3), which in 2004 were essentially the same policy 
interventions and would be discarded as being unsuccessful, because employers 
were not willing to cooperate and the laws were not really enforced. 
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 Furthermore, the Directorate developed several policy interventions, 
labelled as “affirmative action,” to stimulate the employment of the “largest 
minority groups” by combatting discrimination on the labour market. I describe 
these measures in Text box 1.3. Two successive laws, for example, aimed to 
oblige employers to register the number of “allochthon employees” and 
formulate policy to enlarge their numbers. Civil servants Involved in creating 
these measures stressed, however, that despite some success of putting 
structural exclusion of minorities on the political agenda, in general employers 
were not willing to cooperate and as a consequence the Ministries of Economic 
Affairs and of Social Affairs and Employment were afraid to enforce legislation. 
 These interventions developed during the 1990s were, therefore, difficult 
to implement successfully and were not considered to have been really 
effective, except for raising awareness (Minister for Large Cities and 
Integration Policy 199863: 28-30; Blok Commission 200464: 198-215; SCP 2003: 
260-5). At the same time, civil servants stressed that various projects and 
initiatives enabled “Dutch with a colour” to be employed by otherwise 
reluctant employers. Especially state institutions themselves have contributed 
considerably. But in general, employment is largely the result of macro-
economic developments (Regioplan 2016). And considering the failure of these 
legal measures and, indeed, of the still much higher unemployment among 
people “with migrant background” today that is largely caused by 
discrimination (SCP 2012, 2016), fighting labour market discrimination in 
general has not been very successful (cf. Duyvendak and Scholten 2012: 279). 
 More fundamentally, civil servants who worked at the Directorate during 
the 1990s explained that one reason why it was difficult to take other actors 
along, was because discrimination was not considered to be a serious, 
structural phenomenon by many of them (cf. Essed and Nimako 2006: 300-2), 
indicating it was not approached as a question of power relations between a 
white Dutch majority and racialized minorities. It is telling that the 
unwillingness to do something about labour market discrimination on the side 
of employers is not framed as a “problem of integration.” These power 
relations may in fact have been naturalized and reinforced by policies that 
self-evidently targeted those “in need of integration” because they supposedly 
lack the necessary skills (Maeso 2015: 59-62; Bjornson 2007: 74). While the 
                                                          
63 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1998–1999, 26 333, nr. 2. White Paper Integration Policy 1999-
2000: Getting Chances, Taking Chances [Nota Integratiebeleid 1999-2000: Kansen Krijgen, Kansen 
pakken]. 
64  Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 28 689, nrs. 8–9. Investigation Integration Policy 
[Onderzoek Integratiebeleid]. 
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majority position from which they were created was not made object of policy, 
but as the supposedly neutral starting point. 
 Another important new policy measure created to fight marginalization 
was inburgering, which was eventually codified in the 1998 Newcomer 
Inburgering Act. It had as goal to enforce new migrants to learn Dutch and 
acquire basic knowledge of Dutch society in order to facilitate their 
participation in the labour market (Minister of Interior 1994). It was described 
by officials as the “duty side” of the “active citizenship” rationale and is 
exemplary of how specific conceptualizations of migrants and minorities are 
normalized. Those previously defined as “minorities” and now labelled 
“allochthones” were categorically considered to lack the skills necessary to 
find employment or follow education. It thus was rooted in existing expertise 
and techniques (see Text box 1.1) of amending an alleged cultural deficit 
shared by all members of such “problem groups,” by improving language and 
other skills deemed important for employment. 
 The Integration Policy entailed a change from earlier policies in terms of 
the obligatory character, also aiming to limit immigration, and a more 
comprehensive institutional organization of the policy domain. Because I 
extensively analyze the creation and effects of inburgering policies in the next 
chapter, I do not explain it in great detail here. Important for the present 
argument is that while inburgering was developed with the socioeconomic goal 
of reducing the burden for the welfare state, it has never been convincingly 
shown that this form of obligatory language education genuinely contributes 
to better employment opportunities (Bjornson 2007; Significant 2010; 
Regioplan 2013; Goodman and Wright 2015; Algemene Rekenkamer 2017). 
While it did further institutionalize imaginations of the Dutch nation state by 
defining the objects of policy based on alleged cultural, ethnic, and religious 
differences (Bjornson 2007; Van Houdt et al. 2011). 
 Of course, there may exist differences between people and newly arrived 
migrants may face difficulties finding their way around in a new country 
because of their background. This may in itself be a reason to assist these 
people. The question is, however, whether it is the task of the state to create 
coercive policies to this end, which are grounded in assumptions about 
absolute differences between alleged nations and ethnic groups. Although 
policy categorizations based on ethnic background could, for example, be 
useful to fight labour market discrimination (SCP 2013), specifically these 
measures in this sub domain have not been successful. The Integration Policy 
has been ambiguous, aiming to improve social conditions by assisting those 
defined as Others, while not bringing the desired results. An important 
consequence of policies thus has been institutionalizing ideas about otherness. 
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Especially considering that “second and third generation migrations,” meaning 
Dutch citizens who have been born in the Netherlands, were also made objects 
of policy interventions. 
 Ideas of employers about who is “fit” to participate based on culturalist 
assumptions might even impede employment opportunities, especially when 
discrimination is not seriously addressed in complementary policies (cf. 
Bjornson 2007). At another level, civil servants themselves pointed at 
difficulties of implementation, in terms of municipalities being ill-prepared, as 
reasons for the lack of results. Moreover, just as with anti-discrimination 
measures, the Directorate had a hard time motivating other ministries in the 
creation and implementation of the Newcomer Inburgering Act. As during the 
previous decade, convincing other actors of the necessity of policy measures 
was not always an easy task. 65  The weak interdepartmental position the 
Directorate had occupied during the 1980s had improved somewhat, but it 
continued to be far from strong.  
 
1.3.2 A continuing weak position and growing political importance 
The divisions of “horizontal and vertical coordination” that had internally 
structured the Directorate were abandoned in the early 1990s and replaced by 
a division based on topics.66 Contact with other administrative bodies and 
minorities’ organizations did remain important, however. Besides the 
Minorities Consultancy Act of 1997 (see Text box 1.3), the latter was partly 
done through the “knowledge institute for multicultural questions” called 
Forum, which informants described as the “eyes and ears” of the Directorate. 
It is an example of how the subjects are governed indirectly, as direct contact 
with the national administration was thought to have adverse effects. 
Interdepartmentally, the Commission Minorities Policy (ICM) continued to play 
an important role, but the Directorate also remained somewhat of an outsider, 
as several civil servants recalled.67  
 The appointment of a special Minister for Large Cities and Integration 
Policy, Roger van Boxtel (D66), when the second Purple coalition of PvdA, VVD 
                                                          
65 During the 1990s the Directorate was still largely dependent on other ministries for the creation 
and implementation of policies. It especially needed the ministries of Justice, Social Affairs and 
Welfare, Public Health and Culture (the successor of the Ministry of Welfare that had played a 
prominent role in the policy field during the 1960s and 1970s). In the following chapter I will more 
in detail explain the organizational complications and difficulties of implementing inburgering 
laws. 
66 See appendix III for an overview. 
67 This despite the development I call the professionalization of the Directorate, which I describe 
in chapter 4, that had already started a few years after its creation but was intensified because 
the policy work became more focused on creating legal measures. 
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and D66 entered office in 1998, did not change much to this position. Although 
the higher political profile of the Integration Policy meant the Directorate had 
more room for manoeuvring, it was still considered a somewhat peculiar policy 
domain in the eyes of other bureaucratic actors. A minister specifically for 
integration contrasted with the ministers of Interior during the years before, 
who did not always really engage themselves with these policies. But according 
to informants, it was a minister without a portfolio and consequently no budget 
of its own and little power in government. As during the 1980s, the policy field 
primarily seemed to be of symbolic importance to most politicians in terms of 
consolidating the status quo and showing the electorate its worries are taken 
seriously, as I will further explain in the next chapter. 
 This follows, for example, from the one-sided political motivation for 
being involved in the policy field. Several policy officials explained they felt 
that inburgering was mainly created to take away concerns among 
“autochthons” by demanding from “allochthones” to make an effort to earn 
their place in Dutch society and by restricting immigration. Just as the 
Minorities Policy, the main targets of the Integration Policy were people 
problematized because of their background, but its main audience had shifted 
to “real Dutch.” Politicians wanted to perform a firmer stance, while there 
were fewer concerns with the actual implementation or results. In similar 
fashion, if there would have been a true commitment, more budget could have 
been made available, interdepartmental cooperation could have been 
stimulated more or anti-discrimination measures could have been more 
thoroughly enforced. 
 Such actions, however, do not have the effect of reassuring the 
“autochthons” that the government is in control. It may be understandable 
that people worry about the consequences of migration and, for example, have 
difficulties with how their neighbourhoods change (Mepschen 2016). And there 
might be reasons why a government would want to address such developments. 
At the same time, there can be tensions with what a state is legally allowed to 
do. As I will explain in the next chapter, policy measures such as inburgering 
conflict on certain points with the rule of law, using ethnicity as an indicator 
for marginalization. Moreover, the effects of such measures on social 
developments is limited, raising the question of what work policies actually 
do. 
 As during the 1980s, control seemed to be the main driver of the policy 
domain, which was still given substance through defining and problematizing 
cultural differences and governing these. Integration was more explicitly 
framed in terms of economic and social capital, putting more emphasis on 
education and language skills of individual “allochthones” as ways to achieve 
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better employment. The way “integration” was rendered technical was thus 
altered, but at the same time, policies continued to demarcate boundaries 
between Dutch society and various culturalized “problem groups.” So, instead 
of a “Universalist” policy frame that pays little attention to culture and breaks 
with the Ethnic Minorities frame of the 1980s (Scholten 2011a: 135; cf. 
Entzinger 2006, 2014; Duyvendak and Scholten 2012), the fundamentally 
culturalist expertise underpinning the policy field continued, further 
normalizing specific imaginaries of Dutch society (Schinkel 2007; Ghorashi 
2009, 2014). 
 In fact, the demarcation of groups based on ethnicity was reinforced by a 
steady number of studies, conducted by the SCP and CBS68, and ordered by 
state authorities that closely monitored, by means of statistical information, 
the “progress” specific groups, i.e. “Turks,” “Moroccans,” “Surinamers,” and 
“Arubans and Antillians” were making with their “integration” (Schinkel 2007, 
2013; NIDI 2010; Paulle and Kalir 2014). It is a way of making society visible by 
defining boundaries and assembling information, which is, however, the result 
of state categorization rather than objective data found in the social world 
(Mitchell 2002; Li 2007). At the same time, the experiences of those defined 
as “allochthones” were much less studied and taken into account in the policy 
field. While various studies show the adverse effects of top-down 
categorization and nationalist assumptions of the Integration Policies on the 
sense of belonging of its objects, who felt increasingly alienated and excluded 
(Bjornson 2007; Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008; Omlo 2011; Slootman 2014; 
Slootman and Duyvendak 2015; Eijberts and Ghorashi 2017).  
 The lack of expertise related to the lived experiences of the objects of 
policy is a form of depoliticization. It is a very one-sided focus on social life, 
in terms of how in our eyes they do not fit in. There is little interest in how 
the “receiving society” plays a role in processes of inclusion and exclusion. 
Their “sociocultural background” was seen as an important explanation for 
“integration and “acculturation problems” (Minister for Large Cities and 
Integration Policy 1998: 10). The subjects who were the focus of policy were 
thus blamed, instead of the structural political-economic context (Li 2007: 7; 
cf. Ferguson 1994; Mitchell 2002). This was reinforced by the fact that the 
majority population is understood as ethnically neutral, homogenous, and 
static, and is assumed to have no obligation to “integrate” (Schinkel 2013). 
                                                          
68 The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) and Statistics Netherlands (CBS) are research 
institute conducting research for, but independent from the government. Though at distance from 
ministries, their studies are closely related to the goals and assumptions of state policies (see for 
example Schinkel 2013).  
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 The increasing use of scientific knowledge also makes “integration” a 
discussion for experts who are concerned with determining the indicators for 
integration and how to measure it, rather than a political discussion about 
exclusion and belonging (Foucault 1991). Bolkestein had asked for a “great 
political debate,” which developed into technical policies that effectively 
depoliticized questions about the transforming Dutch nation state. In this 
understanding, the anxieties of “autochthons” were considered self-evident, 
legitimate grounds for state intervention, thus neutralizing the specific 
political position these anxieties and the policies addressing them came from. 
Although aimed at more inclusion, the Integration Policy continued to target 
Others, now including citizens born in the Netherlands, as objects rather than 
political subjects. Though the Netherlands was officially recognized as a 
country of immigration and a de facto multicultural society, the national order 
was still considered the natural status quo, an understanding that has turned 
out to be very difficult to change. 
 In this way, the Integration Policy not only depoliticized questions about 
the nation and belonging, but also constituted the state as the neutral guardian 
of a pre-existing nation and its welfare state. As such, policies may have 
contributed to the perception of their own failure, because successive 
governments were not able to live up to their promises of protecting the nation 
from threats, while more social situations and developments were interpreted 
in terms of “integration problems.” Anxieties may have been legitimized by 
the very policies that aimed to address them. Moreover, their results were 
found too meagre. Politicians argued, for example, that still “too little 
attention is paid to autochthons” (Minister for Large Cities and Integration 
Policy 1998: 3). The promise of effective policies without really reducing 
anxieties only seemed to foster growing discontent and notions of failure, 
which was fuelled by continuing asylum migration during the 1990s, primarily 
from former Yugoslavia. 
 Most policy instruments indeed had little structural outcomes in terms of 
participation. Around the turn of the century, progress in terms of declining 
unemployment and better education results were highlighted, but it was 
stressed that this may well be because of the economy in general rather than 
the Integration Policy, of which it is difficult to determine effects (cf. Blok 
Commission 2004). Moreover, it was said that a lot of work still needed to be 
done, because “unemployment is still three times as high as among 
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autochthons” (Minister for Large Cities and Integration Policy 200269: 23). 
Furthermore, ethnicity was more explicitly recognized as an important 
explanation for the over-representation of criminality of certain groups 
(Minister of Interior and Minister of Justice 1997 70 ). Increasingly, the 
perception of failure was explicitly linked to religion and culture, as anxious 
politics became more centred on the perceived intrusion of Islam in Dutch 
society, threatening “modern, Western values” (Minister for Large Cities and 
Integration Policy 2002; cf. Modest and De Koning 2016; Van Reekum 2016). 
 Criticism of the policy domain was most clearly expressed by publicist Paul 
Scheffer, who in 2000 published an opinion article in mainstream national 
newspaper NRC Handelsblad titled “The Multicultural Tragedy,” in which he 
warned of the negative consequences of an “ethnic underclass” that was 
growing in the Netherlands, which he defined primarily along religious lines of 
“Muslims” versus the “autochthonous” population. Being a social-democrat, he 
wrote about socioeconomic marginalization and the lack of social 
advancement, but his point that integration policies had been too soft and the 
consequent “multicultural drama is the largest threat to social peace” 
resonated most in the public debate. The claim of policy failure, especially in 
terms of too lenient a form of “multiculturalism” was a powerful political 
performance, however, that is based on a specific interpretation of earlier 
policies and does not accurately describe the outlook of policy measures (cf. 
Duyvendak and Scholten 2011, 2012; Van Reekum and Duyvendak 2012). 
 Indeed, when looking at the policy field during the 1990s, the same 
assumptions, measures, and organization as during the decade before 
continued to define the policy field relatively unaltered, despite apparent 
changes in terms of framing and the development of more legislation. Another 
shift was the function in terms of to whom the Integration Policy speaks. 
Whereas the Minorities Policy was aimed at pacifying the objects of policy, 
during the 1990 policies became increasingly attuned to appeasing 
“autochthons,” reassuring these “true Dutch” that they are the norm. The 
central rationale continued to be stimulating inclusion by defining who does 
not belong, which did not achieve increased inclusion, but did effectively 
reassert a vision of the Dutch nation. This would become even more salient 
after the turn of the millennium. 
 
                                                          
69  Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2001–2002, 28 198, nr. 2. White Paper Integration in the 
perspective of immigration [Nota Integratie in het licht van immigratie]. 
70 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1997–1998, 25 726, nr. 1. White Paper Criminality in Relation to 
Integration of Ethnic Minorities [Nota Criminaliteit in relatie tot integratie van etnische 
minderheidsgroepen]; cf. Minister for Large Cities and Integration Policy (1998). 
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1.4 A radical shift? 2000-present 
 
Act normal or bugger off! 
 
(Prime Minister Mark Rutte in an election campaign advertisement, 
September 2016) 
 
1.4.1 The Integration Policy New Style 
A year after Scheffer’s publication, the 9/11 attacks fuelled the idea of the 
fundamental incompatibility of Islamic and Western culture (Prins and Saharso 
2010; Duyvendak 2011). In the wake of the local and national debates sparked 
by this event, Pim Fortuyn quickly became politically successful by speaking 
out against the presumed changes in Dutch society and how the culture and 
fabric of Dutch society were threatened by foreign elements. He became very 
popular by claiming that he voiced the concerns of the “silent majority” of 
white Dutch people, who felt neglected by mainstream politicians and 
disadvantaged by “multicultural politics” that had been “too permissive 
towards Islam.” Whereas Janmaat had been placed outside of the political 
order a decade before, no politician could neglect Fortuyn, causing the policy 
field to rise high on the political agenda.  
 This took a further flight when Fortuyn was assassinated, shortly after he 
had won local council elections in Rotterdam and just a few days before 
national elections scheduled to take place in May 2002, for which he was top 
favourite in the polls (Penninx 2006). A new consensus developed about the 
failure of previous policies and the need for a further improvement of the 
policy system. After these events, anxieties among “native Dutch” about 
cultural diversity came to be at the centre of political debate (ibid.; Uitermark 
2012; Van Reekum 2016). Just as during the 1970s, the Dutch government felt 
the need to react to developments and violent events in society in order to 
contain perceived threats to the public order. But also to the national order, 
as it specifically responded to worries about a felt loss of community, lack of 
social cohesion and threat to “our way of living” (Minister for Aliens Affairs and 
Integration 200371). 
 Notwithstanding recurrent diagnosis of policy failure, which could also 
have been seen as a reason to discard the Integration Policy, it would turn out 
                                                          
71 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 29 203, nr. 1. White Paper Integration Policy New Style 
[Nota Integratiebeleid Nieuwe Stijl]. 
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to be a very suitable terrain for giving substance to the “new realist” politics 
(Prins 2002; Prins and Saharso 2010). A new director Coordination of Minorities 
Policy, who had been appointed in 2000, remembered her policy field being a 
top priority for the government at “difficult yet exciting times.” On the one 
hand, it gave her (directorate) the opportunity to “push the buttons,” 
indicating an increase in budget 72 , an expanding formation, and more 
interdepartmental leverage. On the other hand, it also brought tensions and 
pressure as politicians started to interfere more actively with the policy making 
process (cf. Scholten 2011a: 183). 
 The politicization had consequences for the policy field in terms of its 
bureaucratic setting, goals and policy interventions. A new government73 made 
the important decision to relocate the Directorate to the Ministry of Justice, 
after having been housed at the Ministry of Interior for over twenty years. It 
made the policy field the responsibility of a minister for Aliens Affairs and 
Integration. 74  A closely involved high ranking official explained that 
“everybody agreed that only a very big change would be sufficient to regain 
any trust in the policy … it had to move away from BZK [Ministry of Interior].” 
Although not everyone was convinced by the plan to put it “together with 
immigration, to make it tough,” most officials understood the importance of 
these kind of “initiatives that are very symbolic and meant to restore trust in 
order to be able to continue the Integration Policy.” 
 The institutional relocation to a department more concerned with law and 
enforcement, as several officials indicated, is closely related to a reorientation 
of policies towards more restriction. New minister Rita Verdonk (VVD) in 
particular would become known for her hard line and fierce stance, which 
made her the face of the shift that was written in the White Paper Integration 
Policy New Style (Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 2003). It states that 
a “too great part of the minorities’ population is at too great a distance from 
Dutch society,” socially, culturally and economically (ibid.: 7). The 
“contemporary worries about the downsides of the multi-ethnic society” (ibid.: 
                                                          
72 See Appendix III for the development of the Directorate’s budget. Although the budget has been 
steadily decreasing during the past years, it has been on an unprecedented height between 2004-
2010. She referred to the fact that, the Directorate could get money from the otherwise very 
reluctant Ministry of Finance. She stated that “in terms of policy making a golden age was about 
to start … [because] it was very nice to be in the driver’s seat.” […] It also helped that both the 
minister responsible for integration, Verdonk, as well as the Minister of Finance Zalm were from 
the VVD.” 
73 The 2002 elections made the List Pim Fortuyn, named after the popular politician, rather 
substantial out of nothing. They formed an unstable and short-lived government with the CDA and 
VVD, which would last just a couple of months. Soon after movement to the ministry of Justice 
the government coalition fell and when a new government (without LPF and with D66) came in 
office, Rita Verdonk of the VVD became the new minister responsible for the policy field. 
74 In chapter 4, I describe the effects of such a relocation on the Directorate. 
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6) are thought to be caused by earlier “multicultural” policies that had 
“coddled minorities too much.” 
 As I have explained above, “allochthones” or “minorities” had long since 
been problematized because their alleged cultural deficit causes “integration 
problems,” but now their otherness was in itself explicitly defined as a problem 
by politicians and in policy measures (cf. Schinkel 2007: 154). The new 
government explicitly took a stance against what was seen as the demise of 
Dutch culture, especially as it is visible on the streets. People were, for 
example, expected to look after their garden and house, whereas wearing a 
headscarf or not speaking Dutch in public was considered a nuisance (Minister 
for Aliens Affairs and Integration 2003: 6). More knowledge of “Dutch society” 
and “Dutch norms and values” was deemed necessary, implying a stronger 
focus on social cultural adaptation.75 So, again, reforms of new as well as of 
existing, policy interventions were presented as a necessary remedy for alleged 
failure of earlier ones.  
 Politicians thought more rigorous and demanding policies would send a 
clear message to what they saw as the “native Dutch” population, which could 
also serve their electoral interests. Some officials who worked at the 
Directorate during this period explained they were somewhat surprised, 
though, because they thought things were going in the right direction as a 
result of the new policy measures they had created during the years before. 
They thought politicians were impatient, but at the same time they indicated 
they had “underestimated the cultural factor.” Anxieties related to Islam came 
to play a much more prominent role in the policy field. The main target 
population of policies was now categorized as “non-Western allochthones,” 
including “second and third generation migrants” (ibid.: 7). These were the 
same “priority groups” as during the previous decade, although these “migrant 
communities” would increasingly consist of people born and raised in the 
Netherlands. 
  
                                                          
75 As a recent evaluation study observed, an important goal of integration policy field has become 
identification with the Netherlands, as the focus is primarily on sociocultural integration, defined 
as speaking language, internalizing fundamental Dutch norms and values, and active participation 
in society (Regioplan 2016). 
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 As one official recalled “9/11 was a watershed, there are now special 
programs, for instance, to talk about honour related violence, subjects as 
forced marriage, genital mutilation, etc. So the policy was broadened to 
include cultural issues.” In order to address anxieties related to Islam, an 
important focus now became projects and programs aimed at what was called 
Text box 1.4 Culturalist interventions 
 
Besides variations in specific policy measures, a distinctive continuation has been 
the problem definition being primarily based on alleged cultural differences. This 
continues to be so since the politicization of the early 2000s, but cultural 
differences were emphasized and problematized more explicitly as problems in 
themselves in various policy measures that were part of the Integration Policy 
New Style.  
 The position of “allochthon women” was made a central issue in the so called 
PaVEM program (Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration and Minister of Social 
Affairs and Employment 2003). PaVEM is an abbreviation for Participation of 
Women of Ethnic Minority Groups, which aimed to stimulate women with an 
Islamic background to work. This has not only been analyzed as a paternalistic 
measure, but also as based on rigid ideas about how “culture” suppresses women 
(Roggeband and Verloo 2006; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009; Van den Berg and 
Schinkel 2009; Van den Berg and Duyvendak 2012). 
 Furthermore, self-determination, “zelfbeschikking,” is a term to describe 
practices that are viewed as the result of cultural values rather than practices of 
gendered-based violence more in general (Anthias 2013: 333), for example forced 
marriages, honour killings, genital mutilation, and wearing a veil. It sure has 
good intentions of giving people the opportunity to break free from group 
pressure. However, the effectivity of such programs is unclear and the need for 
addressing such phenomena is not always clear (see for example Moors 2009; 
Bakker et al. 2010; Rutten et al. 2015). Over the past years an increasing number 
of policies was instigated by upheaval in House of Parliament about incidents. 
 At the same time there are dangers of seeing practices as “rooted in Islam, 
ethnicity, or national origin, and portraying religion, ethnicity, and national 
origin as homogenous, unitary, and/or ahistorical forces that by definition lead to 
gender inequality” (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009: 234). While at the same time 
portraying “autochthonous” Dutch as problem free, not oppressing women (ibid.: 
235, cf. Anthias 2013: 333), which is not necessary the case, as follows from the 
recent #Metoo controversy or orthodox Protestant communities. Such policy 
interventions thus also send the message that Muslims cannot really belong in 
Western Europe, constructing borders through religion (Goldberg 2006; Lentin 
2014). Nowadays such measure are still an important aspect of the Integration 
Policy, indicative of a (paternalistic) will to improve circumstances of some 
citizens, but also of the need to demarcate Islam as not belonging in the 
Netherlands.  
 Other examples of culturalist policies are specific “stimulating programs for 
ethnic youths” (interview with high ranking civil servant). Arrangements were 
created specifically for “Moroccan and Antillean youths”, because these groups 
were thought to be most at risk of becoming criminal. These were, however, 
controversial because ascribed ethnic background was used as an indicator for 
criminality and would eventually be discarded. 
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“self-determination” of women from “ethnic minorities,” de facto targeting 
Muslims. Such measures, which I further explain in Text box 1.4, continue until 
today. While ostensibly focused on preventing maltreatment of specifically 
women, these policies can be seen as a double-edged sword. They are premised 
upon a static, homogeneous, and bounded conception of culture and religion, 
in which “Islam” is considered to be inherently oppressing women and 
“Western culture” categorically not (Roggeband and Verloo 2006; Korteweg 
and Yurdakul 2009; Van den Berg and Schinkel 2009; Van den Berg and 
Duyvendak 2012). 
 Even if we do not know to what use these programs and projects were put 
on the ground, their main effect is that gender is used in the construction of 
“liberal and modern Western values” against a “traditional and backward 
Islam” (cf. Goldberg 2006; Lentin 2014). This forecloses the option of diversity 
and change within the “Muslim community” (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009: 
235). It also effectively demarcates the subjects of these policies as non-Dutch, 
while overlooking “traditional cultures” and gendered violence within the 
“native Dutch” community (Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens 2010). 
Programs aimed at the labour market participation of “allochthon” women, 
moreover, are predominantly configured towards emancipation in terms of 
fighting gender oppression in the private sphere, which is automatically 
assumed to be part of “migrant communities” while focusing less on the 
structural context of labour market discrimination (Korteweg and 
Triandafilopoulos 2015; Van den Berg and Duyvendak 2012).  
 These and other policies that make up the Integration Policy New Style 
make subjects  responsible for “integration problems” while giving the majority 
absolution from a duty to “integrate” (cf. Schinkel 2013). While it is unclear 
what improvement they actually bring, they do have exclusionary effects. 
These culturalist interventions claim to identify problems and aim to “solve” 
them by adjusting supposed cultural convictions and behaviour. As such they 
can be considered a variation on policy arrangements of the 1970s and 1980s. 
They are also a continuation in the sense that the Integration Policy has 
(always) been largely dependent on programs and projects aimed at raising 
awareness or changing attitudes and behaviour. Informants indicated that it is 
difficult to determine the results of such measures. Therefore, their relevance 
may well lie in the norm they are setting. Further on, in Text box 1.5, I give 
several other examples of such measures. 
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 Another technique in place for a long time, the Minorities Consultation 
Structure, was also continued. 76  Although criticized for being “too 
multicultural,” civil servants explained it was at the same time a convenient 
instrument of control, for example, by containing tensions after incidents that 
were thought to be potentially disruptive for society, such as 9/11, the 
assassination of Fortuyn, and attacks on Mosques (Verdonk in De Volkskrant 27 
February 2017). In 2004 film maker, opinion maker, and anti-Islam provocateur 
Theo van Gogh was murdered by a radicalized Moroccan-Dutch young man, 
causing widespread upheaval and instigating violent acts committed against 
Muslims and mosques (Prins and Saharso 2010; Uitermark 2012). Officials 
working at the Directorate during these tumultuous times remembered “how 
everyone was looking at us to come with solutions.” As during the decades 
before, contact and consultation with “minorities” were still thought 
important for keeping order and control.  
 The murder of Van Gogh had also brought to the attention the risks of 
“home grown” terrorism in the of name of Islam. This instigated stringent 
policies in the context of surveillance and penal law, which fitted with the 
policies common at the Ministry of Justice, but also for more “soft” projects 
aimed at anti-radicalization (Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 
2005b77). In a sense, just as when it was created, terrorism came to serve as a 
new legitimation of the relevance of the Directorate, as its policies are seen 
as instruments that help to protect public order. In Text box 1.5 and further 
below I describe initiatives that are aimed at securing “social stability” and 
preventing “radicalization.” As with most policy measures, these are more 
aimed at the capacities of the subjects than on how society at large also shapes 
their behaviour (Li 2007: 7), explaining problems in cultural terms rather than 
political ones (Lentin 2014). 
 This also holds for reforms of the inburgering legislation. Since 2003, top 
priority had been given to reforming the 1998 Newcomer Inburgering Act. 
Though a variation of an existing policy arrangement, the new Inburgering Act 
of 2007 is often seen as the most prominent exponent of the shifting focus to 
cultural assimilation (Bjornson 2007; Groenendijk 2011a; Van Oers 2013; 
Entzinger 2014; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010). The rationale behind it was to 
extend inburgering beyond the so-called “newcomers” to the so-called 
“oldcomers” as well, those who had been in the country a long time, i.e. the 
                                                          
76 Some policy measures that have been part of the policy field for a long time were simply 
continued, such as the Remigration Act and responsibility for Status Holders. 
77  Tweede Kamer Vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 29 800 VI, nr. 117. White Paper Resilience 
Radicalization Against Muslim Youth [Nota weerbaarheid tegen radicalisering van Moslim-
jongeren]. 
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“traditional problem groups” already residing in the Netherlands. In the next 
chapter, I will analyze these changes, but here I mention only the most 
important aspects. It entailed neoliberal reforms, placing responsibility with 
the subjects of policies, increasing requirements and making sanctions much 
more severe. Moreover, the law explicitly defines a “Dutch way of living” and 
reflects the rationale that every inhabitant of the Netherlands has to obey 
these “Dutch norms and values” and has to speak Dutch. 
 It also entailed a further intertwining of the migration and integration 
policy domains, as naturalization was made conditional upon passing an 
integration exam.78 The controversial Inburgering Abroad Act of 2006 is also a 
salient example, as it obliges new migrants from designated “non-Western” 
countries, primarily targeting people from Morocco and Turkey, to pass an 
integration exam in their country of origin before granted permission to enter 
the Netherlands, where they also have to follow the regular inburgering 
trajectory. These laws not only make it much more difficult for “non-Western 
migrants” to settle in the Netherlands, it also reflects how the policy field is 
increasingly used to demarcate the dominant Dutch nation, assuming the 
absolute cultural otherness of the objects of policies (Anthias 2013). Policy 
measures became less concerned with improvement and increasingly with 
reasserting a particular (national) order. 
 Especially because the new inburgering system was criticized for being 
difficult to implement and having adverse effects (Significant 2010; Regioplan 
2013), the most important effect of these restrictions was the performance of 
state power (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010). As such, reforms of inburgering 
policies primarily consisted of technical changes, not of a real 
reconceptualization of policy assumptions. The same people still had to prove 
they were fit to participate in Dutch society. Civil servants explained, in light 
of inburgering but also of other policies, that policy should be seen as an oil 
tanker whose course can be altered slightly, but not radically. An important 
change that had begun in the 1990s and was further sharpened was the shift in 
responsibility from the paternalistic  welfare state to migrants themselves. 
This corresponded with neoliberal reforms in general and with the VVD being 
an important government party. 
                                                          
78 Since the Minorities Policy in the early 1980s, limiting migration has been an important goal of 
the policy field. A new Aliens Act (and Act on Dutch Citizenship) had been implemented in 2000 
(Groenendijk 2011a). An important goal and effect of the Inburgering Abroad Act was limiting 
family migration from “non-Western countries”. Other restrictions of migration law, related to 
inburgering, entailed a minimum age income requirement for bringing over a partner, a measure 
aimed to prevent “sham marriages” and “import brides” (see Schinkel 2010). 
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1.4.2 The Directorate in volatile political times 
Verdonk left in 2007 and her successor Ella Vogelaar 79  (PvdA) is often 
considered to have brought some relaxation in the policy field. But, as I will 
argue in the next chapter, this should mainly be interpreted in terms of 
discourse and implementation, an increase in budget for example, but not as 
fundamental changes in the interpretation of the problem at hand (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1983; Li 2007). She was forced to leave in 2008 because her own party 
found her approach of the policy domain too soft and replaced by “hard-nosed 
social democrat” Eberhard van der Laan (De Koning 2017: 9). After him, there 
were no ministers who put their mark on the policy field until 2012, but in 
general the budget was decreased while the direction of the field became more 
exclusionary. In 2010, the coalition government of VVD and CDA, which was 
supported by Wilders’ PVV, for example, meant a hardening of discourse and 
(proposals for) controversial measures such as a burqa ban.80 
 In 2012, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, Lodewijk Asscher 
(PvdA), became responsible for the Integration Policy and he tried to strike a 
balance between a hard and a more inclusive approach (Minister of Social 
Affairs and Employment 2013b81). Main responsibilities of the Directorate now 
are inburgering and remigration legislation and “integration measures” 
(Regioplan 2016), of which I give an overview in Text box 1.5. In recent years 
there has been a shift in policies from exclusively focusing on people “with a 
migration background” to all citizens. Instead of treating some “problem 
groups” as mere objects, they are increasingly seen as political subjects as 
well, while more responsibility is placed with “autochthons.” The perspective 
of those deemed in need of integration is, for example, taken more into 
account in programs and think tanks aimed at preventing polarization and 
fostering “social stability” or recruiting new of civil servants. 
                                                          
79 As I will explain in the next chapter, Vogelaar had been a consultant hired to improve the old 
Newcomer Inburgering Act in the early 2000s, when a Taskforce was created to reform the system. 
80 Then Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations Donner did not find a policy domain concerned 
with integration of added value and was known for not really engaging himself but instead argued 
for dissolving the domain. 
81 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2012–2013, 32 824, nr. 80, White Paper Agenda Integration [Nota 
Agenda Integratie]. 
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 Text box 1.5 Recent policies: result and effect 
 
Unlike the decade before, no special minister for integration has been appointed 
since 2010. Minister Lodewijk Asscher (PvdA) of Social Affairs and Employment, 
who was also vice-prime minister and responsible for the policy field from 2012 
until 2017, did have clear ideas, though. Having been alderman in Amsterdam for 
a considerable time he felt a commitment towards this policy. Main rationale is 
the self-efficacy of people “with a migrant background,” for which employment 
is an important instrument (Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 2013b). 
There is a strong focus on people’s own responsibility for learning Dutch language 
and finding work; expertise is for a large part still premised on the cultural 
deficit logic that was institutionalized during the early period of the policy 
domain, although the voice of the objects of policy is increasingly incorporated. 
For example by recruiting more officials “with a migration background” and 
representing “integration” as a task for society at large instead of only for 
specific groups. 
 He particularly made himself known for the Participation declaration (which I 
describe in the next chapter). Asscher himself showed his hard face in media 
while explaining why harsh measures are necessary. He also attracted media 
coverage by warning against labour migrants from Eastern Europe, referring to it 
as Code Orange. Moreover, his hard stance against Turkish Religious 
Organizations and problematizing “parallel community” reflected his 
confrontational approach. Especially the last two initiatives should be seen as a 
reaction to perceived threats posed to the Dutch nation state. Citizens who are 
thought to be more loyal to Turkey than the Netherlands are questioning the 
legitimacy of the Dutch nation state, which thus needs to reassert itself. 
 At the same time, anti-discrimination measure were given priority in order to 
show the friendlier face of Asscher. Most of these measures may have good 
intentions, but little durable structural effects, because they are primarily 
campaigns and programs aimed at raising awareness and do no consist of 
enforceable measures. The program aimed to combat labour market 
discrimination, for example, consists of various techniques to address this 
problem by raising awareness, such as workshops, conferences, expert meetings, 
and other projects (Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 2016c). Civil 
servants responsible for this, who themselves had little knowledge of the topic or 
of the policies that had been created in the decades before, did not find it a very 
convincing approach, because of the many “weak measures” and the very little 
attention from politics. Other than the prime-minister stating “youths with a 
migrant background have to step up and work harder to fight themselves in” (De 
Volkskrant, 20 September 2016). 
 A comprehensive set of policy measures called Programme Integration, have 
the same ambiguity of culturalist policies of the years before. The following 
aspects are addressed: racism (antisemitism and Muslims), parental involvement, 
forced marriage, EU-migrants, language, labour market discrimination, intra-
ethnic and religious dialogue/anti-radicalization, citizenship education (norms 
and values), psychological aid migrant youth, youth unemployment, monitoring 
and evaluating integration policies. Most of these projects and programs, for 
example, consisting of campaigning, informing, or bringing people into contact 
(round table), have yielded some results in terms of raising awareness. But the 
structural effects in terms of stimulating “integration” are far from clear. 
 
(text continues on next page) 
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 This development, therefore, at the same time seems partly instigated by 
the interest the state has to keep order, as was the case during earlier decades. 
The effect of these and other measures is difficult to determine. As several 
policy officials explained, there are few effective techniques other than 
making people sensitive to phenomena such as labour market discrimination 
and “self-determination” by means of knowledge dissemination, media 
attention, public speeches, policy papers, round tables, or campaigns. One 
civil servant underscored that the Directorate has never had a serious budget 
or power position, “so we primarily have to rely on doing research and setting 
the frame.” The effectivity of such “soft measures” seems limited and may be 
further hampered by a political discourse that has become increasingly 
exclusionary. 
Moreover, issues of “self-determination,” as I have described earlier, are still 
important, just as fighting “allochthone” crime, breaking taboos in specific 
communities and promoting proper upbringing (ibid.). Most of these policy 
interventions problematize and penalize otherness, pointing at a development 
some have described as the increasing penal state or the criminalization of 
otherness (Schinkel 2007; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Wacquant 2011; 
Kaulingfreks 2015; De Koning 2017). 
 A good example of this is how, in reaction to terrorist attacks committed 
across Europe in the name of Islam, and youngsters fighting in Syria that are 
fuelling political anxiety, the radicalization of Muslim youth has become a 
major issue in recent years. While revitalizing the relevance of the Directorate 
in terms of policy interventions, the idea of Islam as being incompatible with 
“Western values” and related to many “integration problems” was reinforced, 
justifying “authoritarian modes of control to manage diversity” (Anthias 2013: 
330-1). Such radicalization is, moreover, primarily explained in religious or 
cultural terms, as something coming from the otherness of people, while 
political explanations are shunned (Lentin 2014). Security was important 
motivation when the Directorate was created and still is today. For example, 
the law regulating the consultancy structure officially came to an end in 2013, 
but similar instruments are still used for keeping in touch with “Muslim 
communities” (Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 2016c). 
 Since 2017 Minister Wouter Koolmees (D66) of Social Affairs and 
Employment is responsible for the policy domain. His policy agenda seems to 
less a continuation of Asscher’s harsher stance and more a further inclusion of 
other perspectives than that of the dominant majority. Although it is too early 
to judge whether there is another reorientation of the Integration Policy taking 
place, there does seem to be a difference in tone and approach. MPolicy 
officials currently working at the Directorate explained, for example, that more 
emphasis is put on the Netherlands being a diverse country and that 
discrimination is acknowledged as a problem. At the same time, there does not 
seem to be a fundamental reshaping of the policy domain. 
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  For politicians the symbolic message of demarcating the national identity 
that policies are sending, hoping this yields electoral gains, seems more 
important than actual results. This follows, for example, from the many 
relocations of the Directorate over the past fifteen years. When Vogelaar was 
in office, the Directorate was moved to the Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning, and Environment, and renamed Inburgering and Integration, 
indicating the political importance of inburgering. In 2010 the short-lived 
coalition of the VVD and CDA returned the Directorate to its old department, 
the Ministry of Interior. Asscher relocated the Directorate to the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment in 2012 and renamed it Society and Integration. 
 These relocations are caused by a volatile political will to send a clear 
message that a new government is daring to take the necessary decisions, 
letting the electorate know their anxieties are taken seriously. Yet at the same 
time, the practical difficulties these relocations bring for work of civil 
servants, as I will discuss in Chapter Four, are impeding actual results. Civil 
servants explained, for example, how it contributes to their weak 
interdepartmental position and impedes their work and the effectivity of 
policies. The same holds for various interventions, arrangements and 
knowledge that had been built up in the policy field during the decades and 
were now ended.82 Moreover, the 2013 reforms of inburgering legislation, 
entailing a dramatic budget cut, have substantially limited results (Algemene 
Rekenkamer 2017). 
  Such political decisions point at how politicians prioritize seemingly firm 
action over careful interventions. It seems as if the policy field and hence the 
Directorate are mainly having political relevance as a means to perform a 
fierce stance and for constituting and defending the “Dutch nation” and 
“Dutchness” (Van Reekum 2016). As public security is, again, a central point 
of interest, related to radicalization of youngsters “with a migrant 
background,” this time in light of the heavily politicized topic of Islam, 
integration policies have also become an important means of reasserting the 
state as the protector of public order and citizens. The focus on “social 
stability” and “parallel societies” (Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 
2016c83) are a means of the state to constitute itself as a legitimate, neutral 
actor. The focus on security gives the impression as if the state acts in the 
interest of all citizens, outside of party politics. Even though the Integration 
Policy is not neutral towards the various groups in Dutch society. 
                                                          
82 The consultative structure of minorities’ organizations, for example, was dissolved and expertise 
centre Forum was closed (Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 2013a, 2014). 
83 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2016–2017, 32 824, nr. 176. Progress Report Agenda Integration 
[Voortgangsbrief Agenda Integratie 2016] 
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 There is a clear parallel with the 1980s Minorities Policy, which was a 
reaction to violent acts committed by Moluccan youth. There is also 
continuation in terms of contemporary policy concepts being grounded in the 
culturalist logic of the decades before, which explains and aims to solve 
“integration problems” by looking primarily at the cultural background of 
subjects, rather than the context of exclusionist politics and a non-receptive 
society. As such, the Integration Policy New Style must not be seen as a radical 
paradigm shift (Joppke 2004; Scholten 2011a; Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011; 
Entzinger 2014), but more as a variation on existing expertise and techniques. 
Although in a more radical way than before, as cultural differences are defined 
as problems in themselves (Schinkel 2007), policies continue to demarcate the 
normal from the abnormal (Foucault 1991). This may illustrate why the policy 
field is still relevant in light of recurrent perceptions of failure (cf. Slootman 
and Duyvendak 2015). 
 During the campaign for the elections for the House of Representatives in 
March 2017s, for example, “integration,” “Islam,” and “failed policies” were 
important themes (De Volkskrant 15 March 2017). Besides right wing parties 
such as the PVV and the Forum for Democracy (FvD) that have been voicing 
anti-immigrant and anti-Islam sentiments, more mainstream parties such the 
CDA and VVD also emphasized the importance of defending “Dutch culture.” 
The Prime Minister presented the agenda of his party, the VVD, as the “right 
sort of populism.” This led international media to conclude that “populism had 
won in the Netherlands” (ibid.). During election campaigns and debates, the 
Integration Policy of the past decades was routinely criticized for failing (see 
for example De Volkskrant, 20 September 2016; NOS 201784). 
 Although the “autonomous process of integration” is by some considered 
to be quite successful (Blok Commission 2004; Entzinger 2014), criticizing 
policies is a way of channelling political debate. Politicians tried to outdo each 
other with tough statements, leading the Prime Minister to proclaim, while 
campaigning for the election, that people have to “bugger off” if they “don’t 
act normal.” 85  This expression of hostility against those who don’t “act 
normal” is based on a common Dutch expression, “doe maar gewoon, dan doe 
je al gek genoeg” (just act normal, that’s crazy enough), which reflects a way 
of enforcing social norms. It has become very difficult to talk about the 
Integration Policy from a different point of view. The only political parties 
                                                          
84 Debate Nederland kiest: Het Nationale Slotdebat. 14 March 2017, https://www.npostart.nl/nos-
nederland-kiest/NOSNLDKiest. 
85 Open letter published in national newspapers on 22 January 2017. 
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advocating an alternative, “minorities’” point of view86, are not considered 
serious participants in the political debate. Most other parties implicitly or 
explicitly subscribe to the dominant logic that problematizes alleged cultural 
differences and naturally assumes a fixed Dutch nation in which an 
“autochthonous” majority automatically belongs (Stolcke 1995; Schinkel 2007; 
Ghorashi 2014; Anthias 2013).87 
 Minister of Social Affairs and Employment Wouter Koolmees (D66), also 
responsible for the Integration Policy, has been in office since 2017 but does 
not have as clear a profile on “integration” as his predecessor. At first sight, 
his agenda seems to focus on policy instruments that rationally solve problems 
rather than taking a political stance. A main goal is improving inburgering 
policies by reversing some of the restrictions the previous government had 
made and placing less responsibility with “inburgeraars” (Minister of Social 
Affairs and Employment 2018b88). Another aim is to stimulate labour market 
participation through “evidence based policy measures” (Minister of Social 
Affairs and Employment 2018a89). Notwithstanding benevolent intentions, the 
proposed measures primarily seem to entail technical solutions. 
 Although the role of, for example, employers and municipalities is more 
taken into account than in previous years, the dominant expertise in the policy 
domain is still more attuned to the objects of policy and less to structural 
power relations. This relates to the same mechanism of a fierce political 
debate about belonging being translated in technical solutions that do not 
fundamentally reconceptualize the national status quo. “Integration” is 
primarily institutionalized as a problem of people “with a migration 
background.” As Ghorashi (2014) has argued, notwithstanding developments in 
political discourse and outlook (from emancipation to national exclusion), the 
same people have been categorized as in need of “integration,” and implicitly 
as non-Dutch, on the same grounds. Beneath political volatility, there has been 
consensus about “who and what is the problem” (Groenendijk 2011b: 157).  
                                                          
86 Denk and Artikel1, now called BIJ1. These political parties are part of a trend of “second and 
third generation migrants” increasingly claiming political participation and rights. 
87 A WRR report, Identification with the Netherlands, that was published some years later in 2007 
presented a more nuanced view on identity, loyalty and changing “Dutch” society and norms; it 
warns for exclusionary effects of rigid conceptualizations of Dutchness. However, this message 
was marginalized by the government in its reaction, which instead promoted a very rigid 
conceptualization of Dutchness, emphasizing the liberal rule of law as general context, but 
expecting of all citizens to make an effort to behave in the proper Dutch way. The reactions to a 
remark made by, then, princess Maxima that there is no such thing as the Dutch identity are telling: 
she had no right to question the nation. 
88 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2018–2019, 32 824, nr. 238 Principles of the New Inburgering 
System. [Hoofdlijnen van het nieuwe inburgeringsstelsel] 
89  Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2017–2018, 29 544, nr. 821 Labour Market Policy 
[Arbeidsmarktbeleid]. 
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 Although policies have on the one hand been turning more inclusionary, 
from “guest labourers” and “foreigners” to “ethnic minorities,” via 
“allochthones” to “persons with a migration background,” there was not only 
a continuity in those problematized as “not integrated.” The more they were 
included, however, the stronger the need was to categorize them as Others. 
The dominant point of view from which the Integration Policy has been 
designed, has been from the majority of “true Dutch.” As Dikeç (2008) has 
argued, creating policy objects is indeed very significant in terms of assigning 
people a place within the nation state, consolidating specific images about 
them. Policies create their spaces of intervention rather than acting upon given 
spaces (ibid.: 5). 
 In this sense, the Integration Policy can also be seen as a way of enforcing 
order, as it has been functioning as a “recall to a social order” in which each 
individual is allocated a social position (Fassin 2013: 92). It formalizes this 
order of a national us and foreign them. Moreover, it “defines the relationship 
of some categories of the population to the state, and, more broadly, to 
politics” (ibid.). The objects of policies have a different relation to state and 
politics than the majority population. Especially because people having a 
“second and third generation migration background” have been made object 
of policies, it seems the state is not treating all its citizens equally. Their 
presence is causing problems to Dutch society, reflecting how state policies do 
not acknowledge a changing reality of what constitutes the Dutch nation state, 
but reify very specific imaginations of it (cf. Schinkel 2013). 
 A political discussion about national identity is translated in policies that 
institutionalize and legitimize particular notions of it, which primarily relate 
to the group defined as the majority. Paradoxically, the high political 
importance of “integration” issues is systematically depoliticized, as policies 
preclude a fundamental political debate about who can belong in the nation 
state and on what terms. Formulating a problem as political means taking into 
account opposing forces, ideologies and interests that are played out in public 
(Müller 2011: 296), but as I described in this chapter, the objects of policies 
are not automatically considered to be political subjects. There is wide 
political consensus about how to deal with the “problem of integration”, which 
comes down to the containment of the status quo that is in the interest of the 
“autochthonous majority”, who can set the norm and are reassured they are 
the norm. Expertise underpinning policies is based on apparent objective 
scientific knowledge that naturalizes the national order, which in fact is very 
political. 
 As I will demonstrate at great length in the next chapter, policy 
interventions make the political debate focused on implementation and 
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technicalities while cloaking issues in the neutral language of science (Dreyfus 
and Rabinow 1983; Ferguson 1994; Li 2007; Shore 2011). Despite recurrent 
perceptions of policy failure, reforms are mostly technical adjustments instead 
of fundamental revisions. In order for normalizing power to work, it must 
partially fail (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 195). I have made clear in this chapter 
that policies have the effect of demarcating what is not Dutch and normalizing 
specific imaginations of the Dutch nation state (Schinkel 2010). An important 
function of the integration policy field is to define the norm, it will always 
need to isolate the abnormal and therefore fail to realize its stated goal of 
“integration.” As long as a need is felt to define who does and does not belong 
in the Netherlands, the Integration Policy will remain in place. 
 But as the past years have shown, integration policies are also fuelling 
anxieties about the changing Dutch nation, because it is impossible to realize 
promises of a pure nation (Foucault 1991) and because popular categorizations 
are legitimized. This will only substantiate the desire to define who really 
belongs in the Netherlands and thus for more integration policies. The 
Integration Policy fails, but not because of the reasons often mentioned, such 
as being too “multicultural,” too “soft,” or not clearly setting the norm. 
Instead, it is not able to realize stated goals of social improvement and social 
cohesion because it narrowly defines the national norm. Over the past decades, 
policy makers have not been able to clearly define what “integration” is and 
how it should be best institutionalized as a policy domain field, as the various 
relocations and shifts in approaches illustrate. One constant has been that 
policy measures have been defining the norm. The Integration Policy does have 
political relevance because it creates order.  
 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have answered the following question: How has “immigrant 
integration” been conceptualized and institutionalized in a policy domain? I 
have described how policies have primarily been created in reaction to events 
and anxieties, as the presence of Others was thought to pose threats to the 
public and national order. The translation of such political moments into 
technical policy measures has on the one hand been motivated by a will to 
improve the marginalized position of those deemed “in need of integration”. 
Creating the right techniques to solve defined problems has proven difficult, 
however, because policies have also been grounded in expertise that assumes 
and reifies the Dutch national order. Moreover, in view of their complicated 
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bureaucratic organization and implementation, related to a one-sided political 
interest and will, policies have been bound to yield little results. 
 So in terms of realizing stated goals, the Integration Policy has not been 
very successful. Still, it has been politically relevant. The work policies do in 
terms of producing meaning, though not necessarily intentionally designed as 
such, seems as important as bringing social improvement. Despite variations, 
polices have never been fundamentally altered in terms of assumptions and 
target population. The Integration Policy has been formalizing “minority” and 
“majority” positions in the Netherlands, seeing the first primarily as policy 
objects and the second as political subjects. It institutionalizes the dominant 
perspective and position of the “true Dutch” and so the political status quo. 
Policies thereby naturalize the Dutch nation state as belonging to a specific 
group while considering others as “people out of place” (Yanow and Van der 
Haar 2013). 
 Once institutionalized as official policy, it is difficult to step outside this 
logic that determines what is imaginable and inhibits other conceptualizations 
of society (Shore 2011: 171; Müller 2011: 283-4; Schrover and Schinkel 2013: 
1128). The urge of protecting the Dutch nation has been presented as 
seemingly apolitical, in the sense of being above politics, a self-evident goal 
that forecloses political struggle and debate. There are other depoliticizing 
effects, such as technical policy measures that attribute responsibility to the 
targets of policy to carry out an agenda to fix their own alleged cultural deficit, 
thus absolving the “receiving society” from any responsibility and downplaying 
or ignoring structural factors. Moreover, institutionalization involves the 
legitimization of state interventions by founding them on universal principles 
that are difficult to challenge (Shore 2011: 171). In this case policies were 
represented as serving the general interest, preventing social unrest and 
protecting the economy and public order.  
 These policies illustrate the ways the state has been imagined, 
formulated, and enacted as the protector of its population (Abrams 1988; 
Mitchell 1999; G. Feldman 2005; Sharma and Gupta 2006). As Prime Minister 
Rutte phrased it in an interview (De Volkskrant, 20 September 2016), ensuring 
that “the Netherlands will remain the Netherlands,” economically, socially, 
politically, and culturally may seem like an apolitical goal of state government, 
to the benefit of all. The Dutch population, however, is not considered to 
include those portrayed as a threat to the Netherlands “remaining the 
Netherlands”. This goal is realized, in fact, at the cost of others, who can also 
be Dutch citizens. The state automatically protects the status quo. In this way, 
it is attuned to serving primarily the interests of a particular group, but is at 
the same time represented as being above politics, merely doing what is self-
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evidently thought necessary. I have described in this chapter how state policies 
are part of and shape a very political moment, yet have an air of neutrality 
and authority. In the following chapters, I will look more closely at how this 
“policy effect” (Shore 2011) is realized.  
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2. From Politics to Policy: The Creation of 
Inburgering Legislation 
 
 
“The PVV is clear on this topic: no immigration from Islamic countries!” 
 
(PVV Member of Parliament De Graaf during a debate about inburgering in 
the House of Representatives on 22 January 2015)90 
 
 
In 1991, then VVD leader Bolkestein was the first mainstream politician to 
problematize migration related diversity. Since then, the political debate 
about the place of migrants and people “with a migration background" in the 
Dutch nation state has increasingly focused on the incompatibility of “non-
Western,” “Islamic” cultures with “Dutch liberal values” (Prins and Saharso 
2010; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Van Reekum 2016). Politicians openly 
question the right of some people to live in the Netherlands. The political 
discourse reflects the growing visibility of the resentment among those defined 
as the “majority Dutch population” against migration and religious and cultural 
diversity. Perceived threats posed by “mass immigration” have led to the 
creation of state policies that aim to enforce the “integration” of particular 
populations.  
 Successive inburgering laws have “effectively reaffirmed the difference 
between emancipated, culturally undetermined natives and those who had yet 
to demonstrate their ability to succeed without assistance and guidance” (Van 
Reekum 2016:  37). Various scholars have analyzed inburgering as a technique 
that controls belonging in the Netherlands by making it conditional for certain 
groups of migrants and Dutch citizens with a migration background, especially 
from Turkey and Morocco, implicitly targeting Muslims (Schinkel 2010; Van 
Houdt et al. 2011; Essed and Hoving 2014; De Waal 2017). As such, inburgering 
can be seen as a means of governing “non-Western allochthones” as matter out 
of place (cf. Yanow and Van der Haar 2013), so reinforcing and reasserting a 
particular vision of a Dutch national order. 
 There is a tension within inburgering policies, as they are grounded in 
republican, universalist ideals of inclusion and shared citizenship, and they 
have been created as solutions for social problems with the aim to stimulate 
socioeconomic participation and foster social cohesion (Minister of Interior 
                                                          
90 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2014–2015, 32 824, nr. 89. Report of a Committee Meeting on 
Inburgering [Verslag van een Algemeen overleg over inburgering].   
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1996; Entzinger 2006). At the same time,  however, these policies have been 
criticized for conflicting with liberal principles of the Dutch rule of law, for 
example by illegitimately discriminating on ethnic and religious grounds, and 
for not realizing their stated goals but merely assigning those defined as Others 
a place with additional obligations to 'integrate' into the nation state, an 
ambiguous verb meaning more than learning Dutch or passing a citizenship 
exam (Besselink 2008; Groenendijk 2011a, 2011b; Schinkel 2010; Van Oers 
2013; De Waal 2017). As state policy, this ambiguity is smoothened. Policy 
measures are represented as a clear cut, rational solution to pressing social 
problems and their political meaning is neutralized. 
 Inburgering legislation needs to meet requirements set by the rule of law, 
meaning it has to be legally sound and legitimate in terms of being non-
discriminatory, proportional, and prudent (Besselink 2008; De Waal 2017). As 
policy, inburgering seems much more nuanced and neutral than the political 
discourse on “integration” in the sense that it has been created as a legitimate 
and rational intervention that aims to improve social conditions; 
notwithstanding exclusionary, possible illegitimate aspects it has (ibid.). Thus, 
there is a tension between state neutrality and political outlook, which makes 
it an interesting case to study the policy effect. As Shore (2011: 172) has 
argued, policy conveys a calculated and self-evident course of action that gives 
“legal-rational coherence and direction,” but also “a dignity and morality” to 
political plans they might otherwise not have possessed. Policy, in short, 
endows politics with authority. 
 In this chapter, I analyze how this policy effect is actually produced in the 
process of policymaking by studying how particular political decisions and 
imaginaries have been translated into policy. Whereas the previous chapter 
addressed the relation between political developments and the Integration 
Policy in general, here I focus on how a particular policy measure has been 
created and reformed in reaction to growing anxieties related to migration and 
diversity. Foucault (1991) has argued that recurrent perceptions of failing 
policies often lead to technical adjustments and further restrictions, instead 
of fundamental reforms and political debate. The meaning policies convey and 
the norms they instil are more important than realizing the results they aim to 
bring. I use this lens to understand the creation of inburgering policies, looking 
at the effects of turning a political question about belonging into a technical 
problem. 
 I am specifically interested in how “the particular design of the technical 
solutions and the decision-making process that precedes the solutions is erased 
and neutralized once the technicalities are in place” (Nyqvist 2011: 212). 
Sound policies are, moreover, a representation of legitimate state 
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government, as they have to take into account the rule of law and general 
interest. Studying this policy effect therefore also exposes how the state is 
constructed as a neutral entity above politics and society (Sharma and Gupta 
2006). I examine the following question: How are policy measures created as 
a legal and technical answer to political questions? 
 Inburgering is an interesting case, not only because a very political 
moment is neutralized in seemingly rational policy measures, but also because 
it is an important policy measure within the Integration Policy. It is one of the 
few measures that can be legally enforced and that has been in place since 
1996, which makes it possible to study its development over time. Because of 
this, there are also numerous documents in which the construction and 
development of policy can be studied. My analysis is grounded in data from the 
policy archives. of the Directorate. These files include, amongst others, 
preparations for meetings in the House of Representatives, agendas and 
reports of internal meetings, internal communication, drafts of legislation, as 
well as advice and points for ministers to decide. I used public policy 
documents and interviews with policy makers involved in these bureaucratic 
practices to contextualize and deepen this archival research. This made it 
possible to reconstruct in detail the creation of successive inburgering laws and 
examine how in this tedious process the very political nature of these policies 
has been rendered neutral.  
 I have divided my reconstruction in two phases. First, I discuss how the 
Newcomer Inburgering Act was constructed, analyzing how the definition of 
the target population reflects the tension in policy making between political 
decisions and state neutrality. The technical design of the inburgering system, 
moreover, endows “integration” with objectivity. Second, I describe how 
perceptions of failure soon instigated reforms. More policy was presented as a 
remedy for its own ills, while inburgering measures themselves were not 
fundamentally questioned (Foucault 1991; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983). Instead, 
the inburgering system has been increasingly used to channel anxieties and 
political debate and to reassert the national order. 
 
 
2.1 “Repairing faults of the past” 
 
I said to Dijkstal [then Minister of Interior] that it struck me, in a 
negative way, that the Dutch Minister of Interior seemed to be visiting a 
foreign country [when visiting a minority organization in a Dutch city]. I 
found it remarkable that he needs an interpreter to be able to talk to 
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people who will live here all their lives and whose children are going to 
school here.  
 
(High ranking civil servant) 
 
From the 1960s onwards, a lack of Dutch language skills was problematized in 
terms of impeding employability, educational opportunities, and 
“participation in society” in general of migrants (Minister of Interior 1983: 11; 
cf. Rath 1991; Essed and Nimako 2006). Informants working in this field 
explained how language courses were already offered by employers of “guest 
labourers,” unions, and other private initiatives from the 1960s onwards. These 
language courses were locally organized, mostly run by volunteers 91, and 
although some municipalities started to offer language classes during the 1970s 
and 1980s, no overarching structure or a clear single financial arrangement 
from the national government existed. It was assumed most migrants would 
return to their country of origin. Informants also described how over time the 
Ministry for Education and Science started financing these classes, facilitating 
the professionalization of language education, as policy makers increasingly 
considered the stay of migrants to be permanent. 
 During the late 1980s and early 1990s the Ministry of Welfare, Public 
Health, and Culture was looking for ways to construct a program of supervision 
for language courses that made use of local infrastructure and was 
administered at the national level.92 A recurring theme in the narratives of 
informants was that despite the good intentions of these initiatives, the 
implementation was not considered successful because of a lack of political 
will and funding, which caused a shortage of qualified teachers and 
consequently long waiting lists. Moreover, it was thought to be a problem that 
a considerable group categorized as in need of language education did not 
seem very motivated to follow courses. So although language courses had 
gradually been institutionalized as an instrument to stimulate employment and 
educational opportunities for migrants and “minorities,” it was considered 
ineffective. 
 Around the same time, at the end of the 1980s, migration and 
diversification were increasingly seen as an enduring threat to the Dutch 
welfare state and national community. Such anxieties started to play a more 
important role in electoral politics after Bolkestein’s intervention in the public 
                                                          
91 One official remembered how she had to create course material and methodologies herself, 
because there was virtually nothing of this kind. Non-governmental organizations such as Dutch 
Centre for Foreigners (NCB) were the first to develop methods. 
92 DCM94/1427. Memorandum on Drafting Inburgering Contracts written by the Directorate to 
inform the ICM. 
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debate in 1991, triggering calls from parliamentarians for more restrictive 
measures (Fermin 1997). A growing sense of discontent with the Minorities 
Policy, which had failed in the eyes of opinion makers, social scientists, 
politicians, and policy officials, fueled desires to “repair failures of the past,” 
as some informants put it. While looking for “more effective” and “harder” 
measures, language education turned out to be an apt instrument. Language 
education is a concrete policy instrument the effects of which can be 
monitored and measured, having the potential to successfully enforce 
“integration.”  
 It was considered a solution to the unemployment among “minorities” and 
migrants, which to an important degree was attributed to the difficulties they 
had with the Dutch language (Minister of Interior 1994). The necessity of policy 
measures to stimulate employment, in order to protect the welfare state, was 
put forward in two reports by the Scientific Council for Government Policy 
(WRR 1989, 1992).93 These introduced an “activating citizenship” approach, as 
part of a wider trend of neoliberal reforms that made individual citizens 
responsible and that have been analyzed as important techniques of modern 
government (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; cf. Dean 1999; Rose 1996). 
Language education was seen as an important instrument to make 
allochthones, both “newcomers” and those who had been in the country a long 
time, “oldcomers”, as self-reliant citizens that would not be dependent on 
government assistance for income or finding their way in Dutch society. 
 But language not only reflects the socioeconomic aspects of integration. 
Both “minorities” that were already living in the Netherlands and continuing 
migration were important sources of anxieties related to belonging and identity 
among the majority population. As Bolkestein’s emphasis on defending 
“Western norms and values” showed, this growing discontent was increasingly 
related to fears about Islam intruding into Dutch society. Various informants 
explained inburgering was a way of addressing these anxieties of the white 
majority (cf. Van Reekum 2016: 37) and the government was searching for ways 
that would show it is in control of developments that were seen as threatening 
the Dutch nation state (Minister of Interior 1994: 18). In this light, language 
policies might also function as markers of the nation (Bjornson 2007), an 
argument I further develop in the course of this chapter. 
 In the wake of the “National Minorities Debate” instigated by Bolkestein’s 
intervention, various “working conferences” were organized in 1992 to 
conceive policy measures that could address anxieties and make the 
                                                          
93  Respectively Allochtonenbeleid (Integration Policy) and Voorstudie burgerschap (Pre-study 
Citizenship). 
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Integration Policy more binding. High ranking civil servants of the Ministry of 
Interior discussed the usefulness of language education, and education about 
Dutch society, with social scientists and politicians. Concrete policy solutions 
were put forward in an advisory study by Van der Zwan and Entzinger (1994). 
In order to stimulate the employment of “allochthones,” it advocated for the 
creation of jobs that paid below minimum wage and propelled the idea of 
“inburgering contracts” that would oblige newly arriving migrants to learn the 
Dutch language.94 
 The Parliamentarian elections in May 1994 formed a strategic moment to 
push for a policy reorientation (Scholten 2011a: 166-7; cf. Fermin 1997; Koolen 
and Tempelman 2003). Civil servants recalled that compulsory language 
education for migrants was rather controversial95. Therefore, it was thought 
far too early to publicly express premature plans for targeting “allochthones” 
residing in the Netherlands as well. Some explained that creating an obligation 
for “newcomers” was considered to be difficult enough, so measures for so-
called “oldcomers” would have to wait. Thus, the reconstruction in the 
following section is only about newly arriving migrants, although I will also 
make clear that problematizations and assumptions were closely related to 
anxieties about “ethnic minorities” living in the Netherlands. 
 
2.1.1 Defining who is “in need of inburgering” 
The new government coalition of PvdA, VVD, and D66 that took office in August 
1994 made the decision to create such contracts (PvdA, VVD and D66 1994). 
These would eventually result in the Newcomer Inburgering Act that came into 
force in January 1998 (Staatsblad 1998 263). The target group (“doelgroep”) 
of the law was defined as “all aliens” coming to the Netherlands with non-
temporary purposes. This reads as a neutral definition, having a universal 
implication and not making illegitimate distinctions between people. At the 
same time, my reconstruction in this section of how this law came into being 
reveals how determining the target population was based on problematizations 
of ethnic, religious, and national background, thus reflecting a particular way 
of imagining the Dutch nation state. 
 In one of the first official policy papers on inburgering, the stated goal 
was to make inburgering an obligation for all “newcomers” who are “at risk of 
                                                          
94 Contracts fit in perfectly with the neoliberal reforms of “activating citizenship”. 
95 Further on, I elaborate on the reasons why it was seen as controversial. 
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marginalization” (Minister of Interior 1995 96 : 3). Newcomers is a policy 
category that demarcates specific groups of newly arrived migrants. At that 
time, three groups were defined: 1) “traditional newcomers,” who are “family 
formers and –unifiers”; 2) acknowledged refugees with a residence status; and 
3) refugees with a provisional residence status.97 In internal administrative 
memos written in the fall of 1994, the first phase of the policy making process 
during which civil servants from the Directorate cooperated with 
representatives from municipalities and other ministries, “traditional 
newcomers” were further specified as “legal follow-up migrants from the 
target groups of the Minorities Policy.” 98  This shows how inburgering is 
explicitly not meant to refer to all migrants coming to the Netherlands, but 
rather is a continuation of policies targeting specific “minorities” as problem 
groups. 
 “Traditional newcomers” were defined as the “largest migrant 
communities of Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Caribbean Dutch.” 99 
Inburgering explicitly “is not about the Japanese businessman, who can take 
care of himself, but about persons who settle permanently in the Netherlands 
and who are at risk of getting into a deprived position without an offer from 
the government.”100 Marginalization, explained as not being able to participate 
in Dutch society in terms of having work, following education, and taking part 
in social life, was thus self-evidently related to particular “ethnic 
backgrounds,” which were seen as defining the social position of apparently 
homogeneous, bounded, and static groups. Some officials remarked that from 
the start, inburgering was related to the political desire to limit migration of 
these groups, in order to prevent “importing more trouble.” It also reified the 
idea that “integration problems” are caused by the culture of specific groups. 
 At the same time, policy texts were cloaked in a more neutral language 
of socioeconomic marginalization and self-reliance. This outlook was also 
reflected in the initial idea of creating an inburgering contract, emphasizing 
the responsibility of the migrant to make an effort to “integrate.” Moreover, 
                                                          
96 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1994–1995, 23 901, nr. 10, Note Principles Inburgering [Notitie 
uitgangspunten inburgering].  
NB I have translated the Dutch word  achterstand as marginalization, but it also refers to 
deprivation. 
97 During the further development of inburgering policies in the years that followed there was 
debate about this last group, which was eventually discarded as separate policy category. 
98 DCM94/1427: p. 7; also see DCM95/37: p. 7. Memo about the current status and follow up 
inburgering contracts, sent to the Minister on 10-01-1995. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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it underlined the reciprocal character of the measure, as it entailed a mutual 
obligation. Local authorities, with the full support and approval of the national 
government, had the responsibility of offering the necessary facilities.101 This 
policy measure only obliged recently arrived migrants who were dependent on 
social welfare to take language courses. This group, besides being considered 
“most deprived” and thus most in need, was the only one that could really be 
sanctioned if not complying with their obligation to follow language courses, 
by cutting their social benefit.102 However, there was a strong wish to include 
more groups in the inburgering policy. 
 The aim was to include all newcomers “at risk of ending up in a situation 
of marginalization” (Minister of Interior 1995: 6). Although it was stated that 
only those individuals thought at risk and not a priori all “members of target 
groups” were seen as possible objects; in the process of policy making this 
meant de facto that alleged ethnic or cultural background, determined by 
place of birth, was the main indicator for “being at risk” and thus for inclusion 
in the target population. A report of a meeting between civil servants from the 
Ministry of Interior and various cities that was held in November 1994,103 for 
example, made clear that prevention is an important goal, indicating it is not 
only about improving actual marginalized positions. 104  In order to make 
language education obligatory and enforceable for such a large group, an 
“independent legal base” was necessary. 
 The government ratified a plan proposed by policy officials to continue 
developing the inburgering contracts and to simultaneously begin working on 
measures that have a “solid legal base” (Minister of Interior 1995). The House 
of Representatives discussed the plans in April of that year,105 eventually 
reaching consensus about the necessity to learn Dutch and to make language 
education compulsory. Members of Parliament also approved to start 
developing a legal base. While various political parties asked questions, these 
were mostly about issues of implementation in terms of budget, waiting lists, 
special attention groups, hours of education and possible sanctions. Informants 
remembered that it was a controversial plan. They recalled that not only there 
was resistance among colleagues working at the Directorate, but also that 
social scientists, opinion makers, and media were very critical on the plans in 
                                                          
101 DCM94/1427; also see Note inburgering contracts for ICM and RSCB 01-02-1995. 
102 Note from ICM to RSCB 21-02-1995: p. 1. 
103 DCM94/[not categorized] : p. 2. Report administrative meeting 24-11-1994. 
104 Refugees formed a separate category of people who were generally considered at risk of 
deprivation, not only because of their experiences but also because their assumed different 
background in terms of cultural, religion, education and labour market skills. 
105 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1994–1995, 23 901, nr. 20. Report of a Committee Meeting on 
Inburgering [Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg over inburgering]. 
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light of principles of equality, fairness, and effectivity. At the same time, a 
political majority was convinced of the necessity of inburgering as a means of 
improving the Integration Policy, probably not in the last place because it also 
addressed anxieties of the majority population. This was considered especially 
urgent in light of an ongoing “refugee crisis” in the mid-1990s. 
 Now the decision had been made to start creating a legal base for 
compulsory inburgering, the next question was “how a complex looked-for 
reality may be translated into a simple law.”106 In the next chapter, I explain 
the process of policy making, the actors involved, and their power positions 
more in detail. Various options were proposed by civil servants from various 
departments, who were collaborating in an interdepartmental project group. 
One option was introducing an obligation to follow education, analogous to the 
Act on Compulsory Education from the Ministry of Education and Sciences, but 
civil servants from this ministry were not in favour, because they envisioned 
difficulties with enforcing the obligation.107 
 Other possibilities involved the Ministry of Justice changing its Aliens Act, 
for example rewarding those who have learnt Dutch sufficiently by prolonging 
a residence permit and/or making it permanent.108 Another option was making 
it easier to naturalize and obtain Dutch citizenship if migrants could prove they 
are “ingeburgerd enough.” This was defined as being able to speak the 
language but also as being “incorporated in society, which entails he [sic] has 
social contacts outside his own group and is not bigamously married.” 109 
Although the Ministry of Justice was not eager to amend its laws and these 
options eventually were not chosen, they are revealing in the sense that 
inburgering was considered to entail much more than just socioeconomic 
participation. 
 According to Schinkel (2013: 1150) there are “two factors that [are 
mostly] singled out in the measurement of sociocultural integration” and these 
both seem to underpin this definition. First, the indicator “contacts outside 
                                                          
106 DCM94/941. Memo to inform the Management Team of the Directorate about the Inburgering 
Bill. 
107 DCM95/511: p. 6. Strategic memo Inburgering Contracts for the ODBVC meeting on 16-3-1995. 
108 Termination of residence was not considered a serious option. Another option was to arrange 
sanctions through a private legal base, with the help of positive and negative incentives in terms 
of financial stimuli, repercussions for social housing, providing day care for children, etc. Though 
originally envisioned as a temporary solution to enforce contracts on a larger population it was 
also an option for a permanent legal base. However, there were serious legal objections, 
emphasized by the Directorate Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Interior, so it was eventually 
discarded. 
109 DCM95/511: p. 5. 
104
Chapter 2
116 
one’s own [ethnic or religious] group” implies that “minorities” are “too 
enclosed in their own group” and in order to “participate in society” have to 
get in contact with the majority population. It not only ignores the fact that 
people may both live in the Netherlands and be mostly oriented towards their 
“own group110.” Focusing on the “number of contacts” that “allochthones” 
have with “autochthones” also reflects the idea that the “autochthon 
majority” is the neutral status quo to which others have to relate, while it 
disregards the fact that members of the majority population have little contact 
with people “with a migration background.” 
 Second, “not being bigamously married” relates to the idea that 
immigrants and minorities have to share the “Western norms and values” that 
are considered to be dominant in “modern, secular Dutch society” (ibid.). I am 
not arguing whether it is the right thing or not to forbid certain practices and 
to define what is acceptable behaviour. But it is revealing why this is explicitly 
mentioned here, in the midst of a law that ostensibly aimed to prevent 
unemployment. This ambiguity shows how in light of increasing concerns 
related to especially “Turkish and Moroccan minorities,” thinking about 
migration and diversity was linked to practices that symbolize religious and 
cultural otherness. These ideas about foreignness were used as an indication 
for being “ingeburgerd” or not, for being fit to live and work here. As such, it 
functioned to demarcate the Dutch nation state as modern, secular, and 
Western that needs to protected from practices associated with Islam. 
 Culturalized conceptualizations of Dutch citizenship (Tonkens and 
Duyvendak 2016) that increasingly dominated the political debate about the 
place of migrants in the Netherlands thus found their way into policy making. 
In fact, such ideas about “Dutch norms and values” also underpinned the option 
that was eventually chosen, which was a new, independent law on 
inburgering. 111  Civil servants from the Directorate and other departments 
agreed this would be the best option, because it enabled a large target group 
of newcomers without interfering with or changing existing laws. A new law 
                                                          
110 As I will explain in Chapter Four, various informants indicated they struggled with the related 
conceptualization of “parallel societies” that is used nowadays, reasoning there are also many 
“autochthon” communities in the Netherlands that are “too enclosed” and that there are divisions 
in Dutch society along, for example, education level or between people living in the larger cities 
and the countryside.  
111 DCM95/511: p. 7; ICM95 3/3: p. 7. Report Follow-up Trajectory Inburgering Contracts for the 
ICM D.D. 5 April 1995. 
Ideas about prolonging or permanent residence, or making the process of naturalization go quicker 
were not discarded but taken seriously into account during the creation of the Inburgering law. 
They would eventually not be included as sanctions straight away, but in the 2006 reforms. 
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also gave the Directorate the opportunity to lead the policy making process, 
providing an opportunity to give substance to its desire for being allocated 
more budget and securing a stronger interdepartmental position.112 It also 
helped that it was the favoured option of municipalities. 
 An important point of discussion was how to determine the exact target 
population of the new law. Minister Dijkstal was advised by policy officials from 
the Directorate, late in May of 1995, about how the envisioned criterion of 
“being in a socioeconomic deprived situation” could best be translated in “the 
legal description of the target population of the inburgering policy.”113 They 
proposed to precisely determine who to make subject by creating a list of 
countries of origin “of which it is clear that inhabitants on average will end up 
in a socioeconomically marginalized situation [when coming to] the 
Netherlands.”114 Officials suggested this could be done in analogy to the law 
that had just been created to reduce labour market discrimination115, which 
aimed to stimulate employment of the four largest groups of “allochthones” 
that were specifically defined as “Turks,” “Moroccans,” Antilleans/Arubans,” 
and “Surinamers,” as well as “refugees.” 
 This advice was substantiated by the argument that it would relate best 
to the main goal of decreasing socioeconomic marginalization. It indicates how 
institutionalized thinking in terms of “ethnic minorities” was, because just as 
in the Minorities Policy of the 1980s, some groups were a priori and 
categorically problematized as being at risk of deprivation based on their 
ascribed ethnic background. And it shows how the Newcomer Inburgering Act 
has from the start been ambiguous, aiming to prevent marginalization while at 
the same time targeting its objects as cultural others who need government 
assistance to become emancipated, “normal” citizens. This is especially salient 
because of the desire to include people from Aruba and the Antilles, despite 
the fact that this entailed an illegal distinction between Dutch citizens 
                                                          
112 DCM95/511: p. 11, “because other departments are inclined to ‘protect’ their legislation … the 
field is open for BiZa [Ministry of Interior] to go for a separate public legal base.” In the next 
chapter I further elucidate how this penvoerderschap, or taking the lead in creating policy, implies 
both being in a position to exert considerable influence on the policy being created, and securing 
funding and manpower, thus bringing power. A letter written out of name of the Minister of Interior 
in October 1994 already explicitly mentioned that a separate law on inburgering seemed a good 
idea for this reason. This is an indication that the Directorate was from the start pushing for a 
separate law to codify the inburgering system. 
113 DCM95/1039: p. 2-3. Memo Contours Law on Inburgering, sent to the Minister on 30-05-1995. 
(Also see ICM95 3/5. Towards a Law on Inburgering. Discussion paper ICM 7 June 1995). 
114 Ibid. 
115 The Proportional Participation of Allochthones to the Labour Market Act (Wet BEAA), that I have 
explained in the previous chapter. 
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(Besselink 2008; Jones 2014. Therefore, a “separate regulation [would have] 
to be created.”116  
 Civil servants advised that the option of specifying those “in need of 
inburgering” by means of a list of countries, despite being less flexible, had 
preference above the other option, which entailed to include all newcomers 
and let cities decide who to oblige.117 Although cities could choose not to oblige 
certain types of migrants who were not considered in need of inburgering 
(“people, for example, from Japan or the United States”), this was deemed 
undesirable because this wide formulation would make identifying “eligible 
individuals” less precise. Moreover, it could cause legal insecurity because of 
the possible variation in decisions being made by municipalities. The Minister 
made clear, however, in a meeting in June 1995 that he wanted policy officials 
to carefully reconsider the definition of the target population. 118 He thought 
it would be difficult to determine which newcomers exactly would be in need 
of an inburgering trajectory, so pinpointing specific countries of origin could 
be stigmatizing and conflict with the legal principle of equal treatment. 
 Some months later, officials from the Directorate advised that the choice 
for a wide group is sustainable, “but it means that the emphasis of the 
[inburgering] trajectory that is offered is put on integration [“inpassing”] and 
functioning in the Dutch society,” rather than just on preventing 
socioeconomic marginalization. 119  This is an important alteration. The 
assumption was that particular “minorities” are, because of their background, 
likely to end up in marginalization. But in order to avoid legal difficulties, the 
rationale becomes that all migrants, irrespective of their background or 
employment opportunities, benefit from an introduction in Dutch language and 
culture. This change reflects the ambiguity in the goals, target population and 
rationale of inburgering, especially because labour migrants were in a later 
period excluded again from the target population. 
 This justification for the wider target population also is an example of how 
inburgering legislation has been grounded in a specific normative 
understanding of the Dutch nation state. A few months before, when the 
decision to start exploring options for a legal base had just been made, the 
Minister of Interior had not been able to explain properly in a television show 
                                                          
116 DCM95/1039: p. 4. I further elaborate on the discrimination of certain Dutch citizens in section 
2.2 of this chapter. 
117 Ibid.: 2. 
118 List of Decisions of the IPI meeting, d.d. 30 June 1995: p. 1. Also see DCM95/1642: p. 2 Memo 
with Decision points regarding Newcomer Inburgering Act, sent to Minister 20-09-1995.  
119 DCM95/1642: p. 2. 
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why obligatory inburgering was necessary, given the fact that there were 
probably not enough jobs for newcomers.120 In response, officials from the 
Directorate had started searching for a new rationale to legitimize the law and 
advised: “inburgering is not a goal in itself, but a first step towards integration. 
Labour is a good way of coming to integration, but integration is more than 
that, it is also communication. Just a first idea. Should be further developed 
if desired.”121 
 It was argued that “the concept of inburgering should be much broader 
than work alone. Like for example: inburgering means being able to talk to 
your neighbours, making clear to the doctor what is wrong and being able to 
do groceries.”122 So there is a shift from language being important for finding 
work, to being a prerequisite for “integration” in general, which, according to 
informants, also related to discontent about migrants living in the Netherlands 
for many years without speaking Dutch. As such, the focus on language is linked 
to ideas about the Dutch nation state as a homogeneous community in which 
everyone speaks Dutch and is willing to have contact with everyone. To a 
certain extent, the desire to stimulate a sense of community through a shared 
language may be understandable. But as some critical informants observed, 
the question is whether the government should and legitimately can enforce 
this by law. 
 They pointed out the tension between an obligation to follow language 
education and liberal principles of the Dutch rule of law that offers citizens 
the freedom to live the life and speak the language that they want, and that 
protects them against unnecessary state interference with their personal lives. 
One retired policy official remarked that the state cannot prescribe people 
what language to speak in their private lives and that this in fact may have the 
adverse effect of people being less loyal to the Dutch state. The proposed 
obligation foreclosed the option that people living in the Netherlands may also 
communicate in other languages to their neighbours or while shopping for 
groceries. But mandatory language education can be used to appease anxieties 
about apparent breakdown of social cohesion because of multiple languages 
being spoken in one country (Blackledge 2005). In this way, rather than a 
necessity, the obligation to learn Dutch relates to imagining the Netherlands 
as a monolingual country (cf. Anderson 1983), a point I will further explain in 
the coming sections. 
                                                          
120 DCM95/511: p. 14-5. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
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 It also reflects a paternalistic stance of the Dutch state regarding some of 
its residents who were deemed in need of government assistance because they 
might otherwise end up in isolation, marginalization, or both (Schinkel and Van 
Houdt 2010). This is not to say there are no grounds to assist, even in a 
compulsory manner, those people who lack the “skills necessary to participate 
in society” and therefore “might end up in a marginalized position, because of 
which they will not be able to find their way in Dutch society in social and 
economic sense” (Minister of Interior 1996: 6). But the issue is about the 
authority and judgement of the state. Who decides what skills exactly are 
necessary, who are thought to lack them, and on what grounds? This is 
especially problematic when particular ethnic, religious, and national 
backgrounds have been important indicators for marginalization. The threat 
was that the state, in response to this marginalization, in practice would 
exacerbate it by codifying a different status for people based on their religious, 
ethnic, or national origins. 
 Besides a change in rationale, the choice for a broad target population 
also changed the discussion about who to include exactly as objects of the new 
law.123 A downside, as was advised by officials, was “of course” the high costs 
that are implied even if those “newcomers” who do not really need it, because 
they are “able to take care of themselves,” are offered an inburgering 
trajectory.124 This point was brought up by other ministries, while officials 
from the Directorate stressed the open formulation is desired for “legal, policy, 
and political reasons.” Besides foreclosing discrimination, it would also take 
into account the “changing dynamic of migration,” which was increasingly 
considered to be a permanent phenomenon for the Netherlands and in the 
future could also include new groups. 
 Despite universal definitions, various groups of migrants were explicitly 
not considered to be “in need of inburgering” and thus were never meant to 
be included in the law. Whereas EU citizens could not be included because 
international treaties foreclosed legal restrictions on movement, the Council 
of Ministers made the decision on 10 November 1995125 to exclude “diplomats, 
their families, certain categories of businessmen, and personnel of 
                                                          
123 DCM95/1642: p. 2. 
This would have been the case when precisely defining who would be made subject, based on 
country of origin. During discussions the following question was asked, for example: “has a family 
reunifier from the US to be obliged? If not, where to draw the line?” 
124 DCM95/1818: p. 2. Memo Principles Inburgering Newcomers, sent to the Minister on 19 October 
1995. Especially the ministry of Justice asked why also oblige those migrants to an intake if they 
can take care of themselves (for example diplomats, expats, etc.).  
125 DCM95/1888. Two memo’s sent by the Directorate to the Council of Ministers, one on 6 
November, the other on 15 November. 
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international organizations.” It was considered that these migrants would stay 
in the Netherlands for a relatively short period of time while being employed, 
so obligatory language education was not necessary for them. The Council, 
moreover, decided that a work permit should be considered as a “temporary 
stay,” thereby effectively excluding all “labour migrants,” as inburgering was 
only meant for those who have the intention to settle permanently in the 
Netherlands. 
 Civil servants had advised this would primarily mean that “newcomers 
from OECD countries” 126  were excluded from the law. An obligation for 
migrants from most of these countries was not desired by the government, 
because they were thought to be self-reliant in economic sense. Another 
aspect that might have played a role was that migrants from these 
predominantly “Western” countries were considered to be culturally and 
ethnically closely related and therefore not needed to be included in the target 
population. It is interesting that in earlier memo’s work was not mentioned as 
an “inherently temporary stay” (DCM95/1039).127 Indeed, defining all work-
related stays as temporary ignores the complex reality of labour migrants 
ending up in a permanent residence or other migrants who had the intention 
to settle already leaving after a few years. 
 Moreover, an exemption was made for “Caribbean Dutch,” for whom 
labour was defined as a non-temporary stay.128 These people did not need a 
separate residence permit and municipalities could not check why and for how 
long they were going to stay in the Netherlands. In this way, it was made 
possible to include them in the target population. Intentional or not, the most 
important target groups of the inburgering law were “follow-up migration from 
already residing minorities.” For legal and practical reasons, the target 
population was formulated in general terms of “newcomers who come to settle 
permanently” (Minister of Interior 1995: 5), but there had been a strong wish 
to only include specific target groups, rather than all migrants.129 To ensure 
only those intended were actually targeted, cities were tasked with organizing 
an intake during which they were supposed to decide for whom an “inburgering 
                                                          
126 The current Member States of the European Free Trade Association, Turkey, Israel, the United 
States, Canada, Australia, Mexico, Chile, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand 
(http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/). 
127  Only study and medical treatment were, besides personnel of transport companies and 
international organization. 
128 DDS 5350592. Memo Decision points Inburgering in the Netherlands, sent to the Minister on 28 
April 2005. 
129 DCM95/1861. Memo RSCB-decision making Nota Principles Inburgering Newcomers, sent to the 
Minister on 19 October 1995. 
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trajectory” would be necessary. In order to prevent arbitrariness and too much 
variation between cities, the aim was to standardize the intake by means of a 
uniform “criterion of marginalization” (Minister of Interior 1996130: 6-7). 
 This seemingly objective criterion was a legally vague norm and criteria 
were not objective (Besselink 2008: 16; cf. Regioplan 2002: 37). Defining 
objects of the policy measure was far from neutral. As I described above, in 
internal documents those “in need of integration” were primarily defined as 
“the four largest minorities”, while it was explicitly mentioned that 
municipalities should not consider migrants from the US or Japan as in need of 
government assistance.131 Although all “newcomers” would have to report at a 
municipality for an intake, I will make clear in the following section that there 
was no uniform, institutionalized way envisioned to check the consistency in 
the decisions made by municipalities (Council of State 1996132: 2). It seems as 
if the criterion may have helped to legally facilitate the targeting of 
“minorities” in the context of the universal obligation. 
 Related criticisms may be found in an advice of legal scholar Kees 
Groenendijk133, who was asked by the Directorate to offer his opinion on the 
plans in Fall 1995. His principle objection was that de facto only those 
immigrants were made object of the law who were already seen as culturally 
and ethnically different, which may reinforce negative perceptions among 
“autochthones.” Moreover, nationality and place of birth, used as proxies for 
ethnicity and culture, were illegitimate categories if the goal of the envisioned 
law is preventing socioeconomic marginalization. Although this criticism was 
circumvented by a general definition of the target population, the proposed 
inburgering regulation effectively targeted those people defined as cultural 
and religious others whose place in the Dutch nation state needs to be 
governed. 
 Defining the target population of the Newcomer Inburgering Act, on the 
one hand, was instigated by the aim to create solutions to prevent 
socioeconomic marginalization of migrants, and so help society at large. But 
on the other hand, it institutionalized an anxious politics (Modest and De 
Koning 2016) that were premised upon imaginaries of a national community in 
                                                          
130 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996–1997, 25 114, nr. 3. Explanatory Memorandum Newcomer 
Inburgering Act [Memorie van Toelichting Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers]. Also see DCM95/1888. 
Two memo’s sent by the Directorate to the Council of Ministers, one on 6 November, the other on 
15 November. 
131 DCM95/1039: p. 2. 
132 Council of State (1996), Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996–1997, 25 114, A. Advice of the 
Council of State and Further Report regarding the Newcomer Integration Act Advies van de Raad 
van State en Nader Rapport over de Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers].  
133 DCM95/1770. Letter sent to the Director Coordination Minorities Policy on 25 October 1995 
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which “ethnic minorities” do not automatically belong. As policy formed and 
evolved, in reaction to political debates related to migration and 
diversification, the tension between its stated aims and unstated cultural 
assumptions only increased. But the language used to describe, justify, and 
present it to the public increasingly took on the appearance of neutrality and 
reasoned authority. Policy needs to meet legal standards of equality, 
proportionality, and prudency that follow from the Dutch Constitution, which 
thus functioned as a countervailing power. Tensions between political ideas 
about the target population and state neutrality were eventually eased, 
resulting in a seemingly universal, legally viable, obligation.  
 The political nature of inburgering was in fact given authority and made 
more acceptable through a legal-rational idiom (cf. Shore 2011: 172). The 
definition of the legal term “newcomer” in the Inburgering Newcomer Act 
(Staatsblad 1998 261: 1) exemplifies how this idiom implicates distance and 
neutrality:  
 
1. The alien who is permitted to reside in the Netherlands on 
ground of article 9 or 10, first paragraph, under b of the Alien’s Act, 
who has reached the age of eighteen years and who is admitted to 
the Netherlands for the first time, or has received a permit as 
meant in article 9a of that law, except those who are staying here 
temporary or who on ground of clauses of treaties or of decisions of 
international law organization cannot be obliged to take part in an 
inburgering program, and 
2. the Netherlander who is born outside of the Netherlands, who has 
reached the age of eighteen years and who is for the first time 
inhabitant of the Netherlands in the sense of the Municipal Basic 
administration Act. 
 
 In contrast to the assumptions underlying the law, the text reads as a 
rational, neutral measure. There is no mention of specific groups, only general 
terms are used to described the target population. Inburgering was embedded 
in the rule of law. Decisions taken by a democratically elected government 
have to take into account the fundamental rights of various population within 
the borders of the Dutch state. At the same time, legislation also has to be 
democratically legitimated. So instead of merely legitimating particular 
political decisions, there is a potentially conflictive interaction between 
democracy and constitutional rights, both balancing each other and actually 
shaping policy outcomes. 
 The target population is, furthermore, conscientiously defined; the text 
is written in conditionalities and references to other laws are made. Moreover, 
the definition is written in one long sentence, which makes it rather difficult 
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to comprehend. It relates to the point that policy is grounded in culturalist 
assumptions, but reads as an abstract, dry and reasonable measure. The second 
point in particular is an illegal way of excluding Dutch citizens from other parts 
of the Kingdom than the Netherlands. However, it does not read as 
discrimination, but as a state policy having authority. This is also because the 
specific set-up, lay-out and form of legal texts. In the next chapter I further 
address the effect of the style and form in which legal texts are cast. I now 
turn to how the shaping of inburgering as a technical system further 
contributed to this policy effect. 
 
2.1.2 Creating a technical system 
The official goal of the Newcomer Inburgering Act was eventually formulated 
as “newcomers” having to be able to “independently participate in social 
interactions” and being “judicious and empowered citizens who are able to 
survive in the competitive Dutch society” (Minister of Interior 1996: 1). It thus 
was premised on neoliberal ideas, encouraging state cooperation with privately 
funded institutions and making the targets of policy responsible for their own 
success, as a rational and efficient mode of government (Schinkel and Van 
Houdt 2010; cf. Rose 1996). The Newcomer Inburgering Act links the Minorities 
Policy of the 1980s, which was grounded in the paternalistic welfare state, to 
the disciplining neoliberal style of government that characterized the 
Integration Policy New Style of the 2000s. Responsibility was not completely 
placed on “newcomers,” since the state still promised to take care of these 
subjects financially. But, as I will explain in this section, a system of measures, 
regulations, requirements, sanctions, and control was created. Although 
reality would turn out to be more complicated, this system contributed to the 
apparent objectivity of inburgering.  
 In order to realize the stated goal, all “newcomers” had to register at the 
municipality they were living for an intake, which every city was obliged to 
offer (Minister of Interior 1995: 6-8; Staatsblad 1998 263134: 4-5). The “criterion 
of deprivation” mentioned above was to be determined by an “inburgering 
research” that would make clear the extent to which a “newcomer” was “in 
need of inburgering” and what type of “inburgering trajectory” could best be 
offered. This would depend on the actual skills, learning capacities and 
envisioned end-level of a “newcomer,” which were related to the envisioned 
follow-up education or employment opportunities after having completed the 
trajectory. The government desired a “high level of uniformity” in decisions 
                                                          
134 Newcomer Inburgering Act [Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers]. 
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made by municipalities and therefore three criteria were described that could 
help determining the level of a “newcomer:” mastery of the Dutch language, 
knowledge of Dutch society, and knowledge of the Dutch labour market 
(Minister of Interior 1995: 7). 
 On the basis of the research, an “inburgering trajectory,” or program 
would be determined, which consisted of a number of “modules,” Dutch as 
Second Language, Societal Orientation, and Labour market Orientation, out of 
which some or all could be chosen. Municipalities were obliged to offer 
education, through Regional Training Centres, and to provide guidance and 
counselling throughout the trajectory. “Newcomers” were obliged to follow 
the trajectory that had been offered to them, to register at an educational 
institution and follow classes. An average of 500 hours of language education 
was thought to be sufficient to reach desired levels. In addition, 100 hours of 
education about Dutch society was deemed necessary. The level of language 
education would be determined with the help of the inburgering research.135 
 For the lowest level, meaning one would be trained for communication in 
daily social life, a “CITO136-2 level,” corresponding with CEFR137 A1/A2 level, 
was deemed enough. If further education and work were thought possible, a 
“CITO-3 level,” corresponding with CEFR B1/B2 was striven for. It was 
envisioned this last level would in practice often mean someone is fit to follow 
regular vocational training (Minister of Interior 1995: 4). Though seemingly 
objective, this linking of a certain language level to a degree of integration is 
a political choice (Horner 2015: 215, cf. Bjornson 2007). Moreover, the decision 
about which trajectory a newcomer was to follow would be very subjective, as 
it depended on the judgement of untrained local civil servants. The 
government itself indicated it was not sure whether the three criteria 
mentioned above would be “concrete enough for municipalities” (Minister of 
                                                          
135 Initially, three levels were defined according to which ambitions of “newcomers” could be 
categorized (DCM95/1642: p. 2). “Social self-reliance” was the minimal level all participants 
should master in order to independently participate in society. “Educational self-reliance” was a 
higher level of language skills, which should make it possible for participants to enroll in the regular 
Dutch educational system. “Professional self-reliance” was meant to educate participants on a 
level that makes it possible to find a job on the labour market. These levels were later discarded 
as explicit standards for the intake, but did end up in the inburgering system as a means of 
distinguishing between “inburgeraars.” 
136 A Dutch reference system used to test language skills. 
137 The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, teaching, assessment. 
This has been developed by the European Commission as a “transparent, coherent and 
comprehensive reference instrument” (https://www.coe.int/en/web/common-european-
framework-reference-languages/?). A1 and A2 roughly refer to elementary skills, B1 and B2 to 
more experienced daily language usage, while C1 and C2 stand for an academic level of language 
proficiency. 
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Interior 1995: 7) and the Council of State (1996: 5) warned against legal 
insecurity and arbitrariness. 
 In short, it was not clear what an intake research should exactly look like. 
At the same time, the idea of a standardized intake lent an aura of objectivity 
to inburgering (cf. Shore 2011: 172). Similarly, the final standardized test 
would check the language level achieved, thus enabling the inburgering 
program to be concluded. Although passing the test was not compulsory and 
“newcomers” only had an “obligation to make an effort,” a uniform end test 
was important because it was seen as a trigger for people to participate and 
as a guarantee for connecting with subsequent education or employment 
(Minister of Interior 1995). It remained a sensitive issue to obligate migrants to 
follow language courses and take a test. Sanctions would only be enforced if 
someone had ostensibly done nothing to participate in courses. These primarily 
entailed fines and did not affect the residence permit, which had already been 
declared to be no option earlier in the process.138 
 A nationally standardized test was also found important as it would, in 
combination with the intake, allow for measuring and comparing the progress 
of all “inburgeraars” across the country. As I mentioned above, existing 
practices of language education were considered to fail, partly because it was 
difficult to monitor and control the progress being made in and effects of the 
language education. Standardization was seen as a way to improve the 
efficiency and effectivity of the inburgering system, as comparing and checking 
the quality of inburgering programs country-wide was seen as a way to secure 
equality and prevent arbitrariness. Moreover, it would facilitate the control by 
national authorities of the cities in terms of costs and “output,” as the migrants 
who successfully passed were called, and allocate funding (Bjornson 2012: 195-
6). Funding was a major interdepartmental point of contention. 
 Bjornson (ibid.) has argued that this testing regime of monitoring and 
audit was primarily a means to assess and check the implementation in 
educational institutions. Standardization relates not only to securing quality 
and equality, but illustrates how inburgering functioned to make “integration” 
measurable, as it concerned fixing an observable language deficit and making 
it possible to judge whether someone is “integrated” and on what level (cf. 
Schinkel 2013, also see Foucault 1991; Rose 1996; Mitchell 2002). Measuring 
the ambition and skills of “newcomers,” specifying the number of hours of 
education necessary, defining end levels, and creating a uniform end test 
transformed  “integration,” an ambiguous concept related to socioeconomic 
                                                          
138 The minister (and Council of Ministers) explicitly had declared expulsion out of the order, see 
DCM95/1039 and DCM95/1642. 
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participation, identity, and national belonging, into a measurable quantity, a 
matter of calculation. It became a technical judgement whether someone was 
“integrated enough.”  
 This gives the impression that ambiguous “social problems” definitely 
exist, and in fact can be objectively observed (Scott 1998; Mitchell 2002; Li 
2007). Society could thus be rendered legible and amenable by defining 
precisely when someone is “ingeburgerd” and establishing standards for 
measuring it. Accordingly, solutions could be rationally shaped, an important 
task for policy officials, and results could be monitored. This gives a scientific, 
matter-of-fact aura to particular political plans (Apthorpe 1997; Shore 2011). 
Indeed, inburgering took “what is essentially a political problem, removing it 
from the realm of political discourse, and [recasts] it in the neutral language 
of science” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 196), giving it an “aura of objectivity” 
(Shore 2011; 171). The moment when someone would “fit” in the Dutch nation 
state and could be considered a citizen was made measurable, and as such was 
objectified, thus changing a fundamental debate about the nature and practice 
of “integration.” 
 Language acquisition, moreover, seems objective, because it is 
represented as a practical, self-evident, and transparent instrument for 
“participation in society” and employment. According to Vermeulen, language 
“is seen as the uncontested instrumental means toward integration. Learning 
the language is the sine qua non of equal access to the public domain, and its 
institutions, of Dutch society” (2004: 147). This makes it seem more neutral 
than culture, but language does not necessarily stimulate inclusion and may in 
fact be the “carrier of inequalities,” because command of the Dutch language 
does not necessarily bring equal access (ibid.: 151). Moreover, it is a powerful 
marker of the homogeneity of a nation (Anderson 1983; Blackledge 2005; 
Stevenson 2006; Bjornson 2007; Baba and Dahl-Jørgensen 2013; Horner 2015). 
There probably was a genuine belief that learning Dutch was a necessary 
solution for participation. However, as I mentioned above and will further 
clarify in section 2.2, this relation is not so clear-cut and it’s possible that 
there existed neither the need nor a legitimate ground for enforcing Dutch 
language education. 
 During political debates on inburgering, however, questioning the 
necessity of language, and thus imaginaries of a homogenous nation, was not 
possible. In the Spring of 1996, the principles of the new law had been agreed 
upon by civil servants and responsible ministers and could now be discussed by 
politicians, advisory bodies and interest groups. It took one and half years of 
discussion in Parliament, because of legal objections and due to politicians 
who, as officials saw it, used the inburgering system “as a play thing” in order 
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to draw attention to their political party.139 Various discussions in the House of 
Representatives did not so much focus on the desirability of an inburgering law 
and its underlying assumptions about belonging. All parties emphasized, during 
various debates, the importance of a legal instrument to enforce integration. 
 Although some questions were asked by D66, RPF (a small conservative 
Christian party) and PvdA about the target population and legal arbitrariness, 
most of the discussion focused on more technical aspects.140 For example, a 
point put forward by most parties was whether the norm of 500 hours of 
language education would be enough to get people to the level desired for 
being able to work.141 The minister was advised by his officials to reassure 
Parliamentarians that 500 hours was deemed enough by experts and that it 
should also be considered an average, offering more or less depending on the 
abilities and knowledge of each individual “newcomer.”142 Relatedly, CDA, 
PvdA, and D66 asked questions about how the connection between the 
inburgering program and labour market participation was going to be 
implemented, how “newcomers” could be actively guided to work.143 The 
minister wrote that cities would be instructed to cooperate with employment 
organizations. 144  Parties, furthermore, stressed the importance of paying 
attention to specific groups, such as women, Turks and (young) refugees (PvdA, 
GL, D66).145 
 These are examples of what civil servants referred to as political parties 
prioritizing issues that give them profile. In general, political discussions did 
not question the assumptions or necessity of the proposed measure as such. 
More fundamental criticisms had been put forward by the Council of State in 
                                                          
139 This may have been because the topic of “integration” had never before been so elaborately 
discussed in the House of Representatives. 
140 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1995–1996, 24 401, nr. 14. Report of a Committee Meeting on the 
Minorities Policy 1996 [Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg over het Minderhedenbeleid 1996]; 
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996–1997, 25 114, nr. 5. Report of a Committee Meeting on the 
Newcomer Integration Act [Verslag van een wetgevingsoverleg over de Wet Inburgering 
Nieuwkomers. 
141 Ibid.: p. 22-7. 
142 CIM97/907.Memo Newcomer Integration Act, sent to the Minister on 15 May 1997. Tweede 
Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996–1997, 25 114, nr. 6: p. 33-5, 39. Note as a result of Report [Nota naar 
aanleiding van het verslag].  
A salient point is that the Liberal Party refers to a study that indicates 75% of “newcomers” do not 
reach CITO-2 level, which is lower that the envisioned level 3, but the Minister of Interior writes 
the report is not officially published yet. I refer to this report in the next chapter. 
143 Ibid.: p. 36-9, p. 44-5. 
144 Ibid.; CIM97/907. 
145 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996–1997, 25 114, nr. 15. Report of a Committee Meeting on the 
Newcomer Integration Act [Verslag van een wetgevingsoverleg over de Wet Inburgering 
Nieuwkomers]. 
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the fall of 1996.146  Important points of criticism included, first, that the 
category “newcomer” was not clearly defined, a point that had also been 
discussed in the Interdepartmental Project group Inburgering147, because it was 
not clear how long ago someone must have arrived in the Netherlands to count 
as a “newcomer” (Council of State 1996: 5). The government reacted that 
given the variety of legal terms it was not possible to come up with a clear 
definition, which it did not deem problematic because other articles of the law 
further specified who was to be made subject. 
 Moreover, the Council was critical of the differentiation between Dutch 
citizens, as those from Aruba and the Dutch Antilles were also obliged to follow 
an inburgering trajectory. “This should principally be elaborated on in the 
Explanatory Memorandum of Explanation. The motivation in terms of 
[promoting] social, educational and professional self-reliance of the newcomer 
who may [otherwise] end up in a marginalized situation is not enough” (ibid.: 
1; also see Besselink 2008). The government responded by stating it would 
explain that many youngsters from these countries did not have sufficient 
knowledge of Dutch language and society, justifying inburgering as a first step 
towards integration (ibid.: 2). This left unanswered the questions of who 
determines what sufficient knowledge is and on what grounds, and of the 
legitimacy of targeting entire groups because some of its members are deemed 
in need of government assistance. 
 As a third major objection, the Council warned against too much diversity 
in implementation of the proposed law, given the large freedom left to cities 
in how to put an inburgering program into practice (ibid.). The criteria on 
which the program is to be determined were, furthermore, formulated in 
rather general terms. They warned it could bring legal insecurity, while 
uniformity was desired. The government responded that it considered the bill 
to have the right balance between flexibility and legal security and did not 
foresee problems with too much diversity between cities (ibid.: 3). So core 
aspects of the inburgering system were legally unsound, running against 
principles of equality and non-arbitrariness, failing to precisely define the 
targets of the law or even explain why a law was necessary.  
                                                          
146 CIM96/1933. Report of IPI meeting of 16 October 1996, sent on 17 October 1996. 
This was a draft, the definitive report was sent to the House of Representative no earlier than 
November 1996, which may have to do with fundamental objections the Council had. (also see 
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996–1997, 25 114, A).  
147 CIM96/1037. Report IPI meeting of 24 May 1996, sent on 31 May 1996. 
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 Some of these fundamental objections were discussed in the House of 
Representatives in March 1997, but it did not lead to major changes, as it 
seemed not politically opportune to question the rationale of inburgering. D66, 
SGP, and GPV (a small conservative Christian party) asked whether it was 
desirable to include all Antilleans and Arubans and why they were treated 
differently than Dutch citizens born in the Netherlands.148 The minister was 
advised before in a memo149 to answer such questions by stating that he would 
be willing to make a distinction between highly and lowly educated Arubans 
and Antilleans. GL and RPF, moreover, asked questions about the 
proportionality of the proposed compulsory inburgering and how it relates to 
the responsibility of the receiving society and PvdA and CDA asked questions 
about the vague criterion of deprivation.150 These critical questions, besides 
the many that focused on technical details and implementation151, were no 
reason to alter the bill.152 Apparently, the wish among politicians to “finally do 
something seriously about integration” was more important. 
 There was more critical input from other actors. The Association of 
Netherlands Municipalities was concerned about the availability of funding for 
cities and possible difficulties of implementation related to this.153 Migrant 
organizations were more critical about the possible exclusionary effects of 
obligatory measures.154 The governments of Aruba and Dutch Antilles were very 
critical about the fact that people coming from these parts of the Dutch 
Kingdom were included as objects of the law. Numerous letters, visits and calls 
from Dutch ministers and civil servants aimed to ease tensions.155 Eventually, 
                                                          
148 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996–1997, 25 114, nr. 5: p. 9. 
149 CIM97/907, memo Newcomer Integration Act, sent to the Minister on 15 May 1997. Tweede 
Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996–1997, 25 114, nr. 6: p. 9. 
150 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996–1997, 25 114, nr. 6. 
151 CIM97/907. 
Most related to funding, the set-up of the inburgering system and issues of implementation, only 
these points are discussed with the Minister.  
152 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996–1997, 25 114, nr. 6. 
153 Difficulties would arise because cities would receive money based on output, which brings risks 
when less “newcomers” than expected settle (see CIM96/1866. Agenda for the IPI meeting on 16 
October 1996, sent on 10 October 1996). This had also been a point of contention 
interdepartmentally (see CIM96/1090. Memo accompanying Bill Inburgering Newcomers, sent to 
the Sub Council of Minister for Social Policy on 11 June 1996). 
154 CIM96/2101. Letter from VluchtelingenWerk, received on 18 November 1996; CIM97/622. Letter 
from VluchtelingenWerk, received on 25 March 1997. CIM 97/1678. Letter from VON received on 
19 September 1997. CIM97/1847. Letter from LIZE received on 15 October 1997. 
155 CIM97/592. Concept letter to the Prime Minister of the Dutch Antilles; Letter to the Antillean 
government. CIM97/821. Letter to Antillean Minister of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, sent 
on 28 May 1997. CIM97/856. Memo about meeting with Antillean government, sent to Minister on 
1 May 1997. 
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the promise was made to distinguish between “Caribbean Dutch” in terms of 
levels of education. It is, however, salient that Dutch citizens from the 
Caribbean were self-evidently assumed to be “in need of inburgering” and 
were made subject of the Newcomer Inburgering Act, even though this was 
illegal (as I will further explain in section 2.3). 
 Although inburgering might have been created as a policy measure to 
improve the marginalized socioeconomic position of some groups in the 
Netherlands, an important aspect has also been the creation of policy objects 
as such, reflecting a desire to define specific problem groups in Dutch society 
that mirrored those groups already categorized in the Minorities Policy as non-
Dutch. Moreover, the goal of stimulating socioeconomic self-reliance, with the 
aim to protect the welfare state, would in practice prove difficult to realize. 
It soon turned out it would not be easy to lead people to work or education 
(Regioplan 2002; TI2001-1395156). At the same time, internal documents show 
how the political aspects of inburgering, being premised upon ideas about 
cultural and religious otherness, related to people’s supposed ability to live in 
the Netherlands, were rendered neutral in the process of policy making. 
 The Newcomer Inburgering Act, created in reaction to growing political 
debates and anxieties about diversification and Islam, was universalized by a 
general and legally acceptable definition of the target population. It was 
further given authority and neutrality through the technical design of the 
inburgering system (Nyqvist 2011: 212; Shore 2011: 171). Contentious political 
questions related to belonging, culture, and the Dutch nation state were 
rendered technical in the process of creating policies. Standardization of levels 
and measures, calculation of progression being made, and rationalizations 
about how to come effectively to results, all gave the impression that there 
was a clearly definable problem that could be solved by means of a rational, 
objective system. Inburgering was shaped and represented as if the best, only 
possible way to solve what policy makers considered pressing social problems 
of migration, marginalization, and social cohesion. 
 The policy system also turned a political and cultural debate about how 
to interpret and react to social developments into a technical problem. Instead 
of reflecting on how social developments may necessitate the reconsideration 
of assumptions about nation and belonging, politicians primarily argued about 
issues of implementation and collectively took the need for inburgering policies 
                                                          
156 TI2001/1395. Report Taskforce Inburgering 2000-2001. Cities would become responsible for a 
“follow-up trajectory” leading to either work or additional education, a topic they were to discuss 
during a concluding conversation with the “newcomer,” which was the last compulsory aspect of 
the inburgering program. I will further discuss the results of inburgering legislation in the next 
section. 
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for granted (cf. Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 196). Virtually no critical questions 
were raised about the necessity of learning Dutch or about the exclusionist 
aspects of inburgering and how this may have adverse effects on the goal of 
“integration”,  to say nothing of the irrationality of quantifying when someone 
is considered sufficiently Dutch. In fact, the nativist and culturalist 
conceptualization of belonging was authorized by a democratically elected 
Parliament and thus given legitimacy. Civil servants recalled that initially the 
idea of making language education obligatory for some groups of migrants was 
quite controversial, but eventually the Newcomer Inburgering Act was adopted 
unanimously by the House of Representatives (1997 157 ), reflecting the 
consensus that had grown on this matter. 
 An important effect of solving the “integration problem” in this way was 
that failure could increasingly be attributed to a lack of inburgering of 
individual migrants. Other legislation aimed at improving employment that 
focused on fighting discrimination was also developed. But as I have explained 
in the previous chapter, this was not really successful because of its non-
binding character, unwilling employers and a lack of political will. This was, 
however, not framed as “failing integration.” Structural political and economic 
power relations were increasingly ignored, while the targets of policy were 
increasingly blamed (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; cf. Li 2007). In that sense, 
inburgering was successful in terms of appeasing the majority population, 
disciplining what was considered foreign and so securing support for the 
Integration Policy. It was a way of showing the state is in control of social 
developments that were considered a threat. As I will argue in the next section, 
perceptions of failure led to reforms of the system, rather than questioning it 
altogether. 
 
 
2.2 A system to channel anxieties and debate 
 
Already within a few years after the Newcomer Inburgering Act came into force 
“there was criticism in the House of Representatives that inburgering was not 
working, because the still high unemployment among target groups and little 
improvement in their education results,” a policymaker recalled. “While you 
need more than one or two years” to properly assess the functioning of the 
inburgering system, “politicians started to argue for more restrictive measures 
straight away.” Despite their critical reflection on this “political impatience,” 
                                                          
157 Overview of Voting [Stemmingsoverzicht]. Tweede Kamer 17 November 1997. 
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policy officials voiced similar criticism on the new law. Inburgering was thought 
to fail because of the relatively high number of dropouts, continuing long 
waiting lists and difficulties with implementing the system were also seen as 
problematic (cf. WRR 2007; Regioplan 2002).  
 The diagnoses of failure primarily focused on the implementation and 
technicalities of the Newcomer Inburgering Act. Cities were facing difficulties, 
because now they had an important task in social guidance, while they were 
lacking the expertise, organizational capacity and funding. Some civil servants 
explained it was “really necessary to change the system of funding.” It was 
thought to be perverse, because cities would only be fully paid after an 
“inburgeraar” had passed the inburgering test. Because cities needed funding 
quickly, according to informants, they would take the test way too early. Since 
there was no obligation to meet a specified standard, this had bad results as a 
consequence. They explained there was too little control on the output of 
inburgering trajectories.158 In addition, 500 hours of education was considered 
to be insufficient (cf. WRR 2007: 76-9). Furthermore, a complex system, in 
which many actors, i.e. ministries, cities, Regional Training Centres and social 
services, had to cooperate, asked for strict guidance and regulation. Actors 
working in this field at that time thought this was not done consistently.  
 So politicians, policy officials and cities agreed the Newcomer Inburgering 
Act could not be implemented as efficiently and effectively as was desired and 
it was necessary to start thinking about how to address these shortcomings. 
The Taskforce Inburgering was created in 2000 as a temporary organization 
with the task to find out how to improve the inburgering system (WRR 2007; 
TI2001/1395; TI2001/1513159). I describe its organization, structure and goals 
in Text box 2.1. When after two years the Taskforce was ended, it was claimed 
it had been able to make the inburgering system more efficient and effective 
by decreasing waiting lists, improving the coordination of municipalities and 
being more focused on output. Likewise, the Interdepartmental Policy Study 
Inburgering that had started in 2001 consisted of high ranking officials from 
several departments who studied ways to “increase the effectivity of the 
current inburgering policy” (CIM2002/77340160). 
                                                          
158 One official remembered that “the idea was that people would take the test on level 3, but in 
practice it was sometimes level 2 but often level 1, with that level you cannot function. Therefore 
it had to be more serious.” A non-state expert made a similar observation: “Slowly a commercial 
sense was growing, a focus on results. Gradually everyone got the feeling, that maybe we have to 
get an overview of what we are doing, also set quality requirements.” 
159 TI2001/1395. Report Taskforce Inburgering 2000-200; TI2001/1513.Plan solving waiting list 
problem. 
160 CIM2002/77340. Interdepartmental meeting IBO inburgering. 
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 Thus, much attention was paid to bottlenecks in the implementation and 
to making technical adjustments, or to the alleged unwillingness of subjects, 
raising calls for making measures more restrictive (TI2001/1395; TI2001/1513; 
CIM2002/77340; also see WODC 2007: 4). But there was much less focus on the 
political assumptions about the target population and the necessity of learning 
the Dutch language. It has never been shown convincingly whether the 
Newcomer Inburgering Act has really contributed to better employment 
opportunities (Regioplan 2002; Bjornson 2007; Goodman and Wright 2015). 
Language skills may actually be less important for employment opportunities, 
as they are not really required for the low-skilled jobs many migrants have, 
while a network and the perceptions of employers may be much more 
important for employment opportunities (Bjornson 2007; Ghorashi and Van 
Tilburg 2006). 
 This last aspect is especially salient in relation to continuing labour market 
discrimination that was less vigorously targeted through policies, but also 
because inburgering may itself have helped normalizing ideas about certain 
migrants lacking the necessary skills to function in the Netherlands (Bjornson 
2007: 74). The Dutch state and society also have to be open to and give people 
the opportunity to “integrate”, an aspect that seems to be missing from 
political debates (WRR 2007: 51, 103). The possible adverse effects of policies 
and possible other ways of realizing socioeconomic participation were not 
discussed. Criticisms and reforms were cloaked in a discourse of effectivity, 
efficiency and standardization. Proposed improvements focused on reforms 
and implementation of the system. Rather than questioning whether 
inburgering is the right tool, it was reinforced (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 
196).  
 A central motivation for inburgering legislation seems to have been 
gaining control over a changing society. Inburgering was an effective 
technology to assign objects a place in the national order and address anxieties 
of the white majority, which became more focused on Islam. As the topic of 
“integration” became very politicized in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the 
assassinations of Fortuyn and Van Gogh and other violent incidents, there was 
an explicit need felt to do something about “integration problems” that were 
increasingly related to cultural and religious differences. Inburgering would 
prove the ideal policy instrument that could be tailored to political desires. 
Reshaping the existing inburgering law was seen as an attractive option for 
powerfully modernizing the Integration Policy in light of these events. 
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2.2.1 “Turning a language test into an integration exam” 
Both the Taskforce Inburgering and the Interdepartmental Policy Study 
Inburgering had made recommendations for improving the inburgering system 
that were published in the tumultuous period before the 2002 elections. 
Besides three policy options the new coalition government could choose from 
and that entailed varying degrees of responsibility for either the Dutch state 
or the migrant, it recommended several “no-regret measures” that should in 
any case be taken over by the government because they would improve the 
inburgering system: various financial streams should be unified and funding for 
cities should be made dependent on the number of “inburgeraars” rather than 
the number of tests; a binding exam with financial or legal consequences 
should be introduced; and an open market for course providers should be 
created. 
 The government agreement of CDA, VVD and D66 took over these 
recommendations and decided to reform the Newcomer Inburgering Act 
accordingly (CDA, VVD and D66 2003: 11). In a later policy paper (Minister for 
Aliens’ Affairs and Integration 2004a161) plans for a new Inburgering Act and an 
Inburgering Abroad Act were presented. In a strongly politicized context, civil 
servants had to give substance to new political plans. Policy officials that took 
part in these reforms remembered it was not only a technical challenge to 
make reforms possible, but also a very contentious process. The scale of the 
transformation implied a massive bureaucratic organization and because of the 
political importance, a large budget for developing the new system was made 
available162 (Significant 2010; Regioplan 2016). 
 A new organization was set up, the Project Directorate Modernization 
Inburgering, which was tasked with putting the reforms of the inburgering 
system into practice.163 The word “modernization” may seem a rather odd 
term for reforming a system that is not even five years old, but it reflects the 
ambition of improvement and moving forward. In view of the political priority 
                                                          
161 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 29 543, nr. 2, White Paper Reform of the Inburgering 
System [Herziening van het inburgeringsstelsel].  
162 Officials who have closely worked with her stressed that it helped new minister Verdonk, who 
engaged herself with stricter inburgering (as well as stricter immigration policies) because she 
wanted to make herself known for her toughness, was from the Liberal party. This not only meant 
a strong political position because here desires were shared by other ministers, but also that there 
were less worries about financial means, since the minister of Finance Zalm was from the same 
political party. This led some officials to reflect on this period as wonderful, with many 
opportunities and financial means. They were enthusiastic about having a lot of money and man 
power to create a new system and saw it as a challenge to make the new plans possible. They 
considered it a technical challenge to develop new exams and trajectories, while it was a challenge 
to get everyone on board and cooperating. 
163 Shortly after the Directorate was relocated to the Ministry of Justice, a development that had 
quite an effect on the process of policy making, as I explain in Chapter 4. 
124
Chapter 2
136 
given to inburgering, the Program Directorate had to quickly realize the 
reforms and civil servants explained it therefore operated relatively 
autonomously from the Directorate, though officially under its responsibility. 
In Text box 2.1, I further explain its goals, organization and workings. Officials 
recalled that many extra policy officials were attracted to do the hard work. 
One explained “around forty men were working full time, many of whom had 
a temporary contract, whereas now I’m working on it [inburgering] with six.” 
 These policy officials had to figure out how to translate political desires, 
which were more about obligation and control than about support and 
inclusion, into policy. Especially because “oldcomers” were included in the 
target population, the nature of inburgering would substantially  change and 
the process of policy making would be complicated. Because then Minister 
Verdonk had clear plans, she was closely monitoring progression and interfering 
much more with the process than her predecessors had done. Several officials 
who had been involved remembered that minister Verdonk wanted too much 
and too difficult things, and therefore was “getting into trouble” with many 
people. One official explained how “it was a process with the regular steps”, 
but also “hectic and turbulent […], before the bill was discussed in the House 
there had already been three or four debates to prepare it.” Before I turn to 
these political debates, I first describe the difficulties of defining the subjects 
of the new law. 
 
2.2.1.1 Defining, again, who is in need of inburgering 
Coming to a legally sound definition of the target population turned out to be 
a major challenge. As will follow from my reconstruction, the desire was to 
include all people who since the 1980s had been problematized as “ethnic 
minorities”. This meant legally residing “oldcomers,” either as an “alien” with 
residence permit or as naturalized Dutch citizen, were also intended as objects 
of the new Inburgering Act. When creating the Newcomer Inburgering Act, civil 
servants and politicians thought it was too difficult to also include “oldcomers” 
as objects of this law for legal and practical reasons. But now they thought it 
was more opportune to include all “minorities” already living in the 
Netherlands, together with “newcomers” from the same countries of origin, 
meaning family migrants and refugees (Minister for Aliens Affairs and 
Integration 2004a: 3). In order to target those desired, it was proposed to 
oblige all persons born outside the European Union who wanted to settle, or 
already had settled, permanently in the Netherlands, irrespective of 
citizenship status. 
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 Text box 2.1 Temporary bureaucratic organizations: at distance and effective 
 
Informants explained that temporary bureaucratic organizations are created 
when reforms, often related to political priorities, need to be realized within a 
designated period of time. They operate relatively independently from 
established bureaucratic structures and have clearly defined goals, so as to 
facilitate fast decision making. As one official explains: “a project is literally at a 
distance and has its own culture, as it is often informal, is less involved with 
bureaucratic lines and has more direct contact with important actors.” A project 
is aimed at quickly achieving a goal and everyone working for is attuned to this 
same goal. 
 
Taskforce Inburgering 
The Taskforce Inburgering was created in 2000 with the goal to professionalize 
the inburgering system. Ella Vogelaar was made project leader and external 
actors were attracted from a commercial consultancy firm (CapGemini) and 
cities, but policy officials from the Directorate joined as well. Note the 
similarities with how the Directorate was constructed in the early 1980s, in terms 
of organization but as well of practices (as I describe below). Informants who 
have been working for the Taskforce mentioned that the physical distance it had 
from the ministry related to the freedom they enjoyed, which allowed them to 
pick up things and solve them quickly. They had to account less to the standard 
bureaucratic hierarchy and mostly had contact with the Director Coordination 
Integration Policy Minorities, or directly with the minister. At the same time 
there was some distrust from officials at the Directorate.  
 For two years they spent a lot of time and money on improving and 
professionalizing the system, with varying success. Then project leader Ella 
Vogelaar reflected during an interview on what they had done as follows: “we 
investigated the reasons for the waiting lists and we could partly dissolve them. 
We mapped bottlenecks, came with solutions and streamlined the policy on the 
local level; we acted as a bridge between national government and local 
implementation.” This was done primarily through “account managers” that tried 
to make improvements via intense and direct contact with cities. “And we could 
also give a boost to inburgering by generating attention on both the national and 
local level. 
 In terms of results, some improvements were allegedly made by facilitating 
communication between various administrative levels, making more money 
available and helping out cities with practical difficulties. Moreover, 
recommendations were made for reforming the law 
 
Project Directorate Modernization Inburgering 
The Project Directorate Modernization Inburgering was created in 2003 to make 
possible the reforms of the inburgering legislation. It functioned in similar 
fashion as the group of officials of the Directorate had done when creating the 
Newcomer Inburgering Act. But because of the amount of work many policy 
officials were needed and a separate directorate was created, with some 40 
people working there. Operating alongside the Directorate, though officially 
under its responsibility, it was relatively autonomous, but it did not enjoy as 
much freedom as the Taskforce. Its nature was different, being more concerned 
with drafting legislation than with practical improvements and thus being more 
encapsulated in bureaucracy. 
 
(text continues on next page) 
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 Apparently, policy makers were aware of the legal complications of this 
definition, since in the summer of 2004  the Advisory Commission Aliens Affairs 
(ACVZ)164 was asked to write an advice about the legality of the reforms 
proposed by Minister Verdonk. Indeed the Advisory Commission disapproved 
various aspects of it (ACVZ 2004). It pointed at the proportionality of the new 
law, also mentioned by the directorate Legal Affairs at the Ministry of 
Justice165, because the proposed level of examination and the costs of courses 
and exams would pose severe limitations for people with low incomes and/or 
a low educational level. The most important objection was that place of birth 
is not a legal ground to determine whether people should be obliged to pass 
an inburgering exam. Though seemingly neutral, it may actually include people 
not “in need of inburgering” or exclude those who are in need (ibid.: 23). 
 The directorate Legal Affairs wrote in an internal memo to the Program 
Directorate, arguing the latter had not been “sufficiently made clear the new 
system is legally viable in light of the principal of equality.” It found the 
criterion  
  
suspicious in a legal sense because it does not address the actual 
marginality of people, but ethnicity. This suspicion has to be taken 
away. This can only be done if […] it is sufficiently argued why the 
                                                          
164 An independent advisory body, established under the 2000 Aliens Act, advising the Minister of 
Justice and Parliament on alien law and policies. It consists of fifteen members, a combination of 
social scientists, high ranking civil servants and professionals, who have been personally appointed 
by the Minister (ACVZ 2004). 
165 DDS 5213811. Concept letter sent by directorate Legal Affairs to the Head of the Program 
Directorate Modernization Inburgering on 7 October 2004. According to informants, this directorate 
was a powerful and important actor, especially when creating or reforming legislation 
 In terms of organization there were more similarities. Many people were 
attracted, civil servants from the Directorate and other departments, but also 
external experts and professionals. Because the new inburgering laws involved 
expert knowledge of language acquisition and testing, professionals from this 
field were attracted. Some language experts were strategically incorporated in 
the state bureaucracy to bridge both worlds. 
 The work consisted of drafting legislation, but it also included tendering for 
and supervizing the development of courses, materials and exams done by 
private companies. Coordinating other actors that would have a role (IBG, IND, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was also important. There were, moreover, many 
debates in Parliament, which all had to be prepared. Questions from MP’s, 
NGO’s and citizens needed to be answered. And as I explain in the body of the 
text, there were many complications with drafting legislation, implying a lot of 
work. 
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goal that is pursued with the system is legitimate and that the 
system is ‘fit and proportional’ in its implementation.166 
 
The proposed definition of “born outside the European Union” included “Dutch 
citizens from outside the EU,” meaning people born in the Dutch Antilles and 
Aruba. Though holding Dutch citizenship, they would be treated as aliens, 
isolating them from the Dutch white mainstream population (cf. Jones 2014). 
This would be “discrimination based on origin”, having “no (direct) link with 
the goal … of participating in society” (ACVZ 2004: 10). This categorization was 
considered “not suitable,” because it would target people who are “not in need 
of inburgering.” The same held for including all other migrants born outside 
the EU, because it would be difficult to say who is and is not helped with 
obligatory language courses on the basis of such a crude criterion. 
 Even more problematic was that this definition included Dutch citizens 
who naturalized before 1 April 2003.167 The desire had been to also oblige 
“oldcomers” to follow language education, not only those legally residing in 
the Netherlands as aliens (who could easily be obliged as they held no 
citizenship), but also those who already held Dutch citizenship because they 
had been naturalized. However, this would not only mean a lack of legal 
security because the rules were changed without people knowing this was going 
to happen, but more fundamentally meant a distinction between 
“autochthonous” Dutch citizens by birth and “naturalized Dutch,” which would 
be unfit, arbitrary, and illegitimate (ibid.: 10-1, Council of State 2005168). 
 Just as with the previous Newcomer Inburgering Act, certain people were 
a priori categorized as problem groups without a direct link to the goal of the 
law, i.e. preventing marginalization. Despite these criticisms, policy officials 
were asked by Minister Verdonk to come up with legal options that would make 
it possible to include Dutch citizens from the Caribbean169 and members from 
“minorities” who were naturalized Dutch citizens.170 Only as late as summer 
                                                          
166 Ibid. 
167 When the new Act on Dutch Citizenship came into force, obliging people who want to naturalize 
as Dutch citizens to pass a language exam. 
168 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005–2006, 30308, nr. 4. Advice of the Council of State and 
Further Report regarding the Inburgering Act [Advies van de Raad van State en Nader Rapport over 
de Wet Inburgering]. 
169 A later plan entailed making a separate legal regulation for these groups, but this was eventually 
also discarded all together. 
170 After initial criticisms, three “priority groups” were defined: people on social benefit, parents, 
and religious servants, because they have a “special responsibility for their inburgering” in light 
of their “negative influence” on the integration of others (Inburgering Bill; WRR 2007: 61). It shows 
the importance of the focus on “un-emancipated, non-Western” women in the integration policy 
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2006, after fellow ministers had expressed their concern171 and after repeated 
negative advices from the Council of State (2005 and 2006172), these groups 
were excluded as objects of the law (cf. Besselink 2008).  
 Returning to determining the target population as it took place in the 
second half of 2004, the criticism of the Advisory Commission and directorate 
Legal Affairs had made it impossible to define the target population based on 
their place of birth. But the ACVZ had also proposed a new criterion, which 
would have more or less the same effect, yet was legally viable: instead of 
making place of birth the criterion of selection, inburgering could be made 
obligatory for all persons either willing to settle in the Netherlands 
permanently, or already living here durably, who have not been living here for 
at least eight years during the period they would have been obliged to follow 
education (ACVZ 2004: 11).173 This seemingly universal criterion targeting all 
persons residing in the Netherlands was undesirable from a political point of 
view, because also “non-western allochthones” and “autochthons”, who were 
not problematized in the political debate, would be targeted. Therefore, the 
Minister was asked to include only those really “in need of inburgering” (Motion 
Sterk c.s. 2004174). 
 Finally, the subjects were defined as “the alien who is residing legally 
under article 8 […] of the 2000 Alien Act, who is: a) not staying with a 
temporary goal and b) religious leader” (Staatsblad 2006 625: 2). Thus, the 
obligation for all Dutch citizens was discarded, abandoning the wish to target 
“allochthones” who had naturalized or had come from Aruba or the Dutch 
Antilles. In order to prevent “those who are not in need [are] not obliged,” 
various exemptions were created, also for those who had not lived in the 
Netherlands for eight years during school age (Minister for Aliens Affairs and 
                                                          
field, as explained in the previous chapter, and the implicit importance of Islam in policies. An 
independent ruling (AMvB) regulating the obligation for these groups, which was proposed as a 
possible legal solution, was eventually abandoned (ref TK; Besselink 2008). 
171 The minister for Administrative Renewal and Kingdom Relations wanted minister Verdonk to 
better rethink criticisms on the principle of equality. She was advised by policy officials to accept 
the fact that the criticism cannot be fully met, that there are “still questions about the principle 
of equality, but that this is inherent to the choices made” (DDS 5392797). 
172 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005-2006, 30308, nr. 106. Advice of the Council of State and 
Further Report regarding the Inburgering Act [Advies van de Raad van State en Nader Rapport over 
de Wet Inburgering]. 
173 Compulsory education law determines that in the Netherlands everyone between five and 
sixteen years old is obliged to follow education 
(https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/leerplicht/leerplicht-en-kwalificatieplicht). 
174 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004–2005, 29 800 VI, nr. 78. 
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Integration 2005a175). As was the case under the Newcomer Inburgering Act, 
labour migration was defined as temporary residence, so many highly skilled 
migrants from “Western” countries were de facto excluded, EU citizens could 
not be obliged, and diplomats and employers of international organizations 
were exempted.176 Like during the creation of the first inburgering law, the 
question of who is in need of inburgering seems primarily to have been 
answered by looking at cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. 
 According to the Memorandum of Understanding (Minister for Aliens 
Affairs and Integration 2005c: 11), the goal of the new inburgering law was to 
“bridge backlog in the integration of minorities and prevent new gaps.” Some 
people were considered unable to independently participate in “the economic, 
social, cultural and/or political life in the Netherlands” because they lack 
knowledge of the Dutch language and do not share the “norms and values 
anchored in Dutch society” (ibid.).  In internal memos177, it was stressed that 
because of their background, specific “minorities” were “at distance to 
society.” The proposed objects were the same as the main target population 
of the Newcomer Inburgering Act, which de facto were “Moroccans,” “Turks,” 
“Surinamese,” and “Antilleans and Arubans.” 
 So the intended target population should be seen as a continuation of the 
culturalist logic dominant in the Integration Policy during the 1980s and 1990s 
(cf. Essed and Nimako 2006; Ghorashi 2014). This not only included new 
migrants arriving from these countries, but “oldcomers” as well, such as the 
“first generation guest workers” who had been living in the Netherlands for 
over twenty years.178 Now labeled “non-Western allochthones,” these groups 
were categorized as ”inburgeringsbehoeftig,” meaning “in need of 
inburgering.” This was defined as “those people lacking the basic necessary 
                                                          
175 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004–2005, 29 543, nr. 5. Letter Reform of the Inburgering system 
[Brief Herziening inburgeringstelsel]. 
176 Although it was known that Turkish citizens could not be obliged to inburgering under the EU 
Association Agreement between Turkey and the EU, they were included in order to give a clear 
signal. It was expected they had to be excluded from the target population if a case was made at 
the European Court of Justice, but as I discuss in the coming chapters, in this way the government 
could still make the point they found it important people for Turkey would pass the inburgering 
exam. 
177 DDS [not registered] Memo Structure of speech text for the Meeting about the bill on 27 October, 
sent to the Minister on 1 October 2003. Gsib/ir2004/58971 Meeting MBVK – MVI 25.03.2004, sent 
to the Minister of Administrative Renewal and Kingdom Relations on 24 March 2004. DDS 5213811: 
p. 13 -14. Concept letter sent by directorate Legal Affairs to the Head of the Program Directorate 
Modernisation Inburgering on 7 October 2004. DDS 5350592 Memo Decision points Inburgering in 
the Netherlands, sent to the Minister on 28 April 2005. Memo about the advice of the Council of 
State, sent by DPMI to DGIAV on 6 July 2005. 
178 Memo about the advice of the Council of State, sent by DPMI to DGIAV on 6 July 2005: p. 1-2. 
130
Chapter 2
142 
skills and abilities to bridge societal marginalization and fully participate in 
society.” 179  This need was mainly determined by the  “non-Western” 
background of people, referring to the ethnicity, culture or religion and 
therefore effectively reasserted the perceived gap between the “Dutch 
autochthon majority” and  various “minorities.” 
 Special attention was paid to “allochthone” women, mothers and religious 
leaders.180 This focus reflected problematizations of Islam. Imams and mothers 
were targeted because of their role in raising a new generation, which was 
feared to follow “Islamic norms and values,” primarily gender inequality (WRR 
2007; Schinkel 2010). This has been described as a way to construct Islam as 
non-Dutch and threatening modern Dutch values of equality (Kirk 2010; 
Schinkel 2011; Suvarierol 2012). Though not explicitly targeting Muslims, 
anxieties about religious fundamentalism and the perceived incompatibility of 
Islam with Dutch society were an impetus for reforming inburgering legislation, 
various informants also recalled. Relatedly, popular far-right politicians such 
as Pim Fortuyn, Rita Verdonk, and Geert Wilders argued that too many migrants 
from “non-Western cultures” had come to the Netherlands during previous 
decades 
 Therefore, an important goal was to make it more difficult for new 
migrants to come, so repairing the past mistake of being too lenient. Civil 
servants working at the Directorate during the policy making process 
remembered that in fact the most important target groups were family 
migrants from Turkey and Morocco (cf. Schinkel 2011; Groenendijk 2011a; Van 
Oers 2013). The Inburgering Abroad Act (Minister for Aliens Affairs and 
Integration 2004c: 6181) explicitly targeted these groups in order to bring down 
their numbers and stimulate a “more efficient and effective integration.” 
Because migrants from these and other “non-Western countries” were obliged 
to pass a pre-entry exam in their country of origin, thus further raising the bar 
for entry and residence, this Act is a case in point of how exclusion is 
rationalized and neutralized. I do not have enough space to address its 
construction, assumptions and effects here, but summarize the most important 
aspects in Text box 2.2. 
   
                                                          
179 DDS 5350592. Memo Decision points Inburgering in the Netherlands, sent to the Minister on 28 
April 2005: p. 2. 
180  “Geestelijk bedienaren,” or religious leaders, formed a special target group of the new 
inburgering law. Though leaders from all religious denominations were included, the focus on 
religion seems to be primarily related to worries about the negative influence of Imams (cf. 
Besselink 2008: 6).  
181 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 29 700, nr. 3. Explanatory Memorandum Inburgering 
Abroad Act [Memorie van Toelichting Wet Inburgering Buitenland]. 
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Text box 2.2 Inburgering Abroad Act 
 
The official goal of the Inburgering Abroad Act is to facilitate the integration 
process of new migrants by letting them prepare for their inburgering in their 
country of origin (Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 2004c). The ‘regular’ 
inburgering law requires migrants to pass an inburgering exam within three years 
of arrival in the Netherlands, which should mark their ‘integration’ into Dutch 
society. In addition, the Inburgering Abroad Act obliges some groups of migrants 
to pass an exam already before they can come to the Netherlands. It primarily 
targets family migrants from Turkey, Morocco, and other “non-Western 
countries,” as many “Western” migrants do not need to apply for a visa in their 
country of origin. An important motivation for the law seems to have been 
limiting migration from these countries (Bjornson 2007; Groenendijk 2011a; 
Schinkel 2011). 
  In terms of the policy system that was created, migrants have to pass two 
pre-entry tests: a Dutch Language Test, in which verbal Dutch skills are 
examined; and a Knowledge of Dutch Society test, which consists of 30 questions 
that are posed out of 100 possible questions (Willems 2009). These address 
practical issues, history, constitutional arrangements, and cultural values. 
Migrants can buy a self-study course to prepare for the exam. The examinations 
take place at the Dutch embassy in country of origin and is conducted by 
computers and phone. The creation of the Inburgering Abroad Act would not have 
been possible without the necessary technical expertise. 
 The reconstruction that follows is based on interviews with involved actors 
and Willems (2009). Although policy officials provided the input in terms of end 
goals, type of questions, etc., the actual creation of course materials and exams 
was done by a consortium that consisted of Cinop (a consultancy company in the 
field of education), a US company specialized in publishing and education 
(Pearson/Ordinate), and a Dutch company that advises on language issues (LTS). 
They proposed a technique of examination via telephone and computer, which 
seemed a relatively cheap and efficient option. It coincided perfectly with the 
determination of Verdonk to come up with a strict but well-functioning system.  
 There was much debate among the various experts about the use of speech 
technology. The discussion centred around the reliability of a new and not much 
tested technology, questioning the accuracy of its measurement. The validity was 
doubted as well: does the test really measure what it aims to measure, which is 
the ability to have a conversation? Four expert advisory bodies could not reach 
consensus about the quality of these tests, nor about the pre-entry test itself. 
There were serious worries about whether it was responsible to be put in 
practice in its current form.  
 Despite debate within and between the groups of politicians, experts and 
policy officials, and despite lack of confidence that the pre-entry test could be 
put in practice prudently, it was pushed through with the argument that its 
reliability and validity could be better examined once the system had been made 
operational. Furthermore, there was political debate about the level of 
examination needed to pass the pre-entry test. This was also a technical 
discussion to which experts did not have a conclusive answer. In that sense, the 
political decision that was eventually made depended primarily on the barrier 
that was according to politicians acceptable to set. But it was cloaked in the 
neutral scientific discourse of language acquisition and testing. 
 
(text continues on next page) 
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 In case of both the Inburgering Act and the Inburgering Abroad Act, it was 
legally not possible to explicitly only target the desired groups and a more 
universal definition had to be made. In an internal memo Minister Verdonk was 
advised that it would be “understandable” to target only those “in need of 
inburgering,” but that the criterion needed to be legally acceptable. 182 
National authorities have the power to make people subject to the law. 
Therefore, they are bound by the rule of law and are supposed to use this 
power prudently, meaning amongst others not to discriminate between groups. 
Ethnicity and place of birth are no moral and legal grounds to subject people 
to policies that are officially aimed at “preventing marginalization” (Minister 
for Aliens Affairs and Integration 2005a: 10-1). So in the end a universal 
obligation was defined.  
 In the process of policy making, just like during the creation of the 
Newcomer Inburgering Act, ambiguities and tensions between political desires 
and state neutrality were smoothened. The definition of who would be obliged 
to inburgering eventually reads as follows: 
 
Article 3 
1. Inburgeringsplichtig is the alien with legal residence in the sense 
of article 8, paragraphs a to e, or l, of the 2000 Aliens Act, who: 
a. resides in the Netherlands other than for a temporary goal, or 
b. is a religious leader. 
 
                                                          
182 DDS 5350592: p. 2. Memo Decision points Inburgering in the Netherlands, sent to the Minister 
on 28 April 2005; Memo about the advice of the Council of State, sent by DPMI to DGIAV on 6 July 
2005. 
The Inburgering Abroad Act exemplifies how contentious political decision 
making about residence and belonging are rendered technical and are 
neutralized. Much of criticism has been expressed by social scientists, lawyers 
and NGOs, as it actually restricts migration of those migrants that are deemed 
unwanted others. A Human Rights Watch report (2008) describes it as 
“discrimination in the name of integration.” In 2016, the European Court of 
Justice decided the law does not conflict with the Directive on family life 
(Council Directive 2003/86/EC), as it was asked to judge whether it is an illegal 
migration measure “disguised” as integration policy. According to the 
judgement, the Dutch government is allowed to set integration requirements, 
but was also warned not to make migration of family migrants impossible. 
Within the constraints of (EU) law, the Dutch state seems to be doing all it can 
to control the border of the nation. 
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The text is cloaked in rational and universal terms. As explained above, the 
legal idiom reads as if neutral. This definition started from assumptions about 
religious and cultural differences of specific minority groups posing a threat to 
“social cohesion and the development of society.”183 Initial political ideas 
about the target population had to be aligned with the rule of law when 
translated into policy measures, necessitating the redefinition of 
discriminatory aspects into legally sound policy categories. This illustrates how 
in the democratic Dutch state, political decision related to electoral volatility 
interact with principles of proper state government. Politicians may fuel 
anxieties about migration related diversity but the Constitution balances 
political decision making. 
 Indeed, as Shore (2011: 171) argues, political decisions are fixed within “a 
framework of universal and sacrosanct principles.” But more than legitimating 
particular political decisions by founding them on general interests, such as 
social cohesion, and on legal principles, the rule of law actually determines 
the policy making process, functioning as a check and influencing policy 
outcomes. As policy measures are created, various interests are weighed in an 
ambiguous processes. Eventually, this contention is neutralized. Ideas about 
otherness become intertwined with legal jargon and the authority of the law. 
The legal confines that determine the outlook of official policy at the same 
time endow it with state authority (cf. ibid.). The difficulties of delineating 
the target population are filtered out in the final policy text, which seems 
definite and rational. I now turn to how the system of inburgering further lends 
it a neutral character. 
 
2.2.1.2 Rendering the system more technical 
Defining the target population was not the only challenge following from 
political desires that conflicted with legal possibilities. The system itself also 
had to be made more complex and technical in reaction to other political 
desires and anxieties. The political debate about “allochthones,” demanding 
from them to make an effort and to prove they are willing to integrate while 
at the same time assigning them a place in the national order, was translated 
in the new inburgering law. A policy official recalled it was primarily “about 
making inburgering obligatory, attaching consequences to it, most importantly 
not to be granted a permanent residence permit or not be naturalized when 
failing to pass the inburgering exam. That was the real novelty of the Wi 
[Inburgering Act], besides liberalizing the market for inburgering courses.” This 
                                                          
183 Ibid.  
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also entailed obliging people to pay themselves for the courses and the exam 
(Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 2003: 11; and 2004c). 
 These substantial changes reflect the neoliberal political rationale of 
holding the objects of policy responsible for carrying it out, focusing less on 
helping and more on disciplining them. Requirements were made stricter by 
pushing the buttons of language requirements. A letter to Parliament that 
presented envisioned reforms proposed the CEFR language levels A2 for speech 
and A1 for writing (Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 2004b: 3). Initially 
level B1 was desired, but it was considered too high to attain for most migrants 
within the designated period of time. From a learning aid, language was 
transformed into a “testing measuring stick” (Horner 2015: 215; Van Avermaet 
2009). A special commission of language experts, the Franssen Commission, 
was installed to advise the minister which language levels were justified for 
which part of the exam (ibid. 2005c184: 19). As such it provided scientific 
legitimacy to requirements that were essentially political decisions. As 
Bjornson (2012: 198) argues, testing a certain language level has  
 
an ostensibly scientifically-established and thus politically 
neutral standard of measurement. But as this history of language 
policy in the Netherlands demonstrates, linguistic markers and 
requirements are not neutral, decontextualized facts, but are 
intimately tied to shifting political realities.  
 
 Various debates in the House of Representatives185 focused on the desired 
language level and on the validity and reliability of the proposed means of 
testing, as advised about by the Franssen Commission. There were diverging 
opinions on what level could be reasonably expected from various groups of 
migrants and on the possible negative aspects of the proposed forms of 
examination, but the necessity of learning Dutch as such was not questioned. 
There was political consensus about the importance of the Dutch language for 
the defined goal of “integration.” Political parties did not question whether 
mandatory language education was really necessary for stimulating the 
employment of all who were targeted. 
 Rather than language ability as such, identity seems to have been a much 
more significant consideration, as it relates to imaginaries of linguistic 
homogeneity. As mentioned earlier, language is a powerful yet seemingly 
                                                          
184 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005–2006, 30 308, nr. 3. Explanatory Memorandum Inburgering 
Act [Memorie van Toelichting Wet inburgering]. Also see Staatsblad 2006 625. 
185 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 27083 and 29543, nr. 44. . Report of a Committee 
Meeting [Verslag van een notaoverleg]. 
 An event that attracted many people in the public. 
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neutral tool for demarcating the nation (Anderson 1983; Blackledge 2005; 
Bjornson 2007; Horner 2015). Language is assumed to be an “instrumental, 
transparent means of communication,” and therefore less contested than the 
part of inburgering that is concerned with Dutch culture and society 
(Vermeulen 2004: 150). Besides the language exams, the “Knowledge of Dutch 
Society” exam was also reformed. 
 Although presented as a balance between practical knowledge and 
knowledge of norms and values (Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 
2005d186: 66), much attention was paid to norms and values such as secularism, 
equality and individualism. These were represented as modern, liberal, and 
Western, as opposed to “traditional” cultural and religious norms often 
associated with Islam (Van Huis and De Regt 2005; WRR 2007; Suvarierol 2012). 
The exam thus reified very particular notions of “Dutch society,” being 
premised upon a static, homogeneous conception of culture. The system of 
textbooks, instruction movies, and examination structurally promotes 
essentialized, stereotypical, and culturalized imaginaries of the Dutch and 
Dutch society187, specifically as non-Muslim, which do not correspond with the 
very diverse social reality in the Netherlands. It has therefore been criticized 
by social scientists, NGOs, and civil servants for being arbitrary and not really 
helping integration (ibid.; Groenendijk 2011a; Van Houdt et al. 2011; 
interviews). 
 Some informants argued that “turning a language test into an inburgering 
exam” was not a tactical decision of Verdonk in terms of the policy making 
process, especially because it brought her into conflict with various actors. 
Scholars and migrant organizations were critical about the validity of the 
various exams and the limitations it posed for people wanting to migrate to 
the Netherlands. The Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science was not happy 
with the extra exams, nor was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with having to 
implement the exams at embassies. There were also doubts among civil 
servants from various departments about whether the system would be 
implementable. Informants that had been closely involved in reforming 
inburgering explained that the privatization implied municipalities were 
assigned a coordinating role, for which they were not very well prepared (also 
see Significant 2010; Regioplan 2013). 
                                                          
186 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005–2006, 30 308, nr. 7. Memo Inburgering as a result of the 
report [Nota Inburgering naar aanleiding van het verslag]. 
187 For example, putting visible emphasis on men kissing and female nudity. 
136
Chapter 2
148 
  As a result, as some of them recalled, the implementation was very 
complicated and a “real organizational challenge.” The course materials and 
exams were developed and implemented by private parties. Education was no 
longer the responsibility of Regional Training Centres, but of private course 
providers, whose quality needed to be checked. Other government agencies, 
moreover, were assigned tasks in the implementation of the system188 A solid 
monitoring system needed to control all actors and a smooth implementation 
of the system, in which municipalities thus had to play a key role. This meant 
that “inburgering was essentially reduced to a testing program and many of 
the NT2 teachers lost their jobs” (Bjornson 2012: 194). Moreover, it turned 
“linguistic knowledge into an auditable form and “tamed” the pedagogical 
practices of NT2 [‘Dutch as a second language’] teachers” (ibid.: 184). 
 Because course providers were aimed at meeting targets, migrants were 
focused on passing the exam for the sake of passing, the quality of courses 
offered was low and the results disappointing, inburgering did little more than 
teaching “submissiveness to state and market authority” (Suvarierol and Kirk 
2015: 263). The political, neoliberal nature of the new inburgering law, making 
“inburgeraars” responsible for their own success and right to live in the 
Netherlands, was partly rendered neutral in the process of policy making. A 
technical system was created, aimed at monitoring and enforcing 
“integration,” so rendering it even more calculable than it had been under the 
Newcomer Inburgering Act of 1998.  
 Municipalities could summon “potential inburgeraars” for an intake and 
check their progress, but also were responsible for supporting people in their 
trajectories when necessary and for ensuring the facilities needed were 
available (Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 2005c: 25). To this end, 
the File Potentially Obligated to Inburgering (Bestand Potentiële 
Inburgeringsplichtigen, BPI), containing all persons who might have an 
obligation to pass the inburgering exam, and the Information System 
Inburgering (Informatiesysteem Inburgering, ISI), consisting of information 
about starting date, activities, and results of individual “inburgeraars,” were 
created. These could be used to control people and monitor their progress. 
They were, moreover, necessary to sustain the output financing system.  
 Inburgering was also increasingly made measurable through the 
examination. The system was made more restrictive by transforming the non-
                                                          
188 For example the Education Implementation Service of the Ministry of Education and Sciences, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 2005c: 59). 
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binding test of the Newcomer Inburgering Act into a binding inburgering exam 
(ibid.: 26).189 “Inburgeraars” were obliged to pass the exam within three years; 
sanctions upon failing to pass the exam included a financial fine or not 
obtaining a permanent residence permit (ibid.). Requirements for passing the 
exams were tightened and spelled out in detail. As with the Newcomer 
Inburgering Act, both the language exam and cultural exam were meant to test 
specific final qualifications that seemed to correspond with clearly observable 
stages of integration (ibid.: 19-20; Cinop 2005a, b).190 This made it possible to 
monitor the progression people had made and judge whether they were fit 
enough to “participate in society.” As explained above, such calculation is 
rather arbitrary but it gives the policy system an aura of scientific objectivity. 
 So in reaction to political developments, inburgering became more 
attuned to disciplining specific groups of people living in the Netherlands and 
deterring possible new migrants to come (cf. Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010, De 
Waal 2017). But at the same time, the system itself was made more technical 
and dependent on expert knowledge. An example of how political decisions 
may be rationalized, was the liberalization of inburgering courses, which was 
presented as an efficient and rational solution to improve the inburgering 
system (Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 2005c: 3-5, 8). Civil servants 
explained how Verdonk was advised that the approach of market liberalization 
and holding individual migrants responsible for following the new directive 
would have adverse effects, as people would face difficulties if they had to 
sort out everything on their own and pay for it themselves. Especially because 
the inclusion of so-called “oldcomers” as targets of the law meant increasing 
numbers of people were obliged, while the organization of the courses and 
examination was very complicated. 
 But the political will to push the reforms through outweighed the critical 
advices. One could wonder, in light of how the liberalization de facto led to a 
troubled organization and a decrease in financial support (Suvarierol and Kirk 
2015; Algemene Rekenkamer 2017), whether there was a genuine will to 
improve inburgering policies, or rather a specific political interest in quickly 
shaping policy measures that disciplined “non-Western allochthones.” The 
                                                          
189 The part that tested language skills consisted of four different exams, for reading, writing, 
speech, and listening. Involved officials recalled how it was a technical challenge to create exams 
that would also be easy to implement, as the examination should cost little time and money for 
the Dutch government, but were also of good quality. The creation of the Inburgering Abroad Act 
was a case in point. Automatic computer tests that were proposed by a consortium of private 
actors seemed to be the panacea, although there was discussion about the validity and reliability 
of these exams. 
190 Defining end terms included describing of how to act in specific practical situations, defining 
the specific goals that show someone has the ability to function in specific domain and determining 
desired behaviour in public spheres, specifically as a citizen. 
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reforms meant a further change in responsibility from the state to the migrant, 
a shift that had already started with the creation of the Newcomer Inburgering 
Act. This neoliberal, economic way of thinking repressively blamed the targets 
of policy for their situation, and regarded this policy as a self-evident, rational, 
and efficient mode of government (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; cf. Rose 
1996). 
 This also meant that structural factors contributing to unemployment, 
such as discrimination, are ignored, as even language teachers primarily saw 
difficulties with finding a job and becoming “independent citizens” as an issue 
of individual failing (Suvarierol 2015: 724). It reflects the more paternalistic 
nature of the state, aiming to create law abiding, responsible and self-reliant 
citizens. It also relates to ideas about the Dutch nation state in which the 
“autochthon majority” is not in need of inburgering because it automatically 
is part of the national community, even when socioeconomically marginalized 
and needing assistance with “participating in society,” thus being the norm by 
which others are measured (Schinkel 2017). These “allochthon” others are 
targeted by the Dutch state that knows what is good for them, which is 
becoming emancipated citizens, and aims to enforce this, but does not itself 
have any responsibility for reaching this goal. 
 Assuming no responsibility is a way of depoliticizing questions about 
diversity and belonging. It forestalls an open debate about the changing Dutch 
nation state, who can belong in it, on whose terms and how the “receiving 
society” could also assume an open, more constructive stance to “newcomers.” 
As I will describe in the next section, the meaning inburgering conveyed was 
found more important by politicians than the actual affects it had on the 
process of “integration.” 
 
2.2.2 Adjusting the inburgering system, for whom? 
After the bill was sent to Parliament in September 2005, it took almost a year 
before the Inburgering Act passed the House of Representatives, because of 
the many debates triggered by the proposed reforms. The political debate, 
however, primarily centred on aspects of implementation. Already in 2004, 
much of the discussion in the House of Representatives had focused on the 
pace and possibility for the realization of the reforms and the effectivity of 
their eventual implementation.191 Opposition parties GL, SP, and PvdA raised 
questions about the possible negative effects of too much repression and 
placing the responsibility for carrying out policy on the targets themselves, 
                                                          
191 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 27083 and 29543, nr. 44. 
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arguing that this might deter rather than encourage people. But in general, 
the desirability and necessity of inburgering policies was not discussed in 
political debates and the bill was not fundamentally reconsidered. 
 One year later, the bill was discussed in the House of Representatives192, 
the targets of the proposed law were also debated. Only a few opposition 
parties were critical (GL, PvdA193), in line with the legal objections I have 
mentioned above. But most parties did not worry much about the tensions 
between the proposed measures and the Dutch Constitution and thought the 
risks were acceptable in light of the necessity of inburgering. Instead, parties 
(CDA, VVD, D66, PvdA) performed a critical stance towards “the long time the 
minister is taking” and worried about whether a new system would be 
implementable. At the same time, these parties emphasized the importance 
of making clear the “core values of Dutch society” in the inburgering courses 
and exam. This examination, related to sanctions that restrict legal residence, 
were only criticized by GL. This party was also concerned that inburgering 
would become a goal in itself and wished a better relation with guidance to 
employment. As it would turn out, such fundamental questions did not change 
the policy and eventually disappeared completely in the debate. 
 Too much was debated194 to give a full account here, but most time was 
spent on how to give substance to specific aspects of the technical set-up and 
organization. This included, for example: the hours of education, level of 
examination, regulations for special groups, credit facility, sanctions, 
enforcement, implementation in cities, and control of course providers. It is 
telling that the House of Representatives voted in favour of the bill in July 
2006195, while a month later it had to be drastically altered because the Council 
of State (2006), as I mentioned above, judged that the inclusion of naturalized 
Dutch as subjects of the law was illegal and had to be undone. So most political 
parties used the reforms of inburgering legislation to debate how restrictions 
should be implemented and send the political message that enforcing Dutch 
culture and language education for some groups is necessary, notwithstanding 
fundamental, legal objections. In the context of the ongoing political and 
                                                          
192 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004–2005, 30 308 , nr. 6. Report of a committee meeting about 
the Inburgering Act [Verslag Wet inburgering]. 
193 See Groenendijk (2011b: 165), the PvdA was critical on the issue of targeting naturalized Dutch 
citizens. 
194 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004–2005, 30 308 , nr. 6; nr. 63; Minister for Aliens Affairs and 
Integration (2005d). 
195 Only one MP of the Liberal Democrats voted against. 
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public debate about diversity and belonging, inburgering was naturalized as 
the logical policy measure to improve “participation in Dutch society.”  
 The Inburgering Act passed the Senate in November 2006196 and came into 
force as of January 2007. 197  In that same year, new responsible minister 
Vogelaar (Social Democrats) launched a Delta Plan Inburgering (Minister for 
Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration 2007) 198  in order to make the 
implementation much more effective. As Vogelaar explained during an 
interview, she had to “repair the faults of Verdonk.” Letting people pay for 
the trajectory all by themselves “obviously didn’t work, so I made an increase 
in budget possible.”199 Moreover, Verdonk had minimalized involvement of 
cities to a mere coordinating role and Vogelaar intended to give them a more 
central role in the implementation. At the same time, she thought guidance 
and coherence from the Hague was important.  So a team of policy officials at 
the Directorate, termed the Delta Plan and functioning much like the Taskforce 
Inburgering she had headed a few years before, had contact with cities, 
travelled around the country, tried to resolve bottlenecks, and provided 
guidance.  
 However, as follows from three evaluation studies (Significant 2010; 
Regioplan 2013; Rekenkamer 2017), the promised results of a better 
“participation in society,” were not realized (cf. Goodman and Wright 2015: 
1902). Figures vary somewhat for different cohorts since 2007, also because of 
the many reforms of the inburgering system since then, which I will discuss 
below. Over the past ten years, in general, less than two thirds of all people 
obliged to pass the inburgering exam generally has done so within the three 
year term set by the law. Of those who pass, only a minority of around 40% 
actually have a job, but it cannot be concluded that the inburgering exam is 
the determining factor for being employed, because those who are motivated 
and able to find a job may also be more likely to pass the exam within the 
designated time period (Regioplan 2013: 30). Moreover, the effect of 
inburgering on the participation in regular education is virtually non-existent.  
 So while inburgering had originally been introduced as a policy measure 
to increase opportunities for education and on the labour market, the actual 
                                                          
196 The Liberal Democrats, Green Left, the Independent Senate Faction and Socialist Party voting 
against. 
197 Staatsblad 2006 625. 
198 Also see DDS 5511587/07. Memo about the AO Inburgering d.d. 18 October 2017.   
As I explained in the previous chapter, the Balkenende III government coalition took office in 2007, 
in which the Social Democrats were junior partner. Ella Vogelaar, who had led the Taskforce 
Inburgering from 2000 to 2002, was made Minister for Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration.  
199 For a short period, inburgering was partly funded by the government; see appendix for an 
overview. 
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effects of it show little or very limited success. These limited results, however, 
have not led to a fundamental reflection on the necessity and effects of the 
inburgering system. They have not led to a political debate on the relevance 
of this policy measure as a solution to “integration problems.” Instead, they 
were used as an argument to further reform inburgering legislation, by making 
it even more restrictive. Once a policy system is in place, there ought to be a 
way of solving technical problems and failure is only seen evidence of a need 
to reinforce it further (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 196). Inburgering turned out 
to be a relatively easy means of addressing popular anxieties and political 
debate, as politicians could “push the buttons” as they please.  
 For example, in 2011 the Rutte I government of VVD and CDA, supported 
by the PVV, raised the required level of Dutch for passing the inburgering exam 
abroad from A1- to A1 (Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations 2012: 7).200 
According to some informants, this was a clear influence of the hard PVV line 
on preventing more immigration from especially “Muslim countries.” Although 
several informants also indicated Minister Leers of Immigration and Asylum was 
advised by policy officials about the ineffectiveness of this and other proposed 
reforms, making inburgering more restrictive was attractive to politicians. 
Through it they could perform control over migration and a demanding stance 
towards particular groups of migrants. In this way, government parties hoped 
that more electoral success of the PVV could be prevented. 
 Language requirements could easily be used “as malleable benchmarks 
that can be adjusted as a migration control” (Bjornson 2012: 198). This seems 
to have been a very important effect for politicians. One of the few actual 
results of inburgering, in combination with other restrictive migration 
measures such as an income-requirement, has been restricting family 
migration (Groenendijk 2011a; Van Oers 2013). The raising of the language 
requirements was part of larger reforms (Minister of Interior and Kingdom 
Relations 2012: 5-8). These also entailed that the “oldcomers” would no longer 
be targeted by the law. Furthermore, the coordinating role of cities was 
reduced in favour of private parties, so migrants now really would have to pay 
for courses and exams themselves and the term within which migrants had to 
pass the test was decreased from three and a half to three years. So most of 
the reforms made inburgering more restrictive and placed even more 
responsibility on the targets of policy for passing the exam. 
                                                          
200 In the 2010 elections for the House of Representatives, the PVV had become the third largest 
party and grown from nine to twenty four Members of Parliament. Because of the economic 
recession the PVV election campaign had largely focused on austerity, economic recovery, and the 
Euro, but its hard stance on migration and Islam also contributed to its success. 
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 Yet more controversial was the decision of the government to make it 
possible to revoke the temporary residence permit of a migrant when failing 
to pass the inburgering exam in time (ibid.: 11). A relatively small team of 
policy officials at the Directorate would collaborate with other officials, 
primarily from the Ministry of Justice, to make sure this revision could enter 
into force in 2013. The rationale, as explained by several officials, was that 
the more permanent a legal residence in the Netherlands is going to be, the 
more requirements can be set. Migrants have to prove they are suitable to earn 
their citizenship (cf. Schinkel 2010), but instead of “just” not being able to 
obtain a permanent residence permit or to naturalize, they could now in theory 
also be expelled. Informants responsible for this reform explained it caused a 
lot of debate amongst policy officials, because the sanction is far-reaching in 
its consequences and it conflicts with international treaties.201 
 Because of these legal complications, some informants indicated it 
remains to be seen whether people will be really expelled when they fail to 
pass the inburgering exam in time. As of 2018, this has not yet happened, 
despite many people failing to pass (Algemene Rekenkamer 2017). The 
powerful political message seems more important than the insecurity it brings 
for the migrants in question. An important function of the inburgering system 
thus is to channel political desires and to shape public debate, on the one hand 
because the anxieties that are fuelled by politicians are neutralized in 
technical policy measures, and on the other because political parties could add 
requirements and sanctions according to their particular preferences, making 
inburgering more complex and restrictive. As of 2014, the bar was raised yet 
again by adding a “labour market module” to the inburgering trajectory that 
was represented by informants and the government as an extra aid for 
migrants, but would also be an additional requirement for passing the 
inburgering exam (VVD and PvdA 2012: 31). 
 Another example of how politicians can push the buttons of the 
inburgering system according to their particular interests is the introduction of 
the “participation declaration” by Minister Asscher in 2016 (Minister of Social 
Affairs and Employment 2016b).202 As part of their inburgering trajectory, 
people are now obliged to sign a declaration that they adhere to “core Dutch 
values” and to follow a “participation declaration trajectory” that is offered 
by cities. Meeting this obligation is enforced in the sense that it is a 
requirement for passing the inburgering exam. The idea is that people become 
                                                          
201 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification; United 
Nation (1951) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In chapter Four I further reflect on 
how individual policy officials reflect on their work. 
202 Initially a contract was desired, but this was not possible. 
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aware of norms and values such as freedom, equality, and solidarity, that they 
understand how “we do things here” and act accordingly. These core values 
are represented as liberal, modern, and essentially Dutch, in opposition to the 
“non-Western,” “Islamic” cultures thought to be dominant in countries where 
most targets of the law come from. 
 Apart from the problematic assumption that Dutch society is 
homogeneously liberal and all “newcomers” are by definition traditional, the 
question is whether people really subscribe to these norms once they are 
forced to (Van Houtum 2013). It is, moreover, rather ironic that people are 
forced to promise to become liberal citizens. An important aspect of the 
declaration is the guidance that cities have to offer in getting migrants 
acquainted with Dutch society, which could in itself be a well-intended 
measure, just as it might to a certain extent be helpful to introduce people to 
aspects of social life in the Netherlands. However, the declaration is primarily 
presented as an obligation to “become Dutch,” so reasserting the Dutch nation 
in reaction to migration. As such, rather than an effective measure per se, it 
is first and primarily to be considered as a an expression of “anxious politics” 
(Modest and De Koning 2016: 103).  
 These examples substantiate the reflection of some civil servants that 
inburgering has more and more become a “political plaything.” Being a 
concrete, legislative policy measure, it is relatively easy to make it more 
restrictive and so to score quick results. This was also the impression I obtained 
from a meeting I attended in the House of Representatives about inburgering 
in January 2015203, during which Members of Parliament asked Minister Asscher 
many questions about the reforms and implementation of the inburgering 
system. Civil servants have the task to support “their” minister during such 
meetings by answering these questions and giving advice. Because inburgering 
is a topic that typically attracts much media attention and criticism from 
Members of Parliament, I guessed officials would have to work hard to keep 
Asscher out of trouble during the debate. 
 When talking to officials at this and other meetings, their general response 
was that the work was not that difficult for them. Instead of asking the minister 
fundamental questions, politicians used this opportunity to interrupt each 
other and top each other in tough statements, putting forward their own points 
of interest. A Member of Parliament from the VVD, for example, proposed to 
add a module about “freedom of speech,” in reaction to the terrorist attacks 
on Charlie Hebdo in Paris earlier that month. The CDA also asked the Minister 
                                                          
203 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2014–2015, 32 824, nr. 89. Report of a Committee Meeting on 
inburgering [Verslag van een Algemeen overleg over inburgering].   
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to think about ways to pay more attention to the “core values of our society,” 
besides arguing for raising the language levels. Opposition parties SP, D66, and 
GL criticized previous reforms and emphasized the importance of improving 
the system, while the PVV used this opportunity to make clear it wants to 
prevent all immigration from “Muslim countries.” 
 Non-state actors who attended the meetings because of their involvement 
with inburgering204, reflected that nothing essential was discussed, because 
important decisions had already been agreed upon on beforehand and real 
points of contention were not addressed. They were, moreover, critical of the 
limited interest most politicians have in the position of the objects of policies 
related to stricter reforms. These have since 2007 been rapidly succeeding 
each other, without yielding desired results but instead making it more 
complicated for people to fulfil the duty to pass the inburgering exam. This 
may have to do with the political context of especially the PVV having electoral 
success by being ever more critical on immigration and the presence of Islam 
in the Netherlands. But also by explicitly problematizing “Moroccans,” 
suggesting that they should leave the Netherlands. 205  Though very 
controversial, most other political parties take over at least part of the hard 
discourse out of fear for losing votes, or because they partly agree with the 
points of view206, and propose ever more restrictive measures to substantiate 
their tough stance. 
 Bonjour (2013: 848) argued that the idea that “the preservation of social 
cohesion requires a certain degree of cultural homogeneity among the 
population, and that the state should intervene to maintain or restore this 
homogeneity, is widely shared among Dutch political parties.” Much less 
attention is being paid to the adverse effects of the many reforms, while the 
implementation of inburgering legislation has been seriously hampered. A 
telling example of this was an information meeting I attended in November 
2014. This was organized by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment to 
explain how the inburgering system was going to be adjusted as a result of the 
new labour market module. Presentations from the Directorate and the 
                                                          
204 Primarily NGO’s (Vluchtelingenwerk, UAF), providers of inburgering courses (NCB), interest and 
lobby organizations. 
205 During a party meeting right after municipal elections in 2016, Wilders openly asked a crowd of 
supporters whether they want “more or fewer Moroccans.” The crowd responded by screaming 
“fewer, fewer, fewer,” to which Wilders reacted by stating “then we’re going to fix that.” 
Although this triggered much criticism from other political parties, it did not make him less 
popular. 
206 Which is the case for parties such as CDA and VVD. As I described in Chapter One, for example, 
Prime Minister Rutte makes clear people have to “get out” if they do not “act normal.”  
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company that had developed the module raised many questions. Professionals 
working on inburgering207 were concerned it would become too complicated, 
making it difficult to understand what is exactly expected. 
 Besides fears about consequences for their own practice, there were many 
concerns about the difficulties it would bring for “inburgeraars.” It was 
mentioned, especially in light of the many reforms that had been made to 
inburgering over the past years, there seemed to be little interest in the 
position of migrants. Some people also explicitly questioned the use of an extra 
obligation as such. Civil servants tried to react seriously to most questions, 
patiently explaining exactly what the reforms looked like and why certain 
decisions had been made. The bottom line, however, was that the inburgering 
system was indeed made more complex and the module meant extra 
difficulties for migrants. Repeatedly they stated “this is the political reality 
with which we have to deal,” seeming themselves somewhat frustrated with 
having to explain and defend yet another reform. 
 In general, professionals have become rather sceptical about the many 
changes that rapidly succeed each other and the limited results that 
inburgering is yielding (cf. Vluchtelingenwerk 2014; Belabas and Gerrit 2017). 
As one course provider explained, he is not against an obligation to learn Dutch 
as such, but then the government has the obligation to make sure the 
conditions are right for migrants to meet requirements. It has been argued that 
the quality of language courses is low, not teaching grammar, for instance, and 
that the level reached after passing the inburgering exam is often too low to 
be able to participate in the labour market or to enroll in regular education 
(Suvarierol and Kirk 2015). A recent evaluation study points to the same limited 
results inburgering also had during previous periods, not only describing the 
malfunctioning of the system in terms of lacking information and coordination 
from the national authorities (Algemene Rekenkamer 2017: 32), but also the 
detrimental effects of the recent reforms on pass rates (ibid.: 66).208 These 
conclusions are substantiated by other studies (Regioplan 2013, 2016; MWM2 
2016). 
                                                          
207 Either as a teacher, course provider, interest organization, local authority or Regional Training 
Centre. In general, they seem fed up with the practical issues of the many changes in their work, 
see several Linkedin groups on Inburgering: https://www.linkedin.com/groups/4482146; 
https://www.linkedin.com/groups/2266961. 
208 It also mentions the constantly changing role of cities (ibid.: 32) and the low quality of course 
providers (ibid.: 34-6). And it reveals the detrimental effects of the recent reforms on pass rates, 
as only 60% has passed the exam, of which 6% in fact were exempted (ibid.: 66). Moreover, the 
CEFR level A2 for language is considered too high for most migrants (ibid.: 24) and the connection 
to the labour market is virtually non-existent (ibid.: 49-50). 
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 On a practical level, this is because of the complicated organization and 
implementation of the inburgering system. While being changed every few 
years, there seems to be little political interest in the effects of the many 
reforms on the target population and how successful policy changes are. The 
Rutte III government (Minister of Social Affairs, and Employment 2018b) has 
decided to raise the language level from A2 to B1 and cut down possibilities 
for dispensation that was often granted to people having difficulties. At the 
same time, extra money has been made available to make the operation more 
efficient. Moreover, municipalities are given, again, a central role in guiding 
“inburgeraars.”209 Finally, there are plans for a more tailor-made approach 
and a more intensive combination of learning the language and working, both 
ideas that originated in the mid-1990s. 
 On the one hand, the plans appear to entail a considerable reform. Based 
on studies that point out the complications and ineffectiveness of the 
inburgering system (Algemene Rekenkamer 2017; Significant 2018), a different 
approach is proposed with the aim to more precisely target “inburgeraars” and 
come to better results. On the other hand, plans partly consist of aspects that 
had previously already been part of the system and that turned out difficult to 
implement. Since its inception, the inburgering system has not been 
functioning as envisioned, because of its complicated implementation and 
many reforms. Time and again, malfunctioning and limited results lead to 
technical adjustments that leave the system as such untouched. It remains to 
be seen how this time it will be different, especially because core assumptions 
of inburgering remain unchanged.  
 On a more fundamental level, it can be questioned whether inburgering is 
the right instrument of enforcing “integration.” It has been argued that those 
who are able and willing to learn the Dutch language and find a job do so 
anyway (Van Oers 2013; Regioplan 2016). Although migrants who have passed 
the inburgering exam are a little more likely to be employed, this is not 
necessarily because of inburgering, as this relation may also be a selection 
effect (Regioplan 2013: 8). There are, moreover, still low-skilled jobs, for 
which the Dutch language is not so important, that are being fulfilled by 
migrants (Bjornson 2007; Groenendijk 2011a). And even if people learn skills 
that may help them to build a life in the Netherlands in terms of education and 
work, that does not mean it is easy for them to find a job because of other 
                                                          
209 The decision of its predecessor to place all responsibility on migrants themselves was by this 
government found to have adverse effects on the number of people passing the exam. 
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reasons external to them, such as labour market discrimination. This does not 
mean that people may not benefit from learning Dutch, but forcing 
“newcomers” to follow language education as a policy instrument to improve 
socioeconomic marginalization has not proven successful.210 
 Bjornson (2007: 74) has argued how an overemphasis on learning Dutch 
not only overestimates the necessity of language for employability, but also 
how it adversely contributes to ideas employers have about “migrants” and 
“allochthones” not speaking Dutch well enough and thus not being fit to 
participate in society (cf. Suvarierol 2015). As I explained in the previous 
chapter, structural exclusion is not really addressed by policy interventions, 
especially because measures fighting discrimination have been discarded or 
have until now not been very successful211. So instead of creating such policies 
in order to stimulate the “participation” of certain groups of people, the 
policies that are created may contribute to marginalization. So “integration 
problems” such as unemployment are predominantly attributed to the 
supposed cultural deficits of migrants and “allochthones,” but they ignore the 
role of the majority population. 
 Inburgering has become beyond question, as it made it difficult to think 
about other ways of stimulating participation of migrants. If this had been the 
desired goal of inburgering, it could have been organized and implemented 
much more seriously, not only in terms of more funding, facilities, and support 
while making regulations less repressive, but also by enforcing employers and 
educational institutes to become involved more actively. Inburgering reflects 
and reaffirms the changing relation between state and migrant, placing all 
responsibility for successful “integration” with the latter (Schinkel and Van 
Houdt 2010; Suvarierol and Kirk 2015). The repressive neoliberal style of 
governance is naturalized, although it is does not turn objects into self-reliant 
citizens. 
 The political consensus about the necessity of strict inburgering measures 
as indispensable for participation in Dutch society and for preserving social 
cohesion forecloses any reflection on how it is really serving stated goals of 
“integration” and “participation.” Politicians continue to push the buttons by 
making inburgering more restrictive, as a way to channel anxieties about the 
diversification of Dutch society. When these are fuelled by events (9/11, 
                                                          
210 If linguistic homogeneity would have been an explicitly stated goal, it would have been a more 
fair presentation of state policy. Moreover, there may also have been better, less binding ways to 
realize this — for example, through stimulating an intrinsic motivation for learning Dutch and 
facilitating it on a practical level. 
211 Currently, new measures are being developed (Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 
2018a), but as of now it is unclear how effective these will be. 
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Fortuyn, Van Gogh, Paris), inburgering is turned to in order to perform control. 
As has also be hinted at by various policy officials, inburgering is a way to 
appease the “autochthon majority” and take away their anxieties about 
migration, Islam, and a “loss of culture.” It does so not only by demanding 
newcomers to make an effort to “integrate,” but also by reassuring that the 
majority is the norm. It consolidates the Dutch nation state by categorizing 
some people as Others, by reasserting Dutch as the only possible language and 
by “freezing the nation” (Suvarierol 2012) in the inburgering exam on Dutch 
society. 
 As I argued in the first section of this chapter, inburgering is a technical 
answer to political questions. Having been created as a rational policy solution 
to improve participation and social cohesion, in practice it has also been 
functioning as a political tool to reassert a national order of an “autochthone 
majority” who automatically belongs in and various Others who are assigned a 
place at the edges of the Dutch nation state (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; 
Yanow and Van der Haar 2013; Bonjour and Duyvendak 2017; cf. Dikeç 2007; 
Fernando 2009; Fassin 2013). Such place making and performance of state 
power can also be seen as a rite of incorporation into the nation (Suvarierol 
and Kirk 2015; cf. Verkaaik 2009). It is a ritual way of dealing with what is 
considered foreign, of neutralizing the perceived threat it brings through 
policies that have the important meaning of performing control over the Dutch 
nation state. Paradoxically, it does not really do anything to take away 
anxieties related to the Dutch nation and belonging, it rather legitimizes and 
reinforces them. 
 As a ritual, it reifies imaginations of the Netherlands as a problem free, 
homogenous community (Schinkel 2007) and constitutes social order by 
defining relations. This is the political relevance of inburgering policies. The 
continuous possibility of demarcating the Dutch nation state fosters demands 
for more policies, which may explain the recurrent perceptions of failure and 
related reforms (cf. Foucault 1991). However, as informants indicated, state 
policy also has to be predictable and consistent in order to be legitimate, 
qualities that many reforms did not live up to. It this sense, inburgering does 
not meet standards of proper state government like legal certainty. Still, 
inburgering has been created as a legitimate state intervention, first because 
it has been represented as necessary for social cohesion and socioeconomic 
welfare. In the process of policy making, moreover, political questions about 
belonging, diversity, and inequality have been cast in universal, legally viable 
terms, and translated into a solvable, objective problem. 
 In this process, the political nature of inburgering policies, which have 
been instigated by anxieties that have themselves been fuelled by politicians, 
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is neutralized. Particular imaginaries of national belonging, cultural otherness, 
and religious threats are “made to appear so ‘natural’ that [their] ideological 
content comes to be regarded as common sense and therefore beyond 
question” (Shore 2011: 171). These are endowed with (legal) authority by 
turning them into official state policy. At the same time, the question whether 
rethinking imaginaries of the Dutch nation in light of migration and 
diversification would be more viable than reasserting it, is marginalized. It is 
considered the right thing to do for the state to intervene in society the way it 
does, as though it is a neutral way of governing populations, while it is actually 
a very political involvement, both in terms of assumptions and effects. 
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have answered the following question: How are policy 
measures created as a legal and technical answer to political questions? I have 
described how both the Newcomer Inburgering Act and the Inburgering Act 
were created to target specific groups, based on ideas about who belongs in 
the Dutch nation state. Because the target population had to meet legal 
standards, eventually a universal definition had to be created. Moreover, the 
creation of a rational and calculable system turned a political question about 
belonging into a seemingly technical problem that could be solved with the 
instrument of language education and through establishing quantitative 
parameters to measure success. Thus, I have analyzed how policy making 
cloaks political decisions, debates and anxieties in the neutral language of law 
and scientific solutions endow policy with authority. 
 In the process of policy making, contradictions and tensions between 
political desires and state neutrality already inherent in policy proposals were 
heightened, but eventually made more anodyne because of the legal-technical 
idiom. Behind the creation of these policies, political parties have to different 
degrees and in different ways, reflected, stoked, and appeased the dominant 
“autochton” perspectives on what it means to be Dutch. Adjustments being 
continuously made to the policy system illustrate the political meaning 
inburgering has in terms of reaffirming the Dutch national order in light of 
migration. This political dimension of inburgering, reasserting a particular 
vision of the Dutch nation, is erased and neutralized (cf. Nyqvist 2011). Once 
in place, there is no reflection on the policy system, as it is difficult to step 
outside its logic and it is reinforced rather than fundamentally revised. Debates 
and criticisms focus on the implementation of measures and calls for reforms 
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primarily trigger restrictions, also because technical measures can be easily 
adjusted. Thus, it is a relatively easy way of framing the boundaries of 
discussion, and limiting the scope of political debate around policy. 
 It is a seemingly neutral way of dealing with national belonging without 
actually debating it. A state’s existence is justified by its capability of 
protecting its population and keeping some sort of order. In other words, as 
Sharma and Gupta (2006) have argued, the state is a cultural artefact that 
needs to be performed. The process of policy making that I described in this 
chapter is one way of doing so. Inburgering policies are a way of performing 
control over changing social realities through protecting particular populations 
and reaffirming the national order. Besides the enactment of state control, 
policy is created with stated goals of serving the general interest and the 
welfare of all inhabitants. Moreover, policy making implies taking into account 
the rule of law, it has to meet standards of state rule, such as equal treatment, 
proportionality, consistency, and prudency. In both ways, political decisions 
are endowed with an institutional authority and dignity they might otherwise 
not possess (Shore 2011: 172). 
 Inburgering policies are presented as neutral interventions in society, as 
if the state is a righteous and impartial actor above politics. In the next chapter 
I further disentangle how policy is produced as having state qualities and how 
the process of policy making itself constitutes the state. 
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3. “Up the Line”: Authorizing Policy Texts 
 
 
It is not about you as a person, the policy paper has to be supported by 
everyone in the line, it has to be embedded in the policy of both the 
department and the government. 
 
(Policy official, working at Directorate) 
 
 
“De lijn” (the line) is a term used by civil servants to describe the hierarchy 
that structures their bureaucratic work context. It refers to the chain of 
command and control through which draft policy documents written by policy 
officials, from important White Papers to internal memos, are sanctioned by 
higher ranking officials. Informants explained how it enables communication 
about plans and ideas, but also how it constrains their work. Superiors check 
the documents they have written, amending them, sending them back with 
instructions for rewriting, or sending them “further up the line” to their own 
superiors. As one informant described: “I’ll make a start and the line is there 
to make sure what is written corresponds with the vision of the minister and 
other interests. So you don’t have to do it on your own." 
 “The line” thus encapsulates and connects various hierarchical positions 
within a ministry. Bureaucratic work is largely about communicating 
information and advice to others in order to facilitate decision making. It is a 
collective effort that is to a significant extent realized through writing 
documents (Weber 1978; Hull 2012b; Gupta 2012). What also takes place in 
this process of writing is that political decisions are translated into policy 
measures. I explained in the previous chapters how the Integration Policy has 
addressed very political questions, effectively reinforcing the national order, 
but that at the same time it has been created as if intervening rationally and 
neutrally in social reality. I have analyzed how this policy effect is realized by 
studying the creation and development of various policy measures over time, 
focusing on their rationales, goals, and effects, and the interaction between 
principles of state neutrality and politics.  
 This chapter examines the policy effect from a different angle, paying 
attention to the form of policy texts and to how the bureaucratic context in 
which they are created shapes them as having specific qualities. Bureaucracy 
helps to create an “aura of finality, completeness, and inhuman objectivity” 
(Heyman 1995: 264) over the policies it produces. Therefore, the focus of this 
chapter is on the creation of policy texts as it takes place in a ministry. The 
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aim of this chapter is to obtain a better understanding of the ways in which 
policy is created as a political instrument, but at the same time seems 
apolitical. As the organizational structure in which the writing of policy takes 
place, “the line” provides an interesting angle for the analysis of how policy 
texts are shaped and reshaped. Through this framework, I seek to answer the 
following question: How are policy texts produced as objective, expressive of 
a collective body, and having both political and state authority? 
 My analysis is based on the same inburgering policy archives of the 
Directorate that I used in the previous chapter. Partly the documents overlap, 
but instead of only focusing on their content, here I also pay attention to how 
they have been adjusted when they were circulating within state bureaucracy 
and to their material features. My archival research covers the period from 
1994 to 2007, a time when physical documents still travelled through the 
various ministries that housed the Directorate. This also made it possible to 
study their material qualities, which help to make insightful how bureaucracy 
operates as a seemingly impersonal organization (Hull 2003). While informal 
interactions and processes are also important for bureaucratic work, I focus on 
the formal processes because they illustrate that the creation of policy texts 
is an impersonal collective effort, seemingly immune to human bias and 
removed from cultural influence. This is also what makes bureaucracy such an 
interesting fascinating topic for ethnographic inquiry. I relate my analysis of 
the documents themselves to accounts that civil servants gave of “the line” as 
a distinctive aspect of their work. Indeed, civil servants tended to talk about 
“the line” as if it is an autonomous structure that has agency and controls how 
they write policy texts. 
 Writing is the central bureaucratic activity. Weber (1978: 957) described 
the importance of documents to bureaucracy, which after all literally means 
rule by desk, primarily in instrumental terms of enabling the “management of 
the modern office.” But documents are more than mere instruments, they are 
actually constitutive of bureaucratic activity and structure (Harper 1998; I. 
Feldman 2008; Hull 2012a; Gupta 2012). Writing documents is a means of 
coordination and control, enabling the formation of alliances that make up the 
bureaucratic organization. The circulation of documents in “the line” not only 
characterizes the boundaries of institutional organization, but also reveals who 
is included and excluded in the process of writing and on what grounds. 
Bureaucracies are heterogeneous organizations with conflicting interests, so it 
matters who has a part in writing texts and from what position or function this 
is done. This relates to a second way in which documents are constitutive of 
bureaucratic organization. 
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 Documents construct fixed and shared meaning, which helps to coordinate 
activities and perceptions. The colour of pen used, for example, or unique 
stamps and dating indicate who is authorized to write, read, and comment on 
what kind of documents (Hull 2003). The graphic representation of a document 
is important in this respect, as it signifies its meaning within bureaucracy, a 
“sociality organized by form” (Handelman 1981 in Hull 2012a: 255), and 
mediates this meaning, denoting what action needs to be taken by whom (cf. 
Latour 1999; Riles 1998, 2006). This is reflected in “the line,” which unites 
actors occupying various positions that are signified by material qualities. 
Writing is not done under a personal title, but out of function. Documents and 
their material qualities help to construct a collective bureaucratic authority 
by grounding individual acts of writing in a corporate order (Hull 2003; I. 
Feldman 2008). 
 Bureaucracy not only structures and disciplines individual agency. It has 
also been described as absolving personal accountability, disguising authorship 
and self-interest, and making internally conflictive processes appear to be 
definitive and rational (Heyman 1995: 264; Fuglerud 2004: 31; Shore 2011: 171-
2). Bureaucratic organization seems to render human action seems impersonal. 
Accounts that policy officials gave of “the line” fit in well with such 
conceptualizations of bureaucracy. This depersonalization relates to Harper’s 
analysis of how collectively writing documents in the International Monetary 
Fund effectively transfers authorship from the individual to the organization 
as the “original author(s) of such documents get shunted out of view and 
replaced by the identity of the institution as a whole” (1998: 45; cf. Hull 2003). 
This is especially interesting in the context of a ministry, where the minister 
personifies this institutional authorship, but also is an elected politician. 
 “The line,” with the minister on top, thus symbolizes the tension between 
the political decision making and state authority. This chapter starts with 
describing the line and analyzing how the writing and circulation of policy 
documents both constitutes the bureaucratic structure and transfers 
authorship to this impersonal collective. In the second section, I examine the 
specific form in which officials learn to write, which makes policy texts appear 
as neutral. I then turn to the corrections that superiors make when documents 
are sent “up the line,” analyzing how policy texts are increasingly aligned with 
politics the higher up they move in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The chapter 
ends with an explanation of how the minister, being on top of the line, 
symbolically authorizes all policy texts written. 
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3.1 The line constitutes bureaucracy 
 
Gupta has argued that “writing itself needs to be seen as the central activity 
of bureaucracies. Writing precedes, accompanies, and follows other actions. It 
does not merely record what happened but is the main activity that takes place 
in bureaucratic work” (2012: 150). The previous chapter has made clear that 
writing policy texts is a tedious process, primarily because it is done in 
collaboration with other civil servants. As one policy official phrased it, “they 
call us policy officials, but in practice we are mainly communicating. A memo 
is also communication. There are many departments and directorates, so the 
bulk of your work is not thinking out policy, but getting other people involved.” 
In that sense, writing is not only instrumental to cooperation, it constitutes it; 
it is through writing that collaboration is made possible.  
 In case of the creation of the Newcomer Inburgering Act, the general 
assumptions and mode of implementation of the inburgering system had in 
principle already been determined at an early stage of the policy making 
process. Subsequently, most time was spent on negotiations and getting others 
along, not only politicians, but first and foremost policy officials from other 
departments. As I have described in the previous chapter, policy was gradually 
constructed in the circulation of drafts, which were written by small groups of 
civil servants and then commented on and amended in increasingly wider 
circles. In Text box 3.1 I give a more detailed account of the process of creating 
the Newcomer Integration Act. This process of writing texts is not only 
essential for understanding how policy is created in terms of its content. In this 
section, I analyze how writing policy texts constitutes the idea of an objective 
collectivity that effectuates an institutional authorship. 
 An example of how writing documents is intertwined with bureaucratic 
practices, processes, and organization is the Dutch concept penvoerder, 
meaning secretary or coordinator and referring to the actor who controls the 
writing (and thus creation) of policy. It literally translates as “holder of the 
pen,” indicating the importance of writing in the construction of policy. A 
penvoerder takes the lead, prepares and chairs meetings, determines the 
agenda, writes first drafts and steers the process in a certain direction (Janssen 
1991). This position provides the best overview of the policy making process 
and such information brings the power to connect, coordinate, and direct other 
actors. This is what officials from the Directorate did in shaping of successive 
inburgering acts. They were principal writers, leading the process of policy 
making to the desired outcome, getting others involved by drafting policy texts 
and letting others respond and reshape. 
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Text box 3.1 The process of policy making 
 
In the intradepartmental process, a small working group consisting of officials 
from the Directorate and the directorate for Constitutional and Legal Affairs was 
working on exploring the possibilities of the law (DCM95/941). They would 
consult the Director General and the Minister of Interior before plans were 
discussed interdepartmentally. Later this working group would institutionalize in 
a project structure (Stuurgroep). In addition, a Project group Inburgering was 
formed within the Directorate, which prepared decision making and wrote the 
actual policy papers (ibid.). The Minister of Interior would, for example, be kept 
up to date about developments and advised on important decisions (e.g. 
DCM95/1642; DCM95/1818). 
 In the interdepartmental process, important decisions were made in the 
Interdepartmental Commission Minorities Policy (ICM), in which higher officials of 
various ministries were informed about the ideas that were developed. They 
actively discussed central aspects in order to facilitate decision making in the 
Council of Ministers. The ICM decided to create the Interdepartmental Project 
Group Inburgering (IPI), an administrative body to facilitate interdepartmental 
cooperation on a lower, more practical level (DCM95/474, appendix 1). The 
Project Group was made up of officials from several departments which more or 
less reflected the ICM. The Ministry of Interior, i.e. the Directorate, provided the 
chair, the secretary and one member. Some informants explained that other 
departments were not very willing to cooperate, especially the Ministry of 
Welfare, Health and Culture, which had already started with pilots for language 
education and were not eager to give it out of hands. Moreover, while the 
Ministry of Education was not willing to adjust its own policies to facilitate 
language education for migrants, the Ministry of Finance would watch the 
budget. 
 After the different viewpoints and interests of the ministries had been 
debated and points of contention had been sorted out in the IPI and ICM, advices 
and proposals for decision making were sent to the Sub Council of Ministers for 
Social and Cultural Policy. In this Sub Council, plans related to inburgering were 
discussed and decided upon by involved ministers, in this case those responsible 
for social affairs, education and healthcare, before formal decisions were made 
in the Council of Ministers. So the higher in the hierarchy, the more decision 
making had already been prepared in various constellations. It was a process of 
proposals and decision making continuously going up and down between several 
layers of bureaucracy and ministers, and going sideways between various 
departments. I discuss this process extensively in the next chapter. 
 In practice, officials at the Directorate would prepare most aspects and 
discuss these in the IPI. Major points of contention included the determination of 
the target population, as I explain in the head text. Funding was another 
important point of discussion. The funding for the envisioned Newcomer 
Integration Act was made possible by combining the budgets of the ministries of 
Education and Welfare, who were already the main financeers of language 
education and social facilities for migrants, resulting in various money flows to 
the cities. According to some involved actors this was a rather “complicated 
situation.” 
 
(text continues on next page) 
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 A document thus indeed is closely related to other bureaucratic practices, 
such as meetings, discussions, decision making, correcting and so on, which in 
turn result in more writing. In this way, documents instigate and coordinate 
collaboration between officials. By acting as focus of attention and stimulus 
for action, documents constitute temporary arrangements around specific 
issues that are dealt with, from creating texts for inburgering legislation or 
writing a policy paper about labour market discrimination to answering 
Parliamentary questions about radicalization, in which various actors each 
time collaborate. Hull describes such “shifting associations,” as 
“heterogeneous relations that come into being through the use and circulation 
of the [written] artifacts that mediate all bureaucratic activities” (Hull 2012b: 
21). Though bureaucracy is a relatively fixed organizational structure, actual 
interaction varies depending on the specific work being done, or text being 
written.  
 There are various types of policy documents that are written and circulate 
within a ministry. A memo (nota) is for internal use and meant to advise and 
inform the minister and superiors about specific policy options, decisions, 
plans, or meetings. An agenda or report of a meeting can be added as an 
appendix, but also scientific studies, reports or other background information. 
An example I use in this section and section 2.3 is a memo used to prepare the 
minister for a debate in the House of Representatives. These kinds of texts 
thus are only used internally. A White Paper (beleidsnota), spells out specific 
policy plans of the minister or government and is sent to the House of 
Representatives and thereby made public. The same holds for letters that are 
sent to Parliament in reaction to reports, or that answer questions from 
Members of Parliament. Letters may also be sent to other actors, for example 
answering questions from civil organizations, municipalities, and citizens.212 
                                                          
212 Before such policy texts meant for external communication are send out, a draft is written that 
is called a “minute.” After policy officials have written a first draft of the letter, these actors 
send it to their superior. This first draft is accompanied by a separate, standardized page called 
Others policy officials remembered it was a “hopeless fight” because these 
departments were in the midst of budget cuts and were in general unwilling to 
succumb to the coordination of the Directorate. Informants who were involved 
in the Project Group remember how constructing the new law and coordinating 
this process was “a long and tiresome process.” 
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Legislation, as discussed in the previous chapter, is also an important policy 
text, which typically consists of a legal part and an explanation of the rationale 
called Explanatory Memorandum. 
 Based on remarks of superiors, draft letters are rewritten until there is a 
final draft that is ready to be presented to a director or higher ranking official, 
who finally approves it and authorizes it as a formal letter that can be sent 
out. It is important to note that most internal communication is done 
informally, consisting of e-mails, telephone calls, or talks with direct 
colleagues, other departments, or non-governmental partners. Only when a 
superior needs to be informed about something or has to approve of it213, or 
when an official text is written on behalf of the minister, are texts “sent up 
the line.” In the last case, a decision, plan, activity, or policy proposal has to 
be made official because it is an act in name of the minister. Therefore, it 
needs to be checked “in the line,” to make sure it meets the standards of 
official government policy. At the same time, “the line” also gives authority 
and status to the plans of a government. 
 In this section, I focus on a memo214 to illustrate how this works. The 
memo spells out a strategy for positioning Minister Verdonk in a debate in the 
House of Representatives, during which she had to react to questions and 
comments posed by Members of Parliament about a draft of the Inburgering 
Bill, which had been sent to the House of Representatives in February 2006 
(Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 2005d215). The first ideas for this 
strategic argumentation were written down in a document that was presented 
to the Director-General of International and Aliens Affairs at the Ministry of 
Justice. The document was written in a standard format: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
“minuutformulier,” meaning literally “form for draft letter.” On it is information to facilitate the 
processing of the draft within the Directorate, such as contact information of the policy official 
who wrote the first draft, subject, case number and to whom copies need  to be send. NB The 
letters mentioned here are the most important form of external communication, but more types 
exist, of course. Speeches are an example, which may be seen as a more informal communication 
of plans and vision presented in a Beleidsnota. Other forms include information texts on official 
websites, public campaigns or press communications. 
213 For example preparing a director for a meeting, asking budget for organizing a conference or 
giving an update about a project. 
214 DDS 5043526. Memo planning and preparation written question round, sent to DGIAV on 8 
February 2006. 
215Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005–2006, 30 308, nr. 9, Draft decree Inburgering [Ontwerp-
besluit Inburgering]. 
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 Nota 
 
 Aan DGIAV 
   Datum Paraaf 
 
 Van DPMI 
   
 Concipiënt [name of policy official]  
 
 Doorkiesnummer [telephone number] 
 Datum 8 februari 2006  
 Kenmerk DDS504 3526 
 Onderwerp Planning en voorbereiding schriftelijke vragenronde 
  
 
Figure 3.1 A short version of “the line”  
 
 This fixed format roughly covers the upper third of the sheet of paper (A4 
format) and is a print of a digital document. The words in grey are fixed (pre 
given), the words in black are written (typed) by the policy official who has 
drafted the document. The blue words indicate: 1) what type of document it 
is, in this case the header tells it is a “Nota” (memo); 2) to whom it is 
addressed, “Aan” (to), in this case the Director-General International and 
Alien’s Affairs (DGIAV); 3) by whom it is officially sent, “Van” (from), in this 
case the director of the Program Directorate Modernization Inburgering 
(DPMI)216; and the officials who has written the text, “concipiënt” (initiator), 
in this case a coordinating policy officer. 
 As I explained above, although policy texts such as these are usually 
written by individual policy officials, who often work together in small groups, 
the official sender is the head of a directorate. This actor has to approve of it 
and is responsible for every written piece that leaves the directorate. 
“Concipiënt” is a term that refers to the person who conceives of or starts the 
process of writing a policy text. In the documents I studied, it was only used 
                                                          
216 In the previous chapter I described that a separate directorate was created for shaping the Wet 
inburgering. 
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at the Ministry of Justice but other departments used similar terms. In files 
from the Ministry of Interior from the mid-1990s the term “gesteld door” was 
used, meaning “composed by,” and some years later “inlichtingen bij” or 
”getypt door,” meaning “information from” and “typed by.” The ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment used in the early 2000s the term “steller” or 
“composer.” What all these terms have in common is that they avoid the term 
“author.” 
 A reason for this may be that formally it does not matter who the actual 
author of a text is, because to the outside world the minister is the official 
author and real authorship is embedded into the impersonal collective of a 
ministry (Harper 1998). During the process, moreover, the text is shaped by 
the input of others, who are included in a temporary association around a 
specific document. So the terminology also emphasizes the collective effort. 
The term “concipiënt” also relates to the context that a process is set in motion 
by  the person writing a policy text. In this case, for example, creating a 
strategic argumentation is started by an individual civil servant, who thus 
becomes responsible for it. The “concipiënt” in fact is the only actor whose 
name is explicitly mentioned in “the line,” which allows for internal indexation 
of the writer and thus control (Hull 2003: 289). Eventually, if texts have moved 
“up the line,” personal authorship is disguised to the outside world. 
  Internally, it is traceable precisely who was the initiator of a text. If 
mistakes have been made, superiors have questions or there have been other 
complications, the responsible actor can be found and asked about the issue 
at hand. This mechanism also holds for the superiors of the policy official who 
started writing a text. Behind each actor there is a bold line on which a 
signature, “paraaf,” and the date of signing, “datum,” can be placed. Hull 
(2003: 295) argues that “ideologically, the signature is unique not in indexing 
an individual but in establishing this relationship on the basis of physical 
causality.” This information indicates the responsibility related to the formal 
position of each actor and reproduces on paper the hierarchy in which texts 
are created. It also makes the pathway of a document along various actors 
traceable, allowing “the organization to talk to itself and about itself” (Harper 
1998: 134). The same holds for the information the document continues with 
below these lines: the extension number, (“doorkiesnummer concipiënt”) of 
the writer, the date (“datum”), the document number (“kenmerk”) and the 
subject (“onderwerp”).  
 After this, the document starts with the content of the memo, which I will 
further analyze in section 3.3. Here I am interested in how written artefacts 
travel through the bureaucratic organization. After the composer had written 
the document he or she signed and dated it, in this case “08/02/06,” in blue 
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ink on the lines behind “concipiënt” and below the headings “datum” and 
“paraaf.” Then it was sent to the head of the Program Directorate (DPMI), who 
checked it217 and who signed and dated it, “8/2/06,” also in blue ink, on the 
corresponding place one line above the line where the composer had done so. 
The document was then sent to the Director-General (DGIAV), to be used in a 
meeting he had with the head of the Program Directorate on the strategic line 
that is spelled out in the body of the document. This is an example of how 
writing is intertwined with other bureaucratic practices. The Director-General 
used it during the meeting, which was itself both connected to supporting the 
minister, as well as to the document, all being cause and effect of each other. 
 The Director-General read and commented on the draft; throughout the 
text he made several remarks, which I will discuss further on. On the top blank 
space of the document, above the headings “datum” and “paraaf” the 
Director-General signed, with a sort of large “V,” and dated, “9/2,” the 
document in blue ink and above it writes “Besproken. (zie opm. bij 
betooglijn),” meaning “Discussed. (see re.[marks] at argumentation).” The 
document was then sent back to the head of the Program Directorate, who 
wrote a short note to the composer (over the lines between the typed names 
of himself and the composer and their written dates and signatures): “[first 
name of policy official],  zie opmerkingen DG  lijkt overigens een prima 
stuk.”, meaning: “[name],  see remarks DG  seems to be a fine piece by the 
way.”  
 Once the document was returned to the official(s) who had written it, this 
actor had to rewrite it based on the remarks made by his or her superiors. 
When this had been done, the document was sent “up the line” once more for 
another round of comments and approvals. The document I have just described 
was rewritten and eventually presented to minister Verdonk nine days later in 
the form of a memo.218 The format of this document is different from that of 
the previous document, because it was addressed to the Minister and therefore 
more actors had been involved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
217 In terms of correction, in this case it is not traceable if and what kind of changes have been 
made in this stage because I only had access to this final version of the document. 
218 DDS 5405558. Memo Strategic line for answering second written question round, sent to the 
Minister on 17 February 2006. 
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 Nota 
 Aan de minister voor V&I 
     
   Datum Paraaf 
  
 Door tussenkomst van SG 
  DGIAV 
  
 Van HPMI 
   
 Visie vooraf DW 17/2 tel.akkoord 
 
  i.a.a DCIM    
   
 Concipiënt [name of policy official]  
 
 
 Doorkiesnummer [telephone number]  
 Datum 17 februari 2006  
 Kenmerk DDS 540 5558 
 Onderwerp Strategische lijn voor beantwoording tweede schriftelijke  
  vragenronde. 
 
  Bespreken in regulier overleg van PMI om 8.00 uur 
 
 
Figure 3.2 A long version of “the line”  
 
 As far as the content of bureaucratic documents such as these is 
concerned, the text is usually structured in a clear way. This text started with 
a clear subject, “Strategic argumentation for answering second written 
question round,” and when and with whom it is going to be discussed “regular 
meeting PMI at 8 am.” Then followed a short description of the context and a 
clear depiction of the action that is asked from the minister. Memos that are 
sent to the minister typically consist of clearly visible, to the point headings 
that stand out so they can be found and read easily. They each address an 
162
Chapter 3
174 
important part of what is communicated to the minister: explanation of why 
the memo is send and short account of the context, concrete decisions that 
are asked for, advice about the decision to be made, longer account of the 
context. Civil servants are taught to keep memos short, ideally no longer than 
two pages, to which extra information can be added in the form of an 
appendix. 
 The composer (“concipient”) of this memo, the same official who had 
written the previous one, again signed and dated the document, in this case 
“17/2/6,” in blue ink after finishing it. Because the document was written in 
consultation with the Directorate Legal Affairs (“DW”) there was an extra line 
above that of the concipiënt, before which is written “Visie vooraf,” meaning 
“vision beforehand.” There was no signature or date written on the line where 
reserved for this, but underneath it “17/2 tel.akkoord” is typed, meaning 
“17/2 tel.agreed” or telephonically agreed upon on 17 February. This 
directorate thus approved of what had been written and probably did not have 
substantial remarks, taking away the need for written comments. There is 
another line on which “i.a.a. DCIM” is written, meaning “cc DCIM,” or that a 
copy has been sent to the Directorate, which was not directly responsible for 
writing this document but was informed about it. 
 So policy officials had already been in contact with colleagues from other 
directorates during the writing before the document had been sent to the head 
of the Program Directorate Modernization Inburgering (HPMI) for approval. On 
the same date as the composer, he signed and dated, in blue ink on the 
designated spot. Because this actor had already read the previous version, he 
probably did not need much time to read and comment on it again. Officially 
the memo was sent in name of the HPMI, to whom authorship is transferred 
from the officials that are in this case hierarchically below him. Not only does 
it illustrate how the only actor who is explicitly referred to as the sender is the 
head of the Program Directorate, it also indicates how temporary alliances of 
civil servants are formed in documents that are “sent up the line.” In this case, 
officials from the Program Directorate, the Directorate and Directorate Legal 
Affairs were united around a particular document.219 
 More actors were associated with and through this policy text, as the 
document moved further “up the line.” The next in line to read and comment 
on the piece was again the Director-General. Whereas this actor was the 
highest in line to receive the previous document, now he was not the end 
                                                          
219 Though these actors probably formed alliances rather often, the mechanism works the same on 
each topic and document. So also for less regular intra- or interdepartmental collaborations 
between policy officials 
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station. This time, he received the document at a stage termed “Door 
tussenkomst van”, meaning “intervened by.” This is an indication to the 
minister that the text has been sanctioned by the Director-General. He also 
signed and dated (17/2) it after scrutiny in blue ink, he wrote on the blank 
spot below the lines with dates and signs (besides the telephone number, date, 
etc.) “Een goede, niet defensieve lijn,” meaning “A good, non-defensive line,” 
indicating the official who did the rewriting had sufficiently incorporated the 
previous comments according to the Director-General. 
 At the same stage “Door tussenkomst van,” the memo was also reviewed, 
for the first time, by the Secretary-General (“SG”), who signed and dated 
(17/3) it and apparently did not have any substantial remarks. This actor, or 
officials working for the office that supports this powerful function220, wrote 
in green ink and often used the abbreviation “m.i.”, which stands for mijns 
inziens, meaning “in my opinion,” to indicate whether this actor approves with 
the text at hand. So although to the outside world their personal opinion does 
not exist, internally they communicate in terms of personal views. These 
should not, however, be seen as personal in the sense of private, but come 
from a certain position and knowledgeability in the bureaucratic hierarchy. 
 In fact, the only name on both documents is that of the composer, whose 
identity is eventually erased. The other actors are only referred to by means 
of their official position. While there are many policy officials conceiving texts, 
thus necessitating the indexing through a name, the various management 
positions can only be occupied by one person. This facilitates the tracing of 
responsibility without using names. More importantly, policy texts are checked 
out of a function that, as I will explain in sections 3.2 and 3.3, relates to a 
specific way of looking at them. It illustrates how bureaucratic action is 
depersonalized, an effect that is reinforced by the use of acronyms (DCIM, DW, 
HPMI, DG, SG). What matters is a view associated with organizational position 
instead of personal opinion. The higher a texts moves “up the line,” the more 
its authorship is transferred from individuals to the bureaucratic organization 
of a ministry, as it becomes institutionally embedded in the hierarchic line. 
 The different colours used, for example, not only facilitate the quick 
scanning of information and traceability of comments, but also signify position 
and importance of the various actors associated in writing this text. Their 
signatures relate to their position in the bureaucratic hierarchy and 
organization, and signifies who is allowed to read and write what (I. Feldman 
2008; Hull 2012b). The bureaucratic hierarchy is physically recreated because 
each actor higher in rank signs above the rank directly below, indicating 
                                                          
220 I further explain the position and tasks of the higher management in section 3.3. 
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authorship being transferred one level each time a document travels further 
“up the line” (Harper 1998). Material qualities of policy documents that only 
circulate within bureaucracy thus reflect “the line.” They also enable 
coordination by constructing shared meaning about positions and 
responsibilities and thus help constitute bureaucratic organization. 
 Another material quality with a similar function is the stamp. Two stamps 
can be found at the top of the page, one red (left) and one black (right), both 
with a rectangular border. Both have the date in the middle (17 FEB 2006) and 
have “Ontvangen” (received) as header, the black one has “BSG” (Bureau 
Secretary-General) behind it, the red one has “Minister voor 
Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie” (Minister for Alien’s Affairs and 
Integration) as footer. The black one has signed initials in the right upper 
corner and the written number “480” in the lower left corner. At the bottom 
of the document, barely readable and written in very small script is at the left 
“[signature] 17/2” (blue ink) and at the right “17-2 W” (black ink). These marks 
indicate (to specific actors) when they received a document. Stamps thus 
indicate when a “piece” comes in, date plays an important role, as follows 
from the text “rappel na,” meaning “recall after,” followed by a line on which 
a date can be written. Only the Secretary-General and minister, or better, 
their staff, use a stamp. 
 As Hull writes, “office stamps, the traces of movement of graphic artifacts 
among offices, normatively function through the same mechanism of physical 
causation: the image is produced by a stamp physically controlled by a group 
of functionaries in a particular physical location” (2012a: 257). Many different 
documents pass the desks of the higher management and this is a way to keep 
track of what entered an office at what time and how to safeguard the pace 
of each process associated with each individual document. Although the exact 
layout of the standard documents, stamps, and remarks differs over time and 
between departments, the general idea is the same: internally the authors are 
known and at any moment a specific document is traceable, both physically 
and in time. 
 Writing is nowadays principally done electronically in a system, which is 
called DigiDoc. 221  This has replaced such material qualities, but the 
mechanisms I describe in this chapter are the same. Informants explained 
DigiDoc as an interface where people can collectively write texts, access 
documents and send pieces “up the line.” Superiors can comment and sign and 
send a text further up or back again. Before digitization, documents were 
                                                          
221 At least in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and Ministry of Interior. In the Ministry 
of Justice and Security it is called DigiJust. 
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literally carried in folders through the ministry and documents could get “lost” 
if a civil servant wanted to obstruct the policy making process. Digitization has 
made control much more strict, but it is the same hierarchy of control that 
used to be materialized on physical documents, in which “the line” is 
materially reproduced. 
 As the use of different stamps, pen colours and signatures during earlier 
periods indicates, the checking of policy texts is done from function and 
position in the hierarchic organization. “Tracing the ‘careers’ of documents 
[…] can shed light on hierarchy, bureaucratic processes, bureaucrats’ ideas 
about the importance of specific practices” (Hoag and Hull 2017: 22). The 
trajectory of a document “highlights the frameworks of organizational action” 
(Harper 1998: 44) and the boundaries of institutional organizations (Hull 2012a: 
258). Demarcating the border, the minister is the end point of “the line.” In 
case of the documents analyzed here, Minister Verdonk signed and dated 
(19/2) the paper in red ink behind her title on top of the page, across the 
heading “paraaf.” This indicates the highest authority, the minister, had read 
and approved it, meaning the text is set for becoming definite and may be 
made public in name of the minister. 
 “The line” reifies the importance of function and formal position for 
bureaucratic action. Each time a policy text is sent to a higher hierarchic level, 
more actors are involved in the process of writing it. The authorship of policy 
texts is detached from individuals and collectivized, as it is transferred from 
the actual writers to the bureaucratic organization (Harper 1998: 46; cf. Hull 
2003). Texts are made to appear impersonal, definitive and institutional (Shore 
2011), a mechanism I further disentangle in the rest of this chapter. “The line” 
facilitates the process of policy making, but also constitutes bureaucracy and 
the policy it produces as objective. As such, the collective act of producing 
policy texts is a way of performing the state, even if only internal memos are 
concerned. This mechanisms is more salient for texts that are officially 
published, whose form is also important in this respect. 
 Policy texts that are sent to Parliament have some distinctive material 
qualities that lend authority to policy texts. They are written in the same 
format. Image 3.1 is an example of a regular policy text, in this case a letter 
written by Minister Verdonk in which she reacts to the criticism of the Council 
of State on her definition of the target population, as explained in the previous 
chapter. Some interesting graphic features include the header reading 
“Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal,” literally meaning Second Chamber of 
the States General, which is the House of Representatives. The number “2” in 
the right upper corner emphasizes it is a letter sent to this institution, not the 
Senate, which is often referred to as the “First Chamber.” Below a bold line 
166
Chapter 3
178 
the Parliamentary year, “Vergaderjaar 2005–2006,” is mentioned. Below 
another bold line the case number, 30 308, title, issue number, and in capitals 
a description of what the document is, can be found. Then it reads to whom it 
is sent, the President of the House, the place, and date of writing. 
 
 
 
 
Image 3.1 Letter sent by Minister Verdonk to the President of the House of Representatives
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 Then the content follows, also according to a standard format of headings. 
On each page there is, furthermore a footer that summarizes the most 
important information and, only on the first page, information about the 
publisher. At the end of the actual text, there is the name of the Minister and 
space for a signature. All official policy texts are published in the same font, 
which looks formal and tight. Such characteristics serve standardization, for 
which there are two reasons. First, the use of numbers and title makes a 
document traceable. But, second, the specific lay-out and aesthetic 
representation also lend an air of officialdom to documents (Riles 2006; I. 
Feldman 2008; Hull 2012a). Their uniformity makes them part of a larger order. 
 This is especially the case for law texts, which can be said to represent 
the supreme authority of the state. Image 3.2 is the official publication of the 
Inburgering Act. They start with a preamble: “We Beatrix of Orange, by the 
grace of God, Queen of the Netherlands, Princes of Orange-Nassau, etc., etc., 
etc..” Followed by several sentences that consist of archaic, formal words and 
syntax, such as “Salute!” (salute!), “doen te weten” (make to know), “alzo” 
(in consequence), that are not commonly used in colloquial Dutch. This ritual 
text places the specific document in a large history and tradition of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, or the Dutch state. The formal words, titles and 
three etcetera’s ritually signify the importance of the official head of the 
Dutch state, who personifies the state. The law is published on behalf of this 
highest authority, and so of the state itself. In the upper right corner, 
furthermore is the weapon of Dutch Kingdom, which endows a law with status. 
It is published in the “Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden,” or 
State’s Paper of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, emphasizing it is a product 
of the state. Laws only enter force after publication in this paper of the state, 
because the state needs to inform its citizens in order to legitimately rule. 
 Endowing particular political decisions with authority is a way of 
constituting and performing state authority. It becomes a way the state 
manifests itself. Before policy can be policy it needs to be produced in a 
specific way. As Shore argues, “declaring a policy to be ‘official’ endows it 
with a certain authority […] with a dignity and morality it might not otherwise 
possess” (2011: 172). The political is rendered objective and neutral, not only 
because of calculated solutions such as inburgering rationalize political 
decisions as I explained in the previous chapter, but also because the process 
of policy making in the bureaucratic organization of a ministry authorship, is 
rendered objective. In the following section I further explore how the form and 
style of writing endows policy texts with authority.  
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Image 3.2 Publication of the Inburgering Act 
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3.2 The line disciplines officials in writing policy texts 
 
You write something and then you send it up the line, which then 
decides what it thinks of it, sending it back to you with 
corrections. 
 
Most of us learn [to write] by trial and error, if a memo is returned 
from the line you’ll find out how it has to be.  
 
(Policy official working at the Directorate) 
 
Many policy officials indicated that writing is the central activity of their 
work.222 Most informants stated they see bureaucratic writing as a specific 
“craft” they had to master; they had to adapt to a certain way of writing. A 
retired official remembered he initially had some problems adjusting to writing 
policy texts because of “the layers above you that are scrupulously looking over 
your shoulder.” Another point brought up by informants is the anonymity as a 
writer of policy documents. All informants have studied at universities and 
quite a few have also worked there as researchers; bureaucratic work requires 
a high level of education.223 An important difference, informants underscored, 
between scientific and bureaucratic writing is that as a policy official, you are 
much more limited by the political context and bureaucratic prescriptions. 
Although in academia you may also be bound by conventions and guide lines, 
as a civil servant it is not possible to take a clear stance or write on personal 
title. 
 Feedback from “the line” is an important way of socializing policy officials 
in a specific way of writing. Most officials, notwithstanding their formal 
position in the hierarchy, talked about “the line” as if it is an abstract actor. 
They depicted it as an autonomous structure that has agency, that considers, 
decides, constrains, enables and disciplines actors, and acts within state 
bureaucracies. You send what you have written “up the line,” thus giving it 
out of hands, and then wait how it gets back, as it moves up and down the 
hierarchical layers of a ministry, having power over your practices and 
products, controlling your work, while you only have limited or no control over 
it. They described it as a given that exists outside of them, while it is also an 
                                                          
222 As I explained in the Introduction of this dissertation, there are different types of civil servants, 
who accordingly write different types of texts. Some write White Papers, spelling out a coherent 
vision of the policy domain in general, others write a letter that has to be sent to Parliament on 
specific topics, or write little official documents at all. 
223 This implies that the epistemologies of social scientists and civil servants largely overlap (cf. 
Schwelger and Powell 2008; Mosse 2011). 
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expression of the interaction between them. Besides shaping bureaucratic 
organization as collective, objectified action, another important function of 
“the line” is that it controls individuals working in a ministry. 
 In this section, I analyze how “the line” disciplines individual officials into 
a specific form of writing, as superiors check important features of 
bureaucratic writing that shape policy texts as seemingly neutral and rational. 
I do so by examining a letter that was sent from the Directorate to the 
Association of Netherlands Municipalities in 1995. When preparations for the 
Newcomer Inburgering Act were underway, a plan was proposed by a Member 
of Parliament during a discussion in the House of Representatives to use 
volunteers to help “newcomers” with their inburgering.224 A letter225 was sent 
in October 1995 to the Association of Netherlands Municipalities to notify cities 
about this plan, because if it was going to be put in practice, it would be 
implemented at this local level. Although the plan was discarded at a later 
stage, the letter that was sent is of interest for my analysis because a draft 
version reveals how a superior had corrected what was written by a lower-
ranking policy official.  
 This latter actor wrote that a Member of Parliament “proposes to 
stimulate citizens, through a carefully staged governmental campaign, to 
transform their concerns about societal decay and newcomers into actions.” 
The draft letter was sent to a superior to be checked, in this case a manager 
of the Directorate, who amended the last part of this sentence as follows: “… 
to transform their concerns about a growing gap between on the one hand 
people in our society who have work, are healthy and participate in society, 
and on the other hand people who have settled here recently and who are 
prone to end up in a marginalized position and even in isolation, into active 
involvement.” In the last version of the letter before it was actually sent 
(minute), this amendment had been adopted. 
 What is most apparent in the adjustment is the deletion of the term 
“societal decay,” which was replaced by a more elaborate description of 
“social problems,” and the replacement of “newcomers” by “people who have 
settled recently.” This amendment relates to several aspects of bureaucratic 
writing. First, policy texts have to be formal, or detached. “You should not 
write in too popular a style,” one civil servant explained, but rather “a bit 
official,” as another called it. Colloquial speech should be avoided and texts 
should not contain spelling or grammatical errors. Yet another informant 
                                                          
224 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1994–1995, 23 901, nr. 20. Report of a Committee Meeting on 
Inburgering [Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg over inburgering]. 
225 DCM95/942. Letter Using volunteers for the inburgering of newcomers, sent to the Association 
of Netherlands Municipalities on 27 October 1995. 
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further explicated that it depends on who you address; for example, a memo 
meant for your direct superior can be more informal than one for the minister 
or one that is officially sent to the House of Representatives in name of the 
minister. In general, a formal style of writing is associated with representations 
of state authority. Formal language, moreover, is also a way of creating 
distance between the writer and what is written about. 
 Such detachment is realized, for example, through broad constructions 
such as a double negation, passive verbs, abstract nouns, and nominalizations, 
which all shape texts as impersonal (Hull 2003: 288). This aids the construction 
of bureaucracy as a collective, impersonal effort. Policy texts are typically 
complicated, verbose, difficult to comprehend, and often vague. The 
description of those “who participate” and “are prone to isolation” is a rather 
abstract and vague way of defining the problem at hand. Besides creating 
distance between policy and its writer, this is also because their main function 
is building consensus and uniting interests. Therefore, all involved actors need 
to be appeased by having their interests incorporated in the text (Janssen 
1991; Van der Mast 1999, 2006). Another reason is that too much clarity would 
too easily invite criticism (Terlouw 2006).  
 Officials recalled how they learned to write in a “woolly” style. As one 
social scientist who had turned into a policy official phrased it: “an 
administrative piece is much less pronounced [compared to scientific writing], 
a clear stance is not easily taken, it is void of any controversial points.” 
Although most policy texts are intended to convince readers, “these texts 
should not at all be like a pamphlet,” as one informant told me. An important 
function of policy texts is promoting a new course of action, for which they 
need to unite and take along many different actors. Texts therefore need to 
be “flat,” they should “flow easily and offend nobody, they shouldn’t evoke 
emotions,” so no one, whether politicians, interest groups, or other readers, 
could take offence and might therefore not be willing to cooperate with the 
proposed policy plans. This especially holds for the contentious and sensitive 
topic of integration. 
 In the draft letter I discuss here, some readers (for example, people who 
identify as migrants, interest organizations, or politicians) might take offence 
or be negatively aroused by the term “societal decay,” which may sound 
judgmental or condemnatory. In addition, if this observation had been 
published, the minister could have been criticized for using a biased or 
damning description of a social situation. Moreover, the minister could have 
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been held accountable for expressions such as these. 226  In general, civil 
servants explained, the ministers can be asked, by Members of Parliament or 
others such as citizens, local politicians, interest groups, what they mean by 
this, whether it reflects the political party line, what is going to be done about 
it, or why nothing has been done yet to prevent this situation. “Societal decay” 
may quite accurately reflect the sentiments found among parts of the 
population, but the phrase is not impartial and can not be considered an 
appropriate term to use in policy texts.  
 It relates to the second aspect of bureaucratic writing, which is that texts 
are made to appear neutral. Popular ideas that “foreigners are taking over” 
have been an important impetus for integration policies. But terminology such 
as “societal decay” is thought to be too controversial for policy, which is thus 
cast in much more neutral terms in order to make it more acceptable (Shore 
2011; cf. Apthorpe 1997). The correction also suggests to replace “newcomers” 
by “people who have settled recently.” Because “newcomer” was a central 
term in the political debate at that time, around 1995, any reference to it 
might have triggered a political reaction. By using a more matter-of-fact 
description, the political connotation was neutralized, which might have made 
it easier for municipalities to implement proposed plans. 
 Relatedly, the indirect description of the various ways in which “people 
who have settled recently” are “prone to end up in a marginalized position and 
even isolation” might have helped to prevent triggering a political discussion 
about the changing Dutch society, which would have hampered policy 
development. By contrasting them with “people in our society who have work, 
are healthy and participate in society,” the problem is represented as a 
rational observation of social reality, rather than a political interpretation. 
Instead of the more negative “societal decay,” the formulation of specific risks 
can also be read as an argument for assisting those in need. As an alternative 
to stating that foreigners are not welcome because they inevitably cause 
societal decay, specific problems of marginalization “newcomers” face are 
described more precisely. 
 Again, the style of writing gives the policy text authority, although both 
the original version and the correction have been written from the perspective 
of the majority population that finds its society being “in decay” because of 
“newcomers” (cf. Schinkel 2007). Such anxieties are naturalized by describing 
a similar social situation, but doing so in a more rational way. Describing more 
                                                          
226 As I will further discuss in this and the next chapter, a large part of the work of civil servants is 
attuned to protecting the minister. For this reason you are also not supposed to make promises 
the minister cannot keep up to or write about topics or in a fashion that run against the political 
Zeitgeist. 
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precisely what the problem is, gives the impression of a more reasonable, 
neutral way of looking at social developments than political rhetoric that 
focuses on anxieties. But it does not change assumptions about the necessity 
of policy measures that aim at protecting Dutch society against the potentially 
disastrous effects of the settlement of migrants, who apparently have no work, 
are not healthy, and do not participate. 
 A precise problem definition also relates to a third aspect of bureaucratic 
writing, as it not only renders anxieties of a particular part of the population 
neutral, but also constructs policies as rational. The rather vague definition of 
“societal decay” is difficult to relate to specific solutions. Describing more 
precisely that (some) people who have recently arrived in the Netherlands are 
prone to marginalization and isolation and specifying they should have work 
and good health and should participate gives the impression as if “social 
problems” objectively exist and can be accurately observed (Mitchell 2002; Li 
2007). Accordingly, solutions can be rationally shaped, which is an important 
task of policy officials. This gives a scientific, realistic aura to particular 
political plans (Apthorpe 1997; Shore 2011). Although specific policy 
interventions are not mentioned in the letter, they relate to the solutions that 
were available at that moment, which is the inburgering system that was being 
created at that time.  
 Various policy texts that are related to the same topic are expected to 
contain a similar, clear explanation and argumentation. A policy official 
explained that “it is not enough to just bring the message of everything that 
needs to be done, but you have to explain as well how things have evolved, 
what the problems are and why something needs to be done about it now and 
not the day after tomorrow. And what needs to be done.” Another official 
explained that "texts are here mainly checked on coherence and clarity of 
argumentation.” Policy officials indicated they learn their texts have to be 
“objective” in the sense that they are based on various sources of 
knowledge 227 , provide complete information, and present various policy 
options. Moreover, this specific letter, as one policy text during a specific 
period addressing the topic of inburgering, has to be consistent with other 
documents that have been written and published on this topic. 
 As one senior civil servant remarked, he checks whether policy texts 
address “current events as consistently as possible, from a clear framework. 
So you react as consistently as possible and don’t wobble, saying one thing at 
a certain moment and another the other moment.” Looking at the inburgering 
documents analyzed in the previous chapter, all are based upon the same 
                                                          
227 In the next chapter I further analyze the seeming objectivity of knowledge and expertise.   
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diagnosis and proposed solutions, thereby both building upon and themselves 
contributing to the consistent argument of why inburgering is necessary. The 
rationale was that “newcomers” are at risk of ending up in socioeconomic 
marginalization and had difficulties participating in society, therefore they had 
to be stimulated to find employment, for which citizenship and language 
education were seen as important solutions228 (Minister of Interior 1994).  
 It thus is important that proper reasoning and arguments relate to a 
coherent vision of the government, which is itself shaped by policy texts and 
measures. Repeated in many different texts, a coherent description of 
“integration problems” and consistent justification of the need to solve these 
with the proposed, seemingly rational instruments, are constituted. It may 
facilitate the internalization of this ensemble of discourses and measures by 
actors involved in policy making and by the wider public (Shore and Wright 
2011: 11). A specific form of expertise thus becomes dominant, but also 
represented as the natural way of looking at the world. Migrants with particular 
backgrounds are a priori thought to end up in marginalization and thus threaten 
the Dutch welfare state, which self-evidently needs to be protected by the 
state. Indeed, policy texts fix a course of action “within a framework of 
universal and sacrosanct principles,” so challenges to policy “can be construed 
by those in power as a challenge to the principles upon which the policy is 
founded” (Shore 2011: 171). 
 In the next chapter I further address the importance of expertise in 
creating policies that are based on particular political interests and ideas as 
seemingly neutral and rational. A final characteristic of bureaucratic writing I 
describe now is the legal idiom. Although only used by legal experts when 
writing law texts and lower legislation, and not used in the example discussed 
here, it is important for shaping official policy texts as having a certain 
authority. As explained in the previous chapter, a legal idiom consists of 
precise definitions of objects, exemptions and rulings. At the same time these 
are described in general, abstract terms; no specific groups are mentioned. 
Moreover, references are made to other articles or laws, which together with 
elaborate descriptions and conditionalities read as an internal logic,  
 An example of this is Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Newcomer Inburgering 
Act (Staatsblad 1998 261: 3), which reads: 
 
The newcomer who is Dutch, meets the obligation meant in the 
first paragraph within six weeks after he [sic] has registered his 
                                                          
228 Besides measures aimed at fighting labour market discrimination, but as I explained in chapter 
1, these were eventually discarded. 
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stay and address as meant under article 65 of the Municipal Basic 
administration Personal Data Act. 
 
This text determines that Dutch citizens born in the Antilles or Aruba have to 
register themselves as newcomers, so they can start an inburgering program. 
While legally discriminating, as I explained in the previous chapter, the text is 
presented as detached from the people whom it concerns and seems neutral. 
 In this way it resembles the example I cited of the corrections a senior 
official made to an outgoing policy letter about inburgering. It illustrates how 
policy officials are socialized in a way of writing that is characterized by a 
formal, detached style that relate to such state qualities as neutrality and 
rationality. Coordinating policy officials and managers within the Directorate 
also check whether what is written is in line with the political discourse at the 
time. They have an important role in linking specific policy measures and plans 
to each other and to the broader political vision. A coordinating Policy Official 
working at Directorate explained that 
 
there are several senior policy officials at our directorate who 
prepare [texts and] decision making on a specific topic before it 
goes further up the line. … I collect everything [on a specific topic 
that is my responsibility] and check whether it is all netjes, so the 
next in line does not have to send it back because it is not good 
enough. I prepare it so it is nearly finished and it goes up to be 
further discussed.  
 
 The Dutch word netjes has several meanings. It is primarily used to 
describe things or situations that are clean or neat, but can also mean proper, 
well-arranged, or correct. In this context, an important meaning is that you 
“prepare the minister in such a way that he can work with it both politically 
and content-wise.” This, of course, is more important for outgoing documents, 
but also when it comes to documents for internal use that are meant to advise 
superiors and the minister, all texts related to the same issue should be 
“correct” in terms of style and rationality, as I have just described. A set of 
documents on the same topic should also be complete and coherent. And there 
should be no “political heresies” in a text, as a former manager explained. 
 By this he meant that “on the one hand you know the political climate and 
on the other hand you know the state of affairs in your field. You try to combine 
both and make sure that what is written corresponds with both.” Another 
manager clarified that “it is of course convenient [if texts] do not run against 
the government agreement,” pointing out the political boundaries within 
which policy is shaped. Since the early 2000s, for example, it has not been 
possible to write anything about multiculturalism without problematizing it 
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and the objects of policy are themselves held responsible for their “integration 
problems.” Another such example might be how recently the terminology 
“allochthones” and “autochthones” has been discarded.229  In general, the 
political discourse and plans of a given time determine what can be written 
and in what way. 
 Moreover, individual ministers often have some specific points they find 
important and that therefore have to be taken into account. One policy official 
explained that “our minister [Lodewijk Asscher] has in the past [when he was 
alderman in Amsterdam] been much involved with integration and education, 
so it is clear in what tone you have to write about that.” When writing texts, 
policy officials thus need to have an idea of what the minister thinks of a 
specific topic, while it is also important to take into account the personal style 
of the minister. Besides the aspects of bureaucratic writing I have discussed so 
far, it is paramount to incorporate the political plans and accents of the 
minister in what is written. 
 In this section, I have examined how policy officials are socialized in a 
specific way of writing. As their texts travel “up the line,” the first levels they 
encounter, i.e. coordinators and managers in their own directorate, check 
whether policy texts are formal, neutral, rational and in line with the political 
vision at the time. It depends on the sensitivity or importance of a specific text 
how strictly it is checked. “It matters whether it is just a yearly report or 
simple question that needs to be answered [both routine], or whether you 
write a vision on integration on behalf of the minister, or the minister needs 
to take a stance on a certain issue,” one informant explained. Civil servants 
acquire a feeling for how to write texts in a proper way and when and how 
these are checked by superiors. One official explained that “over time you 
know what superiors are going to delete so then it is easier not to write it down 
in the first place.” 
 Those who do it well may write important documents such as White Papers 
spelling out the coherent vision of the minister. Being a good writer brings 
status to policy officials, a former minister explained during an interview: “you 
may have meetings with the minister, you may articulate his or her vision, you 
go to the House of Representatives, and so on. You can really put your skills 
into practice.” Likewise, another former minister wrote in his diary that 
negative remarks the minister makes about a draft text may have severe 
effects on the status of the official who wrote it (Van Thijn 1994: 151). The 
                                                          
229 As I explained in the Introduction of this dissertation, the WRR (2016) published a report in 
which it advised to stop using these terms in all official communications because of their 
exclusionary effects in little practical use. The government decided to take over this advice. 
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comments made by superiors thus discipline individual policy officials. They 
are socialized in a specific way of writing by “the line.” “The line” thus reflects 
how people who “must think for themselves because of the nature of their 
tasks” are “controlled as thinkers in order to ensure the regular production” of 
policy texts (Heyman 1995: 263). 
 So regardless of the actual author(s), policy texts have a uniform, formal 
style that substantiates state authority (cf. I. Feldman 2008: 31-3). Rather than 
reflecting individual points of view or employing radical language, plans are 
presented as neutral, rational, and depersonalized. Besides the transfer of 
individual authorship to the antiseptic bureaucratic collectivity, this effect is 
also realized by the socialization of policy officials in a specific form of writing. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I further disentangle how policy texts are 
endowed with authority. First, I do so by analyzing policy making as uniting 
various interests in “the line.” 
 
 
3.3 The line unites interests 
  
What you write always has consequences for something or someone else. 
[…] Most importantly, you write on behalf of the minister, so you have to 
write clearly what course of action you propose, but you should also not 
thwart other policy fields or promise things you cannot live up to; you 
should not make too many commitments in a letter. And therefore it is a 
good thing we have this process of coordination, this hierarchy within 
the ministry. Because a Secretary-General or a Director-General knows 
much more about specific hot topics the minister is dealing with.  
 
(Senior policy official working at Directorate) 
 
Draft policy texts are not only sent to superiors for a check on features related 
to style. “The line” also unites interests, between civil servants themselves 
and between them and politicians. Writing policy texts is often done in 
cooperation with other policy officials working in other parts of the national 
administration, who may well have different interests and points of view, 
which may differ altogether from those of the minister. Writing policy texts 
thus is a social process in which various interests are united, making policy 
seem an impersonal and neutral compromise (cf. Harper 1998; Hull 2003, 
2012b; Janssen 1991; Van der Mast 1999). Analyzing how texts are collectively 
written thus yields insights into the nature of policy. I first address 
collaboration between civil servants and then turn to the alignment of politics 
and policy. 
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3.3.1 Conflicting interests 
In the previous chapter I described how during the creation of successive 
inburgering laws various interests had to be taken into account. I made clear 
the Directorate Legal Affairs, for example, wrote a letter to the Directorate to 
draw attention to the rule of law. Generally, civil servants collaborated 
interdepartmentally because inburgering touched upon various policy fields. 
One policy official explained that “most topics [we deal with at the 
Directorate] are not just the responsibility of our minister, specifically not. 
Integration is always part of many agendas of many ministers.” Therefore, 
collaboration is not only important within the Directorate in terms of the 
consistency I explained in the previous section, but also in relation to other 
directorates and departments. A manager of the Directorate explained that 
 
it may seem rather bureaucratic, but if there is, for example, a 
meeting in Brussels about integration with colleague ministers 
from Italy and Spain, the discussion will concentrate on 
integration but also on border control, international affairs. So 
that has to do with at least three directorates here and all input 
has to be good, has to be in balance. That’s what the co-signing is 
for. If it’s good, it moves on to the Director-General and on to the 
Minister. 
 
 A specific example of interdepartmental cooperation was given by a civil 
servant working at the Directorate, who described how she had to write an 
answer to a Parliamentarian question on radicalization. She had done so in 
collaboration with a colleague from the Ministry of Justice. Radicalization is a 
topic that concerns the Directorate in terms of understanding the social 
circumstances leading to it and thinking about prevention, but is also 
considered an issue of public safety and therefore the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Justice. “They look at it from a security discourse, which sometimes 
conflicts with our perspective from the social domain [employment, education, 
health, etc.]. If their line says one thing and ours says another, this can be 
difficult. … You have to find a compromise.” 
 I could not study drafts of letters on this specific topic, but looking at 
official communication that the government sent to the House of 
Representatives, the policy line primarily aimed at “protecting the rule of 
law,” “acting against violation of criminal law” and “intensify prosecution” 
through harder measures (Minister of Security and Justice and Minister of Social 
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Affairs and Employment 2014230). At the same time, the letter warned against 
“one-sided framing of all Muslims” and stressed the importance of cooperation 
and dialogue. A later policy paper (Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 
2015231) emphasized that freedom of religion is a constitutional right and that 
policy is aimed at preventing potential security risks not by targeting ideas, 
but by focusing on “problematic behaviours” at an early stage, for which 
contact with the “Muslim community” is deemed important. But 
“confrontation and keeping order” are even more so. 
 Rather than focusing on the content, here I am mainly interested in the 
task of the management, both within a directorate and a ministry, in the 
development of policy texts. Both texts come across as dispassionate and 
reasoned, striking a balance between a hard approach, favoured by the 
Ministry of Justice seeking a tough public stance on an ongoing ‘problem', and 
the more careful, contextualizing view of the Directorate. Lower ranking policy 
officials from various directorates worked together on the texts. It was the role 
of the middle and higher management in both ministries to unite various 
positions and points of view into a coherent final draft. The higher one’s 
position in the bureaucratic hierarchy, the easier it is to check the coherence 
of and coordinate the various subfields. This is the case for both 
interdepartmental as well as intradepartmental cooperation. 
 Interdepartmental coordination had always been troublesome, given the 
weak power position of the Directorate and because its policies conflicted with 
the views and interests of other ministries. But as a former manager of the 
Directorate explained, within the various departments in which it has been 
housed cooperation was often also rather difficult. He explained how his 
director often found himself caught between the views of the Directorate and 
the vested interests of a department. “All kinds of ideas and proposals coming 
from us had to be weighed by other parts of the organization, who judged how 
these would fit in with their own policies. This meant there were many points 
of discussion and also games being played with our director.” He gave an 
example of how the directorate at the Ministry of Interior responsible for police 
tended to “forget” to invoke the Directorate in decision making during the 
1980s, as it was not willing to pay attention to “minorities” in its general 
policies. 
 Such intradepartmental contestation, although in a different way, can 
also be found in the letter from the Directorate Legal Affairs about the legal 
                                                          
230 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2013–2014, 29 754, nr. 253. Letter Integral Approach Jihadism 
[Brief Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme]. 
231  Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2015–2016, 29 614, nr. 38. Letter Fundamental Rights in a 
Pluriform Society [Brief Grondrechten in een pluriforme samenleving].  
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complications of proposed reforms of the inburgering system, which I analyzed 
in the previous chapter. It illustrated how various points of view within a 
department were incorporated in the process of creating the Inburgering Act. 
Therefore, I use the same letter here, in order to further analyze the writing 
of policy texts as a way of uniting interests. To briefly recapitulate, minister 
Verdonk wanted to make inburgering more obligatory by reinforcing 
requirements, by letting people pay themselves and by making sanctions upon 
not passing the exam more severely. Initially, the plan was to also include 
“naturalized Dutch” and “Dutch born outside the EU” in the target population, 
referring respectively to former “guest workers” who had acquired citizenship 
and Dutch citizens from Aruba and the Antilles. In other words, those 
categorized as “non-Western allochthones” but legally Dutch. As these reforms 
were given shape by officials from the Program Directorate during the second 
half of 2004, the minister had promised to inform the House of Representatives 
about her plans in a letter.232 
 A draft of this letter had been written by policy officials from the Program 
Directorate, which was sent for consultation to the Directorate Legal Affairs 
within the same Ministry of Justice. The Ministry submitted a memo233 in which 
it made clear that: 
 
The text of the concept letter impels DW [Directorate Legal 
Affairs] to advise to take more time before sending this “definitive 
report” [letter] to the House of Representatives. It is the opinion 
of DW that the elaboration of the system reveals some 
fundamental legal objections, which cannot be resolved quickly by 
making adjustments in the text of the letter. […] 
DW thinks the letter does not sufficiently make clear that the new 
system is legally viable in light of the principal of equality.”234  
 
The memo also emphasized that the “obligation to pass the inburgering exam 
is reasonable for everyone targeted by the new law,” because the Directorate 
Legal Affairs thought the proposed level of examination and costs of courses 
and exams were too high for some targeted groups. 
 Eventually, the concept letter indeed was altered on some fundamental 
points. Because there were too many alterations to discuss here, I describe one 
                                                          
232 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 27083 and 29543, nr. 44. Report of a Committee 
Meeting [Verslag van een notaoverleg]. 
233 DDS 5213811: p. 2. Memo in return to the Program Directorate on 7 October 2004. 
234 In the previous chapter I have also explained how other actors have voiced similar criticisms. 
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such point, from which I make several inferences. The concept letter 
mentioned that “oldcomers,” meaning the “first generation guest workers” 
who had been living in the Netherlands for over twenty years, would have to 
pass the language exam on CEF level A2 for speech and A1 level for writing.235 
This low level, it was argued on behalf of the minister, “I only find acceptable 
because it will mostly concern elderly people who are not very well educated 
and for whom learning to write Dutch will be a relatively large effort.”236 
Although the advisory Commission Franssen237 had also advised this relatively 
low level because Dutch society “had offered little opportunities to this 
group,” the letter argued this was less relevant, since “they have had a long 
time to take initiative themselves.” The Directorate of Legal Affairs 
commented that this would place too much responsibility on the people “and 
less on legislation and government of the past.” 
 This directorate explicitly referred to the advice of the Commission 
Franssen and further remarked that the text shows little empathy with the 
target population. Especially because the draft letter mentioned that “an 
exemption for oldcomers who are older than 50 is out of the question,” while 
this ran against the advice to exempt this group “in light of what is realistic to 
achieve.” In the letter that was eventually sent to the House of 
Representatives, these comments had been incorporated, any reference to 
own responsibility had been deleted and elderly “oldcomers” were exempted 
(Minister for Aliens Affairs and Integration 2005a: 3-4). Although still no 
reference was made to the consequences of previous governments’ (in)action, 
the demanding style, “I only find acceptable…”, had been toned down. This 
may also relate to a remark about style with which the memo of the Directorate 
Legal Affairs concluded: “As the presentation of these issues is concerned, it 
would in our opinion be advisable to make the tone less harsh.” 
 Because these points had been incorporated in the letter that was 
eventually sent to the House of Representatives (ibid.), it is a good example of 
how in eventual policy texts contestation within the civil service is unified into 
one voice (Van der Mast 1999). It illustrates how writing policy texts not only 
is a collective effort, but also is a process in which conflicting interests need 
to be turned into a single institutional authorship. Internal ambiguity has to 
remain hidden to the outside world, which contributes to the smooth, definite 
character of policy. The specific language that is used to communicate within 
bureaucracy is related to this point. Although the last remark about style 
                                                          
235 See previous chapter for an explanation. 
236 DDS 5213811: p. 13-14. Concept letter sent by directorate Legal Affairs to the Head of the 
Program Directorate Modernization Inburgering on 7 October 2004. 
237 See previous chapter for an explanation. 
182
Chapter 3
194 
mentions “our opinion,” the earlier quotes show how in general the letter was 
written in the abstract third person singular: “DW thinks.” Comments thus are 
not personal but made from an organizational position, in a formal style (cf. I. 
Feldman 2008: 39-40), in this case based on legal expertise and written on 
behalf of the Directorate Legal Affairs. 
 Just as other policy texts I have discussed so far, this memo was written 
by one (or a small group of) officials, then checked by superiors and eventually 
approved and signed by the director. This means that it was broadly supported 
by a directorate as a unified actor and individual authorship was disguised. 
Writing is related to a specific role in which officials working at the Directorate 
Legal Affairs had been socialized and in which they learned their primary 
interest is the rule of law and responsible state governance. This was a 
different interest than the Program Directorate had, which was at that moment 
more attuned to making sure political wishes were translated into a workable 
policy system. It primarily served the political interest of disciplining 
“allochthones,” reflecting anxieties about the Dutch nation state, and 
performing control. 
 As the input of Directorate Legal Affairs clarifies, a ministry does not 
pursue one clearly defined goal, but comprises a variety of conflicting 
interests. The examples I have discussed in this section relate to the tension 
between political interests and state neutrality. Not only in terms of 
discrimination and equality, but also between restrictive policy change and 
what civil servants consider proper state government, meaning legal certainty, 
a stable, predictable state, and proportional measures. In case of the letter 
about radicalization, there was a tension between keeping order and religious 
freedom, or national security and non-discrimination. This tension is also 
reflected more in general in the Integration Policy, on the one hand 
categorizing and disciplining some objects and creating an inclusive society on 
the other hand. In case of the draft letter, a fierce political stance conflicted 
with the duty of state rule to be reasonable towards citizens and motivate their 
disciplining sufficiently. 
 While culturalist assumptions and political desires to exclude Others have 
been important determinants of policy, the democratic rule of law and state 
neutrality have also been important interests that have been safeguarded by 
some parts of the state bureaucracy. Political decisions meet legal push back, 
as I have also explained in the previous chapter. They are thus not only cloaked 
in a legal-rational idiom that endows policy with authority (Mitchell 2002; 
Shore 2011), but are actually altered because of legal and moral 
considerations. Contention between different interests is eventually rendered 
definite as they are united in the line. An unambiguous institutional authorship 
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is created out of a polyphony, that seems objective and definite, and that 
speaks with one voice to advise the minister. Such institutional authorship 
implies that any disagreement between various parts of bureaucracy, both 
intra- and interdepartmentally, needs to be settled. 
 This is typically done by a Director-General and Secretary-General. In the 
letter draft, I could not trace what influence these actors have had on the 
eventual policy text, but it seems as though a balance was struck between the 
fierce stance of Verdonk and the rule of law. In general, the higher 
management of a ministry has to weigh, balance and unite all the interests and 
points of view that have an influence on the shaping of policy, including points 
I have not discussed such as budget, operational priorities and bureaucratic 
power relations. It prepares decision making for the minister and therefore 
aligns the bureaucratic domain with political desires, discourses and plans. 
Although public managers have various tasks and functions that have the goal 
of keeping a ministry operational, in light of the creation of policy I focus on 
this uniting of politics and policy. 
 
3.3.2 Aligning politics and policy 
As a policy text moves higher “up the line,” a Director-General or Secretary-
General has to make sure a specific policy field is embedded in both the 
departmental and general government policy. To this end, for example, high 
ranking civil servants discussed policy proposals in the Interdepartmental 
Commission Minorities Policy.238 More specifically, the higher management of 
a ministry checks policy texts in “the line” on whether it fits into the broader 
policy agenda of the minister. As they have a better overview of issues that 
are being dealt with in the wider policy field, they are more concerned with 
aligning policy and political strategy than their subordinates, whose expertise 
and interests lie more with specific (sub) areas of a policy field, although they 
of course also write policy with the political context in mind. 
 I will illustrate this with the help of the example239, which I also used in 
section 3.1, of the “strategic argumentation” that was written to prepare 
Minister Verdonk for a debate in the House of Representatives about the 
Inburgering bill. The text prepared by lower ranking policy officials was first 
sanctioned by the head of the Program Directorate and then sent to the 
Director-General International and Aliens Affairs. Throughout the printed text 
                                                          
238 As I explained in chapter 1, in the ICM decision making was prepared for the Council of Ministers 
and coherence of the integration policy field with other policy fields was tried to be secured. 
239 DDS 5405558. Memo Strategic line for answering second written question round, sent to the 
Minister on 17 February 2006. 
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this last actor had made several hand written remarks, which he presumably 
also addressed in a meeting he had about the upcoming Parliamentary debate 
with the head of the Program Directorate. The comments made by the 
Director-General were quite clear and concerned issues of political 
representation of policy, making it an interesting example to analyze how 
politics and policy are brought into balance by this actor. 
 A specific part of the policy text addressed the possible difficulties 
illiterates could have with passing the new inburgering exam. Members of 
Parliament had expressed concerns that it may be too difficult for this group 
to fulfil their obligation to pass the exam within the designated three years. 
Policy officials initially had written down the following strategic argument for 
the minister to use during the debate if necessary:  
 
Finally, there are fears that illiterates may be marginalized. I think 
it also is important for this group that we should not discard them 
too quickly. It is to be seen whether the group that is not able to 
pass the exam within the designated time will be that substantial. 
The union of teachers from the sector [Dutch language education] 
has made this remark as well. At the same time, I do not want to 
assume beforehand that illiteracy and the limited progress 
illiterates make with their inburgering can be attributed to 
themselves. That is the reason why I want to seriously address the 
concerns that have been expressed about this. My approach is as 
follows: could it not also be the case that it [limited progress] is 
due to the courses, the education, and not the illiterates 
themselves? I have therefore ordered to start a project, that 
examines whether we still can bring illiterates to the desired level 
through a qualitatively excellent approach. I will report to you 
about the result of that study. 
 
 Above this text, the Director-General had written “Illiterates are not 
stupid!”, and on the right hand side of it “too defensive.” Apparently, he 
feared that formulating the response the way policy officials had done, allowed 
too easily for criticism from Members of Parliament. Though it was mentioned 
that probably just a small group will not be able to fulfil their obligation, much 
emphasis was put on facilitating the extra needs of illiterates. Responsibility 
for not passing the exam in time was also partly placed on the inburgering 
system itself. Policy officials thus first had written a policy text taking into 
account standards related to being a reliable state, paying attention to the 
quality, desirability, and proportionality of policy measures. In this case, the 
marginalized position of the target population was given prominence over the 
political discourse that focused on holding them responsible for carrying out 
the policy. 
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 This would have made the minister vulnerable to criticism, however, not 
only because in the end she would be responsible for the system, but also 
because it conflicted with her otherwise firm stance, even against vulnerable 
groups. In opposition to the hard, clear discourse minister Verdonk was known 
for, this text seems to be rather willing to give illiterates the opportunity to 
learn Dutch at their own pace and to attune education to their needs. By using 
just a few words (“illiterates are not stupid”), the Director-General drew 
attention to these points and so aimed to bring the text more in line with the 
political vision of the minister. Despite the vehemence of the ‘not stupid’ 
comment, it is not intended to be ideological or judgmental. An important 
responsibility for this actor when checking policy texts is eliminating any 
potential risk for the minister, to ensure that the voice presented seems 
reasoned, and even when expressing toughness, is never callous. Nine days 
later the definite text of the strategic line was sent to minister Verdonk.240 
The passage had been rewritten as follows: 
 
Finally, there is fear illiterates may be marginalized. I think we 
have to be cautious here. Illiterates are not stupid, in general they 
did not have the opportunity to go to school. I think a substantial 
[part] of this groups in fact is able to pass the exam within the 
designated time period. The union of teachers from the sector has 
made this remark as well. I thus concur with this. Therefore I will 
order to start a project that examines whether we still can bring 
illiterates to the desired level through a qualitatively excellent 
approach. We should give these people a fair chance. 
 
 Various aspects of this amendment are interesting. The political 
standpoint that illiterates might be able to pass the inburgering exam, but have 
missed the opportunity to develop their skills, was foregrounded. It was related 
to the expectation that most will not encounter substantial problems passing 
the exam in time. The reference to the statement that the union of teachers 
made was effectively used to substantiate the claim that illiterates are not 
stupid. This fits in with the political new realist discourse (Prins 2002) that sees 
“integration” as the problem and responsibility of “newcomers,” whether 
illiterate or not. The Dutch state, and by extension the Dutch population, is 
not obliged to solve the problems of others. In this neoliberal rationale, an 
obligation to pass the inburgering exam, which actually makes it difficult for 
these people to maintain legal residency in the Netherlands, is presented as 
an opportunity for them to invest in themselves. 
                                                          
240 DDS 5405558. Memo Strategic line for answering second written question round, sent to the 
Minister on 17 February 2006. 
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 The final sentence illustrates how restrictive reforms that held the targets 
of policy accountable to the inburgering policy were presented as a 
“qualitatively excellent approach” and as something to help the intended 
target population, even though these people were going to have a hard time 
fulfilling the obligations the new law imposed on them.241 This demonstrates 
how the higher management in a ministry checks policy texts on whether they 
fit in the political strategy, but also ensures policy is represented as a 
reasonable, fair, and rational solution. Such features of policy that relate to 
sound state government are less explicit than in the previous version of the 
text. They are made subordinate to a specific political vision, which is given 
authority because it is represented as an even-handed state policy. As such, a 
Director-General and Secretary-General act as a bridge between politics and 
policy. 
 This is also reflected in bureaucratic practices. On the one hand, a 
Director-General and Secretary-General communicate political wishes to policy 
officials. It is the task of the higher management of a ministry, a policy official 
explained, “to make sure that all different plans he [the minister] initiates and 
goals he sets are given substance in the right way in a set of coherent policy 
measures.” A director, but especially a Director-General and Secretary-
General have regular contact with the minister and therefore are central nodes 
in the network of policy makers. On the other hand, linking politics and policy 
also works the other way around in terms of advising the minister. 
“[S]upporting political decision making is the central task of the civil service, 
supplying ministers well with information is essential” (SG Overleg 2006: 18).  
 In this role, the higher management functions as a filter. Information “has 
to be well timed, complete, and thorough. There is no room for ‘own’ goals. 
The information does have to be relevant and ordered. SG’s pay a lot of 
attention to this” (ibid.). But as a policy official explained it is also the “art of 
the management to estimate what the minister wants and what he should 
know.” They are the ones who personally advise the minister and filter all the 
information that is supplied by policy officials further down “the line”. In this 
respect, they “have an active role in organizing the [problem] solving capacity” 
of a ministry (ibid.: 4). This includes making sure the minister stays out of 
trouble by “controlling and preventing incidents” and checking the information 
                                                          
241 Further on in the text it is mentioned that “those who are obliged can start [with their 
inburgering] … those who cannot succeed within the designated time can get an extension. Those 
who cannot make it can get exemption. Those who do not want to are ushered with help of the 
fining-instrument.” 
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and advice that is sent to the minister. It may also refer to the “administrative 
coordination of interdepartmental policy questions.” 
 In terms of organization, an important task of a Secretary-General is 
running a ministry, while a Director-General heads several directorates and is 
the formal employer of civil servants working there. 242  Both actors feel 
responsible for the policy making process in terms of organization and content. 
The higher management also supplies ministers with more general advice, such 
as making sure ministers know how to find their way around in the bureaucratic 
organization. One informant stressed that the hierarchic organization of 
director, Director-General and Secretary-General helps the minister to get in 
touch with the right people for the right issues. “A ministry can be very big if 
you discard all structure and order … [therefore] we are happy to guide and 
help the minister.” Likewise, they monitor the process of policy making, 
ensuring it is continuing in a steady pace and is going in the right direction. 
 For instance, a memo written to Minister of Interior Hans Dijkstal in 
September 1997 243  reveals how a Secretary-General safeguards the 
development of the process of policy making. The memo was written to advise 
the minister on whether or not to send preliminary results of a study about the 
effects of the proposed Newcomer Inburgering Act, which was then in its final 
stage, to the House of Representatives. The Secretary-General advised against 
sharing “incomplete feedback,” as it may lead “to partial adjustments” of the 
bill. The policy making process was already delayed due to political discussions 
and difficulties policy officials were facing. The Secretary-General was afraid 
that if the results were shared with Members of Parliament, the bill, which was 
practically finished, would have to be altered again. He thought it would be 
detrimental to “formal legal processes” if they take so long, especially because 
cities were already starting with implementing inburgering trajectories. In this 
way, “the disorder [would] become rather great.” 
 This remark can be interpreted as a critique of the work of policy officials, 
but also of politicians who were taking much time discussing the bill. The 
Secretary-General warned against “administrative volatility” that would “not 
be beneficial for the implementation” of policy measures. This illustrates how 
civil servants on the one hand perceive their role as enacting a trustworthy 
state, feeling responsible for the quality of the policies they create. On the 
other hand, the remark can be interpreted as a means of protecting the 
minister, who can be held accountable for this volatility. Not sharing the 
                                                          
242 The “middle management,” i.e. Heads of Unit, act as mangers and are responsible for policy 
officials in terms of functioning and personnel issues. 
243 CIM97/7679. Memo Newcomers Inburgering Bill, sent to the Minister on 18 September 1997. 
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preliminary results of an effect study may be politically convenient for the 
minister, but it may also ignore possible complications or negative effects of 
policy measures. Not sharing results from the effect study was deemed less a 
risk to the policy making process and position of the minister than possible 
critical questions in the future why these insights had not been used. 
 It is the task of the higher management to judge situations and make such 
decision. It is responsible for a smooth process of policy making and for aligning 
politics and policy. The position of high ranking civil servants thus reflects the 
tension in state bureaucracy between performing the state and serving politics. 
In this section, I have described how writing policy texts in “the line” is a 
process in which tensions are smoothened and various interests are united. It 
facilitates the social production of impartiality (cf. Herzfeld 1992; Brenneis 
1994), in the sense that many actors contribute to policy making, but the end 
product is represented as a definite, impersonal text in which contention is 
erased (Heyman 1995; Harper 1998; Fuglerud 2004; Nyqvist 2011; Shore 2011; 
Hull 2012b). 
 Instigated by growing anxieties about migration and diversification and a 
contentious debate about belonging in the Dutch nation state, policy measures 
were created that aimed to discipline some migrants. During the process of 
actual creation, this political outlook was related to other interests and partly 
neutralized because policy needed to meet standards of state government. In 
this process, authorship is transferred from individual civil servants to 
increasingly comprehensive levels of collectivity, until finally a Secretary-
General communicates with the minister in one voice, so constituting the 
ministry as one institutional author. After policy texts have turned polyphony 
into one definite manifestation, they are presented to the minister, who is the 
actor on top of “the line” and in whose name text become official. 
 
 
3.4 The line authorizes and legitimizes 
 
Policy officials, occupying various levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy and 
across departments, do the bulk of the work that goes into making policies, 
but it is only elevated to the status of “official policy” after the consent of the 
minister. In this last section, I describe how the minister, being the last “in 
line,” sanctions policy and becomes the formal author of policy texts. I will 
explain why this authorization is a crucial step in the creation of policies. 
Because the figure of the minister is also important for the process of policy 
making within a ministry, I start with discussing how the minister enables the 
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creation of policy, setting this process in motion and structuring the work of 
civil servants. I then examine how institutional authorship is transferred to the 
ministerial authority and how the minister endows policy with democratic 
legitimacy and authority. 
 To start with the first point, the minister guides policy making processes 
by bringing a political vision. Policy officials have to take into account and have 
to write about it in the rational, formal way that I explained above. As one 
official put it: “we work in a politically steered organization, so we all work 
for the minister who is currently in office.” The example of the strategic line 
on illiterates that I discussed above illustrates how the neoliberal principle of 
personal responsibility and a demanding government’s stance gave direction to 
the writing of policy texts. Minister Verdonk was known for her specific 
political vision, thus providing her own civil servants clear guidelines for 
writing policy texts, although I have also described how this sometimes 
conflicted with the ideas of other parts of the national administration. 
 An example from the initial phase of constructing the Inburgering Act 
makes clear how Verdonk put her mark on the process of shaping policy 
texts. 244  When writing about the liberalization of courses, policy officials 
started from the assumption that cities should be given more freedom in 
choosing providers and buying courses. Although they also wrote that 
eventually it should be up to the “inburgeraar” to choose, Verdonk had written 
the following comments: “Note [double underlining]: 1) liberalization of course 
provision; 2) Citizens buy themselves; 3) begin and end test are certified.” This 
highlighting of the political principles of her plans underscores her ambition to 
liberalize the market for inburgering courses and make subjects responsible to 
follow the policy, rather than just give more freedom to cities. It illustrates 
that Verdonk felt the need to give clear instructions to her civil servants. 
 In a comparable example245, policy officials suggested a transition regime 
should be introduced in order to facilitate people who were already residing in 
the Netherlands for three years or more and who wanted to apply for a 
residence permit. These people would now have to prepare themselves for 
passing a more difficult exam. Because the rules were changed when the game 
was on and they would face difficulties adjusting to the new circumstances, 
this would conflict with legal principles of stable and predictable government. 
Verdonk commented: “shouldn’t we expect from those people that they 
themselves invest in learning the language?” Apparently, civil servants had 
                                                          
244 DDS 5245308. Memo Concept-bills inburgering Principles’ Agreement, sent to the Minister on 12 
September 2003. 
245 DDS 5353378. Two decision points related to the new inburgering system, sent to the Minister 
on 17 May 2005. 
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already taken her vision in to consideration, because out of several options 
that had been offered to solve this issue, the one proposed as the best option 
was a compromise between legal feasibility and political wishes: a transition 
period of three years, which, however, already started from the moment the 
bill was sent to the House of Representatives, instead of the moment the law 
actually entered into force (some one and a half years later). Verdonk 
approved this latter suggestion. 
 This example shows how advice from the civil service embedding political 
decisions in the Dutch Constitution. As mentioned above and in the previous 
chapter, political decisions have to relate to qualities of proper state 
government, such as legal certainty and proportionality, before they can be 
turned into policy measures. There are boundaries within which political 
decisions have to be translated into policy measures, pointing at checks and 
balances that make up the Dutch rule of law and that may curb electoral 
volatility. The process of policy making thus involves interaction between 
actors who are looking to push the boundaries of what is legally possible, out 
of political interests, and actors who to a certain extent enable this process, 
but on the other hand keep an eye over the legality and desirability of 
decisions. 
 Furthermore, I want to make clear with these examples that specific 
political points of view voiced by ministers are necessary to give direction to 
the writing process of civil servants. Already when writing a draft of a new law, 
they need to have a focal point. Although not necessarily corresponding with 
their own opinion, several officials mentioned it was nice to work for Verdonk 
in terms of her clear, consistent vision. It structured ideas and texts about 
what needs to be done and how. One former manager recalled how writing a 
speech for the minister who did not know what message to send was a real 
trial. Several informants mentioned they prefer to work for a minister with 
clear plans, even if these are controversial, than for someone who has no idea 
at all when it is not clear what is expected of you. 
 Related to this, the minister is important for the process of policy making, 
because it is the figure who symbolically enables bureaucratic work. Political 
vision is important, indeed nothing is published without the consent of 
minister, but the minister is at the same time dependent on the civil service. 
As I have explained above, policy officials give substance to political ideas and 
plans, they rationalize them and give advice. Informants indicated “the 
minister of course is responsible for many policy areas and you cannot expect 
him to have full knowledge of all topics he is responsible for, so it is the role 
of the policy official to prepare him for this as good as possible.” The minister, 
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moreover, is often “a novice in this peculiar field of integration policy” and 
has to rely on the knowledge, networks, and expertise of policy officials. 
 This dependence on the work of civil servants may be interpreted as a way 
of how the minister structures bureaucratic organization and practices. As 
Rhodes et al. (2007a: 211) have described, the daily practices of civil servants 
are attuned to serving “the minister,” who as a figure thus determines their 
working lives, although this should be understood as being loyal to the office 
and not to a specific person. The individual person might change every couple 
of years, but conceptually the minister is a constant factor, on top of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy and structuring bureaucratic activities by giving 
direction to processes at a ministry. Although physically the minister is a 
marginal phenomenon in the life of most policy officials, the minister is a 
seminal figure, both absent and omnipresent, a real person and a symbolic 
figure. 
 What is interesting in this light is that most policy officials rarely meet the 
minister in person. While the higher management of a ministry has regular 
contact in institutionalized meetings and various other moments, lower ranking 
policy officials do not often have direct contact. The distance between them 
and the minister that is visualized in “the line” actually reflects the distance 
between actors in a ministry. Contact is formalized through the line, also when 
a policy official does meet the minister this is never done directly but always 
via superiors. Individual policy officials may receive short instructions from 
their direct superiors or know themselves what they are expected to do when 
receiving minutes of a meeting. For this, they do not need to have contact with 
their minister. In text box 3.2 I describe the physical enactment of “the line” 
during meetings in the House of Representatives. 
 One informant gave an example of how he found out what he was supposed 
to do in a newspaper. Minister Asscher had given an interview in which he also 
briefly mentioned his wishes concerning a policy measure – the participation 
contract - that was being developed, making it much more obliging than 
originally intended. This official was already working on the issue and because 
of the interview Asscher had given, the work that had to be done changed. 
Work instructions were thus received through one sentence in a newspaper, 
without having contact with his minister in person or via “the line.” In general, 
what the minister says, whether it is in public or internally in the form of 
official orders based on the government agreement that are communicated 
through the line, is an important incentive for bureaucratic action. As a person, 
the minister does not do much in terms of actually making policy, but the 
minister is the symbolic creator of policy, instigating and motivating the 
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process of policy making. In this sense, the minister is the author of policy in 
the sense of the original Latin auctor, meaning creator or motivator. 
 
 Being the official author has a second important effect. The minister not 
only instructs individual policy officials but also reflects the shared goal of civil 
servants who work together on a specific policy text and whose authorship is 
transferred to that of the minister. Personifying a ministry, the minister 
symbolically unites all actors working on a policy text and is able to neutralize 
any possible contention between them, more so than a Director-General or 
Secretary-General. The minister is the focus of attention of all parties 
involved. Even if different parts within the national administration have 
conflicting views, as the examples in this and the previous chapter made clear, 
the minister is the figure everyone is working for, thus making them attuned 
to the collective effort of producing policy. Though sometimes leading to 
internal contention, an order given by the minister ensures that all civil 
servants required to execute this order will cooperate and do what they are 
asked to. 
 As a symbol, the minister represents a shared goal, acting as a focus of 
attention, a stimulus for action and a means of providing policy officials with 
categories of orientation and strategies for action (Turner 1967; Ortner 1974). 
When talking about their work, civil servants would often use a narrative of 
doing things for “our minister,” who instructs, has plans, and needs advice. It 
is the figure who is personally responsible for everything that happens and is 
Text box 3.2 “The line” enacted in Parliament 
 
During a Parliamentary Debate or Committee Meeting in the House of 
Representatives, the minister is supported by various civil servants, who 
physically enact “the line” during such an event. Typically, the room is divided in 
a semi-round table and a place for the audience. On one side of the table sit 
Members of Parliament, in the middle the minister and on the other side sit civil 
servants. Directly besides the minister is the highest ranking civil servant, who is 
the one who directly communicates with the minister. 
 If there are questions asked by Members of Parliament, this actor writes the 
important ones down on paper and hands them down “the line.” In this case, 
three to five other civil servants are sitting in a row, in hierarchical order. Often 
there are also several officials sitting in the audience. Together, they write 
answers to the question, which they might also do at their own initiative if they 
concern their specific field of expertise. These answers are then returned in 
reversed order, being checked by superiors and eventually handed to the highest 
ranking civil servant. This actor is the final check and filter before answers are 
presented to minister, who is so supported in fulfilling the democratic duty of 
reporting about his policy to Parliament. 
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produced at a ministry and, as I describe extensively in the next chapter, civil 
servants are focused on not compromizing him or her. They aim to do their job 
to the best of their abilities with “their minister” in mind. If something needs 
to be done, colleagues will easily help each other because they understand it 
is with the shared goal of serving the minister. The minister thus gives meaning 
to the work being done in bureaucracy and stimulates collaboration. 
 The minister is literally on top of the hierarchic line and once a policy text 
reaches the minister, it has to be collectively shared by “the civil service.” If 
there is discussion, the minister may act as a touchstone for making choices 
and if there is interdepartmental contention, ministers may serve as 
mediators.246 By approving policy texts as the last in “the line,” the minister 
unites all actors. By becoming the official author, the already objectified, 
depersonalized and unified, institutional authorship is now turned into the 
voice of the minister, who represents the government’s stance on a given issue. 
This definitely settles any argument that preceded the institutional authorship. 
All versions and communications that are not authorized remain invisible to 
outsiders. The minister authorizes policy documents in the sense of sanctioning 
them with a signature in “the line,” but also in terms of literally becoming the 
only author. As one policy official remarked, “you write 99% and he may only 
alter 1%, but it is his letter.” 
 If a law or policy letter is officially published by sending it to Parliament, 
it is personally signed by the minister, endowing the document with an aura of 
finality and authority, as well as the appearance of individuality. This relates 
to the final function of the minister I discuss, which is giving legitimacy to a 
bureaucratically produced text by adopting it as official government policy. A 
policy text is written by civil servants in name of the minister, with the political 
vision of the minister in mind, but it also becomes a manifestation of the 
minister. Being representatives of elected political parties and being 
controlled by an elected Parliament, ministers hold democratic legitimacy. For 
this reason, they are the only ones who can be held responsible for policy texts 
that have been collectively written, but are officially made public in name of 
the minister.  
 As follows from this chapter, a state bureaucracy is practically able to 
write policy texts, and even to govern, irrespective of a political government 
                                                          
246  One coordinating policy official explained that when he and several colleagues at the 
Directorate were working on the 2013 reforms of the Inburgering Act, they had to convince civil 
servants at the Ministry of Justice to adapt the Act on Dutch Citizenship, which was a rather 
difficult job because they were not really willing to do so. “But then our minister had a chat with 
their minister and it was sorted out.” The ability to influence other ministries is of course 
dependent on the power position the minister has, but at the same time this example illustrates 
how at every ministry civil servants are loyal to their minister. 
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(I. Feldman 2008). Nevertheless, the minister is important, at least in the 
Netherlands. The authorship of a minister represents the institutional state 
authority produced in bureaucracy, but also the democratic authority of an 
elected government, whose executive power is legitimated and controlled by 
Parliament. In this way, all Dutch citizens who are allowed to vote symbolically 
approve of the policy that has been created within a ministry. It is elevated to 
the status of official government policy through the minister and so endowed 
with democratic dignity and legitimacy. A policy text and a minister are 
recognized as supreme political power to which all citizens have to abide, 
which is substantiated by uniting democratic legitimacy with the reassurance 
it has been created in bureaucracy according to standards of proper state 
government. 
 An elected government coalition and individual ministers are inherently 
political, but in their function they are also expected to be above parties, to 
govern all citizens on equal terms. This needs to be constantly performed. One 
way of doing so is creating policies that on the one hand follow from a specific 
political vision and have political goals and on the other hand meet standards 
that are acknowledged as neutral state government. These standards 
constitute the policy effect, as I have discussed in this chapter. For ministers 
to have authority they need to authorize particular courses of action that have 
been created as objective, formal, and balanced in “the line.” It functions as 
checks and balances, serving two purposes. First, being created in “the line” 
is a guarantee that policy has been ritually produced as sound government, 
because “it has passed all those layers of people thinking it through,” as an 
informant described. Second, potential risk for the minister has been 
eliminated as much as possible. 
 There is a continuous interaction between the political and bureaucratic 
domains. A political decision first sets the process of policy making in motion, 
then a policy text is written having institutional bureaucratic authority, and 
finally a minister brings democratic authority. Most documents about 
inburgering that I have discussed in this chapter were written when Verdonk 
was minister and they illustrate this interaction. The VVD, Verdonk’s party, 
had been successful in elections for the House of Representatives, partly 
because it had been capitalizing on anxieties about migration and loss of 
“Dutch culture.” Because of this success, it could join the coalition government 
and when Verdonk was made minister, these anxieties provided input for policy 
decisions. In the policy making process, other factors also influenced the policy 
outlook. Texts were produced in bureaucracy in a specific style and form and 
within the legal confines of the rule of law. 
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 Policy making is an ambiguous process, because very political and 
contentious choices, related to anxieties that have been fuelled by the same 
political actors that may later become minister, may conflict with standards 
of state government. These tensions are smoothened as policy texts move “up 
the line.” After signing by the minister, and in case of a law also after the 
approval of Parliament, the policy measure is officially reconnected with the 
political domain. Once the minister, who is affiliated with a political party, has 
become the only author, the political nature of policy is emphasized; a policy 
text is “repoliticized.” But this political nature has also been “neutralized” in 
an institutional authorship, as in the process of its creation, policy is endowed 
with qualities that represent neutral state government. As a citizen, you trust 
that policy is deliberate, sound and correct. Specific political frames about the 
nation, migrant and belonging are so institutionalized and authorized, making 
it difficult to challenge them because they are state policy.  
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how bureaucracy is important for realizing the 
policy effect by answering the following question: How are policy texts 
produced as objective, expressive of a collective body, and having political 
and state authority? I have first described how bureaucratic organization is 
constituted in the writing and circulating of policy documents. These pass the 
hierarchy, and are written and commented on from specific depersonalized 
positions. Policy texts are rendered objective and impersonal, as authorship is 
gradually transformed from the individual, through the line, to the collective 
(Harper 1998: 46) and eventually the minister. Documents mediate between 
the collective bureaucratic order, which seems homogeneous, uniform and 
definite from the outside, and specific event of writing (Hull 2003). Moreover, 
state authority is produced in the daily practices of civil servants and the 
documents that are created and accumulated (I. Feldman 2008). 
 I have also explained how “the line” socializes individual civil servants in 
a particular way of writing, which is formal, flat and detached. Policy officials 
also learn how to take into account various interests when writing policy texts. 
Studying the writing and circulation of draft policy texts reveals bureaucracy 
is made up of several positions, each representing a different interest, which 
are united in “the line” into one institutional authorship. An important linkage, 
checked by the higher management of a ministry, is that between politics and 
standards of good policy. The end result, policy, has a typical character 
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because it has gone through the “neutralizer” of state bureaucracy. Not only 
the content of policy reflects the tension between politics and state neutrality, 
as explained in the previous chapters, but also its form and the manner and 
context in which it is actually created. Institutional authority is transferred 
into political authority after authorization of the minister, lending democratic 
legitimacy to specific policy texts.  
 The minister is also important as a symbol that makes bureaucracy work. 
Moreover, the minister embodies the tension between above-party state 
government and political decisions. Policies have political authority, but this 
is only possible because they also reflect qualities associated with proper 
government and a stable, just state. I have described how policy texts are 
made to appear standing above particular political interests and decisions as 
they are written in bureaucracy: decision making is objectified, responsibility 
is collectivized, texts are written in a formal style and interests are balanced 
in the processes of creating it. Not surprisingly, policies are artefacts through 
which “the state” is imagined (Hull 2012a: 260, cf. Mitchell 2002; Sharma and 
Gupta 2006). The idea of the state is that it is a righteous and careful actor 
whose governance of populations is justified. Indeed, bureaucratic authority is 
important for the survival of government (I. Feldman 2008). 
 This thus makes possible the imagination of the state as an autonomous, 
fixed, homogeneous entity that  as if a single body  knows what is good for, 
and acts deliberately in the interest of, the people it governs. The state comes 
into being through policy. The creation of policies is also an expression of the 
tension inherent in the state between neutrality and politics. The complexities 
and ambiguities of policy making, reflecting the conflicting relation between 
electoral politics and standards of just state government are eventually 
smoothened. In this chapter I, have focused on how bureaucratic structure and 
organization are important for the policy making process and for realizing this 
policy effect. In the next chapter I focus on the expertise and the culture of 
professionalism as similarly important factors, disentangling the dilemma’s 
individual civil servants experience between serving a minister and being loyal 
to notions of proper state government. 
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4. “We’re all Professionals”: How Civil 
Servants Deal with Political Volatility 
 
 
Revoking a temporary residence permit, part of the 2013 
inburgering reform, was entirely new for us and therefore it was 
really controversial. At the Directorate you noticed, of course that 
some people were more enthusiastic than others … that some 
people were struggling more with some issues than others. But I 
think everyone knows that if you cannot separate it, then you 
should leave. 
 
(Senior coordinating policy official) 
   
 
We’re all professionals, we know we have to deal with the 
difficult aspects [of our work]. 
 
(Retired policy official)247 
 
 
The actual work of creating policies is done by people who are employed in the 
civil service. In case of the Dutch Integration Policy, political volatility has 
been an important factor in the development of policies. Policies address 
questions about belonging and exclusion in the nation state, topics that are 
important during elections. Political contention about “integration” has 
resulted in many policy reforms, primarily making them more restrictive. Such 
political decisions may contradict perceptions that civil servants have of what 
are desirable policy measures, based on personal motivation, professional 
expertise or notions of proper government. As highly educated experts, they 
have ideas about what is good policy in terms of the achievability of policy 
measures, their possible effects or how they relate to the general interest, 
social justice, or the rule of law. 
 Therefore, civil servants may not always agree with political decisions. As 
the previous chapters have made clear, once a policy has been created and is 
officially implemented, the underlying contention is erased. Policies are 
created as definite, rational, and neutral solutions to objectively existing 
                                                          
247 Parts of this chapter have been published as Swinkels and Van Meijl (2018), Performing as a 
professional: shaping migrant integration policy in adverse times. Culture and Organization DOI: 
10.1080/14759551.2018.1475480. 
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problems. But policy making is not as self-evident as it may seem. It requires 
civil servants who are able to set aside possible reservations regarding the 
policies they have to shape. They are expected to be and describe themselves 
as “professionals,” or craftsmen dedicated to their work and possessing the 
right qualities to perform their job well (Rijnja and Wilmink 2010; CAOP 2011; 
‘t Hart 2014). There is a tension between the autonomy of policy officials, 
based on their role as experts, and the overarching hierarchy that controls the 
entire process of policymaking (Heyman 1995; Page and Jenkins 2005). 
 Civil servants have to navigate between what they see as proper state 
government and political goals that may conflict with this. The tensions 
inherent in modern government between the state, as an ostensibly impartial 
institution, and particular political goals is thus expressed on the individual 
level. So far, I have demonstrated how the bureaucratic context in which policy 
is created endows political decisions with authority that is grounded in state 
neutrality. In this chapter I focus on the individuals working in the state 
administration to further disentangle this policy effect, studying how civil 
servants perceive and enact their role of making policy. The aim of this chapter 
is to understand how civil servants who work in a ministry perform their role 
as state functionaries, how they navigate tensions in their work and how they 
constitute the state effect (Mitchell 1999) while doing so. 
 This chapter sets out to answer the following question: How do civil 
servants navigate tensions between political decisions and features of proper 
government? My analysis is based on forty expert interviews conducted with 
civil servants currently working or having worked at the Directorate, but also 
with state and non-state actors who have worked closely with them. I focus on 
the reflections of civil servants on how they help creating, sometimes 
controversial, policies. Central in accounts of civil servants about how they 
negotiate tensions inherent to their work was the trope of “professionalism.” 
Informal conversations with important actors, content analysis of public 
documents, and analysis of the Directorate’s internal archives endorse the 
importance of professionalism in the Netherlands state bureaucracy.  
 The narrative of professionalism relates to a “strong esprit de corps and 
shared consciousness-of-kind” that makes their work meaningful (Shore 2007: 
192). It refers to the institutional culture in which they work. Civil servants are 
controlled, not only in “the line,” as described in the previous chapter, but 
also because they are socialized in a specific code of conduct. According to 
Weber (1978: 975), “[b]ureaucracy develops more perfectly, the more it is 
‘dehumanized.’” Civil servants are expected to do their work sine ire ac studio 
(“without anger and fondness”), as rational, neutral technocrats. Bauman 
(1989: 154) has argued that bureaucracy dehumanizes behaviour, because 
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“social relations are rationalized and technically perfected.” This relates to a 
strict division of labour and a technical, rather than moral, responsibility, that 
dissociates workers from the work they are doing (ibid.: 98).  
 In practice, civil servants do not work as objective and politically neutral 
automatons, but have emotions and ideas about what is right and wrong (Hoag 
and Hull 2017: 13). For bureaucracy to function, in fact it is essential that there 
is room for discretion (Lipsky 1980) and morality (Du Gay 2000). Bureaucrats 
are “real” people who “respond to a wide spectrum of pressures, incentives, 
and values” (Hoag 2010: 18). As the previous chapters have also made clear, 
bureaucratic work is internally conflictive; civil servants develop systems of 
meaning to navigate the tension and indeterminacy of their work context 
(ibid.; Heyman 1995; Fuglerud 2004; Gupta 2012; Hull 2012b). In this chapter, 
I focus on how professionalism functions as a code of conduct that disciplines 
civil servants in their role, but also provides meaning and institutional 
belonging. 
 I explore how bureaucrats perceive their role in order to understand the 
tension between political decisions and state neutrality. Not many accounts 
exist of how civil servants make policy in the higher ranks of state 
administration (Hoag and Hull 2017: 9), an analysis of how they deal with 
difficult, conflicting aspects of their work adds a crucial perspective on the 
workings of state government and on how the state is constituted. Civil 
servants perform a bureaucratic expertise, or “authority arising out of a claim 
to knowledge, neutrality, and to efficacy” (Rose 1996: 38). Bureaucracy 
naturalizes certain knowledge as “professional expertise” (Carr 2010: 25), 
which enables civil servants to enact an aura of state authority and neutrality 
by performing as professionals. Although in the end they help reasserting the 
political order (Hoag and Hull 2017: 7). 
 As such, civil servants embody the ambiguity of the state, since both have 
above-party authority and are political. This ambiguity is reflected in the 
concept of professionalism. Professionalism may be regarded as a road map for 
action in the civil service or a program for “orderly social action in relation to 
culturally defined goals” (Ortner 1974: 1340). For that reason, too, it plays an 
important part in the disciplinary dimension of the bureaucratic organization. 
The appeal to professionalism serves to make the conduct of individual policy 
officials accountable “by delineating the “competence” of the professional 
employee, by instilling “professional like” norms and work ethics which govern 
not simply productive behaviour but more fundamentally employees’ 
subjectivities” (Fournier 1999: 293). As a consequence of these “technologies 
of the self,” “professional” policy officials are self-controlled and self-
motivated to perform (see also Evetts 2003). 
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 This chapter focuses on several ways in which civil servants deal with 
tensions that follow from the political volatility that impacts on their work. 
First, I analyze how they define themselves as neutral professionals in 
opposition to minority interests. Then I examine how civil servants distance 
themselves from volatile political decision making by reasserting their expert 
authority, which they ground in rationality and expert knowledge. Third, I 
focus on how they strike a balance between their perceptions of the general 
interest and political decisions. In the fourth section I turn to how they align 
notions of proper state government with political volatility. Finally, I explain 
how the tensions in their work are expressed in the notion of 
“professionalism,” which explains how being able to deal with political 
volatility makes their work meaningful, while at the same time it disciplines 
them in reasserting the political order. 
 
 
4.1 Professionalizing the Directorate 
 
In the previous chapters, I described how the Directorate has developed in 
terms of budget, tasks, jurisdiction, organization, number, and type of civil 
servants working there, and ministry where it was housed. This development 
has partly been driven by a wish to improve its position in the 
(inter)departmental power domain and to be taken more seriously within the 
state bureaucracy. Despite its coordinating function, other departments and 
agencies were not easily convinced of the necessity of paying attention to 
minorities and their integration. The Directorate has been described by 
informants as somewhat of an outsider in the Hague bureaucracy. This 
reputation stems from the perceived fuzziness and softness of the policy field. 
 “Other departments and actors would ask where your power is, what kind 
of legislation we are making, or what our budget is,” as was remembered by 
one official who has worked at the Directorate for a long time. This related to 
the particular political importance of the Integration Policy. Being mainly 
interested in the symbolic meaning of policies, politicians gave the Directorate 
little financial backing or prominence compared to other policy areas, so 
consequently it had no real power position. Together with the vaguely defined 
goal of “integration,” lack of hard policy measures and a focus on the position 
of “minorities,” it made that the Directorate was not seen as a “proper” 
bureaucratic organization by other civil servants (cf. Molleman 2003; Scholten 
2011a: 166). Various informants described how over the past decades it was 
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attempted to make the Directorate become more accepted by 
“professionalizing” it.  
 In this section, I describe this “professionalization” of the Directorate in 
more depth, as it has also been an important way of how civil servants deal 
with political volatility. Informants explained how since Bolkestein successfully 
problematized migration and religious and ethnic diversity in 1991, the 
Integration Policy had the image of being “idealist,” “multicultural,” “leftist,” 
and “too sympathetic to minorities,” rather than being proper civil servants 
serving state interests (cf. Prins and Saharso 2010).248 Although such criticisms 
should partly be seen as a posteriori constructions serving contemporary 
(political) goals, various civil servants who have worked at the Directorate 
during the 1980s and 1990s described they had to convince colleagues in other 
parts of the national administration of their “professionalism.” Henk 
Molleman, who was Director during the 1980s, was especially seen as an 
activist, as someone driven by ideals of emancipation that were thought to 
conflict with the “bureaucratic reality” of bureau-politics and serving 
particular political and state interests. 
 Becoming a more “professional” organization was one way civil servants 
have aimed to counter such accusations of political involvement. Towards the 
end of the 1980s, perceptions of failing policies induced a reorientation of the 
Integration Policy, resulting in new legislative measures during the 1990s, but 
also leading to changes in the Directorate itself. The then newly appointed 
Director explained his task was to make the policy field less “soft,” 
“multicultural,” and “activist” and instead more “firm” and “professional.” 
Part of this strategy was reforming the Directorate itself. Some officials 
remembered it as a formalization of its culture, with more official lines of 
communication, a stricter management style, less space for personal initiatives 
and more attuned to serving the goals of the coalition government than to the 
“welfare of minorities.” 
 Creating more legislation, such as inburgering and anti-discrimination 
measures, implied the policy work became more concerned with the 
bureaucratic work of creating policy measures. Informants working at the 
Directorate during this period remembered they would no longer go out to 
“preach the gospel of Molleman,” but would more often stay at their desk 
“doing paperwork.” Moreover, the organizational structure of horizontal and 
                                                          
248 A development reinforced by Scheffer’s op-ed article on the “multicultural drama” in 2001 and 
the rise of Fortuyn in 2002. 
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vertical coordination was discarded and thematic divisions were created that 
followed political priorities, such as refugees, religious groups, inburgering and 
legal affairs. 249 In addition, a separate research and strategy division was 
created. The changing tasks and policies also implied that new civil servants 
were attracted. The goal of creating more legislation and becoming more 
effective interdepartmentally, for example, made the new Director “attract 
hard, legal experts.” 
 Most civil servants working at the Directorate during its creation phase 
and the following years had been selected based on their experience with 
“minorities.” They had been working for migrant organizations as advisors, 
legal experts, or lobbyists. They were also recruited from “minorities” 
themselves, as I will explain further below, or they had as civil servants in 
municipalities or at the national level been dealing with the topic. Since its 
creation, there had also been working civil servants who had expertise on 
working in state bureaucracies as such, rather than on the topic. Gradually, 
more such “career bureaucrats” began to work at the Directorate, to facilitate 
interdepartmental coordination and take care of the policy work such as 
writing and creating policy, among other reasons. As another new Director took 
office in the early 2000s, this development was reinforced. 
 Some informants who had been working from the start at the Directorate 
framed it as a shift from people who were valued because they had “some 
knowledge of minorities” to “generalist” policy officials who brought more 
technical and rational expertise. They were thought to be motivated “more by 
fixed employment and income” than by a commitment to “improving society.” 
The distinction made by these informants between types of civil servants and 
their motivations should not be taken at face value, however; during the 1980s 
there probably was also a motivation to be a “professional civil servant” and 
those who joined in later may also have been motivated to help “minorities250.” 
But it does indicate a certain development, observed by more informants, that 
work was increasingly done “at more distance from society,” more about and 
less with “minorities.” 
   Representations of an “activist” past compared to a later 
“professionalization” can also be interpreted as a way of legitimizing the 
Integration Policy. As I explained in Chapter One, since the late 1980s, 
politicians and researchers had been criticizing the policy field for being 
                                                          
249  The full development of the organizational structure of the Directorate can be found in 
Appendix III. 
250 What changed is how people defined improving society and the relative importance attributed 
to each motivation. It can also be interpreted in terms of a more general shift in mind-set from 
emancipation and welfare to a more neoliberal mode of governance. 
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“multicultural,” being too much “in favour of minorities” while neglecting the 
“autochthonous Dutch” (Fermin 1997; Prins and Saharso 2010; Van Reekum 
2016). Various informants, both old and young, higher and lower ranked, 
repeated this popular idea that multicultural policies and civil servants had 
disastrous effects on society and that the contemporary, “more rational and 
realistic” approach is therefore legitimate. Some spoke of a “democratic 
correction,” implying that it was logical and not necessarily a bad thing that 
the “neglected white underclass” was finally heard, while less attention was 
paid to “pampering minorities.”  
 So in reaction to political developments and in order to prevent 
accusations of being “too much involved with minorities,” civil servants aimed 
to claim a more “professional” position. They portrayed taking into account 
the anxieties of the “autochthon majority” as a legitimate development. 
Although in the 1980s policies had also been created from this dominant 
majority perspective, as explained in Chapter One, the Integration Policy was 
more explicitly used to speak to a peer white audience. The desire to distance 
the Directorate from the objects of policy indicates that the Integration Policy 
was not supposed to be serving “minorities” interests. Instead, by pointing at 
the necessity of stricter policies in order to keep “society” problem-free (cf. 
Schinkel 2007), the needs and anxieties of the majority were defined as the 
general or state interest. This development was depicted as rational and 
realistic by civil servants, in tune with the new realist discourse (cf. Prins 2002) 
so as to underscore their own neutral position, at a distance from “minority 
interests.” 
 This was evidenced by the professionalization that aimed to turn the 
Directorate into a “proper” bureaucratic organization. In order to understand 
how this neutral position of the Directorate and its civil servant has been 
enacted and coded, I elaborate on the background of civil servants working at 
the Directorate. During the 1980s, various civil servants working at the 
Directorate were recruited from “minorities,” primarily to have access to these 
groups in order to facilitate control, as various informants explained. 
Moreover, it was thought to be important in terms of legitimation and 
credibility, to have the correct image as an official organization towards the 
objects of policy. At the same time, informants recalled that various officials 
recruited from “minorities” were thought to be acting too much as 
“representatives” of these groups, hampering a “hard approach” of the 
“pampering of minorities.” Therefore, they were seen as rather “amateurish” 
and not considered as “professional” civil servants who are able to find their 
way around in state bureaucracies and know how to distinguish personal 
interest from the general interest. 
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 Not surprisingly, most people occupying powerful positions during the 
1980s were white Dutch (males). This changed in the 1990s, as two successive 
Directors had a “migration background,” both born in Surinam. One Director 
explained that “administrative and political bosses” were not necessarily 
looking for a “black director,” but they may have found it “conveniently 
coincidental,” or a “positive circumstance.” The other thought “being an 
allochthon” was important in terms of being seen as someone who “would be 
trusted by migrant communities in the country.” But this Director also 
indicated that it was a little difficult to be approached for a function based on 
one’s “ethnic background.” This illustrates a more general tension around the 
Integration Policy, which defines and underscores cultural and ethnic 
differences in order to help people becoming Dutch. 
 I am not arguing these directors were solely appointed because of their 
background and certainly do not want to judge their qualities and 
performance. Their careers before and after their time as Director make clear 
that they are very capable public administrators and they would not have been 
appointed if they did not had the right capacities. At the same time, those 
with political and bureaucratic power apparently thought it strange if only 
representatives of the white majority would create policies aimed at 
controlling culturalized Others. Appointing people “of colour” as a director 
thus can be seen as a way of securing credibility and legitimacy. During the 
1990s, other new civil servants “with an ethnic background” came to work at 
the Directorate who were also expected not to be “too much engaged” with 
“their” communities, but at the same time were attracted because of their 
connections and trustworthiness.   
 Most of these civil servants, both the directors and policy officials, 
stressed they were in favour of a more “hard and realistic approach.” They 
were very critical of “allochthones misbehaving,” “unlimited migration,” and 
strongly condemned “too lenient policies” of the past. Apparently they felt the 
need to express a specific worldview and role, as if to prevent accusations of 
being “multicultural.” One former strategic policy advisor explained it as a 
feeling that “other foreigners” ruin the chances of those with good intentions, 
including themselves. All opposed the current anti-migration political 
discourse, but understood where it came from, similar to their colleagues with 
a “native Dutch” background. They argued that if earlier policies had been 
more repressive, there would now be little reason for part of the electorate 
and politicians “to be xenophobic.” They also reasoned that “as guests you 
should not cause any trouble.” Their accounts are interesting because of their 
ambiguity and interesting as well for placing the blame for xenophobia on the 
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“guests/immigrants” instead of on the official policies and fearful sentiments 
of certain sectors of the public and political parties. 
 They define themselves as foreigners and guests and thus do not consider 
themselves to be a part of the “autochthon” majority to which the Integration 
Policy speaks. Moreover, those civil servants “with a migration background” 
felt the need to distinguish themselves from the objects of policy. They did so 
by subscribing to the dominant knowledge in the Integration Policy about what 
constitutes “society” and who can naturally belong (cf. Schinkel 2007), 
assuming the dominant majority perspective from which policies have been 
made. Since its creation, and despite the orientation towards engagement and 
even “activism” in the 1980s, the policy field has been dominated by what has 
been called “white expertise” (Scholten 2011a: 124), reasserting majority-
minority power relations and ideas about cultural otherness (cf. Rath 1991; 
Essed and Nimako 2006; Ghorashi 2009). Retired civil servants who were 
motivated by the ideal of emancipation, for example, stressed that the 
otherness of people necessitates policy interventions. 
 Many informants implicitly or explicitly distanced themselves from the 
objects of policy, talking, for example, about “inburgeraars” as a category of 
people they would never be part of. Moreover, acting on behalf of “minorities” 
or “allochthones” is considered political involvement, while the politically 
dominant majority perspective is associated with state neutrality. Of course, 
civil servants are expected to serve any elected government, theoretically 
notwithstanding whether it attends to majority or minority interests. The 
assumptions, however, of the Integration Policy are considered to be rational 
and realistic, more so than serving “minority interests,” not only because of 
their neutral role, but also because most civil servants see this as a neutral 
way of looking at the world. In both ways, performing as “professional civil 
servants” is only possible in opposition to minority interests. As criticisms of 
previous “multicultural policies” became the “new political correct” (Prins and 
Saharso 2010; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016), this may also have increased the 
necessity for demarcating “real” officials from those acting on behalf of 
“minorities.” 
 The narrative of “professionalization” thus effectively demarcates civil 
servants from the subjects of the policy they make. Those who are authorized 
to decide about issues of belonging and citizenship are imagined and 
discursively constituted in opposition to those who are not authorized to do so 
(Gupta 1995: 376; Fuglerud 2004: 28; Carr 2010: 22). As Li (2007: 7) has argued, 
“trustees” can never be the ones whose life they aim to approve. A boundary 
needs to be maintained between those who have the capacity to diagnose 
deficiencies in others and “those who are subject to expert direction” (ibid.; 
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cf. Rose 1996; Mitchell 2002; G. Feldman 2005). Techno-political expertise is 
only possible in relation to minorities or migrants as non-expert Others, so that 
“professional” civil servants can be constructed as detached, rational, and 
reasonable, as occupying a neutral, above-the-parties-position that claims to 
identify objectively what is in the general interest. Moreover, the 
categorization of some as “in need of integration” is institutionalized and 
rationalized in state bureaucracy. 
 It is important to note that especially during the last decade various 
young, new civil servants “with a migration background” have been attracted. 
As I explained in the Introduction, it was difficult to interview them, which 
may have to do with inhibitions to share their dilemmas and difficulties of 
navigating between political developments, state policy and their personal 
background. Other informants explained how they did bring a different 
perspective, for example drawing attention to the perspective of people “with 
a migration background.” They are connected to both the objects of policies 
and to state neutrality. On the one hand, the Integration Policy seems more 
open to the viewpoint of people who were born in the Netherlands but do not 
have the feeling they are accepted, focusing, for example on discrimination or 
the effects of feeling excluded251. On the other hand, being professional civil 
servants they are also expected to maintain a distance to those who are 
targeted by policies. Something that is less explicitly demanded of white Dutch 
civil servants. 
 Professional expertise relates to the background of people working at the 
Directorate, which, notwithstanding variety in ethnic background, over time 
has been rather homogenous. Most policy officials and managers live in the 
Randstad (the large cities in the Western part of the Netherlands), typically 
vote for political mainstream parties, and are university educated, many in the 
social sciences. Professionalization has over the past several decades been 
stimulated in the Dutch civil service by means of a traineeship that selects and 
recruits university graduates. Although there was a widespread motivation 
among informants to work for the public cause, rather than for commercial 
companies, for example,  these developments do point to a worldview that is 
shared at fundamental level. It is a view from a rather privileged position in 
society, while policies deal with those who are in a very different 
socioeconomic position and who have a different sociocultural background.  
                                                          
251  See for example: Minister of Social Affairs and Employment (2014c), Tweede Kamer, 
vergaderjaar 2014–2015, 32 824, nr. 87. Letter Integration Policy [Brief integratiebeleid]; and 
Minister of Social Affairs and Employment (2017), Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2016–2017, 30 950, 
nr. 118. Letter Race discrimination [Brief Rassendscriminatie]. 
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 As one informant explained, “most of us do not live in deprived 
neighbourhoods or have to deal with discrimination.” Some described their 
work as “being at a distance from society,” making policies from behind their 
desks that aim to improve situations of which they are themselves not part. 
The self-evident goals of addressing anxieties of the white majority and 
amending alleged cultural deficits are based on assumptions of a bourgeois, 
white middle-class that have always been guiding experts and the policies they 
shape (cf. Bonjour and Duyvendak 2017). It is no coincidence that mostly 
people with such a background work at the Directorate, self-evidently making 
policy from this perspective. Despite various shifts over time, the Integration 
Policy has always been characterized by a paternalistic “we know what is good 
for you” attitude. This has developed from a focus on emancipation during the 
1980s into a more “realistic,” technocratic approach, associated with the 
professionalization of the Directorate. 
 A clear example of this development are organizational reforms such as a 
style of management that focuses on temporary projects that are important to 
a minister or government at a particular moment. Furthermore, management 
terms that seem to represent a “professional,” business like organization have 
been introduced, such as “jobs,” “job market,” and “output.” Moreover, 
instead of assigning policy officials to a specific topic for various years or 
longer, a structure associated with the division of the Directorate in three 
thematic units, there have been experiments since 2013 in which civil servants 
may work on various projects or programs. The idea behind it is that they are 
less attached to a single topic and expertise, but rotate much more and have 
expertise on bureaucratic work as such.  
 This illustrates how what civil servants do, namely crafting policies, is 
increasingly detached from what these policies are about and instead more 
adjusted to the process of policy making, of carrying out assigned tasks and 
delivering what is required. This is stimulated in the Dutch civil service 
generally through the regulation of career planning, the standardization of job 
requirements, and the promotion of switching functions and (CAOP 2011). 
There is, for example, a trend called “3-5-7” that stands for the informal rule 
that all employees in a ministry should start thinking about looking for another 
function, ideally in a different directorate or ministry, after three years, 
should make serious progress with their switch in five years, and should move 
on within seven years. 
 Although in practice many people tend to stay in their jobs for a longer 
period of time, especially the older generation, it shows how detachment from 
a topic is stimulated. This trend has been reinforced by the relocations of the 
Directorate between various ministries, a development also instigated by the 
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politicization in the early 2000s.252 As a consequence, it became easier for civil 
servants to switch jobs. So new officials with various career paths joined the 
Directorate, making it more diverse in terms of policy expertise, while at the 
same time civil servants who had been working at the Directorate for years 
remained at the “old” departments after relocations. These developments 
help explain how over the past years, the Directorate has become less 
concerned with the targets of policy and more with functioning as a “proper” 
bureaucratic organization, one more clearly dedicated to serving its own 
interests rather than any particular group or sector of society. 
 Another effect of the relocations has been that officials working in the 
integration policy field had to reposition themselves in light of the dominant 
expertise of a new ministry. The Ministry of Interior was mainly concerned with 
public order and administrative measures, determining the scope and 
institutional set-up of the Integration Policy during the period it was located 
there. Informants who worked at the Directorate during that period described 
the other departments as rather narrow-mindedly focused on binary 
oppositions when it comes to policy objects. “The Ministry of Justice is only 
concerned with people in light of criminal and alien law, only knows illegal and 
legal persons,” one official remarked. Similarly, the Ministry of Public Housing, 
Spatial Planning and Environment, “only knows bad neighbourhoods and good 
neighbourhoods. Just as Social Affairs253 is only thinking in terms of employed 
and unemployed persons.”  
 Such binary taxonomies reflect the rationale of a ministry and thus of the 
policies that are created there. Informants indicated they had troubles 
adjusting to a very specific way of seeing the world when moving to a new 
ministry, but they also reflected on it as an opportunity to break through this 
“narrow mind-set” of other departments and let them start paying attention 
to “minorities” and broader societal concerns. This may well be a coping 
mechanism and it is hard to judge how thinking about such “soft issues” has 
since then been institutionalized in these departments. But on a more 
fundamental level these remarks are revealing. First, it touches upon the 
question of what exactly is “integration” and “integration policy.” As Schinkel 
(2007: 154) has argued, integration is blank space that can be defined in a 
specific way in various domains, according to specific political interests. 
                                                          
252 Obviously, picking up a complete organization and dropping it in a new, unfamiliar place has 
affected the Directorate and officials working for it in several ways. In section 4.3 I discuss the 
difficulties it brings for the work of civil servants and describe how they have coped with these. 
253 The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment was defined as having a “culture of control and 
monitoring,” as it is responsible for social benefits, which involve huge amounts of money. Already 
during the 1980s and 1990s this department was thought to be more about systems and how people 
do or do not fit into them, rather than about concerns for the beneficiaries of policies. 
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 Second, civil servants working at the Directorate reflect on other 
bureaucrats as thinking according to a binary logic, while not explicitly 
reflecting on their own world view. Although they claim to think less in terms 
of systems and are not primarily concerned with formalized monitoring and 
control, this does not mean that they do not have a specific way of looking at 
the world. As I also explained in Chapter One, the Integration Policy itself is 
frequently characterized by a taxonomy of “integrated” and various degrees 
of “non-integrated” people (cf. Handelman 1981; Herzfeld 1992; Scott 1998). 
In fact, this rigid categorization of who is rooted and thus can belong in the 
Netherlands (Yanow and Van der Haar 2013; Ghorashi 2014) is a very political 
worldview that is represented as neutral expertise, as self-evident, natural, 
and necessary (Carr 2010: 26). Civil servants, enacting the role of objective 
and neutral brokers, obscure rather than clarify political conflicts (Müller 2011: 
297). 
 In this section, I have shown how in response to political developments, 
civil servants at the Directorate have aimed to represent themselves as a 
proper, “professional” bureaucratic organization. I am less interested in 
whether over time civil servants really have become more “professional” and 
less engaged with minorities, but rather that there has been an apparent need 
of informants to underscore they are ‘suitable’ civil servants. It is a means of 
legitimizing their work and policy, which have been closely related to political 
developments. The narrative of “professionalization” is a powerful way of 
setting civil servants apart from “minority interests” and is a way of 
representing themselves as neutral, capable professionals, as detached 
experts. As Bourdieu (1999) has argued, each organization that considers itself 
a part of “the state” has to keep a distance between itself and “society” in 
order to protect its legitimacy. The authority coming from professionalism 
gives the impression that policy is rationally and neutrally intervening in 
society, while it is reifying the existing nationalist order. In the following 
sections, I further analyze how civil servants perform a neutral position in 
reaction to political volatility. 
 
 
4.2 Objective advisors 
 
The main point, of course, continues to be that you have to advise 
the minister. ... Yes, that is your professionalism... . 
 
(Senior coordinating policy advisor) 
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Civil servants described they see it as their most important task to advise 
“their” minister about the course of action to take. A former Director 
summarized it as follows: “your professionalism as a policy official entails 
having affinity with society, following developments, acting proactively, and 
being able to inform the minister.” In general, informants indicated their work 
boils down to advising elected politicians about policy based on relatively 
“objective, reliable knowledge and expertise.” I have made clear in the 
previous section that by setting themselves apart as “trustees” from the 
beneficiaries of policy (Li 2007), civil servants define themselves as 
professionals who occupy a neutral position. In this section I will explain how 
a similar mechanism is at work vis-à-vis the politicians they serve. When asked 
how they deal with political volatility influencing their work, the role of 
expertise and knowledge was central in the reactions of informants. I describe 
three ways in which civil servants used rationality to define themselves as 
apolitical.  
 First, they clearly define their role as serving political decision making by 
supplying information that is in itself “objective.” They do so by spelling out 
the pros and cons of policy alternatives, what their consequences are for 
society and how they relate to political desires. One informant recalled that 
when she started as a civil servant she soon found out that policy officials are 
usually requested to think decisions through, because they are expected to 
have expert knowledge on certain topics. This means having knowledge of 
social developments, having contact with scholars and stakeholders about a 
topic, but also being sensitive to political and media attention for it. “Because 
of this we can form an opinion about a topic that someone else might not have 
and we say something about the desirability and feasibility of a plan.” 
 The plan of Minister Asscher, for example, to create a participation 
contract that every migrant would be obliged to sign, was prompted by a 
political desire to address public anxieties about migration related 
diversification of the Dutch nation state. 254  Policy officials indicated they 
understood where this plan came from, but also that the minister was advised 
about the legal complications, practical difficulties and possible negative 
consequences of such a measure. Eventually, the plan was altered and turned 
into a participation declaration that, as part of the inburgering trajectory, 
would only be obligatory for some groups of migrants. In cases such as these, 
civil servants define themselves as technocrats, not having political 
responsibility and only concerned with the technical, instrumental aspect of 
creating policy measures. For this, they rely on scientific knowledge as an 
                                                          
254 In Chapter Two, I have described this example in more depth. 
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important form of expertise. Although this is juxtaposed with political 
decisions, it is itself also inherently political. 
 An important source of knowledge are research institutes, universities, 
advisory councils, and consultants (Scholten 2011a). A retired high ranking civil 
servant who was involved in writing the Minorities Policy White Paper (Minister 
of Interior 1983) remembered they were happy they could use ideas from the 
report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR 1979), “as we 
needed this expertise to design specific policy measures.” Other officials 
stated also that advisory reports and studies by (semi) official institutes have 
a large influence on the policies that are created. Their advice are thus based 
on scientific knowledge, which is often represented as neutral (Foucault 1991; 
Mitchell 2002; Shore 2011). However, the expertise underpinning the 
Integration Policy has been far from neutral, as many scientific studies have 
been guided by specific imaginaries of the Dutch nation state (Essed and 
Nimako 2006; Schinkel 2007, 2013; NIDI 2010; Paulle and Kalir 2014).255 
 Still, by stressing the importance of “objective” knowledge and rationality 
in their work and by presenting their role as merely advising the minister on 
the basis of professional, impartial expertise, policy officials define themselves 
as apolitical. Their professional or academic background on a specific topic 
enables them to claim a professional authority. A central idea in this context 
seems to be that good arguments always prevail, and the resulting policy thus 
reflects the most informed, solid, and intelligent case made by disinterested 
experts. In practice, however, interpreting social developments is fraught with 
uncertainty, the effects of particular policy measures are often ambiguous, 
and the solutions presented reflect administrative priorities above any 
supposedly objective social reality. Those claiming expertise and objectivity 
(often with utter sincerity) are swayed by administrative priorities, 
bureaucratic forces, and cultural influences they may not even be consciously 
aware of.  
 A manager working at the Directorate gave an example of how the Rutte 
I government, at the instigation of the PVV demanding stricter measures, made 
the decision to set stricter requirements for naturalization, which has an 
important symbolic function in terms of controlling citizenship and thus 
performing the state. Civil servants had to rationalize the link between 
naturalization and “integration.” He described how “over the past years there 
has been much [political] debate about what you can ask of newcomers … when 
they should be entitled to Dutch citizenship [in legal sense].” He explained you 
can look at naturalization in terms of a “positive stimulus,” hoping people “will 
                                                          
255 A point I have explained in Chapters One. 
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make an extra effort” to learn about the Dutch language and culture as quickly 
as possible if they are promised a permanent legal residence status within five 
years upon arrival. “But you could also say, then soon everyone will be coming 
to the Netherlands, which we don’t want, so it is better to set strict 
requirements. So yeah, what is the truth?” He continued with explaining that 
“if you have hard figures, from other countries or your own studies, than you 
can substantiate either rationale and advise specifically.” But in this case “it 
is up to politics, we present the plusses and minuses, providing all the 
information and let them decide.” 
 This perspective shows not only how advice ideally is rationalized by 
substantiating it with “objective” numbers and comparisons, but how 
“politicians want to be advised, which should primarily be based on what is 
best for the minister,” as another informant explained. As either knowledge 
claim in the example can be grounded in sound reasoning, whatever political 
decision is taken can be substantiated by rational expertise. This means that 
even when claims to “objective” knowledge are difficult to substantiate, the 
role defined for and by civil servants is still apolitical and impartial, merely 
informing politicians of relevant information based on their strongly 
credentialed background and professional competence. 
 Defining themselves as advisers is a way to cope with volatile politics that 
demand increasingly restrictive measures. It is a way of shifting responsibility, 
in the end it is a political decision, even though they may reinforce the political 
order and legitimize it by providing a scientific, rational base for political 
decisions. However, this specific political decision potentially leads to a 
tension with the objectivity of civil servants, because no one knows whether it 
really stimulates “integration.” It also illustrates the second aspect of 
rationality I discuss in this respect, which is how civil servants are often 
struggling to rationalize their advices, as there may be a tension between 
rational ideals of objectively informing about the “real world” and political 
desires.  
 Some informants rather cynically remarked their work is about 
rationalizing a tough, volatile political framing with the help of arguments. 
“We are chameleons, we write policy papers depending on the political wind”, 
as one strategic policy advisor phrased it. If politicians want to establish a 
certain frame, this official further explained, he is willing to deliver the 
necessary arguments, as long as the reasoning does not become too wild and 
too far off course. Others also mention that they find it important that their 
work is still “correct” in the sense that “no harm is done to the real social 
world,” that you do not make up stories and “demarcate facts from fiction.” 
So you should be able to frame the social world in a certain way, depending on 
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political priorities but at the same time ensure it is not too far removed from 
the facts. The point is, however, that it is difficult if not impossible to be 
“correct,” especially in the case of “integration,” because this is not easy to 
define, and how problems are defined often reflect implicit biases and cultural 
assumptions. 
 There are multiple tensions contained in attempts of governments to grasp 
the social world (Foucault 1991, Scott 1998). A event or social development 
may be interpreted differently, depending on one’s social position or interest. 
In case of the Integration Policy, interventions are often related to incidents 
that are framed as “integration problems,” which draw significant media 
attention (De Koning 2013). When in the summer of 2014, for example, there 
were suddenly many concerns about a “sharia triangle,” this pressured the 
government to do something. A national newspaper had written about certain 
neighbourhoods in The Hague that were “developing towards enclaves of 
orthodox Muslims” (Trouw 18 May 2013256). This triggered much upheaval in 
national media and led to a contentious political debate257, focusing both on 
the one-sided and tendentious coverage of the article and on the dangers of 
the “Islamization of Dutch society.” 
 Informants explained how Minister Asscher proposed several measures to 
deal with the situation, for example through anti-radicalization programs and 
projects aimed at improving living conditions in the neighbourhood. Another 
approach was aimed at preventing the development of “parallel societies,” 
which had also grown important in relation to other developments, for example 
in relation to the “Turkish community” (Minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment 2014b258). Policies had to be created, but civil servants faced 
difficulties shaping these and give substance to such political plans based on 
arguments and expertise. One strategic policy official explained: “A fraternity 
can also be said to be a ‘parallel society’, but all of a sudden this is the political 
framing, people become very concerned about it and something needs to be 
done.” It turned out to be rather difficult, however, “to come up with a clear 
definition, to make it workable.” This did not seem possible without reifying 
political concerns about groups with “undesirable behaviour” being “outside of 
society,” which itself is seen as problem free (Schinkel 2008). 
 One way of how the concept was made “workable” was by means of 
monitoring and disciplining Islamic boarding schools and “TRSO’s,” an 
abbreviation for Turkse stromingen en organisaties, meaning Turkish 
                                                          
256 Perdiep Ramesar, ‘Als je wijk verandert in een klein kalifaat.’ 
257 Handelingen TK 2012-2013, 5 september 2013 TK 107. 7. 
258  Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2014–2015, 32 824, nr. 75. Letter Parallel societies [Brief 
Parallelle gemeenschappen]. 
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movements and organizations (Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 
2014b). The reasons for this focus were that in both situations, people were 
thought to be turning “their backs towards society,” a place where they were 
liable to “indoctrination.” There were concerns about orthodox religious 
beliefs and “undemocratic cultural beliefs” conflicting with “Dutch liberal 
values.” This reflected fears about both Islam and influences from and loyalty 
towards another nation state, in this case Turkey, posing a threat to the Dutch 
nation state.259 An important solution that was developed, besides regulations, 
inspections, and sanctions that aimed to control and impede these 
organizations, was promoting “Dutch citizenship.” 
 One informant mentioned, for example, how she and some colleagues 
were discussing what to do with the promotion of “good citizenship.” They had 
to decide what concrete measures to develop. For example, should more 
attention be paid to citizenship in schools and if so, in what ways? She 
explained that central to this process was arguing why a specific 
conceptualization and implementation of citizenship fits best with the political 
vision and what it contributes in terms of results. Civil servants have to link 
political priorities to practice, although some acknowledged rationalizations 
are sometimes more a “paper reality of the Hague bureaucracy” than relating 
to concrete needs in society. Apart from doubts what problem exactly needed 
to be solved, the problem definition and policy solutions are based on very 
specific interpretations of ”social reality,” which is itself shaped by them. 
Reason is provided for why certain problems need to be solved with the help 
of specific measures, but arguments substantiate the framing that is important 
for politicians. 
 For this, argumentation is required, which implies particular political 
interests are rendered rational. However, another policy official explained, 
giving substance to political buzz words such as citizenship and parallel 
communities may seem self-evident “and they are easily used, but often it is 
far from clear what they exactly mean.” It is not without reason that the 
writing of policy texts in a specific way is seen as the enactment of expertise 
(Carr 2010: 24). As I made clear in the previous chapter, policy texts reinforce 
political discourse, but are written as if more “objectively” observing what is 
happening in the “real social world.” Some civil servants indicated they 
understand their work may actually help shape social reality, rather than 
neutrally interpreting it, but they also explained it was important to “do 
                                                          
259 Confrontations between Dutch citizens with a Turkish background and the police during protests 
following the coup in Turkey in the summer of 2016 and related to election campaigns of both 
Dutch and Turkish Parliamentarians in spring 2017 reinforced this idea, which in fact may have 
served political interests of some parties in both countries. 
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something” about anxieties and concerns that genuinely exist. As long as 
arguments are “not too far from the truth,” they will come up with technical 
solutions, more attuned to instrumental reasoning than to critically reflecting 
on assumptions, goals, or the bureaucratic priorities of policies set by ministers 
and political parties. 
 Besides navigating the tensions between political desires and rationality, 
there is a third aspect of how rationality plays a role in dealing with volatile 
politics. Civil servants may also use their expertise to counter political 
volatility. When, for example, media reported about “sharia courts” in the 
United Kingdom and Sweden, there were concerns about similar developments 
in the Netherlands. A coordinating policy official clarified how the PVV put this 
issue on the agenda and other political parties picked it up, in line with 
political problematizations of Islam that yielded electoral success. When 
Members of Parliament questioned then Minister of Justice Hirsh Ballin and 
Minister of Public Housing, Neighbourhoods, and Integration260 Ella Vogelaar 
about the presumed proliferation of sharia law in the Netherlands, university 
researchers were in turn asked to conduct a study of this phenomenon (Bakker 
et al. 2010). 
 This case exemplifies the political volatility that has characterized the 
Integration Policy over the past two decades. Any issue that was negatively 
associated with Islam, in particular sharia law, was elaborately debated in 
Parliament and media.261 The policy official explained that he sees it as the 
task of civil servants to respond to react to the political discourse. “We advised 
that nobody wins from a discussion based on images instead of a factual base.” 
The results of the study that was asked for did not point at any sharia courts, 
although there were some instances of Imams counselling in conflicts, which 
was not considered to be very different from comparable practices in other 
communities. “From now, every time questions are asked, we can use this 
study to explain that we’ve done thorough research and found that there is no 
such thing in the Netherlands.” 
 Research was explicitly framed as being done by a university, an institute 
with the authority to produce accurate, objective knowledge, and which would 
be trusted by the public. By replacing “images” with “facts” and finding out 
“what is really happening,” the political debate can be tempered. A similar 
case, which I also explored in Chapter One, recently emerged regarding child 
                                                          
260 Kamerstukken 2008‐2009, VI 160 and Kamerstukken 2009‐2010, 32123, VI 5. 
261 As the example about the “Sharia triangle” I described above illustrates. 
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marriage and “self‐determination.” In order to separate fact from fiction, 
research was conducted on these phenomena in the Netherlands. The report 
concluded that although there were cases that needed attention, there was no 
structural problem in the Netherlands (Minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment 2016a262). In this way, the sting was taken out of the political 
debate. Rationality is thus often based on scientific research and can be used 
by civil servants as a means of “correcting politics,” providing an objective 
base. As such, they can perform a neutral in‐between position, offering nuance 
to political ideas they consider too radical. Rational argument, in other words, 
is not exclusively used as a tool to justify political goals of the ruling party or 
coalition. Informed research can also dispel myths that promote fears and 
prejudice, and smoothen rather than stoke social tensions via "correcting 
politics.” 
 In terms of their political orientation, these studies may be said to occupy 
the “reasonable” middle ground. Most vote for “neither PVV [Freedom Party] 
nor SP [Socialist Party]. And we do not live in deprived neighbourhoods, so we 
take notice of the discussions taking place outside these walls, but we’re not 
part of them,” a former manager explained. In the context of the political 
debate about integration this implies not acting on behalf of a specific political 
party or of the “populist” electorate, besides serving “minorities.” Civil 
servants defined themselves as having more rational, nuanced views. 
Grounding their advice in expertise and providing a “factual base” in the 
otherwise “emotional” debate about belonging in the Dutch nation state, they 
aim to balance the volatile, “neo realist” (Prins 2000) political debate and  
discourse that, according to some, may only lead to further polarization. 
Although, as I described above, they to a certain extent also subscribe to such 
discourses, for example of a multicultural backlash. 
 Civil servants reflect on these political developments, but as the above 
examples also make clear, they largely follow the dominant policy frame. Their 
techno‐political expertise requires rational “cognition,” but not a fundamental 
rethinking of the assumptions and meaning of policy (G. Feldman 2013: 146). 
Although they do engage in reflection, this section has made clear there is only 
limited space for ambivalence within bureaucracy, and expertise is primarily 
used to carry out the policy priorities they’re presented with and to sustain 
the status quo. The conditions of what is possible to think are determined by 
dominant political framing and the role of civil servants. Civil servants 
rationalize political decisions and define themselves explicitly as non‐political, 
                                                          
262 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2015–2016, 32 824, nr. 122. Letter Religious and child marriages 
[Brief Religieuze huwelijken en kindhuwelijken]. 
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demarcating themselves from political volatility or voters who are motivated 
by nationalist or xenophobic feelings. But at the same time they substantiate 
and neutralize specific political discourse and imaginaries of the Dutch nation 
and its Others. 
 By performing as professional experts who ground their work in rationality 
and stay close to “social reality,” they enact authority coming from 
professional expertise, which enables them to delineate a neutral position 
(Rose 1996; Mitchell 2002; Li 2007; Carr 2010). Playing this role of providing 
“objective” knowledge is a powerful way of depoliticizing power relations and 
translating political contention into technical problems that can be rationally 
solved, endowing political decisions with legitimacy and authority (Foucault 
1991; Shore 2011; Müller 2011). This juxtaposing of their own role against 
politics may also be seen as a coping strategy of civil servants to legitimize 
what they are doing. It provides direction in terms of what is the right thing to 
do, that they act conscientiously. 
 Civil servants also adhere to other values that determine their practices, 
they are more than just the stereotypical “technocrats.” In the following 
section I further analyze how civil servants position themselves in opposition 
to volatile politics. I start with a specific form of rationalizing politics, in terms 
of arguing why a certain policy is beneficial for society, in the interest of the 
public good. 
 
 
4.3 Having “affinity with society” 
 
From the beginning onwards the Directorate has been very 
committed [to society in general and minorities in particular]. Some 
have been working here for a very long time, others have a migrant 
background themselves. This stems from the idea that we have to 
work towards a better position of migrants in society. … When we 
read the coalition agreement [of the government led by Rutte in 
2010] for the first time, we were shocked, although in the end it 
turned out things were not so bad. But we did have to switch. 
 
(Strategic policy official) 
 
Various informants indicated they had difficulties with the assimilationist 
discourse of politicians and calls for ever stricter policies. Although this trend 
started in the early 1990s, the political discourse of especially Minister 
Verdonk, in office between 2003 and 2006, and of the first Rutte administration 
in 2010, which was supported by the anti-Islam and anti-immigrant PVV, was 
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particularly experienced as problematic. For some, their personal ideals and 
professional commitment stood far apart from politics. Various informants 
remarked that choosing a career in the civil service implies you have some 
“affinity with society.” They explained to be motivated to work for the “public 
cause” rather than just pursuing personal interests in their career, like status 
or income. Indeed, they have a “will to improve” (Li 2007), which may be said 
to be part of the professionalism of civil servants and thus an inherent part of 
bureaucratic culture. 
 Some also explained that when working at the Directorate, you are 
expected to have at least some dedication to the topic you are working on and 
to be sensitive to the position of the various groups living together in the 
Netherlands. This should not only be interpreted as a moral motivation to help 
and “do good.” Understanding social developments also is an important form 
of expertise of civil servants, because notwithstanding the boundary they have 
to maintain between themselves and the objects of their policies, they should 
be able to grasp society and intervene in it. Not everyone working at the 
Directorate had problems with the political volatility. As I explained in the first 
section of this chapter, there are generational differences. Several informants, 
most of them started working at the Directorate during the 1990s, and some 
with a “migrant background” stressed that they were rather satisfied when 
government “finally” began to act more tough on integration. But they 
disagreed with the harshness of the political discourse. 
 Yet another group, mostly working for the Directorate during the first 
decade of this century, defined themselves more as technocratic, indicating 
that changing political views of integration did not bother them all that much. 
At the same time, some emphasized they still have affinity with integration as 
a policy domain. At the same time, several outsiders who have collaborated 
closely with policy officials at the Directorate stressed the general 
disappointment, lack of motivation, loss of inspiration, and even resentment 
among its employees. “The only reason some of them are still there is because 
they have a mortgage to pay,” a non-state actor explained. Most officials I 
spoke to lamented the difficulties they or colleagues had with an increasingly 
restrictive politics on integration. 
 In general, informants pointed out, there is a shared sense of 
responsibility for the position of migrants in society. Many, for example, felt 
uncomfortable with the intentional polarizing effects of political discourse and 
policies, setting some people aside as not belonging and hampering the 
effectiveness of policies aimed at helping marginalized groups. It is illustrative 
that in response to the political discourse and plans of the Rutte I 
administration, the management of the Directorate organized special meetings 
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to help civil servants to deal with difficult political circumstances, which some 
referred to as some kind of “bereavement counselling.” Indeed, various 
informants indicated they were struggling with the challenge to balance 
personal convictions and professional values with their work in a hierarchical 
context demanding them to elaborate political decisions with which one 
disagrees. 
 Some policy officials explained that the difficulty they found in the 
Integration Policy nowadays is principally about inburgering, for which people 
themselves are made responsible, while there is virtually no room for assisting 
marginalized people in society. They were disappointed that the whole idea of 
emancipation and government responsibility was abandoned, and that the 
personal circumstances, i.e. migration history and cultural background, was no 
longer taken into account. Some described, however, how within the political 
parameters set by, in this case, Verdonk, there were still opportunities to do 
what they thought was right, as they managed to “make money available for 
what can be called multicultural policies.” Notwithstanding the political 
context at any given time, there is room for balancing what are deemed too 
severe political plans because the Directorate itself has official tasks that allow 
for various interpretations and consequent policies. 
 Official goals of the Directorate are formulated in rather broad terms of 
“integration and inburgering into society,” which is further specified as 
“preventing discrimination,” “making sure general policies are attuned to 
migrant groups,” and creating a “stable society” in which “migrants and their 
children are economically self-reliant [and] newcomers are responsible for 
their own inburgering263.” Other important goals are making people “deal with 
diversity” and to “prevent social tensions.” This allows for interpretations both 
in terms of a more assimilationist political discourse and corresponding 
repressive measures, and a more facilitative approach that is premised upon 
helping those deemed in need. Various other policy officials also stressed they 
find it important there is at least some room for them “to stay true to their 
own principles.” They try to fit their values in where possible and to be careful 
to “never loose what you believe in.”  
 In this context, it is not uncommon to advise against political plans, 
although a minister decides what to do with it. Because their professional 
expertise also entails having knowledge of society and the objects of policy, 
                                                          
263 Staatscourant 2015, 47956. Organisation, Mandate and Authorization Decree director-general 
Social Security and Integration 2015 [Organisatie-, mandaat- en volmachtbesluit directeur-
generaal Sociale Zekerheid en Integratie 2015].  Also see 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-sociale-zaken-en-
werkgelegenheid/organisatie/organogram/directeur-generaal-sociale-zekerheid-en-integratie 
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civil servants can advise a minister about the desirability of policy plans. 
Various informants, for example, clarified that they had voiced their doubts 
about the adverse effects of the many reforms of the inburgering system. “Of 
course we advise the minister about the negative consequences of certain 
reforms [of the Inburgering Act] on the actual integration of newcomers and 
the detrimental effects of the many changes themselves on the already 
marginalized position of migrants,” one policy official explained. In the 
previous chapter I also analyzed internal documents that illustrate how civil 
servants have advised against political plans. Their gatekeeper’s position 
provides some opportunity to correct these, but their serving role may lead to 
frustrations when political volatility eventually does lead to policy reforms. 
 A way to address this is by framing restrictions of policy in a positive way. 
When politicians keep on adding new requirements to the Civic Integration Act, 
for example, civil servants are responsible for realizing these adjustments. 
Several informants explained such restrictions in terms of providing immigrants 
with extra facilities that could help them finding a job. The Labour Market 
Module requires inburgeraars to follow training in job searching, cv writing, 
and job interviews, which was explained as supporting the participation of 
immigrants in the labour market. Thus, policy officials attempted to reframe 
political decisions aimed at making it more difficult for migrants to pass the 
inburgering exam, putting emphasis on assisting migrants, within the dominant 
political framework. It is a way of justifying continuance of their work by 
pointing to the potential positive effects of more policy reforms. Political 
decisions may be found bad for society, but may also be represented as having 
some beneficial aspects. 
 At the same time, they expressed a need to feel some affinity with the 
policies they are requested to develop. They attempt to convince themselves 
that their work does not entirely contradict their views of what is good for 
society. Some would reason that if these people are not helped at all, they 
have fewer opportunities to participate. An important aspect of the work of 
civil servants is developing policies which they think are good for society at 
large. Some officials explained ministers are short-lived and you should wait 
for better times, while reframing your ideas within the dominant political 
discourse. But most civil servants are “not able to really take up active live of 
caring for other human beings” (G. Feldman 2013: 140-1). Those who are 
targeted by policies are objectified and alienated, the relation with them 
mediated by technocratic, administrative expertise, because of which the 
positions of both civil servant and policy object are depoliticized and a distance 
between the two is created. 
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 Navigating tensions following from political volatility is especially salient, 
as several informants explained, because “setting the frame” is a very 
important instrument of the Integration Policy. There are not many “hard” 
policy measures that can effectively intervene in society. Roundtables, 
Parliamentary Letters and debates, or public statements can be used as means 
to let the minister give a signal about what the government is thinking of a 
certain topic. It is through such communication that meaning is created and a 
frame is set. While it offers little space for civil servants to counter too harsh 
a political discourse, it sometimes may provide opportunities to do so. 
 An incident of discrimination a couple of years ago was, for example, 
mentioned by several informants as an opportunity to let the minister speak 
out on this matter, giving a signal of what the government finds important. A 
young applicant had accidentally received an e-mail, which was meant for 
internal use from the employer where he had applied for an internship, in 
which it was mentioned they “did not want a black guy.” Civil servants said 
they were appalled by this incident and indicated they were glad they could 
prepare policy texts for their minister, in which the government would distance 
itself from labour market discrimination and stress the importance of 
combatting it. “Although this youngster might not be helped directly, it does 
set the terms of the debate and I believe in the use of that,” one manager 
explained. However, this should be seen in a wider context as I described in 
Chapter One, of Minister Asscher performing a hard stance, the exclusionist 
discourse of many politicians and the limited effectivity of policies to prevent 
discrimination, which makes this denouncement of discrimination somewhat 
obligatory, but also ambiguous and non-binding. 
 Another example some informants described was that they found it 
difficult when the PVV, while it was supporting the Rutte I government, opened 
a website where people could submit complaints about labour migrants from 
Eastern Europe. There had been concerns about these people as they 
supposedly were taking jobs from “real, hardworking Dutch” and were 
allegedly also annoying the neighbourhoods in which they were living. The PVV 
wanted to exploit these anxieties, which some civil servants saw as “hatred 
against ethnic groups,” pitting neighbors against each other, and it upset them 
specifically that the government did not officially distance itself from this 
initiative. According to one policy official, however, it turned out that in the 
end things were not that bad since the website was soon removed. Although 
there was frustration about the limited possibilities for countering this frame, 
there was relieve that “welfare policies were kept in place with support of the 
argument that they also prevent a nuisance.” 
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 Interestingly, this argument is based on the same anxieties and 
assumptions about some migrants allegedly causing trouble because of their 
background. Instead of only problematizing the presence of certain groups in 
the Netherlands, however, a government should also try to improve the 
situation. As during previous decades, policy measures are legitimized by 
claiming that supporting some groups is a means to protect and improve society 
in general. By preventing public disorder, the government secures a “stable 
society” in the interest of all. Various informants explained how they see it as 
an important part of their professional role that they work for the “general 
interest,” to take into account what is “good for all.” By balancing between 
the “political reality” of stricter reforms and what they think is in the interest 
of both migrants and society at large, they perform a neutral, in-between 
position.  
 As such, civil servants enact state authority by being professionals. At the 
same time, policy officials follow the dominant cultural deficit logic that I 
explained in the previous chapters, naturalizing the idea that “newcomers” 
lack the necessary skills to live a life in the Netherlands. An important 
difference with politicians is that they see this more as a reason to help them 
than to exclude them. They counteract political discourse by using arguments 
related to the objects of policy or the effects of reforms in advices, but do not 
fundamentally question political decisions or policies. They rather legitimize 
and neutralize political decisions, as they aim to balance political severity 
through their expert authority and place policies in perspective of improving 
society, commitment and state interest. 
 This is not to say that bureaucrats are supportive of xenophobic elements 
of the new realist political discourse and that this explains why they help 
create policies that have exclusionist aspects. It does illustrate that they 
define their responsibility in terms of protecting the status quo (cf. Fuglerud 
2004: 25; Li 2007: 5). As Herzfeld (1992) has argued, bureaucracy and 
nationalism are closely related. Civil servants naturally see the Netherlands as 
“Dutch,” corresponding with a worldview that divides the social world in 
different groups of “integrated” and “non-integrated” citizens and 
newcomers. Such categorizations are according to Herzfeld based on cultural 
ideas about national belonging that relate to metaphors of kinship, blood, 
ancestry and birth (ibid.: 64-5). Such “irrational” symbolic classifications are 
officially abandoned in bureaucracy, its rationality being the basis for its 
authority, but they are transformed in rigid taxonomies about pollution and 
exclusion (cf. Douglas 1966). 
 The cultural roots of bureaucracy are not more “rational” than 
“premodern cosmology” or “popular dross” (Herzfeld 1992: 65-6). They are, 
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however, cloaked in a rigid state logic that is represented as rational and 
reflecting an objective reality. Bureaucrats may distance themselves from 
explicit nationalism and xenophobia, emphasizing their motivation to help 
Others, but they actually reinforce these phenomena by self-evidently 
categorizing people as foreign and needing integration policy. They follow the 
dominant worldview of the majority population, rather than question it, and 
reify the Dutch nation as the neutral status quo from which policies are 
created. Although civil servants are more concerned with the public good than 
politicians, against whom civil servants define themselves, in the end they 
reinforce the political order (Hoag and Hull 2017: 7). 
 They define themselves vis-à-vis politicians as professional civil servants, 
taking into account the general interest and welfare of society. Placing 
responsibility with elected politicians can also be interpreted as a justification 
for having to deal with difficult parts of their job. Using a narrative of a 
“political reality” one cannot change, but at best advise strategically against 
or frame positively in terms of opportunities for improving the marginalized 
position of certain people, might be seen as a strategy of distancing oneself 
from moral difficulties. “If you cannot deal with that, than you better find 
another job,” was a remark often made. But at the same time they are 
committed to the public good. A similar tension is that they are attuned to 
proper government. 
 
 
4.4 Being there “for the long run” 
 
Feeling responsible for the general interest is also an important aspect of 
proper state government. Informants used this concept to describe the 
importance of creating policies of high quality, so as to ensure trustworthy 
governance that is grounded in the rule of law. Qualities related to legality, 
equality, proportionality, and providing certainty may conflict with political 
volatility; several informants explained that recent political developments do 
not contribute to better policies and sometimes even complicate enacting 
what they considered as appropriate state government, which is an unbiased 
arbiter carrying out the public good and not acting too severely or aggressively, 
or punishing particular groups. In the previous chapters, I have described how 
political desires and decisions related to inburgering ran against legal 
principles and explained how civil servants pointed out these flaws in their 
advice. In this section, I examine how civil servants deal with these tensions 
and at the same time enact neutral state government by doing so. 
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 I start with illustrating how political volatility influences state government 
by focusing on the various relocations of the Directorate. These offer other 
examples of how political demands can come into conflict with the work of 
civil servants. Apart from the hassles of selecting your stuff and not finding 
your way around a new place, relocations bring difficulties of building a new 
network and adapting to a different departmental culture and mores. Making 
policy, however, is about communication and cooperation, taking others along 
in the process. This implies building good relations and creating trust, with 
which you have to start from scratch if you are relocated, making it difficult 
to get things done and complicating the daily work of officials and 
consequently whether they can effectively perform their task of creating good 
policies and advising the minister. 
 An example of the difficulties of adapting to a new ministry was given by 
one policy official who described how it took four weeks before a letter they 
wanted to send on behalf of Minister Asscher to the House of Representative 
was approved by the higher management of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment, whereas “where we came from it would have been done within 
a day.” He explained that at the Directorate they are used to reacting on behalf 
of the minister to incidents, which has to be done quickly before the 
momentum has passed. But at a more “systemic” department such as Social 
Affairs, he continued, they are not used to this and take much more time for 
checking policy documents to make sure they are correct and no mistakes are 
made. This makes communication much more difficult. Moreover, there is no 
trust yet higher “up the line” that something written by the Directorate is 
good. The higher management has to know what the Integration Policy is about 
and how to judge its policy texts. 
 So in practical sense, relocations hamper the ability of civil servants to 
perform as they are expected. When asked how they dealt with this tension, 
civil servants in general used expressions such as “we are nomads of national 
administration,” or “we have to integrate [inburgeren] ourselves.” Making 
jokes can be a coping strategy to deal with a challenging situation (Swinkels 
and De Koning 2016). Moreover, they tended to respond in a narrative of such 
aspects being part of their job, which may not be very easy, but if you cannot 
deal with it then you should start looking for another job. Others would frame 
it positively in terms of making new connections, trying to make new parts of 
national administration sensitive towards minorities, or pointing at how the 
political importance makes it possible to get others along. 
 A former Director was rather critical of the decision to move the 
Directorate to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, arguing 
politicians underestimate these consequences for civil servants (Castricum 
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2012). Especially because she herself came to know about the relocation via 
the Government Agreement, which she considered rather rude. Besides, it was 
not very easy to find desk space in the new department. But she also mentioned 
that most civil servants are very loyal to the organization for which they work. 
In this case not only a ministry, as this changes from time to time, but the 
Directorate itself. “Loyalty towards each other is great within the civil 
service,” as one senior policy official explained. Almost in the sense that it is 
your fate to deal with being used by powers above you. 
  “We are all professionals, so they [civil servants in a new ministry] will 
support our policies and know a topic is important for the minister. And we 
will do as asked, continue our work,” one senior policy official remarked. But 
in the end, it is not positively contributing to the work of civil servants. In 
many interviews, people would start talking about their relocations 
spontaneously, as something out of the ordinary. Retired civil servants were 
critical more openly, indicating that although you should be flexible as a civil 
servant, relocations give the feeling as if you are not taken seriously, as if 
decisions are made with short-term, particular political motivations, without 
taking into account their dignity. It was sometimes experienced as 
disrespectful and thus harmful to the motivation of civil servants. This relates 
to how they perceive their role of enacting proper government. Besides 
practical complications, they also have the feeling relocations are harmful to 
policies themselves. Moreover, they find it difficult to be forced into a 
situation that impedes their ability to create sound policies. 
 In terms of the contents of policies, relocations also conflicted with what 
policy officials defined as proper government. When the Directorate was 
moved to the Ministry of Justice in 2003, for example, policies became more 
focused on repression and closer aligned with migration policy. Some 
informants described this as contradicting the goals of the Integration Policy. 
“Whereas we aim to include people, migration policy is aimed at excluding 
them,” various policy officials explained. A similar observation was made about 
the relation between the Directorate and cities, because at the Ministry of 
Interior, “we were used to seeing cities as partners in our mission to integrate 
migrants, not as unwilling subjects that need to be disciplined and controlled 
through legislation, as was more the case in the Ministry of Justice.” 
 The adverse effects of these and other political decisions, such as 
inburgering repeatedly being altered and made more exclusionary, or the 
decreasing budget of the Directorate, were thought to be detrimental to 
reliable government. Those who are targeted by policies, and citizens in 
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general, need to know what to expect from state policies.264 Therefore, civil 
servants also defined their role in terms of ensuring continuity in the 
Integration Policy. Most informants stressed that there are no radical shifts 
when a new minister enters office, for several reasons, but also because 
bluntly reforming existing policies is considered to be bad governance. Civil 
servants see it as their responsibility to provide continuity to the state, 
preventing volatility, arbitrariness, and legal uncertainty. A member of the 
management team of the directorate phrased his perception of the relation 
between politicians and professional expertise in the following way: 
 
You are here, on the one hand, for the minister and on the other 
hand you are here for what I call the long run. The minister 
disappears and a new one comes, and it matters who is in office, 
but it does not change society. And reality doesn’t change either. 
[…] So that civil servant is there for the long run, also to provide 
continuity. He knows how it was ten years ago and what the trends 
and forecasts are. 
[…] 
When they [the government] decided in 2011 that from 2014 
onwards no funding should be available for the inburgering system 
and inburgeraars [people who are obliged to take inburgering 
courses and pass the inburgering exam] wouldn’t receive financial 
compensation anymore, we mapped what the consequences were 
going to be. It turned out that the rapid pace of dismantling the 
system would damage it and we could convince the government to 
extend this period. Moreover, the cutting back of reimbursement 
would be harmful to vulnerable groups like refugees. Politics was 
also sensitive to this argument and when a new government came 
into office it decided to reintroduce a financial compensation for 
groups in a precarious financial situation. So the initial plans were 
adjusted and I’m happy that good arguments in the end prevailed. 
 
Several aspects are interesting, some partly overlapping with other ways of 
how civil servants define their professionalism. In opposition to volatile 
political developments they aim to balance between serving a minister and the 
needs of the objects of policy, as I explained above. They base their advice on 
rational arguments, pointing at how they have mapped consequences of certain 
decisions. These may lead to dysfunctional policies in the sense of running 
against what is in the interest of the “public good.” Proper government means 
making sound policies that work effectively. This can be explained in terms of 
the content of policy, in this case ensuring a financial compensation for those 
                                                          
264 A point I have also discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, in light of the many reforms 
of the inburgering system the past ten years. 
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who are in a marginalized position. But also in the sense of not damaging the 
system and ensuring changes are implemented conscientiously . 
 Creating sound policies is explicitly linked to providing continuity, legal 
certainty and stability. This may be hampered by political volatility. As 
explained in Chapter Two, several civil servants and non-state actors indicated 
how they have been struggling with the fact that the Inburgering Act has been 
changed so often over the past decade, only because of what they identified 
as “political impatience.” Not only did they think that successive amendments 
have had a negative impact on the goal of facilitating the participation of 
migrants in Netherlands society, it also left them with the feeling as though 
years of hard work were not appreciated and results of measures not seriously 
awaited. In such accounts, civil servants clearly define themselves as non-
political, taking continuity in state policies more into account than short-
termed politicians. 
 Civil servants understand volatile politics on the one hand as a reaction to 
concerns among part of the electorate. As mentioned above, some pointed to 
the democratic legitimacy of decisions and the necessity of correcting past 
policies, which allegedly were “too lenient.” Being a democratic state, they 
find these kind of developments have to be taken into account. On the other 
hand, they also see it as their duty not to let this determine policies too much. 
In this respect, they explicitly mentioned the rule of law as the central guiding 
principle in their work of creating policies. Measures may not be legitimate or 
do more harm than good. Especially because the state holds supreme power, 
some informants indicated, this power needs to be used prudently. If political 
plans are too wild, policy officials see it as their duty to curb these off so they 
remain within the confines set by the Constitution. 
The flip side of this is that they search the boundaries of what is legally 
possible, as was the case for some reforms of the Inburgering Act and the 
Inburgering Abroad Act. Because of their expertise they are able to develop 
policy that is acceptable in light of the Constitution. There is a tension, 
because they also see themselves as safeguards of righteous government. Some 
may use their gatekeeper’s position coming from their rational expertise, long 
term experience in bureaucracy to countervail radical political plans and 
provide continuity, not only because in a liberal democracy minorities need to 
be protected, but also because they think citizens must have trust in a stable 
government. So civil servants enact a professional expertise by stabilizing 
political volatility. Especially where it may conflict with ideas about good 
governance, the rule of law, and the general interest. 
 The tension between neutral state government and political decisions 
inherent in modern government is thus expressed in the daily work of civil 
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servants. They have to deal with both the demands of serving a coalition 
government and principles of proper state government. By navigating this 
tension, they not only put their professionalism into practice, but also perform 
“the state.” Not in a direct way towards citizens as street level bureaucrats 
would, but symbolically through the policies they create. For the state to be 
imagined and performed as a fixed, homogenous and timeless entity, it needs 
to have some continuity in what it does and produces. And it needs to be 
enacted in policies that have specific qualities and standards, so they are 
recognized as having authority while at the same time being inherently 
political. 
 Relocations and political volatility conflict with the various dimensions of 
such state government, running against ideas civil servants, as experts, have 
about effective and appropriate policies. They nonetheless continue working, 
trying to balance various objectives in their work. In the end, there is a strong 
commitment to continue working, for one thing, because working for the 
Directorate is seen as important for keeping up the “good work for society,” 
but also because they aim to ensure stable state government. It is by 
negotiating the tensions between these objectives and political developments 
that they enact state authority and define themselves as “professional civil 
servants,” in opposition to impulsive politicians. In the final section of this 
chapter, I further analyze what it means to perform as a professional civil 
servant. 
  
 
4.5 “Playing the game” as a professional 
 
Political volatility may conflict with bureaucratic values such as relying on 
objective expertise, serving the general interest and endorsing proper state 
government. This causes tensions with which civil servants have to deal. 
Paradoxically, some political decisions are seen as a nullification of their 
professionalism, but dealing with them is at the same time a proof of this 
professionalism. It is precisely their acceptance of these circumstances that 
make their work difficult, that defines them as professionals civil servants who 
are capable of dealing with practical difficulties and tension, and who are loyal 
to both politics and state values. As I have explained in the previous sections, 
navigating these tensions sets civil servants apart as unique actors, with 
different motivations and interests than the objects of policies and politicians. 
Reconciling conflicting interests makes it possible to enact expert authority 
and a neutral position. 
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 In this section I focus on how the narrative of professionalism is an ethos 
of office that disciplines civil servants but also makes their work meaningful. 
Informants explained they tend to deal with tensions in their work by taking 
pride in their professional craftsmanship. In their own words: they enjoy and 
are motivated by “playing the game.” One policy official clarified that 
normally he has no inhibitions to advise his superiors or even the minister in 
case he thinks political plans are not feasible, but he also emphasized that if 
a ministers insists on implementing something that runs counter to what he 
thinks is desirable, he enjoys employing his expertise to the best of his 
abilities: “in that case, it pleases me to succeed in opening closed doors and 
to achieve something, to realign parties for my minister. Then, I can really get 
a good feeling from the entire process.” 
 Although creating policies within political constraints can sometimes be 
difficult, and notwithstanding a commitment to work for the public cause, it 
provides an opportunity to show your qualities. Writing texts according to 
predetermined patterns, as I explained in the previous chapter, for example, 
provides an opportunity for the enactment of expertise (Carr 2010: 22). The 
process of substantiating controversial decisions also requires them to 
persuade other sceptical policy actors. In this way, you can make an effort to 
distinguish yourself through contributing critically yet constructively to policy 
making. Some civil servants find it stimulating because it involves directing the 
process, creating support and playing a pivotal role behind the scenes. The 
morality of certain political decisions is put aside in favour of executing their 
task of “making policy happen” (Maybin 2014). 
 Only in extreme circumstances, some spoke of “Second World War 
conditions,” moral objections to political demands might incite policy officials 
to request for other tasks or projects from their superiors. Various informants 
mention this to be a very final option, and nobody admitted to have resorted 
to this possibility. This reference to the Holocaust is interesting, because it 
touches upon Arendt’s (2006) and Bauman’s (1989) analyses of bureaucracy. 
They argue that efficient bureaucratic procedures that are followed by 
disinterested, not evil, bureaucrats has helped to make the Holocaust possible. 
Civil servants are not trained to critically think about the system they help 
substantiating. However, as the previous sections have also made clear, the 
account of bureaucracy as a purely technical, dehumanized system that erases 
individual moral judgement is somewhat more complicated and at least some 
degree of morality is inherent to bureaucracy (Du Gay 2000). 
 Civil servants did reflect on their position, the political context, and 
policies they create (also see G. Feldman 2013: 149). Although some were 
appalled by the exclusionist political discourse and related policy reforms, 
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others thought there is some moral justification for protecting Dutch citizens. 
So although it matters that as bureaucrats they are not trained to 
fundamentally question political decisions, civil servants do have moral 
opinions on the policies they are asked to create and they are not fully 
dissociated from the people who are targeted by them. The example of the 
Holocaust was used by informants to illustrate there are moral boundaries they 
would not cross. This implies that most civil servants did not see the particular 
political decisions that they themselves had to translate into policy measures 
as coming near this extreme example. 
 Various informants indicated they are able “to follow politicians for a long 
way.” The question is, of course, how far they would go. It may be difficult to 
determine the boundary when you are part of a system that pushes this 
boundary in small steps and that consists of policy measures that both aim to 
help and to exclude. Indeed very few have left the Directorate because of 
moral dilemmas and most continued in their role of serving politics. This is not 
only because it is unlikely for them to bite the hand that feeds them. The 
reflections of informants on their role also make clear they consciously execute 
political orders because, notwithstanding possible doubts, they are socialized 
in an ethos of office that does not force them to do as they are told, but that 
has made them internalize a specific code of conduct. Acting as a professional 
indeed requires having specific competencies, explained by informants in 
terms of craftsmanship. 
 They are there to support the minister and therefore should be able to set 
aside personal preferences, be capable to act under pressure, appreciate how 
and why political decisions are made, and know their way around the national 
bureaucracy. In this context, informants used the Dutch expression “weten hoe 
de hazen lopen,” to be translated as “knowing how the hares are running,” 
meaning having inside knowledge of how things are run in national 
administrative circles. This entails having a compelling intuition for political 
trends, understanding political (power) relations, which issues are politically 
important, and knowing how to deal with them. Furthermore, one has to be 
able to think strategically, knowing what serves the political interests of a 
minister, a skill which is often described as “political-administrative 
sensitivity.” Relatedly, one has to be familiar with informal bureaucratic rules, 
the balance of power between state ministries, and having a solid network, 
which all help to accumulate leverage. Being a successful civil servant means 
knowing your way around state bureaucracies. 
 As a member of the management team of the Directorate explained: “you 
have to position the minister, to know when and how he has to respond to 
events, know how others will react and anticipate the effects of some studies.” 
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Especially in a policy field that has relatively few concrete policy measures and 
which is dependent on “setting the frame,” disseminating knowledge and a 
willing network in order to realize policy goals, it is paramount what stance a 
minister takes in debates or in reaction to incidents. When looking at the job 
descriptions provided by the national administration, the most important 
competence asked of a policy official is being able to detect risk factors for 
the minister. There is a general trend in the Dutch civil service of a growing 
importance of protecting the minister (Nieuwenkamp 2013). This specifically 
holds for such a sensitive topic as “integration,” where incidents may have a 
large impact, many people have an opinion about and a minister can be easily 
accused of being “too soft” or “too tough.” 
 As one policy official explained: “An incident may get very big, in the 
worst case leading to the departure of a minister. We are here to make sure 
this does not happen.” Civil servants indicated they have to rely on strategic 
expertise and understanding of the political field to judge whether an incident, 
such as the example of labour market discrimination described in section 4.3, 
is a potential risk, or opportunity, and accordingly, what action to take. 
Controversial policies, debates and incidents are potential causes of trouble 
for ministers if their response comes too late or is premature, inadequate, or 
controversial. Many informants consider their ability to support the minister in 
difficult times as evidence of their qualities as a civil servant, which come to 
light especially in what some call “politiek handwerk,” or political 
craftsmanship. They indicate to obtain satisfaction from supporting “their” 
minister, making policy happen, or executing other tasks to the best of their 
ability. This may be interpreted as a dedicated attitude towards work and pride 
in their profession. 
 One policy official gave the example of a letter about antisemitism she 
had to write to illustrate how you have to think strategically from the point of 
view of a minister or the government. She was not supposed to go too much 
into detail, because “as government you don’t want to become involved too 
much in that religious discussion.” You have to reflect on the interest of the 
government, in this case sending a clear message and write accordingly that in 
the Netherlands discrimination is not allowed and minorities are protected. 
Elaborating too much on whether a specific case is anti-Semitic or not brings 
with it the danger of making claims that may not be substantiated by non-state 
experts or may create a precedent for others looking for support of the 
government. Both possibilities pose potential risks for the minister. More 
fundamentally, strategic expertise, or knowing how the hares are running, also 
means knowing why politicians propose specific policies and to be prepared to 
232
Chapter 4
244 
make them possible, even if you know these cannot be implemented because 
of practical or legal constraints.  
 An example of this was the wish of the Dutch government to include 
Turkish nationals in the target population of the Inburgering Act. Because of 
the Association Treaty (1963) between Turkey and the European Union, 
informants explained, there would be virtually no chance that this obligation 
would hold in front of the European Court of Justice in case someone might 
want to contest the measure legally. This is what policy officials advised 
minister Verdonk, but she decided to make inburgering obligatory for Turkish 
citizens and to wait and see what a possible judgement would mean for the 
new inburgering legislation, reasoning that the signal it would send is more 
important than its legal soundness. Several civil servants explained they 
understood the symbolic importance of this for politicians and the strategy of 
creating illegitimate measures with the risk of having to withdraw them, 
“because then you can state as a minister you still find it of utmost importance 
that these people [Turks] make an effort to integrate. While the other way 
around [not creating a measure while stressing its importance in public] would 
have meant serious political problems.” 
  In case of inburgering there are more of such controversial decisions that 
have been described by civil servants as a political strategy. Some policy 
officials involved in the 2013 reforms of the Inburgering Act, for example, 
illustrated that although it was legally uncertain whether residence permits 
could be revoked, both because of international treaties and practical 
difficulties, the relevance of the restricting amendment was situated in the 
political message it conveyed. “We’ll have to see whether it will be actually 
enforced and if so, whether it will hold in court. But I am a technocratic, I 
execute what is democratically decided upon.” Variations on this narrative 
could be found in the accounts of many civil servants: “the bottom line is that 
it is your duty to loyally execute what you are asked to, if you cannot deal with 
that you better find another job.” 
 As such, the expression “know how the hares are running” is an example 
of how professionalism has a normalizing, disciplining effect. As a professional 
civil servant, you should take into account political context, know how the 
game is played and be able to act strategically within this context. This form 
of craftsmanship is valued and rewarded. But it is also a way of shifting 
responsibility for policies to politicians (cf. Bauman 1989; Arendt 2006; G. 
Feldman 2013). Referring to a “political reality” with which you have to work 
also means to confer with and reinforce such politics. Bureaucracy implies 
absolution from personal responsibility (Herzfeld 1992: 159). A selection 
mechanism is at play in the sense that those who are able to be a “technocrat” 
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and are good at their job can make a career in state bureaucracy. Civil servants 
are socialized in an ethos that values strategic expertise and instrumental 
reason, rather than reflecting on political goals (Bauman 1989). 
 Of course, their work is about advising a minister about the feasibility and 
desirability of policy plans. However, some explained there is a kind of 
unwritten rule that you can advise against political plans three times, but then 
accept it. Many informants understood that symbolic measures are extremely 
important for some politicians. A final example of controversial inburgering 
legislation illustrates this point. In 2015 the European Court of Justice decided 
that the Civic Integration Abroad Act does not conflict with the Council 
Directive 2003/86 EC on the right to family life. The Court judged that the law 
does not set too strict migration requirements, which was the allegation, but 
it does make it difficult for people to come to the Netherlands because of too 
high costs and too high levels of examination. The Court explicitly prohibits 
setting such strict integration requirements that make it impossible for people 
to migrate. 
 This touches upon the criticism I also discussed in Chapter Two, that 
argues the Inburgering Abroad Act is not an integration measure, but a 
migration measure in disguise, which is illegal according to EU law 
(Groenendijk 2011a). Although the Dutch government can continue to set 
requirements, the verdict shows how it is pushing the boundaries as it aims to 
prevent immigration. Especially because it is very hard to prove when 
requirements are made so strict that it becomes impossible for people to 
migrate to the Netherlands. Civil servants working on inburgering were aware 
of the controversies and criticisms surrounding this specific legislation. 
University professors and other experts regularly voice criticism of policy 
measures in national newspapers, which some officials see as “part of the 
game.” 
 Some informants stated they welcome comments as “free information,” 
but at the same time they think these “outsiders” comment from an easy 
position, because they do not have inside knowledge of decision making 
processes and do not have to take into account the political situation. As a civil 
servant you have your hands tied. If a minister attracts bad publicity by 
proposing a specific measure, civil servants have little opportunity to respond 
directly to criticisms and explain what they are working on. The only thing you 
are able to do is writing policy texts for the minister, while it may feel as if 
the “outsiders” are attacking something you have been working on in an 
enclosed bureaucratic environment. Although various informants indicated 
such pressures can be frustrating sometimes, at the same time they mentioned 
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they are in a rather unique position, “close to the fire,” working on politically 
sensitive and timely topics. 
 This relates to the motivation that civil servants derive from the dynamics 
brought along by incidents, because attention from politics and media for the 
Integration Policy requires policy officials to react promptly and accurately 
when something makes the headlines. This can make their job rather difficult, 
because the Integration Policy is much more guided by incidents and 
controversial issues than other policy areas. If there is media coverage of 
discrimination or radicalization, they always have to write answers to many 
Parliamentarian Questions, which according to some hampers their “real 
work,” but at the same time makes their work meaningful. “A policy area such 
as water management is not politicized and has a very different pace, more 
long term and technical than our field. This makes things easier, but also a bit 
more dull,” a policy official explained. 
 The pressure coming from the pace and sensitivity of their work, provides 
them with an opportunity to proof their skills, which may also be an indication 
of how civil servants deal with the futility that sometimes characterizes their 
work. Writing a policy paper may be the highest importance one day, because 
of which they invest a lot of time in crafting it, but it may not be needed 
anymore the next day. As I have explained, the breaking down of policies and 
relocations of the Directorate may also lead to a loss of motivation. Working 
for the contentious, volatile and sometimes controversial topic of 
“integration,” being able to perform well under difficult circumstances is 
considered a professional challenge by most civil servants. It hampers a proper 
execution of their tasks, but also provides an opportunity to demonstrate their 
professionalism. Some explicitly mentioned they see dealing with these 
pressures and tensions coming from political volatility as something that makes 
their job at the Directorate attractive and interesting. It is a way of performing 
craftsmanship.  
 They indicate to obtain satisfaction from supporting “their” minister, 
making policy happen, or executing other tasks to the best of their ability. One 
thing stands out from my discussion so far of how civil servants negotiate 
tensions in their work. Notwithstanding personal convictions and the 
opportunity to advise against political plans, “in the end we do what a minister 
wants.” This loyalty means that civil servants respect the authority of their 
superiors, especially the minister. “The minister cannot have civil servants who 
do not execute what he or she says,” one official explained. Professional policy 
officials are working in a bureaucratic organization, which is based on 
principles of hierarchy that clearly define their tasks and autonomy, implying 
that their work is invariably scrutinized by superiors (cf. Weber 1978). They 
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are expected to be dedicated to their employer in the sense that they continue 
their work regardless of some disagreement. One also has to be trustworthy in 
the eyes of colleagues. 
 This may be interpreted as a dedicated attitude toward work and pride in 
their profession (cf. Evetts 2003; Noordegraaf 2007). Playing this game well, 
showing craftsmanship, informants explain, may be rewarding in several ways. 
Succeeding in it provides not only satisfaction since you are able to put your 
skills into practice, but it also brings recognition and enhances your status 
among colleagues and superiors. Furthermore, it may be beneficial for 
advancing your career, promotion in the rank and files and by moving up a 
salary scale. In general, the civil service provides job security and people are 
also inclined to stay working here, despite difficulties, because of the financial 
consequences of leaving, especially if there are not many alternatives.” So 
“making policy happen” (Maybin 2014) in a “neutral” way is part of the game, 
which you either play along or you quit, that is your professionalism. Complying 
to this code of conduct not only provides job security and a regular income, 
but it may also help to advance your career in the bureaucratic hierarchy. 
“[T]hose who as workers act like “professionals,” are self-controlled and self-
motivated to perform in ways the organization defines as appropriate. In 
return, those who achieve the targets will be rewarded with career promotion 
and progress” (Evetts 2003: 408). In this sense, professionalism may be 
considered a form of symbolic capital that reflects dominant values in 
bureaucracy (Schinkel and Noordegraaf 2010). It is an environment in which 
“professional qualities” are valued and rewarded and therefore not everyone 
can advance successfully. Some informants explained, for example, that not 
everyone is suited to be a civil servant and that one needs to possess the so-
called “intrinsic values” of a professional. 
 As I explained in the first section of this chapter, these values associated 
with being a professional civil servant are related to the social position most 
bureaucrats occupy in society. Many have a white, middle-class, higher 
educated background that shapes their view on society and because of which 
they are thought to be able to enact a rational, reasonable, and detached 
position. Those who act accordingly as “professionals” are valued most in the 
Dutch civil service, having the best opportunities and power positions. Those 
who are believed to be “too much involved” or not able “to separate private 
opinions from their professional role” are less valued and may find it more 
difficult to advance their bureaucratic careers. As follows from the first section 
of this chapter, non-white civil servants are more likely to be seen in this light. 
Professionalism is a social practice that is produced, enacted, and valued in 
bureaucratic routines and processes. 
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 Policy officials use the concept of professionalism to describe their 
attitude toward work in a bureaucratic organization. As such, professionalism 
may be considered a key symbol of the civil service (Turner 1967; Ortner 1973; 
Shore 2007). By classifying themselves as a specific group following designated 
programs for social action, policy officials are enacting, reifying, and 
responding to the structures at work and by doing so they re-construct 
themselves as a special community. Within this group variety does exist, but 
from diverging opinions and values a seemingly coherent community is created 
(cf. Turner 1967: 75). Thus, different aspects of the work of policy officials are 
collapsed and condensed in the trope of professionalism. Professionalism 
provides a central orientation for civil servants at a ministry with specific 
guidelines for becoming a “good” policy official (cf. Ortner 1974: 1340). 
 The classification of policy officials as part of the civil service 
simultaneously entails a strict conception of behaviour that is considered 
appropriate for this group. Serving the minister and offering expert, 
“impartial” advice is essential for policy officials, even if they themselves are 
not personally convinced of the use or desirability of political plans. In other 
words, professionalism embodies the “ethos of bureaucratic office” (Weber 
1978), while it constitutes and structures “the domain of possibility for action 
and subjectivity” by delineating the “thinkable” (Fournier 1999: 282). Even 
though there is some space for cushioning the impact of political volatility, it 
is simply unthinkable to act contrary to orders of a minister. Civil servants may 
have difficulties with political volatility for reasons discussed in this chapter, 
but they have been socialized not to question their role. As such, 
“professional” civil servants embody the tension between state neutrality and 
political decision making. 
 Thus, professionalism symbolically represents both the “obligatory” and 
the “desirable” (Shore 2007: 201; cf. Turner 1967: 30). It aligns moral and 
social norms imposed by the bureaucratic structure with personal desires and 
feelings of doing the right thing, being of importance and personal 
development. The trope of professionalism facilitates the internalization of 
institutional norms and enables a performance on the basis of internal 
incentives and not just external orders. By performing as a professional, policy 
officials reconstruct bureaucratic norms and structures that also shape their 
attitude and actions. As institutional norms are aligned with personal 
preferences, professionalism is also a powerful representation of the identity 
of policy officials as employees in the civil service. Professionalism not only 
represents cognitive and even emotional categories that are important to them 
(Ortner 1974: 1340), but also symbolizes loyalty, craftsmanship, and 
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objectivity as important aspects of their work, which all relate to their 
“professional” honour and pride. 
 These are powerful subjectivities that stimulate policy officials to feel 
committed to their job and how they manage it. Performance as a professional 
thus creates a sense of belonging in the bureaucracy as it pertains to emotional 
attachment and identity construction. Professionalism makes the work of 
policy officials meaningful because it symbolizes not only that they take their 
work seriously but also that they play an important role in policymaking 
processes. Thus, it embraces the significance of their occupation, but also 
signifies their position as neutral experts. As I explained in this chapter, by 
classifying themselves as professionals, policy officials define their community 
vis-à-vis other groups, in this case the objects of policy, politicians, and social 
scientists. This enables the enactment of rationality, neutrality, and authority 
associated with their role. But by constructing boundaries around their 
professional community, they make their work not only meaningful in relation 
to others, but locate themselves in the order of things, and in so doing, 
contribute to their sense of belonging and professional identity.  
 Classifying themselves as part of a community of professionals for which 
a special work ethos is required also provides policy officials with a justification 
to continue working in adverse political times. When stating in interviews that 
they are acting as they are expected to as professionals, policy officials put on 
a mask that disconnects them emotionally from political values, but also from 
concrete incidents at work to which they might have objected on personal 
grounds. It enables them to cope with tensions. Professionalism, moreover 
encapsulates all important aspects of their work, including those that 
potentially conflict. As such, it also reflects the ambiguity within the state 
itself, both having above-party authority and being political. Professionalism 
provides a sense of belonging and gives meaning to bureaucratic work in the 
sense that being able to cope with difficult situations is proof of your skills as 
a civil servant and a source of professional honour and pride. 
 Notwithstanding personal reservations, policy officials contribute to 
shaping sometimes controversial policies and in so doing transform political 
decisions into policies that institutionalize a culturalist logic, yet are created 
as rational, self-evident policy solutions. Although policy officials acknowledge 
they have to navigate tensions in their work and have various justifications for 
continuing their work, the bottom line is that they have to accept the 
conditions that shape their work context. Performing as a professional implies 
not quitting your job, which shows you are capable of accepting and dealing 
with difficulties. Because this ethos of office also makes their work as policy 
officials meaningful, it functions much like Foucault’s (1977) embodied 
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disciplinary logic and is a mode of being that constrains, enables, and gives 
meaning to action all at the same time. 
 The disciplinary effects of the trope of professionalism thus also draw 
attention to the operation of bureaucratic organizations. These are not simply 
characterized by a strict hierarchical structure of command and control, but 
they are constituted by a complex interplay between policy officials and a 
minister, in which individuals may negotiate their space to manoeuvre and 
intertwine personal motivations and convictions with institutional goals. Thus, 
professionalism symbolizes the values that policy officials have internalized as 
well as the bureaucratic control that exists alongside their personal 
preferences and beliefs. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The work of civil servants can be challenging, as they have to respond to 
various, conflicting interests and objectives. In this chapter, I have answered 
the following question: How do civil servants navigate tensions between 
political decisions and features of proper government? I have examined how 
they deal with the political volatility that affects their work of creating the 
Dutch Integration Policy and what role “professionalism” plays in their coping 
strategies. I have described how the narrative of “professionalization” is a 
powerful way of setting civil servants apart from “minority interests” and 
enacting a neutral, detached position to fend off accusations of being “too 
multicultural.” By defining themselves as professional experts vis-à-vis 
politicians, moreover, they establish an apolitical, rational position. By taking 
the “general interest” and standards of state government into account, they 
not only perform expert authority, but also state authority.  
 As such, they aim to balance political volatility, but at the same time, 
civil servants are attuned to making policy happen, serving political functions, 
and eliminating risks for a minister. They deal with tensions through a system 
of meaning (professionalism) that values a specific role and practices and 
constitutes civil servants as a separate group. Professionalism is a disciplinary 
logic that controls civil servants and gives meaning to their work. Civil servants 
define themselves and are recognized by others as a specific group, balancing 
between political demands and proper state government. In performing their 
function, they constitute the “the state” as an authority above parties that is 
at the same time essentially political. Their enactment of expertise lends 
legitimacy, authority, and rationality to specific political decisions. By turning 
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these into policies that are grounded in qualities that signify state government, 
they enable the state to be imagined and recognized by the public as the 
ultimate authority that governs society.  
 Policy making is carried out by individuals, but their practices and 
products are endowed with objectivity and authority associated with state 
rule. Tensions inherent in the state, being influenced by political volatility but 
also an anchor point that governs beyond it, is expressed by individual civil 
servants. They safeguard qualities associated with state rule, enacting this 
power as reasonable, aimed at promoting general interests and taking into 
account the rule of law, and as a stable, coherent entity. By performing as 
professionals, civil servants thus enact the state and make state government 
possible. Although their daily work is not directly visible to the public, what 
they do and the policies they make represent what the state stands for. It is a 
way in which the state effect, constituting it as an entity separate from 
society, is produced (Mitchell 1999). The ambiguities and tensions civil servants 
navigate in their work reflect the tension between neutrality and politics that 
is inherent in the state. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis set out to out to understand the construction of state authority, 
building on and aiming to deepen anthropological analysis of the state, 
bureaucracy, and policy. In order to do so, it has examined how the process of 
policy making reflects the tension between political decisions and state 
neutrality. In this way, my study intended to further understanding of how the 
state is constructed as a single, independent, and homogenous actor that is 
also constituted as a legitimate, neutral entity that rightfully governs a society 
(Abrams 1988, Gupta 1995; Mitchell 1999; Ferguson and Gupta 2002). I have 
analyzed policy making as one way of how the state idea is created and 
enacted, in particular concentrating on the importance of authority for this 
idea. 
 My analysis has focused on the work that is being done in state ministries, 
a place where the tension between politics and state neutrality is very salient. 
By studying bureaucracy as an important context of policy making, this thesis 
aimed to understand how authority is constructed out of an ambiguous, 
complex, and heterogeneous process that consists of conflicting interests, 
contrasting visions, and inherent tensions, but produces official policy 
outcomes that seem definite and neutral (Heyman 1995; Harper 1998; Hull 
2003, 2012b; Fuglerud 2004; Nyqvist 2011; Gupta 2012). This relates to the 
goal of disentangling the policy effect, explaining how political decisions are 
endowed with authority, rationality, and legitimacy when created as official 
policy (Shore 2011), and how this has depoliticizing effects (Ferguson 1994; 
Foucault 1991; Mitchell 2002; Li 2007).  
 Thus, in order to understand the construction of state authority, this 
thesis has focused on the complexities of policy making, taking into account 
both the content and form of policy measures, and the context in which they 
are produced. Each chapter has addressed a different aspect of the policy 
making process, relating to a different feature of the policy effect. Starting 
with the collection of measures that make up the Integration Policy and the 
institutional setting in which these have been created, each successive chapter 
zoomed in on the actual practice of policy making, focusing on the construction 
of specific measures, on the bureaucratic context in which policy is made, and 
on the individuals doing the policy work. 
 In Chapter One, I examined how the Integration Policy institutionalizes a 
specific model of society and reasserts state control. I described the creation 
and development of the Directorate, its institutional position and the specific 
policy measures it has been producing. These have been grounded in political 
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assumptions about nation, culture, and belonging, rather than multicultural 
ideals. This, in combination with a weak power position of the Directorate 
related to a one-sided political interest in the Integration Policy, has hampered 
the efficacy of policy measures in terms or realizing their stated goal of 
“integration.” Although the Integration Policy has been created as an 
instrument of social improvement, I have argued that rather than a set of 
pragmatic policies, its political importance has been to consolidate the status 
quo and reassert state control through defining the nation and governing those 
defined as Others (cf. Fassin 2013). 
 The categorization of some people as targets of policy interventions, 
justified by claims of protecting the public, social, economic,  and cultural 
order, has been represented as objective knowledge about society and the 
problem that is aimed to be solved, rather than as a social construction. 
Despite variations in categorizations and outlook of policy measures, the 
groups that have been targeted as objects of policies did not fundamentally 
change, defining who can and cannot belong in the Dutch nation state (cf. 
Ghorashi 2014; Schinkel 2017). Policies have been reassuring one part of the 
population they are the national norm, being political subjects and the “true 
Dutch,” while people “with a migration background” are considered “people 
out of place” (Yanow and Van der Haar 2013) who threaten the position of 
those not targeted by policies. By translating this political relation into policy, 
the dominant majority position from which policies have been made is 
consolidated as the neutral status quo. 
 The political question of how “we” should deal with “them” has been 
attempted to be solved through policies that objectify and depoliticize these 
relations. The Integration Policy has been consolidating the existing political 
and national order, focusing more on the responsibilities of those targeted by 
policies than on the structural political-economic context or on addressing the 
political community at large. Imaginaries of the Dutch nation and related social 
positions have not been questioned, but reasserted as they were 
institutionalized in policy, by means of which they have been naturalized and 
given legitimacy and authority. In this way, the abstract state idea is not only 
enacted as the protector of the nation through controlling what is considered 
foreign and a threat (G. Feldman 2005), but also constructed as an actor that 
occupies a neutral position towards various social groups it governs, as if above 
politics. An important aspect in this mechanism is the translation of politics 
into policies that are created as rational, legitimate, self-evident, and 
apparently above politics. 
 In Chapter Two I examined this mechanism in more detail by analyzing the 
construction of formal policy solutions in detail. I described the creation of 
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successive inburgering laws in order to illustrate how a political debate about 
belonging is translated into a technical problem of inburgering. The creation 
of this law has been a reaction to anxieties of the “autochthonous majority” 
about developments affecting “their” society; policy has been grounded in 
ideas about who can belong in the Dutch nation. The stated goal of stimulating 
socioeconomic participation for all newcomers, presented as a general 
interest, turned out difficult to realize. In light of their limited results, 
especially in combination with the discarding of anti-discrimination measures, 
an important effect of inburgering has been constituting the nation. I have 
shown how inburgering was intended to target only specific groups, thus 
demarcating who within Dutch society is “non-Dutch.” 
 My reconstruction of the creation of inburgering measures showed the 
legal difficulties of targeting specific groups within the confines of the rule of 
law, which itself was an important factor shaping policy measures. Political 
ideas and decisions were during the process of policy making cloaked in the 
neutral language of law and scientific solutions. The technical set-up of the 
system, furthermore, contributed to the objective, neutral character of 
inburgering policies. The political design was erased and neutralized, by 
presenting them as rational, technical solutions to unemployment and as 
having legal authority (Nyqvist 2011; Shore 2011). Political debate and 
criticism focused on the technical design and implementation of the 
inburgering system, forestalling fundamental debate about the changing Dutch 
nation state. Despite many reforms and restrictions, however, there has been 
no real improvement of policy measures and their outcomes, because reforms 
follow the same logic. Perceptions of failure only lead to technical adjustments 
and reinforcement of the disciplining logic. 
 Therefore, the creation of successive Inburgering laws exemplifies how 
policy renders political decisions neutral and channels political debate. As a 
policy measure, inburgering has turned out to be a relatively easy way of 
addressing an anxious politics about the fate of the nation state (Modest and 
de Koning 2016). It has provided an opportunity for politicians to perform ever 
more control without really having to discuss who belongs in the Netherlands 
or how to rethink the Dutch nation in light of migration. Inburgering reflects 
the ambiguity of the state. It is both aimed at safeguarding public order and 
welfare for all, and at protecting the position and interest of a particular part 
of the population while holding the targets of policy responsible for its 
implementation based on specific conceptualizations of national belonging. At 
the same time, legal and expert push back from civil servants endowed policies 
with a neutrality and legitimacy associated with state authority. State policy 
has to meet quality standards, such as being rational, efficient, right, 
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deliberate, legitimate, non-discriminatory, proportional and in the general 
interest. These qualities, many relating to the rule of law, present the state 
as if it were above politics or somehow separate from the political realm. 
 In Chapter Three, I further explored the policy effect by analyzing how 
policy texts are created as impersonal, seemingly objective, and expressive of 
a collective body (Harper 1998; Hull 2003). Collectively writing policy texts in 
“the line” is not only facilitated by, but is itself constitutive of the 
bureaucratic organization that controls civil servants. In “the line,” civil 
servants are socialized in a formal style of writing, various interests are 
unified, politics is aligned with policy, the act of writing is depersonalized and 
authorship is transferred from individuals to the institution and eventually the 
minister. This not only makes policy seem a definite, objective product, but 
also endows political ideas and decisions with authority and legitimacy, as 
policy needs to meet certain standards of proper, neutral state government. 
Policy making is a contentious process, because various interests have to be 
balanced. 
 The creation of policy is the result of many individuals who work together 
in a ministry. Notwithstanding contention and conflicting interests during the 
process of policy making, the result seems finalized, neutralized and 
objectified (Heyman 1995; Fuglerud 2004; Shore 2011; Hull 2012a). The tension 
between politics and state neutrality is reflected not only in the content of 
policy, as explained in the first two chapters, but also in the form and the 
organizational context in which it is actually performed and enacted. 
Institutional authority is transferred into political authority after authorization 
of the minister, lending further authority to specific policy texts. Bureaucratic 
organization thus is important for the policy effect, not only because authority 
is produced in the daily practices of civil servants (I. Feldman 2008), but also 
because it unites political and state interests and policies are an expression of 
this tension inherent in the state between neutrality and politics. 
 Policies are created as correct, unbiased, reasonable, serving the general 
interest and existing above party politics, although politics is needed for 
democratic legitimation. Policies substantiate politics by aligning political 
decisions with qualities that are associated with proper government and a 
stable, predictable, and just state, lending objectivity, authority, and 
legitimacy to political decisions. This enables a minister to perform both a 
political and an above-parties role. “The line,” moreover, facilitates the 
construction of the state as coherent, homogenous, and removed from human 
bias. While being the work of various individuals working in ministries, from 
the outside it may seem as if the state is a coherent, consistent, impartial 
entity that transcends daily practices, work routines, cultural bias, and 
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individual people. As such, “the line” constitutes the state as an authoritative 
entity and the policies “the line” produces are artefacts through which “the 
state” is imagined, and authority is enacted. 
 In Chapter Four, finally, I illustrated how state authority is not only 
constituted by bureaucratic organization, but also by the individuals who work 
in it. I studied how civil servants deal with political volatility affecting their 
work and by doing so personify the tension inherent in state rule. The narrative 
of “professionalism” is a powerful way of how civil servants set themselves 
apart from “minority interests” and party politics. They demarcate a neutral, 
detached position regarding both sides. They perform as expert professionals 
who are not motivated by particular interests and perform both expert and 
state authority by taking into account rationality, the general interest, what is 
good for society and the rule of law and stable state. While setting themselves 
apart from politics, however, they also substantiate it, sharing the same 
political assumptions and being trained as experts who create technical policy 
solutions. 
 Moreover, they aim to balance political volatility by safeguarding qualities 
associated with proper state rule, but at the same time, civil servants are 
attuned to making policy happen and serving politics. Playing the game 
associated with a specific role is valued in terms of salary and career 
perspective. Professionalism, moreover, is a disciplinary logic that controls 
civil servants and gives meaning to their work. It provides them with a road 
map to deal with tensions, indicating how they are expected to act in an 
ambiguous environment. It not only helps them to deal with any possible moral 
dilemmas by reassuring what is right in their role as professional civil servants. 
The trope of professionalism also entails that they take honour and pride in 
dealing with difficulties. It thus also helps to control them in a serving role. 
Substantiating political decision making becomes the normal way of acting and 
thinking, because civil servants are internally motivated to do so. 
  This relates to how civil servants perform the state. They facilitate the 
translation of political debate and decisions into policy measures while feeling 
responsible for values associated with proper state rule and enacting neutral 
state power. This is a complex process, in which they have to navigate tensions 
and ambiguities. These are eventually smoothened, because opaque 
bureaucratic practices are not visible to the outside world and produce 
seemingly definite policy outcomes, enabling the constitution of the state as a 
seemingly coherent, homogenous entity. By creating policies they enable the 
state to be imagined and recognized by the public as the ultimate authority 
that governs society (Mitchell 1991). Policy making is influenced by the 
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political moment, but policies are also representations of state neutrality. This 
tension is embodied by civil servants. 
 
 
The contentious production of state authority 
 
The analyses in the four chapters make it possible to answer the main question 
this dissertation set out to answer: How is policy making in state bureaucracies 
shaped by tensions between neutrality and politics and how does it constitute 
state authority? The policy making process reflects this tension in several ways. 
Each chapter addressed a different aspect of it, aiming to disentangle the 
policy effect, by building on anthropological studies of state, bureaucracy, and 
policy. 
 First, policy measures seem to be based on neutral and objective 
expertise, while they reassert the existing political order by institutionalizing 
and naturalizing particular models of society (Foucault 1991; Ferguson 1994; 
Li 2007; Fassin 2011). Second, policy renders political, sometimes controversial 
decisions technical because measures are created as having a technical-legal 
form (Foucault 1991; Shore 2011; Nyqvist 2011). Third, the bureaucratic 
organization enables an impersonal and definite institutional authorship that 
erases individual agency and tensions, and substantiates political authority 
(Harper 1998; Hull 2003, 2012a; Gupta 2012). Fourth, individual civil servants 
navigate tensions between proper state government and political decisions, 
while enacting a neutral position (Heyman 1995; Fuglerud 2004; Nyqvist 2011). 
 What this dissertation adds is that it combines these insights and 
approaches, making it possible to gain a better understanding of the policy 
effect. Shore (2011: 172) has argued that “declaring policy to be ‘official’ 
endows it with authority.” This dissertation described the various mechanisms 
through which the office, or bureaucracy, exactly constitutes state authority 
in the process of policy making, focusing in particular on the interaction 
between policy and politics. It has studied the organization, work, everyday 
practices and self-representations of bureaucrats, in relation to broader 
political arrangements, bodies of knowledge, and institutional discourses 
(Hoag and Hull 2017: 4; cf. Heyman 1995, 2004). Both the office, or the 
bureaucratic context of policy making, and the seemingly apolitical 
assumptions and expertise underlying policy measures are important for 
understanding state authority.  
 As far as the office is concerned, authority is socially produced in 
bureaucracy, out of the tensions mentioned above. Being created as official 
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state policy, as a citizen you can expect policy measures to meet standards of 
quality, that it is well thought through and created as correct, impartial, and 
just. Ideas and decisions are elevated from mere opinion, simply stipulating an 
arbitrary course of action, and turned into the voice of the state. This not only 
represents policy decisions as the right way forward but also imbues them with 
rationality, legality, and an official form, all reflecting a position that 
overarches particular social positions and groups. This enables the recognition 
of policy as representing state authority, because it is grounded in the rule of 
law and professional expertise, focused on the general interest  having a long 
term perspective and intending to do what is good for society at large  and 
created in a formal style of writing by a depersonalized, collective body. 
 At the same time, authority comes from a democratically elected minister 
that legitimately takes decisions, which can be contentious. Policy measures 
need to be grounded in political decisions and ideas about society, but this is 
balanced with a neutrality associated with the state. Modern power is not 
simply about disguising the political nature of policies (Shore 2011: 171), and 
bureaucracy is not just an anti-politics machine (Ferguson 1990). Rather, there 
is a more nuanced relationship. Policy outcomes, and the state in general, need 
to be recognized as having political characteristics, because democratically 
elected politicians want to make visible to the electorate what they stand for. 
Moreover, policy has an important political, symbolic function of giving 
meaning to social reality. This is endowed with state authority, which indeed 
neutralizes the political nature, but simultaneously underscores its 
importance. 
 This dissertation has focused on high-level state bureaucracies, a place 
not studied as much as service delivering bureaucracies (Hoag and Hull 2017: 
9). Because it is close to Parliament, the ministry is an interesting focus for 
understanding the relation between state neutrality and political decisions. By 
analyzing the ambiguous bureaucratic organization, it could shed light on how 
everyday practices of civil servants both substantiate and neutralize political 
knowledge and power. Bureaucracy and civil servants aim to safeguard the 
legality of policy measures but are also attuned to making policy happen and 
substantiating political decisions. While enacting technical, seemingly neutral 
expertise, bureaucrats share by and large the same models of society as their 
political bosses. Individual agency is transformed into collective action because 
civil servants are controlled in a hierarchical line and an ethos of office. This 
is done in a subtle way, because they are socialized in an organization that 
motivates to follow orders and perform well, although bureaucrats do have 
ideas about whether policy measures work and are morally right. 
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 Policy making is people’s work. Indeed, bureaucracy is an ambiguous and 
complex, rather than simple and monolithic organization. While discretion and 
morality are important for making bureaucracy work as an organization in 
which people are motivated to work and that is able to implement political 
decisions (Lipsky 1980; Du Gay 2000), bureaucrats are also controlled and 
depersonalized in order to make the organization function (Weber 1978; 
Bauman 1989). As Hull has argued (2003: 288, cf. 2012b), bureaucracy produces 
both collective and individual agency. It is in the interaction between civil 
servants, as both accountable individuals and an anonymous collective, that 
the neutrality of state is enacted and negotiated. This ambiguity relates to the 
various features of policy that need to be taken into account, and the different 
interests that are aligned, in the process of creating it. 
 Bureaucracy is about socially constructing modes of proper state 
government and authority (cf. Brenneis 1994; I. Feldman 2008). The complexity 
and ambiguity of the policy making process is erased and turned into a single 
voice once a policy text is officially published because it has passed the various 
hierarchical layers in a ministry. The process of creation is not visible from 
outside the state bureaucracy and policy outcomes are definite in the sense 
that they seem unequivocal, written in one voice that appears correct, smooth, 
neutral, and rational. The state’s authority is thus produced out of ambiguity 
and tensions. It is by easing these tensions, making it seem as if they do not 
exist, that policy outcomes are made to appear objective and self-evident. 
This makes it possible to construct and perceive the state as an entity that has 
above-party authority. The bureaucratic mechanisms through which it is 
created elevate it to this status. 
 In addition, the work that policies do in terms of institutionalizing political 
ideas and power relations is also important for understanding this policy effect. 
Policy has a depoliticizing effect because the assumptions, goals and effects 
of policy are rendered apolitical (Ferguson 1994; Mitchell 1999; Li 2007). A 
model of society that is grounded in the dominant position of a specific part of 
the population is made operable and so rationalized, legitimized and 
naturalized. What is specifically interesting, is that besides the complexities 
of policy making itself, the contentiousness and sometimes irrationality of the 
political debate and related decisions are erased. In case of inburgering, for 
example, previous policies are said to have failed and reforms and restrictions 
are proposed that entail no real changes. Still policy is represented as rational 
and necessary. This is particularly salient because politicians fuel anxieties 
related to migration, diversification and national belonging, which are 
neutralized when translated into specific measures. 
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 The Integration Policy is a domain that has become increasingly 
politicized; performing a firm stance against people “with a migraiont 
background” has brought politicians electoral success. When translating 
decisions that follow from this “new realist” political discourse (Prins 2002) 
into policy measures, these are depoliticized. The Integration Policy has very 
symbolic meaning in terms of reasserting the Dutch nation based on specific 
expertise, and this meaning has become more important over time, but policies 
have been created as merely technical instruments aimed at improving social 
conditions, intervening from a neutral position based on objective knowledge 
about the problem that is aimed to be solved. Policy making turns a political 
moment into policy measures that protect the status quo and prevent a true 
political debate about belonging in the Dutch nation state. 
 This effect is not only realized by means of the specific expertise 
underpinning measures and the one-sided emphasis placing responsibility on 
its targets for carrying it out, but also because the political debate comes to 
be focused on the effectivity of specific measures and not on a broader 
discussion about the political and national order. Because policies primarily 
have been speaking to the “autochthone majority” population, aiming to 
address its anxieties, they principally legitimize and fuel these concerns. Like 
the state that produces them, the assumptions underpinning policies are 
considered apolitical and beyond question, so determining what is imaginable 
(Shore 2011: 171; Müller 2011: 283-4; Schrover and Schinkel 2013: 1128). 
Criticism about the lack of results therefore does not lead to a fundamental 
rethinking of the issue at hand, but a further step in the same direction 
(Foucault 1991). 
 This makes it possible to channel political volatility, providing an 
opportunity for politicians to push the buttons in order to perform a hard 
stance. A political moment is institutionalized in the sense that a particular 
model of society comes to be seen as natural and state policies that are 
premised upon it as neutral. At the same time, there has been little discussion 
about the legitimacy, desirability, or necessity of measures, while the 
legitimacy of measures that enforce learning a language and are premised upon 
a very specific form of cultural belonging can be questioned. Nor has there 
been much debate about how policies might negatively affect society and 
stated goals of social cohesion and participation. In this light, it is interesting 
how policy measures and adjustments, for example in case of inburgering, are 
documented to have negative effects but are still represented and considered 
as something good, thus illustrating how irrationalities are erased. 
 Notwithstanding its declared benevolent intentions, the Integration Policy 
has not really brought the improvement it promised. Rather, it has reified ideas 
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about how social marginalization is related to culture, ethnicity, or religion. 
The Integration Policy is above all a ritualistic way of dealing with what is seen 
as foreign and about coming to grips with developments such as globalization, 
migration, and diversification affecting the Dutch nation state. It is a ritual in 
the sense that it reaffirms the social order by defining what is foreign. It relates 
to Hage’s (2000) idea of governmental belonging, or the belief of having the 
right to management over the nation. The “autochthon” majority sets the 
terms of the debate and is able to determine whether someone is sufficiently 
“integrated.” This dominant position is reproduced in policy. Particular 
conceptualizations of the Dutch nation state and its others are 
institutionalized, lending them authority and normalizing them; signifying and 
reasserting their meaning. 
 Both this governmental point of view and the bureaucratic context in 
which policy is created demonstrate how policy making constitutes the state. 
First, the process as such is an enactment of the state. Policy making 
constitutes the state by presenting itself as being above or apart from the 
contentious cultural issues of society, and as dispassionate and unbiased 
through the authoritative form in which political decisions are cast. Policies 
are one way in which the state is represented to the public. The state comes 
to be imagined in artefacts and practices, which are not a reflection of a pre-
existing, coherent state structure, but actually constitute the state idea 
(Abrams 1988; Mitchell 1999; Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Policies are created 
in a deliberate way, according to qualities associated with state rule. This 
helps to create the appearance of an entity standing apart from and above 
society. The state is constructed as if it is homogenous, stable, and durable, 
being synonymous with even-handed, proper government and a benevolent, 
self-evident authority. In this way the state must be continually produced, and 
policy making is one way of doing so, as explained above. 
 The form of policies is also important in this respect. Policy texts have a 
formal style and material qualities that place individual policy measures within 
a larger order of state rule. Moreover, policies have been created by various 
civil servants collaborating “in the line,” a process that has many checks and 
safeguards, so as to make sure the end product is reliable and does not reflect 
fallible individuals. The state needs to be enacted by individuals in such a way 
that makes it possible to represent itself as something larger, a homogeneous 
authority that transcends ordinary daily practices and routines. The 
heterogeneous workings of both state power and bureaucracy remain largely 
opaque to the public; tensions, conflicts, and ambiguities are obscured. This 
serves to cloak the state in a sort of neutral authority. In order to continually 
maintain its authority, the state seeks to present itself to its citizens as 
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homogeneous, benevolent, reasoned, consistent, and lawful. It would be 
interesting for future studies to analyze how the objects of policy and the 
public at large perceive state policy, whether they acknowledge state power 
as righteous, of high quality, proper, reasonable, and deliberate, and how they 
come to accept or not the authority of the state and its policies (cf. Leerkes 
2018). 
 Second, in this specific case the content of policies also helps constituting 
the nation, because they deal with fundamental questions about belonging in 
the Netherlands and control over the Dutch nation. The Integration Policy 
consolidates the nation through creating objects of intervention that are 
placed outside the national order. It is in opposition to “migrants” and people 
“with a migration background” that the state is able to perform its central task 
of looking after the welfare of its citizens (G. Feldman 2005). Migration and 
diversification are issues that are essential to a state’s existence in terms of 
protecting a population, because they trigger the fundamental question of who 
is the population. The state is constituted as a legitimate guardian of its 
citizens that rightfully governs in order to control alleged disorder caused by 
people not considered to be fully part of the national population, 
notwithstanding whether they are legal citizens. 
 The particular interests of the majority population in the Dutch nation are 
transformed into neutral state interest. Moreover, it is endowed with authority 
by both bureaucracy and politics, so being rendered natural as state rule. The 
state comes into being in policy and through policy making. State authority is 
no given but needs to be constantly produced and recognized as such. It has to 
be taken seriously as the ultimate authority that governs society, above parties 
and politics. This dissertation has focused on how state policy is created in 
high-level bureaucracies, close to the political domain and constituting state 
authority. It has shown how out of political contestation and debate, but also 
out of the complexities of bureaucratic state government, policy is produced 
as seemingly rational, neutral, definite, and right. By doing so, it has analyzed 
how the state is constructed as an apolitical entity that has authority, while at 
the same time it is inherently political in nature. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1. Governments and Ministers responsible for the 
Integration Policy 
 
Period Coalition Government and 
Prime Minister (from largest 
coalition partner) 
Minister responsible for the Integration Policy 
1973-1977 PvdA , D66 , PPR , KVP and ARP 
PM Joop den Uyl 
[none] 
1977-1981 CDA and VVD 
PM Dries van Agt 
Minister of Interior, Hans Wiegel (VVD, also vice 
prime minister) 
1981-1982 CDA, PvdA and D66 
PM Dries van Agt 
Junior Minister of Interior, Gerard van Leijenhorst 
(CDA) 
1982-1986 CDA and VVD 
PM Ruud Lubbers 
Minister of Interior, Koos Rietkerk (VVD), died in 
office in 1986, Korthals Altes and De Korte ad 
interim (VVD) 
1986-1989 CDA and VVD 
PM Ruud Lubbers 
Minister of Interior, Kees van Dijk (CDA), Ministry 
of Interior 
1989-1994 CDA and PvdA 
PM Ruud Lubbers 
Minister of Interior, Ien Dales (PvdA), died in 
office in 1994, Ed van Thijn ad interim (PvdA) 
1994-1998 PvdA, VVD and D66 
PM Wim Kok 
Minister of Interior, Hans Dijkstal (VVD) 
1998-2002 PvdA, VVD and D66 
PM Wim Kok 
Program Minister for Large Cities Policy and 
Integration, Roger van Boxtel (D66), Ministry of 
Interior. First program minister 
2002-2003 CDA, LPF and VVD 
PM Jan Peter Balkenende 
Program Minister for Aliens Affairs and 
Integration, Hildebrand Nawijn (LPF), Ministry of 
Justice.  
2003-2006 CDA, VVD and D66 
PM Jan Peter Balkenende 
Program Minister for Aliens Affairs and 
Integration, Rita Verdonk (VVD), Ministry of 
Justice.  
2006-2007 CDA and VVD 
PM Jan Peter Balkenende 
Program Minister for Aliens Affairs and 
Integration, Rita Verdonk (VVD), Ministry of 
Justice. After 13 December 2006 Program 
Minister for Integration, Youth Prevention and 
Rehabilitation 
2007-2010 CDA, PvdA and CU 
PM Jan Peter Balkenende 
Program Minister for Housing, Neighbourhoods 
and Integration, Ella Vogelaar (PvdA), Ministry of 
Public Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment 
2011-2012 VVD and CDA, informally 
supported by PVV 
PM Mark Rutte 
Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations, Piet 
Hein Donner (CDA). As of 2012 the Integration 
Policy was made the responsibility of the Program 
Minister for Immigration, Asylum and Integration 
Gerd Leers (CDA), Ministry of Interior 
2012-2017 VVD and PvdA 
PM Mark Rutte 
Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, 
Lodewijk Asscher (PvdA) 
2017-
present 
VVD, D66, CDA and CU 
PM Mark Rutte 
Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, 
Wouter Koolmees (D66) 
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Appendix 2. Directorate 
 
Name, director and institutional location 
 
Year Name Director Location 
1980 Coordination of Minorities 
Policy (Directie 
Coördinatie 
Minderhedenbeleid, DCM) 
Henk Molleman, 
1980-1990 
 
Ministry of Interior, Directorate-General 
Public Administration 
1985 Principles Minorities 
Policy (Directie 
Hoofdlijnen 
Minderhedenbeleid, DHM) 
  
1990  Hugo Fernandes 
Mendes, 1990-
2000 
 
1991 Coordination Minorities 
Policy (Directie 
Coördinatie 
Minderhedenbeleid, DCM) 
  
1996 Coordination of 
Integration policy 
Minorities (Directie 
Coördinatie 
Integratiebeleid 
Minderheden, DCIM) 
  
2000  Marilyn Haimé, 
2000-2011 
 
2003   Ministry of Justice, Directorate-General 
International Affairs, Asylum and Aliens 
Affairs 
2007 Inburgering and 
Integration (Directie 
Inburgering en Integratie, 
DI&I) 
 Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial 
Planning and Environment, Directorate-
General Housing, Neighbourhoods and 
Integration  
2011 Integration and 
Inburgering (Directie 
Integratie en Inburgering, 
DI&I) 
Afke van Rijn, 
2011 - 2017 
Ministry of Interior and Kingdom 
Relations, Directorate-General Housing 
and Building  
2012 Integration and Society 
(Directie Integratie en 
Samenleving, DI&S) 
 Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment, Directorate-General 
Participation and Income Security 
2016 Society and Integration 
(Directie Samenleving en 
Integratie, DS&I) 
 Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment, Directorate-General 
Social Security and Integration 
2017  Mark Roscam 
Abbing, 2017 - 
present  
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Budget 
 
 
The increase in the Directorate’s budget for the Integration Policy is explained by the 
creation of inburgering legislation. Although it is still the most important and costly 
policy measure, the budget has decreased because migrants have to pay for their 
inburgering trajectory and exam themselves. Until the mid-1990s most of the money 
was spent on organisational costs. 
The chart is based on figures that can be found in documents that are published by the 
Dutch government. In particular three documents are important: the Miljoenennota 
(National Budget), Begroting or Voorjaarsnota (Departmental budget) and Jaarverslag 
or Slotwet (National Financial Annual Report), which can be accessed for every ministry 
from 1911 onwards on the website www.rijksbegroting.nl. 
Although differences in the exact numbers for every year can be found in the various 
documents and the precise budget presented here might not be fully accurate, it is the 
aim of this visualisation to give an impression of the general development of the budget 
over time. 
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Summary 
 
 
Within the state administration, political decisions are translated into 
seemingly rational, impersonal, and definite policy measures that represent 
legitimate state power. Political ideas are endowed with a certain institutional 
authority once they are declared to be “official.” It is the goal of this study to 
disentangle this “policy effect” (Shore 2011). In this way, this dissertation aims 
to elucidate how the state is constructed as an apolitical entity, as though 
above politics and the society it governs, and deriving its legitimacy from this 
seemingly neutral nature, while at the same time it is inherently political. 
 The policy domain that is concerned with the “integration” of migrants, 
and citizens “with a migration background,” in the Netherlands is an 
interesting case to study this tension. The Integration Policy is closely related 
to a heated political debate about belonging in the Dutch nation state, but the 
policy measures that are created in response appear much more rational, 
neutral, and legitimate than the political ideas and decision making that 
instigate their creation. 
 This thesis studies the assumptions and outcomes of policies themselves 
but also the work of civil servants in the state administration in this domain. 
In this way, it contributes to anthropological studies of policy, bureaucracy and 
the state. The analysis is based on data collected through interviews, 
document study and observations. Each of the four chapters addresses a 
different aspect of the policy making process, relating to a specific feature of 
the policy effect. 
 
Chapter One analyses how “immigrant integration” has been conceptualized 
and institutionalized in a policy domain. During the decades after the Second 
World War, various migrants came to the Netherlands, in the wake of 
decolonization, for work or for family reasons. Local, uncoordinated and ad 
hoc measures in the 1960s would eventually develop into the Integration 
Policy. Notwithstanding changes in discourse, frames, and focus of policy 
measures, the government interventions have in principal been consistent. 
 First, policies were (re)created primarily in response to, often violent, 
incidents. Policies have first and foremost been an issue of public order, closely 
related to popular anxieties and political debate about the social and national 
order. The Integration Policy has been functioning as a means of canalizing 
social unrest and debate. Second, the target groups of policy measures, despite 
being labelled differently, have more or less stayed the same over the past 
decades. They have always been defined based their perceived ethnic, cultural 
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or religious distance to Dutch society. Third, the policy domain has been 
characterised by a culturalist logic that problematizes the apparent otherness 
of certain groups. Fourth, notwithstanding stated goals of socioeconomic 
improvement, the structural, political and socioeconomic context is not really 
addressed by policy measures. 
 The dominant position of the majority population is the self-evident 
starting point of policy, which so consolidates the political status quo. As a 
result, policy measures do not realize their stated goals. Moreover, the 
directorate that is responsible for the Integration Policy within the state 
administration has always had a weak position. Despite the high political 
relevance, successive governments have not ensured sufficient bureaucratic 
leverage. 
 Ever since their first creation, policies are repeatedly perceived to fail. 
More policy is proposed as a solution, which actually reinforces the same 
assumptions, outlook and results instead of fundamentally debating these 
policies or Dutch society. New policies are bound to fail. A reason to keep the 
Integration Policy in place is that it offers the opportunity to define and 
reassert the national order. In a sense, policies must fail in order to continue 
to do so and be relevant. Paradoxically, the high political importance of 
“integration” issues results in the depoliticization of the question who can 
belong in the Dutch nation state and on what terms. 
 
Chapter Two analyses how policy measures are legal and technical answers to 
political questions. Inburgering was created as the policy instrument to resolve 
defined problems of unemployment and a lack of participation in society. 
Although explicitly aimed at improving socioeconomic conditions and 
institutional inclusion, implicitly inburgering policies aim to control national 
belonging. This in response to growing political debate and anxieties about the 
Dutch nation state being threatened by migration and “allochthons.” 
 This chapter reconstructs the creation of the Newcomer Inburgering Act 
(1998) and Inburgering Act (2002). It elucidates that determining the target 
population started out from ideas about who does not really belong in the 
Netherlands. Because this was illegitimate, more general definitions were 
proposed that met standards of proper state government. This functioned as a 
countervailing power against political decisions, but also endowed 
controversial policy measures with authority. A similar mechanism 
characterizes the “inburgering trajectory” that was created. An intake, 
determining an education program and taking a test, amongst others, made it 
possible to precisely define when someone is “ingeburgerd.” The ambiguous 
concept of “integration” was so rendered measurable and amenable. 
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 As a consequence, inburgering turned what was essentially a political 
question about belonging into a technical problem that is predominantly 
discussed by experts. Policy is cloaked in the neutral language of science, 
giving it an aura of objectivity. The debates in Parliament about inburgering 
legislation focused primarily on technical aspects. It naturalized ideas about 
an unchangeable “receiving society” into which people have to “integrate.” 
 Inburgering has never been considered a success. Solutions were primarily 
sought in technical adjustments and policy measures have been repeatedly 
reformed and made more restrictive. However, results in terms of passing rates 
or employment opportunities have not really improved. This raises the question 
why inburgering is still in place. The political debate becomes focused on the 
design and implementation of the inburgering system, forestalling fundamental 
debate about the necessity of policy measures or about the gradual 
transformation of the Dutch nation state. Inburgering consolidates the political 
status quo by categorizing some people as Others, by reasserting Dutch as the 
only possible language and by defining “Dutch norms and values.” 
 The majority population is reassured it is the norm. The continuous 
possibility of demarcating the Dutch nation state fosters demands for more 
policies, which may explain the recurrent perceptions of failure and related 
reforms. In the process of policy making, this political meaning is cast in 
universal, legally viable and technical terms and is related to socioeconomic 
deprivation. Inburgering offers politicians a way of debating national belonging 
without actually discussing it. 
 
Chapter Three analyses the complex process of writing policy texts, that 
consists of many actors and conflicting interests. Out of this heterogeneity, 
policy texts are created that seem definite, uniform and impersonal. “The 
line” is the organizational structure in which the writing of policy takes place 
and encapsulates and connects various hierarchical positions within a ministry 
policy documents are written and sanctioned. “The” line enables the 
construction of state authority in several ways. 
 First, “the line” constitutes bureaucracy as an impersonal collective and 
the policy it produces as objective. The authorship of policy texts is detached 
from individuals and collectivized, as it is transferred from the actual writers 
to the bureaucratic organization. Second, “the line” socializes officials in a 
specific, uniform and impersonal style of writing policy, through the comments 
made by superiors. Policy texts are formal, flat and detached, but also neutral, 
rational and in line with the political vision at the time. Third, “the line” unites 
conflicting interests and aligns politics and policy. Bureaucracy is made up of 
various positions, each representing different interests, and any possible 
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contention is eventually settled in the line. An unambiguous institutional 
authorship is created out of this polyphony, that is objectified and advises the 
minister in one voice. 
 Fourth, “the line” authorizes and legitimizes. Policy officials do the bulk 
of the work that goes into making policies, but it is only elevated to the status 
of “official policy” after the consent and authorisation of the minister, who, 
being the last “in line,” sanctions policy and becomes the formal and only 
author of the definitive policy texts. Besides guiding the policy making 
processes by bringing a political vision, the minister also instigates and it. It is 
the figure who symbolically enables bureaucratic work; the daily practices of 
civil servants are attuned to serving “the minister,” who symbolically enables 
the bureaucratic policy work. By becoming the official author, the already 
objectified, depersonalized and unified institutional authorship is now turned 
into the voice of the minister, who represents the government’s stance on a 
given issue. 
 “The line,” with the minister on top, symbolizes the tension between 
political decision making and state neutrality. Both policy text and minister 
are recognized as the supreme authority to which all citizens have to abide. 
This is substantiated by uniting democratic legitimacy – the government is 
formed out of and controlled by an elected Parliament – with institutional 
authority – a reassurance it has been created according to standards of proper 
state government. Policy texts are artefacts through which “the state” is 
imagined. State authority is thus produced in the daily practices of civil 
servants and the documents that they create. 
 
Chapter Four analyses how civil servants navigate tensions between political 
decisions and features of proper government. Political choices may contradict 
the perceptions of civil servants of what are desirable policy measures, based 
on personal convictions, professional expertise or notions of state 
responsibility. Policy making is not as self-evident as it may seem. It requires 
civil servants who are able to set aside possible reservations regarding the 
policies they have to shape. This chapter describes how “professionalism” 
functions as a code of conduct that disciplines civil servants, but also reasserts 
their neutral role and provides an institutional belonging. 
 First, civil servants define themselves as neutral professionals in 
opposition to “minority interests” and “multiculturalism.” In response to 
political developments and to images of fellow bureaucrats, civil servants have 
aimed to represent their directorate as a proper, “professional” bureaucratic 
organization. It is a means of legitimizing their work and policy. A boundary 
needs to be maintained between expert policy makers and the subjects of their 
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policies. Second, civil servants also distance themselves from volatile, 
“emotional” political decision making by performing as apolitical experts. They 
see it as their role to come with rational and “objective” advice. At the same 
time they develop argumentation to substantiate political choices, providing 
them with a scientific, rational base. Political decisions are so endowed with 
legitimacy and authority.  
 Third, civil servants strike a balance between their perceptions of the 
“general interest” and political decisions. They often have some “affinity with 
society” and feel a responsibility to work for the “public cause,” which they 
sometimes have to align with a “political reality” that seems to run against it. 
They perform a neutral, in-between position that relates to the authority of 
the state, but at the same time they do not fundamentally question political 
decisions. They rather legitimize and neutralize political decisions, as they 
place policies in perspective of improving society and state interest. Fourth, 
they align notions of proper state government with political volatility. Civil 
servants try to ensure continuity in the Integration Policy and make sure 
decision making remains within the confines set by the Constitution. The flip 
side of this is that they may explore the boundaries of what is legally possible. 
 The tensions in the work of civil servants are expressed in the notion of 
“professionalism.” They take pride in their craftsmanship and enjoy supporting 
“their” minister, making policy happen or “playing the game.” Civil servants 
may have difficulties with political choices, but they have been socialized not 
to question their role. “Professionalism” represents loyalty, craftsmanship and 
objectivity as important features of their work, that interrelate with their 
occupational honour. It embraces the significance of their work, but also 
signifies their position as neutral experts and disciplines them. Classifying 
themselves as part of a community of professionals for whom a special work 
ethos is required makes their work meaningful. It also provides them with a 
justification to continue working in adverse political times; they shift 
responsibility for policies to politicians. As such, “professional” civil servants 
embody the tension between state neutrality and political decision making. 
 
The conclusion claims that the authority of the state is no given but is 
constituted through various bureaucratic mechanisms that each shed light on 
how political power and state neutrality relate. Policy measures seem to be 
based on neutral and objective expertise, while they reassert the existing 
political order by institutionalizing and naturalizing particular models of 
society. Policy renders political, sometimes controversial decisions technical 
because measures are created as having a technical-legal form. The 
bureaucratic organization enables an impersonal and definite institutional 
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authorship that erases individual agency and tensions, and substantiates 
political authority. Individual civil servants have to navigate tensions between 
proper state government and political decisions, by which, as neutral 
“professionals”, they substantiate politics and the authority of the state. 
 By combining various theoretical approaches of policy, this dissertation 
explores various features of the “policy effect” and relates them to each other. 
It analyses the everyday work, organization and self-representations of 
bureaucrats, in relation to broader political arrangements. This makes clear 
that bureaucracy does not simply have a dehumanizing or depoliticizing effect; 
it is a much more nuanced and complex interplay between bureaucratic 
organisation, individuals and politics. “Official” policy does not reflect the 
heated political debate and complex bureaucratic organisation out of which it 
is created. Instead, policy measures seem rational and unequivocal. State 
authority is socially produced out of messy and intricate contexts. Both the 
office and the outside world are necessary for understanding how the state is 
constructed as a neutral entity while at the same time it is inherently political. 
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Binnen de rijksoverheid worden politieke besluiten vertaald in schijnbaar 
rationele, onpersoonlijke en ondubbelzinnige beleidsmaatregelen die de 
autoriteit van de staat representeren. Politieke ideeën krijgen een zekere 
institutionele autoriteit zodra ze tot “officieel” beleid worden verklaard. Het 
doel van deze studie is om dit “beleidseffect” (Shore 2011) te ontleden. Op 
deze manier maakt dit proefschrift inzichtelijk hoe de staat wordt 
geconstrueerd als een apolitieke entiteit, die ogenschijnlijk boven de politiek 
en samenleving staat en zijn legitimiteit ontleent aan zijn neutrale aard, 
terwijl deze tegelijkertijd inherent politiek is. 
 Het beleidsdomein dat zich richt op de “integratie” van migranten, en 
burgers “met een migratieachtergrond,” in Nederland is een interessante casus 
om deze spanning te onderzoeken. Het Integratiebeleid hangt nauw samen met 
een verhit politiek debat over belonging in de Nederlandse natiestaat, maar 
de beleidsmaatregelen die in reactie hierop worden gecreëerd lijken veel 
rationeler, neutraler en legitiemer dan de politieke ideeën en besluitvorming 
die eraan ten grondslag liggen. 
 Dit proefschrift bestudeert de aannames en gevolgen van 
beleidsmaatregelen en daarnaast het werk van rijksambtenaren op dit terrein. 
Op deze manier levert het een bijdrage aan antropologische studies van beleid, 
bureaucratie en de staat. De analyse is gebaseerd op data verkregen uit 
interviews, documentonderzoek en observaties. Elk van de vier hoofdstukken 
behandelt een ander aspect van het beleidsvormingsproces, dat samenhangt 
met een specifieke dimensie van het beleidseffect.   
   
Hoofdstuk 1 analyseert hoe “integratie” is geconceptualiseerd en 
geïnstitutionaliseerd in een beleidsdomein. De decennia na de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog kwamen verschillende migranten naar Nederland, in de nasleep 
van dekolonisatie, voor werk of voor gezin. Lokale, ongecoördineerde ad hoc 
initiatieven in de jaren zestig zouden zich in de daaropvolgende decennia 
ontwikkelen tot het Integratiebeleid. Verschillen in discours, frame en focus 
van beleidsmaatregelen daargelaten, is het overheidsingrijpen op dit terrein 
tot op heden op hoofdpunten consistent. 
 Ten eerste is beleid vooral ge-/hervormd in reactie op, vaak 
gewelddadige, incidenten. Beleid is primair een zaak van openbare orde en 
daaraan gerelateerd van maatschappelijke onvrede en politiek debat over de 
sociale en nationale orde. Het Integratiebeleid is een manier om zorgen en 
debat te kanaliseren. Ten tweede zijn de doelgroepen van beleid, ondanks 
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verschillende labels, de afgelopen decennia min of meer gelijk gebleven. Zij 
zijn altijd gedefinieerd op basis van gepercipieerde etnische, culturele of 
religieuze afstand tot de Nederlandse samenleving. Ten derde wordt het 
beleidsdomein gekenmerkt door een culturalistische logica, die het 
veronderstelde anders-zijn van bepaalde groepen problematiseert. Ten vierde 
zijn de structurele, politieke en sociaal economische context, ondanks het doel 
om de sociaaleconomische positie te verbeteren, nooit serieus meegenomen in 
beleid. 
 De dominante positie van de meerderheid is het vanzelfsprekende 
uitgangspunt van beleid, dat daarmee de politieke status quo consolideert. 
Hierdoor kunnen beleidsmaatregelen de gestelde doelen niet realiseren. 
Daarnaast heeft het organisatieonderdeel dat verantwoordelijk is voor het 
Integratiebeleid altijd een zwakke positie gehad binnen de rijksoverheid. 
Ondanks de politieke relevantie hebben opeenvolgende regeringen nooit echt 
gezorgd voor slagkracht binnen de bureaucratie. 
 Sinds de eerste “integratiemaatregelen” werden ontwikkeld, wordt keer 
op keer gesteld dat beleid faalt. Als oplossing wordt meer beleid gecreëerd, 
dat telkens bestaande maatregelen, uitgangspunten en gevolgen ervan 
versterkt, in plaats van dat er een fundamenteel debat over het beleid of over 
de Nederlandse samenleving wordt gevoerd. Nieuw beleid is gedoemd om weer 
te mislukken. Een reden om het Integratiebeleid toch in stand te houden, is 
dat het de mogelijkheid biedt om de nationale orde te definiëren en 
herbevestigen. In zekere zin moet beleid falen om dit te kunnen blijven doen 
en zo relevant te zijn. De paradox is dat het grote politieke belang dat aan 
“integratie” wordt gehecht, zorgt voor het depolitiseren van de vraag wie er 
in de Nederlandse natiestaat thuishoort en op welke voorwaarde. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 analyseert hoe beleidsmaatregelen juridische en technische 
antwoorden vormen op politieke vragen. Inburgering werd gecreëerd als hét 
beleidsinstrument om gedefinieerde problemen van werkloosheid en 
participatie in de samenleving op te lossen. Hoewel inburgeringsbeleid 
expliciet gericht is op het verbeteren van sociaaleconomische omstandigheden 
en institutionele inclusie, probeert het impliciet belonging in de natie te 
controleren. Dit in reactie op toenemende maatschappelijke zorgen en politiek 
debat vanaf begin jaren negentig over de Nederlandse natiestaat die bedreigd 
zou worden door migratie en “allochtonen.” 
 Dit hoofdstuk reconstrueert hoe de Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers (1998) 
en de Wet Inburgering (2007) tot stand zijn gekomen. Hieruit blijkt dat het 
bepalen van de doelgroep startte vanuit ideeën over wie er wel en niet 
thuishoort in Nederland. Omdat dit niet legitiem was, werden er algemenere 
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definities voorgesteld die voldeden aan standaarden van deugdelijk 
overheidsbestuur. De rechtsstaat functioneerde zo als tegenwicht tegen 
politieke besluiten, maar gaf uiteindelijk ook autoriteit aan controversiële 
beleidsmaatregelen. Een vergelijkbaar mechanisme karakteriseert het 
“inburgeringstraject” dat werd ontwikkeld. Onder andere een intake, het 
bepalen van een lesprogramma en een afnemen van een test maakten het 
mogelijk om precies te definiëren wanneer iemand “ingeburgerd” is. Het vage 
concept “integratie” werd zo meetbaar en bewerkbaar gemaakt. 
 Op deze manier veranderde inburgering wat in essentie een politieke 
vraag over belonging is, in een technisch probleem dat voornamelijk door 
experts wordt bediscussieerd. Beleid wordt verpakt in de neutrale taal van 
wetenschap, waardoor het een aura van apolitieke objectiviteit krijgt. 
Debatten in het parlement over inburgeringswetgeving draaiden hoofdzakelijk 
om technische aspecten. Verbeeldingen van een onveranderlijke “ontvangende 
samenleving” waarin buitenstaanders moeten “integreren,” werden zo 
genaturaliseerd. 
 Inburgering is nooit als een succes beschouwd. Oplossingen werden vooral 
gezocht in technische aanpassingen en beleid is meerdere malen hervormd en 
restrictiever gemaakt. Resultaten van het inburgeringsbeleid in de zin van 
hogere slaginspercentages of arbeidsparticipatie, zijn echter niet wezenlijk 
verbeterd. Dit roept de vraag op waarom inburgering nog steeds bestaat. Het 
politieke debat wordt gericht op het ontwerp en implementatie van het 
inburgeringsysteem, er is geen fundamenteel debat over de noodzaak van 
beleid of over de veranderende Nederlandse natiestaat. Inburgering 
consolideert de politieke status quo door sommige mensen als anders te 
categoriseren, het Nederlands als de enige mogelijke taal te bevestigen en 
“Nederlandse normen en waarden” te definiëren. 
 De continue mogelijkheid om de Nederlandse natiestaat af te bakenen 
voedt de vraag om meer beleid. Gedurende het proces van beleidsvorming 
wordt deze politieke betekenis in universele, juridisch haalbare en technisch-
wetenschappelijke termen gegoten en gerelateerd aan sociaaleconomische 
achterstand. Inburgering biedt politici een manier om over belonging in de 
natiestaat te discussiëren zonder het daadwerkelijke te bespreken.   
 
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert het complexe proces, dat bestaat uit veel actoren en 
conflicterende belangen, waarin beleidsteksten tot stand komen. Uit deze 
heterogeniteit worden beleidsteksten gevormd die schijnbaar definitief, 
uniform en onpersoonlijk zijn. “De lijn” is de organisatiestructuur waarin 
beleidsteksten worden geschreven en omvat en verbindt verschillende 
hiërarchische posities in een ministerie van waaruit teksten worden geschreven 
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en gesanctioneerd. “De lijn” maakt de constructie van de autoriteit van de 
staat op verschillende manieren mogelijk. 
 Ten eerste constitueert “de lijn” de bureaucratie als een onpersoonlijk 
collectief en het beleid dat het produceert als objectief. Het auteurschap van 
beleidsteksten wordt overgebracht van de daadwerkelijke schrijvers naar de 
bureaucratische organisatie en zo losgekoppeld van individuen en 
gecollectiviseerd. Ten tweede socialiseert “de lijn” ambtenaren in een 
specifieke, uniforme en onpersoonlijke manier van schrijven, door middel van 
opmerkingen die leidinggevenden maken. Beleidsteksten zijn formeel, vlak en 
afstandelijk, maar ook neutraal, rationeel en in lijn met de politieke visie van 
een bepaald moment. Ten derde verenigt “de lijn” tegengestelde belangen en 
brengt het politiek en beleid op één lijn. Bureaucratie bestaat uit verschillende 
posities die elk een ander belang vertegenwoordigen en mogelijke onenigheid 
wordt beslecht in “de lijn.” Uit deze polyfonie ontstaat een definitief 
institutioneel auteurschap, dat objectief wordt gemaakt en in één stem de 
minister adviseert. 
 Ten vierde autoriseert en legitimeert “de lijn.” Ambtenaren doen het gros 
van het werk dat nodig is om beleid te maken, maar dit krijgt pas de status 
van “officieel beleid” na instemmingen en autorisatie van de minister die, als 
laatste “in lijn,” beleidsteksten sanctioneert en de formele en enige auteur 
van de definitieve versie wordt. Niet alleen geeft een politieke visie richting 
aan dit proces, de minister instigeert en motiveert het ook. Het is de figuur 
die symbolisch het bureaucratisch beleidswerk mogelijk maakt. Door de 
officiële auteur te worden, transformeert daarnaast het al geobjectiveerde, 
gedepersonaliseerde en verenigde institutioneel auteurschap nu in de stem van 
de minister, die het regeringsstandpunt ten aanzien van een bepaald 
onderwerp vertegenwoordigt. 
 “De lijn,” met bovenin de minister, symboliseert de spanning tussen 
politieke besluitvorming en de neutraliteit van de staat. Zowel beleidstekst als 
minister worden erkend als de autoriteit waaraan alle burgers gebonden zijn. 
Dit is gestoeld op het bijeenbrengen van democratische legitimiteit – de 
regering wordt gevormd en gecontroleerd door een gekozen parlement – en 
institutionele autoriteit – een verzekering dat het gewogen tot stand is 
gekomen volgens standaarden van correct staatsbestuur. Beleidsmaatregelen 
zijn artefacten waarmee “de staat” wordt verbeeld. De autoriteit van de staat 
wordt dus geproduceerd in de dagelijkse werkzaamheden van ambtenaren en 
in de documenten die zij maken. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert hoe ambtenaren omgaan met spanningen tussen 
politieke besluiten en verschillende aspecten van behoorlijk staatsbestuur. 
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Politieke keuzes kunnen ingaan tegen ideeën die ambtenaren hebben over wat 
wenselijke beleidsmaatregelen zijn, gebaseerd op persoonlijke overtuigingen, 
professionele expertise of noties van (rechts)statelijke verantwoordelijkheid. 
Beleidsvorming is niet zo vanzelfsprekend als het lijkt. Er zijn ambtenaren voor 
nodig die mogelijke bedenkingen aan de kant kunnen zetten. Dit hoofdstuk 
beschrijft hoe “professionaliteit” functioneert als een gedragscode die 
ambtenaren disciplineert, maar die ook hun neutrale rol bevestigt en hen een 
institutioneel belonging brengt. 
 Ten eerste definiëren ambtenaren zichzelf als neutrale professionals ten 
opzichte van “minderhedenbelangen” en “multiculturalisme.” In reactie op 
politieke ontwikkelingen en beeldvorming van collega’s binnen de 
rijksoverheid, hebben ambtenaren geprobeerd om hun directie te 
representeren als een correcte, “professionele” bureaucratische organisatie. 
Dit is een manier om hun werk en beleid te legitimeren. Er moet een grens 
worden bewaakt tussen professionele beleidsmakers en de subjecten van hun 
beleid. Ten tweede zetten ambtenaren zich ook af tegen veranderlijke, 
“emotionele” politieke besluitvorming door zich als apolitieke experts op te 
stellen. Ze zien het als hun rol om rationeel en “objectief” advies te geven. 
Tegelijkertijd ontwikkelen ze argumentatie om politieke keuzes te staven en 
geven ze deze een wetenschappelijke, rationele grond. Politieke besluiten 
krijgen zo legitimiteit en autoriteit. 
 Ten derde balanceren ambtenaren tussen hun eigen opvatting over het 
“algemeen belang” en politieke besluitvorming. Ambtenaren hebben vaak 
enige “maatschappelijke affiniteit” en voelen zich verantwoordelijk voor de 
“publieke zaak,” die ze soms moeten verenigen met een politieke realiteit die 
hier tegenin lijkt te gaan. Ze nemen een neutrale tussenpositie in, die 
samenhangt met de autoriteit van de staat, maar stellen geen fundamentele 
vragen bij politieke keuzes. Ze legitimeren en neutraliseren deze door beleid 
in het perspectief te plaatsen van het verbeteren van de samenleving en belang 
van de staat. Ten vierde proberen zij noties van goed staatsbestuur op één lijn 
te brengen met politieke veranderlijkheid. Ambtenaren proberen te zorgen 
voor continuïteit in het Integratiebeleid en zorgen ervoor dat besluitvorming 
binnen de grenzen van de Grondwet blijft. De andere kant hiervan is dat ze de 
grenzen op kunnen zoeken van wat juridisch mogelijk is 
 De spanningen in het werk van ambtenaren komen tot uitdrukking in de 
notie “professionaliteit.” Ze zijn veelal trots op hun vakmanschap en halen 
voldoening uit het ondersteunen van “hun” minister, het mogelijk maken van 
beleid ofwel “het spelen van het spel.” Ambtenaren kunnen moeite hebben 
met politieke keuzes, maar er wordt van ze verwacht dat ze hun rol niet in 
twijfel trekken. “Professionaliteit” representeert loyaliteit, vakmanschap en 
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objectiviteit als belangrijke aspecten in hun werk, die samenhangen met hun 
beroepseer. Het omvat het belang van hun werk, verduidelijkt hun positie als 
neutrale experts en disciplineert ze. Door zichzelf als aparte gemeenschap te 
classificeren waarvoor een specifiek arbeidsethos nodig is, maken ambtenaren 
hun werk betekenisvol. Dit brengt ze ook legitimering om hun werk te blijven 
doen in politiek lastige tijden; ze leggen de verantwoordelijkheid voor beleid 
bij politici. Zo belichamen “professionele” ambtenaren de spanning tussen de 
neutraliteit van de staat en politieke besluitvorming. 
 
De conclusie stelt dat de autoriteit van de staat geen gegeven is maar wordt 
geconstitueerd in verschillende bureaucratische mechanismen, die elk licht 
werpen op hoe politieke macht en neutraliteit van de staat samenhangen. 
Beleidsmaatregelen lijken gebaseerd op neutrale en objectieve expertise, 
terwijl ze de bestaande politieke orde consolideren door specifieke 
verbeeldingen van de samenleving te institutionaliseren en naturaliseren. 
Beleid vertaalt, soms controversiële, politieke besluiten in technische 
vraagstukken omdat maatregelen worden gecreëerd in een rationeel-juridische 
vorm. De bureaucratische organisatie van een ministerie brengt een definitief 
institutioneel auteurschap voort dat individualiteit en spanningen uitvlakt en 
politieke autoriteit bestendigt. Individuele ambtenaren moeten omgaan met 
spanningen tussen correct staatsbestuur en politieke besluiten, waarbij ze als 
neutrale “professionals” de politiek substantiëren en uiting geven aan de 
autoriteit van de staat. 
 Door meerdere theoretische inzichten over beleid te combineren, brengt 
dit proefschrift de verschillende dimensies van het “beleidseffect” in kaart en 
verbindt deze met elkaar. Het analyseert de dagelijkse werkzaamheden, 
organisatie en zelfrepresentatie van ambtenaren, in relatie tot bredere 
maatschappelijke en politieke verhoudingen. Hieruit blijkt dat bureaucratie 
niet simpelweg een dehumaniserend of depolitiserend effect heeft; het is een 
veel complexer en genuanceerder samenspel tussen ambtelijke organisatie, 
individuen en het politieke domein. “Officieel” beleid weerspiegelt niet het 
verhitte politieke debat en de complexe bureaucratische organisatie waaruit 
het voortkomt. In plaats daarvan lijken maatregelen rationeel en 
ondubbelzinnig. De autoriteit van de staat wordt sociaal geproduceerd in 
moeilijke en ondoorzichtige omstandigheden. Zowel het bureau als de 
buitenwereld zijn nodig om te begrijpen hoe de staat wordt geconstrueerd als 
een neutrale entiteit die tegelijkertijd fundamenteel politiek is. 
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